ACF1ARYA JAGDISHWARANAND AVADHUTA; ETC. v. ··COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, CALCUTTA & ANR.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATH MISRA, J. The petitioner in Writ' Petition No.

F 6890/82, a monk of the ~nanda Marga, and currently General Secretary, Public Relations Department of the Ananda Marga Pracharak Sangh, has filed this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for a direction to the Commissioner of Pohce, Calcutta -- and the State of West Bengal to allow processions to be carried in the public streets and meetings to be 1ield in public places by the foll!'wers of the Ananda Marga cult accompanied by the performance of Tandava dance within the State of West Bengal. There are two G connected writ petitions being Writ Petition Nos. 7204/82 & 3491/83 by the Diocese Secretary of West Bengal Region and another follower of Ananda Marga. All these Petitions raise this common' question and have been heard' at a time. For convenience the petition by the .H General Secretary, Public Relations Department of the Ananda Marga Pracharak Sangh . . has been treated as the main petition and ·references in the j udgm~nt have been confined to it.

A.J. AVADHUTA v. COMMR. OF POLJCB'(Ranganath Misra, J.). 451

In the original petition cer ain factual assertions have been made and after counter ~ffidavits were. filed several further affidavits A have been placed before the Court on behalf of the petitioner and rounter affidavits too have been filed. Shorn of unnecessary details, i the averments oi:i behalf of the respective contenders are as follows : • Sbri Pravat Ranjan Sarkar otherwise known as Shri Ananda Q Murti, founded a socio-spiritual organisation claimed to have been dedicated to the service of humanity in differ!lllt spheres of life such as physical, mental and spiritual, irrespective of caste, creed or colour, in the year 195). In the initial period the Headquarters of this organisation was lotated ·near Ranchi in the State of Bihar but C later it has b,een shifted to a 1place within \he City of Calcutta in West Bengal. It bas been pleaded tbat.Ananda Marga contains no dogmatic beliefs and teaches the yogic and spiritual science to every aspirant. In order to ·realise the Supreme, Anand.a Marga does not believe that it is necessary to abandon home, profession or occupation and spiritual sadhana is possible at any place and con- D currently with fulfilling all duties and responsibilities of family life. It has been pleaded that Ananda Marga shows the way and explains the methods for. spiritual advancement and this helps man to practice his dharma. According to the petitioner Lord Shiva had performed Tandava Dance in 108 forms but Shaivite literature has given details Ill of 64 kinds only. · Seven forms out of these 64 appear to have been commonly accepted and they are called Kalika, Gouri, Sandhya, Sambhara, Tripura, Urdhava and Ananda: The first of these forms elaborates the main aspects of sbiva while the seventh, i.e. the Ananda Tanda1•a portrays all the manifold responsibilities of the Lord. Ananda Tandava is clai'!led .to ha','.e taken place at Til!ai, the ancient name of IF Cbidambaram now situated in the State of Tamil Nadu. It is the petitioner's stand' that the word Tandava is deri>1ed from the root Tandu which means to jump about and Shiva was the originator of Tandava abont·6500 years ago. Ananda Murtiji, as the petitioner maintaius, is the Supreme Father of the Ananda Margis. It is custo- G mary for every Ananda Margi after being duly initiated to describe Ananda Murtiji as his father. One of the prescriptions of religious rites to be daily performed by an Ananda Margi is Tandava Dance and this is claimed to have been so introduced from the year 1966 by the preceptor. This dance is to be performed with a skull,. a small, U symbolic knife and a Trishul. It is also customary to hold a lathi and a damroo. It is explained that the knife or the sword symbolises the force which cuts through the fetters of the. mundane world and ·

