BHARTU v. RANDHIR SINGH & ORS.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Though we confess that during the course of the hearing we did feel somewhat perplexed as to the proper cons- F truction to be placed on the provisions of secs. 7, 7 A and 8 of the PEPSU Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, on second thou- ghts we think that only one conclusion is permissible. The PEPSU Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 which was originally passed in 1955 and amended in 1955, was again amended in 1956. The Act purports to amend and consolidate the law relating to tenan- cies of agricultural land and to provide for certain measures of land G reforms. Section 3 broadly defines "permissible limit" for the pur- poses of the Act to mean 30 standard acres of land and where such 30 standard acres on being converted into ordinary acres exceed 80 acres, such 80 acres. Section 5 enables every land owner owning land exceeding 30 standard acres to select for personal cultivation from the land held by him in the Stiite in parcel or parcels of land not eJ1ceed- H

640 SUPREME COUR r REPOR rs [1985] 2 S.C.R. A ing in the aggregate the permissibie limit and reserve such land for personal cultivation by intimating his selection in the prescribed form aLd manner to the Collector. Section 6 requires the Collector to notify the particulars of all lands reserved for personal cultivation of a land-owner under sec. 5. Chapter IV-A (secs. 32-A to 32-NN) deals B with ceiling on land and acquisition and disposal of surplus area. In particular sec. 32-A provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, customs, usage or agreement, no person shall be entitled to own or hold as land-owner or tenant land under his personal cultivation within the State which exceeds in the aggregate the permissible limit. The subsequent provisions provide for the c determination of the surplus area and sec. n-E provides for the ves- ting of surplus area in the State Government. We have to note here that sec. 32-00 provides that tenancies created after the commence- ment of the 1956 amendment in any area which could have been declared as surplus area have to be declared for the purposes of deter- mining the surplus area of any person. Section 32-F vests the Collec- D tor with the power to take possession of surplus area and sec. 32-J rescribes the modes of disposal of surplus area. We are not really concerned with all those provisions for the present purpose. Chapter III of the Act deals with "General rights of tenancy". Section 7 prescribes that no tenancy shall be terminated except in accordance with the provisions of the Act or except on any of the foll owing grounds. The grounds mentioned are non-payment of rent within a period of six months after it falls due, subletting without the consent in writing of the land-owner, cessation of personal cultivation of the tenant in the manner and to the extent customary in the locality, user of the land or any part of it in a manner which is likely to render it unfit for the purpose for which the land was leased and the refu- sal by the tenant, on demand in writing, to execute a kabuliyat agree- ing to pay rent in accordance with the statutory provisions. What has to be particularly noticed is that the tenancy cannot be termina- ted except in accordance with the provisions of the Act or except on any of the grounds mentioned in sec. 7. In other words, a tenancy may be terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Act or on any of the grounds mentioned in sec. 7. Therefore, it means that the tenancy may be terminated on any grounds mentioned in sec. 7 or in accordance with the provisions of the Act provided, of course, other provisions of the Act provide for the termination of tenancy. In the case of tenancies subsisting at the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, sec. H 7-A provides for two grounds for termination of tenancy in addition

BHARTU v. RANDHIR SINGH (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 641 A

to the grounds specified in sec. 7, namely, (i) that the land comprising the tenancy has been reserved by the landowner for bis personal cul- tivation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter-II and \ii) that the landowner owns 30 standard acres of less land and the land B falls within bis permissiiJle limit. In the case of tenancies commencing after the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, sec. 8 provides that the mini- mum term of the tenancy shall be three years, subject to the pro vi- sions of sec. 7. The question raised for consideration in the present ~ .. case is whether in the case of tenancies commencing after the com- mencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second c Amendment) Act, 1956, sec. 8 provides for an additional ground for terminating a tenancy, namely, the expiry of the period of tenancy provided it is not less than three years. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that sec. 8 is made expressly subject to the provi- sions of sec 7 and when it prescribes that the minimum period of tenancy shall be three years, it cannot possibly mean that the tenancy ....J may be terminated before the expiry of the term of three ye~rs According to the learned counsel, sec. 8 means that a tenancy may not be terminated on any ground whatsoever for three years but may be terminated after the term of three years but may be terminated on any of the grounds mentioned in sec. 7. Such a construction in our opinion would lead to some absurd and anomalous results. For example, one of the grounds mentioned in sec. 7 which enables the termination of the tenancy is the user by the tenant of the land .... in a manner which is likely to render the land unfit for the purpose for which it was leased to him. If the construction placed upon sec. 8 by the appellant is to be accepted, a tenant may, with impunity as soon as the land is leased to him, use the land in a manner to render the land unfit for the purpose for which it was leased to him, yet the ,.. land-owner would have to wait for a term of three years before terminating the tenancy. This appears to us to be an absurd conse- ~ quence and it ;, not possible for us to accept a construction which will lead to such disastrous results. The only alternate consrutction of sec. 8 is to hokl that quite distinctly from the provisions of sec. 7, G a tenancy may not be terminated within a period of three years after ' its commencement if the tenancy commenced after the commence- ment of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amend- ment) Act, 1956, that is to say, while the provisions of sec. 7 would always be available in the case of tenancies commencing after the Second Amendment Act, a tenant may also be evicted on the termi nation of the period of tenancy which shall not be less than thre years. So construed it may appear as if the words 'subject to the pro- H

642 SUPREME COCRT REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C.R.

A visions of sec. 7' are being read by us as 'notwithstanding the provi- sions of sec. 7 ; but that may not be a correct way of looking at what we have said. The proper way of looking at the scheme of secs. 7, 7-A and 8 is to hold that while sec. 7 enumerates the grounds on which any temncy may be terminated, sec. 7-A provides for addi- tional grounds on which tenancies subsiting at the commencement of B the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands \Second Amendment) Act, I 956 may be terminated and sec. 8 provides for the termination of a tenancy commencing after the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment), 1956, apart from the grounds mentioned in sec 7. That is why sec. 7 itself uses the word 'no tenancy shall be terminated except in accordance with the provisions of the Act or except of any of the following grounds,' that is to say, a c tenancy may be terminated either on the grounds mentioned in sec. 7 or in accordance with the provisions of the Act. We think that this is the only reasonable and permissible way of construing sec. 8 in the setting of secs 7, 7-A and 8. The view taken by us appears to have been taken consistently by the Punjab High Court in the last 15 years and construing as we are doing a State Act, we do not think that- D there are any compelling reasons justifying any departure from the view taken by t~e Punjab High Court for so long. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed. No Costs.

N. V.K. Appeal dismissed.