452 SUPREME COURT REPORts (1984) I s.~.R.

allows· humarr beings to transcend towards perfection; the trishul or A. the trident symbolises· the fight against static forces in the three ·different spheres of human existence - spiritual, 'mental and physical; the lathi which is said to be a straight stick stands out as the symbol of straightforwardness or simplicity; the damroo is the symbol to · bring out rhytmic harmoµy between eternal universal music and the . entitative sound; and the skull is the symbol of death reminding every B man that life is short and, therefore, every ·moment of !i'j'e should be utilised in the service of mankind . and salvation should be sought. The petitioner has further maintained that Ananda Margis greet their spiritual preceptor Shri Ananda. Murti with a dance of Tandava· wherein' one or two followers use the skull· ahd the symbolic knife. c and dance for two or three minutes. At intervals proc:essions are intended to be iaken out in public places accompanied by the ,Tandava dance as a religious practice: . ·

Though in subsequent affidavits and in the course of argument an attempt was made by Mr. Tarktinde. to assert that Ananda Marga D is a new religious order, we do' not think there is any justification to accept such a co~tention when it runs counter to the pleadings in' paragraphs 4 and 17 of the writ petition. In· paragraph 4 it was ·specifically pleaded that:'Ananda Marga is· more a denomination than an institntionalised religion", and in paragraph 17 it was pleaded ' that "Ananda Margis are Shaivites ... " We shall, therefore, proceed to deal with this petition on the footing that, as pleaded by the petitioner, Ananda Marga .is a religious denominati"n of the Shaivite order which is a well known segment of Hindu .religion.

• Though the petitioner had pleaded that Tandava dance has been F practiced and performed by every Ananda Margi for more than three decades, it has been conceded in the course of the hearing that· Tandava Dance . was introduced for the first t'ime as a religious rite ,for Ananda Margis in or around 1966. Therefore, by the time of institution of this wdt petition the practice was at best prevalent for about 16 years. G The Commissioner of Police, respondent 1 befor~ us is alleged to have made repetitive orders under section J44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; 1973 ('Code' for short) from August 1979, directing that "no member of a procession or asse!Jlbly .0£ ·five or H more persons should carry any fire arms, explosives, swords, spears, knives, tridents, lathis or any article which may be used as weapon of offence or ..any. article. likely . to . cause -~ . annoyance to the .

A.I. AVADl!U'rA ~. COMMll.. OF POLICE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 453

public·, for example skulls ...... " A petition was filed before the Calcutta High Court under Artii'le 226 of the ·Constitution .A, by the General Secretary of Ananda Marga for a writ of mandamus against the respondents for· a direction nc;it to interefere with or place. ~ testraints on the freedom of conscience and fr~e profession, practice and propogation of their religion, including Taodava Dance, iq matter No. 903 of 1980. The Calcutta High Court rejected the said petition B on September 23, 1980. and observed : ' ·

"It is open to any one in this country to practice any religion bµt the religious practice must npt be inconsistent with the susceptibility or sensibility or fairness or public · order: Tandava dance as such may not be objectionable. In-the streets of Calcutta all kinds of demonstrations and procession are being held every day which may on ·many . occasions cause disturbance to others . and interrupt the free flow of traffic. In spite of the same, such demons• !rations and grocessions ar,e allowed to take place parti· cularly every - day by the authority concerned. If the petitioners or any member of their.group want to hold a procession or reception or demonstration accompanied by any dance or music, that by itself may not be objectionable. However, brandishing fire torches or skulls or daggers in the public places including · streets cannot come under the. same category. Here other things are involved. The interests of other members of the public are involved, the sense of security of the others is ·also involved. The authorities concerned have to keep in mind the ~question · of the feelings of other members of the public and the question of the'!Jossibility of any attempt to retaliate or counter-act to the same are also to be considered. Taking into considera_tion all these factors I .~m of the op/nion . that the petitioners de not have any legal right arid they have not established any legal right to carry 'fire torches, skulls and dagger• in public places or public streets and G, do not intend to pass any order entitling the petitioners to do so. However, the petitioners shall be entit)ed to go in Procession or bold any.demonstration' without any such fire tourches, daggers Cir skulls. However,· this H would .be subject to prevailing law of ·the land. in the particular area. For example, in. the High Court, Dalhousie Square and Assembly order under section 144

454 "suPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) I s.c.a.

of the Criminal Procedure Code is. promulgated from time to time. This order would not entitle the petitioners to hold any such procession, demonstration in violation of such. promulgation, if any. This order would also not entitle the petitioners to hold any proc.ession or demonstration without the permission of the authority . B concerned when such permission is required for such purposes under any existing Jaw." ,

On March 29, 1982, respondent I made a fresh order under s.144 of the Code wherein the same restraints as mentioned· in the earlier order were imposed. An application for permission to take out a C processfon on the public street accompanied with Tandava dance was rejected and that led to the filing Of this P,etition. · . . ? The petitioner.as.serts that tandava dance is. an essential part · of the religioJ}S rites of-the Ananda Margis and that they are entitled to practise the same both in private as · also in public places and interference by the respondents is opposed to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 ofthe Constitution. The order under s.144. of the Code has been assailed mainly on the ground that it does not state the material facts of the case though the statute requires such statement as a condition precedent to the making of the order. Repeiitive orders under s.144 of the Code, it. has been contended, are not contemplated by the Code and, therefore, making of such orders is an abuse of the Jaw and should not be countenanced. ·

Two separate returns h.ave been made to the rule nisi. Respon-· dent 1 has filed a counter affidavit alleging that Ananda Marga is an organisation which believes' in violence and if Ananda Margis are permitted to carry open swords or daggers in public processions it is bound, or" likely, to disturb public peace and tranquillity and is fraught with the likelihood of breach of . public order and would a,ffect public morality. Carrying of human· skulls and indulging in provocatjve dances with .human skulls is not only repulsive to public taste and morality, but is bound, and is likely, to raise fears in the minds of the people particularly children thereby affecting public order, morality, peace and tranquility. It has been further pleaded that the petitioner, or for the niatter of that, Ananda Margis can have no fundamental right to carry weapons in the public; in procession or otherwise, nor have they any right to perform tandava dance with daggers and human. skulls. It is stated· that -Ananda

A.1· AVADHUTA '· COMMR. OF POLICE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 455

Marga· is a politico-religious organisation started · in 1961 by Shri Pravat Ranjan Sarkar alias· Sri Ananda Murti, who is a self-styled tantrik yogi. · Reference has been made to an incident of 1971 which led to prosecution of Sri Ananda Murti and some of his <t followers. It Ois stated that militancy continues to be the main feature of the organisation. Prior to. promulgation of the prohibi· tory orders, it has been pleaded, Ananda Margis took out processions B ·carrying leihal weapons like tridents, lathis as well as human skulls and knives from time to time and caused much annoyance to the public in gener~I and onlookers· in partic~lar, and this tended to • disturb public peace, tranquillity and. public order. In spite of the prohibitory orders in force from August 10, 1979; a procession was taken out on the following day 'within the city of Calcutta by c Ananda Margis with lathis, tridents, knives, skulls, and the proces- sion became violent. The assembly was declared unlawful and the police force was obliged to 'intervene. The police personnel on duty including.· a Deputy Commissioner of Police rec.eived injuries. Reference to several other incidents has also been made in the D · counter-affidavit of the Police Commissioner. The State Government has supported the stand of the Police Commissioner in its separate affidavit.

We have already indicated that the claim that Ananda Marga is a separate religion is not acceptable in view of the clear assertion .E that is was not an institutionalised religion but was a religious . ·denomination. The principle indicated by · Gajendragadkar, CJ, while speaking for the Court in Sastri Yagnapurushadji & Ors• .v. Muldas Bhudardos Vaishya & Anr.,(1, also supports the conclu.sion that . Ananda Marga cannot be a separate religion by itself. In . that case the question for consideration was whether the followers of Swaml- F narayan belonged to a religion different from that of Hinduism. 'I'he · 1earned Chief Justice observed : 1

,.I "Even a cursory study ·of the 11rowth and development .of Hindu religion through the ages shows that whenever G a saint or a religious reformer attempted the task of reforming Hindu r~ligion and fighting irrational or corrupt practices which had crept into it, . a sect was born which was governed by its own tenets, but which basi• cally subscribed to the fundamental notions of Hindu H ~eligion and Hindu philosophy. '

(1) [1966) 3 S.C.R. 242

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) 1 s.c.R

The averments in the writ petition would seem to indicate a situation A ' Of this type. We have also taken into consideration the writings of Shri Ananda Murti in books like Carya-Carya, Namah Shivaya .. Shantaya, A Guide to Human Conduct; and Ananda Vachanamritam. These writings by Shri Ananda Murti are essentially founded upon • the essence of Hindu philosophy. The iest indicated by the .!earned ~· 8 Chief Justice in the case referred to above and the admission in . #. paragraph i 7. of the writ petition that Ananda Margis belqng to the Shaivite order lead. to the ·<:!ear conclusion that, Ananda Margis belong to the Hindu religion. Mr. Tarkunde for the petitioner had claimed protection· of Article.25 of the Constitution but in view ·of our finding that Ananda Marga is noi a separate religion, application 0 of Article 25 is not attracted.

The next aspect for consideration iS whether · Ananda Marga ·.can be acceptea"to be a religious denomination. In The Commissionir Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra · Thirtha ' . D . Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,(') Mukherjee, J. (as the learned Judge then was), spoke for the Court thus :

"As regards article 26,. the first question .is, what is. •the precise meaJ!ing ?r connotation of 'the expression • 'religious denomination' and whether a Math could come ,, E. ··within this expression. The word 'denomination' ha~ .been defined in. the Oxford Dictionary to mean 'a· collection or'individuals classed together under the same name : a religious sect or -body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name'." F ·.This .iest has been rono'wed in The Durgoh Commitiee, Ajmer .& Anr. .• v, Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.( 2 ) In the majority judgment, in S. P. Mittal etc. v. Union of India & Ors.( 8) reference to this aspect has also been made and it has been stated : ' G "The words 'religious denomination' in Article 26 of the Constitution ·must take their colour from .the word ;religion' and if this be so, the expression 'religious denomination' must also satisfy· three conditions : ·

H (1) [1954) S.C.R. 1005 at 1021 (2) [1962] l S.C.R. 383 (3) [1983] l S.C.R. 729 at 774

• • A.I. AVADHUTA v. COMMR. OF POLICE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 457 • (I) It must be a collection of individuals. who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-hein11, that is, a common faith; ·

(2) · common organisation; and

(3)' des~gnation b~ a distinctive name." ' B Ananda Marga ap·pears to satisfy all the three conditions, viz., l ' .. it is a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs which they regar1 as conducive to their. spiiitua'J 'well·being; they have a common organisation and the collection of these individuals has a distinctive name. Ananda Marga, therefore, can be appropriately c treated as a religioiis denomination, within the · Hindu religion. Article 26 of the Constitution provides that subject to public order, morality and health, ever.Y religious. detl~mination· or any section thereof shall have the right to manage its own affairs in 1Datters of religion. MukJierjea, J. hi Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar' s case D (supra) iidverted to the question as. to what were the matters of religion and stated :

"What then are matters· of religion! The word 're!igien' has not beeu defined in the Constitution and .it is a term which is hardly susceptible of any rigid definition. In .an American case (Davie v. Benson, 133 US 333 at 342), it has been said "that the term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his· relation to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and

... Character and ·of obedience to His will. It is often · c0nfounded with cultus of form or worship o(a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter".. We do not · think that the above definition can be regarded as either F

precise or adequate. Articles 25 aud 26 of our Consti• tution are based for the most part ·upon article 44(2) · of the Constitution of Eire and we have great doubt .whether G a definition of 'religion' as given above could have been in the minds of our Constitution-makers when they framed the Constitution. Religion is certainly a matter of faith · with indivi!1uals or communities and it is not necessarily. theistic. There are well known religions in India like. B ·:Buddhism and Jainism which do not .believe in God or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1198411 s.c.R. . . . has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are re~rded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to . say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules .. · · for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and ol;>servances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to . matters of food and dr~·ss ... "·

-''Restrictions by the ·State upon free exercise of c religion are permitted both under Artic1es '25 .and 26 on grounds of public or.der, morality and health. Clause· (2) (a) of article 25 reserved the right of the State to regulate r restrict any economic, financial, poltical. and other sec - activities which may be ~associated with religious prac. ce and there is a further right. given ·to the State by sub·clause (b) under which the State can legislate for social welfare arid reform even though by so doing it might interefere with religious practices .. " ·

"The contention formulated in such broad terms cannot, we think, be supported.· In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines ·or that (

religion itself. It the tenets of any religious sect of tlie Hindns prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, . that periodical ceremonies.sh,ould be performed in a certain way at cer- tain periods of the year or that there should. be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, .all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of.priests and servants or the use .of marketable commodi- tie~ would not make them secular activities partaking of . a commercial or . economic character; all of them are religious practices and should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of artide 26(b) ... "

Courts have the power to determine whether a particular rite or observance is .regarded as essential by the tenets of a particular

A.1. AVADHUTA v. COMMR. OF POLICE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 459

~·--Ii religion. In Laxshmindra Thirtha Swamiar's case, Mukherjea, .J. observed:

"This. difference in judicial opm1on brings out forcibly the difficult task which a Court ·has to perform in cases of this type where the freedoln of religious convic•

-· tions genuinely entertained by men come into conflict with the proper politicial attitude which is expected from citizens in matters of unity and solidarity of the State organization." B

The same question arose in the case of Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay ~ Ors.(') The Court did go· into the question whether certain matters appertained to religion and con- • cluded by saying that "these are certainly not matters of religion and the objection raised with regard to the validity of these provi- ' sions seems to be altogether baseless." In Ti/kayat Shri Govint/lalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan & cirs.,( 2 ) this Court went into the question as to whether tl:Je tenets of the Vallabh denomination and its o· religious practices require that the worship by the devotees should be

- performed at the private temples and, therefore, the existence of public temples was inconsisteut with the said tenets and practices, and on an examination of this question, negatived the plea.

The question for consideration now; therefore, is whether performance of Tandava dance is a religious rite or practice essential to the tenets of the religious faith of the Ananda Margis. We have already indicated that tandava dance wasnot accepted as an essential religious rite of Ananda Margis when in 1955 the Ananda Marga order was first established, It is tho specific case of the petitioner p t!tat Shri Ananda Murti introduced tandava as a ·part of religious rites of Ananda Margis later in 1966. Ananda Marga as a religious order is of recent origin and tandava dance as a part of religious rites of that order is still more recent. It is doubtful as to whether in such circumstances tandav~dance can be' taken as an essential religious rite of the Ananda Margis.• Even concedmg that it is so, it is difficult to accept Mr. Tarkunde's argument that taking out religious processions with tandava dance is an essential religious rite of Ananda Margis. In paragraph 17 of the wri! petition the petitioner ·pleaded that "Tandava Dance lasts for a few minutes where two or H (I) [1954] S.. C.R. 1055. (2). [1964j 1 $.CR.. 561,

460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19841 l S.C.R

three persons dance· by lifting one leg to the level of the chest, bring· ing it down and lifting the other." In paragraph 18 it has been pleaded that "when the An~nda Margis greeUheir spiritua(preceptor at the airport, etc., they arrange for a brief welcome dance .of tandava . wherein one or two persons use the skull and symbolic knife and . ~ dance for two or three minutes," In paragraph 26 it has been plea· · R' ded that "Tandava is a custom among the sect members and it is a customary performance and its origin is over ·four thousand years old, hence it is not a new invel)tion of Ananda Margis." On the basis of the literature of.the Ananda Marga denomination it has been. contended that there is prescription of the performance of tandava dance by every follower of Ananda Marga. llven conceding that c tandava dance' has been prescribed as a religious rite for every fol· 'lower of the Ananda Marg it does not follow as a ·necessary corollary that tandava dance to be performed in the public is a .matter of _religious rite. In fact, there is no justification i,n any of the writin11s of Shri Ananda Murti that tandava dance must be p!rformed in publi~. Atleast none could be shown to us by Mr. Tarkunde .despite an enquiry by us in that behalf. We are; therefore, not in a position to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that performance of tandava dance in a procession or at public places is .an essential religious rite to be performed by every Ananda· Margi.

E 'once we reach this conclusion', the' claim that the petitioner has a fundamental right within the meaning of Articles 25 or 26 to perform tandava dance in public streets·and public places has to be rejected. In view of this finding it is no more _necessary' ·to consider whether the prohibitory order was justified in the interest of public order as provided in Article 25. ll . It is the petitioner's definite case 'that the prohibitory orders • . under-s. 144 of the Code are being repeated at regularintervals from August 1979. Copies of several prohibitory orders made from time to time have been produced before us atid it is not the case of the· .G respondents that such repetitive prohil/itory orders .have not been made. The order under s. 144 of the Code made in March 1982 has also been challenged on the ground that the ma~erial facts of the · case have not been stated. Section 144 of tbe Code, as far as relevant, • provides: "(!) In cases where in the opinion of a District Magistrate,. H a Sub· Divisional Magistrate, or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this •ection and immediate preventfon or spee<\y remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a. j • ' '

A.J. AVADHUTA v. COMMR. OF POLICE (Rangana!h Misra, J.) 461

written order stating the material facts of the case and served in the manlier provided by section 134, direct .. .'~ It has .been the contention A ·of Mr. Tarkunde that the right to make the order is· conditioned upon it being a written one and the m·aterial facts of the case being .~· stated. Some High Courts have taken the view that this is a positive· requiremeni and the validity of the order depends upon compliance of this provision. In our opinion it is not necessary to go into this question as counsel for the respondents conceded that this is B one of the requirements of the provision and if the power has to be exercised it should be exercised in the manner provided on pain of invalidating for non·conipliance. There is currently in force a prohibitory order in the same terms and hence the question cannot be said to be' academic. The other .aspect, viz., th~· propriety of 0 0

repetitive prohibitory orders' is, however, to our mind a serious matter and since long arguments have been adavanced, we propose to deal with it. In this case as fact from October 1979 till 1982 •at the interval of almost two months orders under s. 144 (I) of the Code have J>een made from time to time. It is not disputed before us that D . the power conferred under th!s _section is intended for immediate preventi.on of breach of peaco. or speedy remedy.· . An order made under this section is to reilfain valid for two mpnths from the date of f' its making·as provided in sub•sectkln (4) of s. 144. The proviso to . sub-s. (4) authorises the State Government . ' in case it considers it necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, health or safety, or for preventing a riot or any affray, to direct by notification that ari order made by a Magistrate may.remain in.force for a further period not exceeding six months from the' date on which the order made by the Magistrate would have, but for such order, expired. The effect of the proviso, therefore, is that· the ·State Government would be entitled to give the prohibitory order an additional term of life but th"at would be Ii mited to six months l:ieyound the two months'. period in terms of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 144 of the Code. Several decisions of different High Courts have rightly ta~en the view that it is not legitimate to go on making successive orders after earlier ·orders have lapsed by·effiux of time. A Full Bench consisting of the entire Court G of 12 Judges in Gopi Mohun ,Mullick v. Taramoni Chowdhrani( 1) examining .the provisions of s. · 518· of the Code of 18(!1 (corresponding to present s. 144) took the view that such an action was beyond the Magistrate's powers. Making of successive orders was disapproved by the Divisi.on Bench of the Calcutta High Court 0

(I) ILR 5 Cal.. 7,

462 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] l S.C.R.

in .Bisheisur Chuckerbutty & Anr .. v. Emperor.(') Similar view was 0

taken in Swaminatha Muda/iar v. Gopa/akrishna Naidu;('! Taturam Sahu v. The State of Orissa;(') Ram Das Gaur v. The City Magistrate, •Varanasi;(') and Ram Narain Sah & Anr. v. Parmeshwar · Prasad Sah & Ors.('!. We have no doubt that the ratio of these ·f. decisions represents a correct statement of the legal position. The ~ B proviso to sub-s. (4) of s. 144 which gives the State Government jurisdiction to extend the prohibitory order for a maximum period of six months beyond the life of the order made by the Magistrate is clearly· indicative of the position that Parliament never intended the life of an order under s. 144 of the Code to remafn. in force ·beyond two months when made by a Magistrate. The scheme of c that section does not contemplate repetitive orders and in case the s_ituation so warrants steps have. io be taken ' under other provisions of the law such as s. 107 or s. · 145 of the Code when individual • ' and to meet a situation such as here, there are disputes are raised provisions to be found in ·the -Police Act. If repetitive orders are 'made it would clearly amount to abuse of the power conferred by D s. !44 of the Code. It is relevant to advert to the decision of this Court in Babula/ Parate v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,(') where ·the vires of s. 144 of the Code was challenged. .Upholding the provision, this Court observed :

E "'Public order _has to be maintained in ~dvance in. . " order to ensur~ it and, therefore, it is competent to a , legislature. to pass a. law permitting an appropriate

F authority to take anticipatory action or place anticipatory restrictions upon particular kinds of acts in an emergency for the purpose of maintaining publis order ...... " - It was again emphasized :

"But it is difficult to say that an anticipatory action . takeit by such an iuthprity in an emergency where danger to public order is genuinely apprehended is anything other G . than ;n action done in the .discharge of the duty to lnaintain Order ...... "_ (

(I) AIR I916 Cal. 47. ( AIR 1916 Mad. 1106. H (3) AIR 1953 Orissa 96.. (4) AIR 1960 AU.-397. (5) AIR 1942 Pat. 414. ,<6) (1961] 3 S.C.R. 423 ~t 4n .

A,). AVADHUTA v. COMMR. OF POLICE (R.anganath Misra, J.) 46~

This Court had, therefore, appropriately stresse'd upon the feature that the provision of s. 144 of the Code was intended to meet an emergency. This postulates a situation temporary in character and, therefore, the duration of an order under s. 144 of the Code· could never have been intended to be semi-permanent in character.

Similar view was ~xpresse~ by this Court in Gu/am Abbas & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ots.,( 1) where it was said that·. "the entire basis of action under s. 144 is provided by .the urgency· of the situa• tion and the power thereunder is intended to be availed of for. preventing disorders, obstructions and annoyances with a view to secure the public weal by maintaining ·public peace and tranquiJiity .... " Certain observations in Gu/am Abbas's decision c regarding the nf.ture of the order under s. 144 cif the Code ...:.. judicial or executive - to the extent they run counter to the decision of the Constitiltion Bench in Babula/ Parate's"case, may require reconside· ration but we agree that the nature of the order under s. 144 of ·the Code is intended to meet emergent situation. Thus the clear and definite view of this Court is that an order under s. 144 of the Code D is not intended to be either permanent or semi-permanent in charac• ter. The concensus of jadicial opinion in· the High Courts of the country is thus in accord with the view expressed by this Court. It is not nec.essary on that ground to quash the impugned order .of March ' "' 1982 as by efllux of time it has already ceased to be effective. E

- It is appropriate to take note. of the fact that the- impugned order under s. 144 of the Code did not ban processions or gatherings at public places even by Ananda Margis. The prohibition was with reference to the carrying of daggers, trishuls and skulls. Even performan,ce of tandava dance in public plac~s. which we have held is not an essential part' of religious rites to be obse"ved by Ananda Margis, without these, has not been. prohibited. ' The writ petitions have to fail on our finding that performance .,,,I ,of tandava dance in procession in the public streets or in gatherings in public places is not an essential religious rite of the followers of G Ananda Marga. In the cirumstances there will be no order as to costs.

H.S.K. . , Petitions dismissed

(I) [198112 Cr. L.J. 1835'!!11862. - H