S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR ETC. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E BHAGW ATI, CJ. I am in entire agreement with the judgment prepared by my learned brother Ranganath Misra, but since the questions involved in these writ petitions are of seminal importance affecting as they do, the structure of the judicial system and the principle of independence of the F Judiciary, I think I would be failing in my duty if! did not add a few words of my own,

There are two questions which arise for consideration in these writ petitions and they have been succinctly set out in the judgment of Ranganath Misra, J. The first question is wheth<:r the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the G High Court under Articles 226 and 2:17 of the Constitution in service matters specified in section 218ofthe Admini,;trative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) and the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in i, such service matters in the AdministrativeTribuool to be constituted under the impugend Act, subject .to an exception in favour of the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 32 and 136, is unconstitutional and void and in any event, H even if the first question be answered against the petitioners and in favour of

S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [BHAGWATI, C.J.] 441

~ the Government, the second question required to be considered is, whether the composition of the Administrative Tribunal and the mode of appointment of A Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and members have the effect of introducing a constitutional infirmity invalidating the provisions of the impugned Act. I agreed with the answers given to th~'5e questions in the judgment of Ranganath

. Misra, J. I would articulate my reasons as follows:-

It is now well-settled as a result of the decision of this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. & Others v. Union of India and Ors. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 206 that B

judicial review is a basic and essential featl)re of the Constitution and no law

- }- . passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent powe1 can abrogate it or take it away. If the power of judicial review is abrogated or taken away the Constitution will cease to be what it is. It is a fundamental principle of our c constitutional schem_e that every organ of the State, every authority under the ~ Constitution, derives its power from the Constitution and has to act within the limits of such power. It is a limited Government which we have under the Constitution and both the executive and the legislature have to act within the limits of the power conferred upon them under the Constitution. Now a \ question may arise as to what are the powers of the executive and whether the D executive has acted within the scope of its power. Such a question obviously cannot bC left to the executive to decide and for two very good reasons. First, the decision of the question would depend upon the interpretation of the

.. Constitution and the laws and this would pre-eminently be a matter fit to be decided by the judiciary, because it is the judiciary which alone would be

I possessed of expertise in this field and secondly, the constitutional and legal protection afforded to the citizen would become illusory, if it were left to the executive to determine the legality ·of its own action. So also if the legislature E

~ makes a law and a dispute arises whether in makingthe law, the legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative competence or the la\\.: is violative of the fundamental rights or of any other provisions ,of the~ C<?nstitution, its ' resolution cannot, for the same reasons, be left to the determination of the F ·~ ._ legislature. The Constitution has, therefore created an independent machinery for resolving these disputes and this independent machinery is the judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review to determine the legality of executive action and the validity of legislation passed by the legislature. The judiciary is constituted the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and to it is assigned the delicate task of determining what is the extent and scope of the G power conferred on each branch of Government, .\vhat are the limits on the .} exercise of S!-Jch power und~r the Constitution and whether any action of any branch transgresses such limits. It is also a basic principle of the rule of law which permeates every provision of the Constitution and which forms its very core and essence that the exercise of po\ver by the executive or any other authority must not only be conditioned by the Constitution but also be in H

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] I S.C. R.

A accordance with law and it is the judiciary which has to ensure that the law is observed and there is compliance with the requirements of law on the part of the executive and other authorities. This function is discharged by the judiciary by exercise of the power Jf judicial review which is a most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for maintenance of the rule of law. The B power of judicial review is an intei•;al part of our constitutional system and without it, tjlere will be no Government of laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. That is why I observed in my judgment in Minerva Mills ltd. case (supra) at pages 287 and 288:-,

"! am of the view that if there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the c maintenance of dem•>cracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial review and it is unriuestionably, to my mind, part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest that however effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. But what I wish ! . to emphasise is that judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. If by a Constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it is provided that the validity of any law made by the legislature shall not be liable to be called in question on any ground; even if it is outside the legislative competence of the legislature 'or is violative of any fundamental rights, it would be nothing short of subversion of the Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the distribution of legislative powers between the IJ nion and the States and r~nder the fundamental rights meaningless and futile. So also if a constitutional amendment is made which has the effect of taking itway the power of judicial review and providing that no amendment made in the Constitution shall be liable to be.questioned on any ground, even if such amendrr_ent is violative of the basic structure and, therefore, outside the amendatory power of Parliament, it would be making P:o.rliament sole judge of the constitutional validity of what it has done and that would, in effect and substance, nullify the limitation on the amending power of Parliament and affect the basic structure of the Constitution. The conclusion must therefore inevitably follow that clause (4) of the Article 368 is unconstitutional and void as damaging the basic structure of the Constitution."

S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [BHAGWATI, C.J.] 443

It is undoubtedly true that my judgment in Minerva Mills Ltd. case (supra) was A a minority judgment but so far as this aspect is concerned, the majority Judges also took the same view and held that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution and. it is equally clear from the same decision that though judicial review cannot be altogether abrogated by Parliament by amending the Constitution in exercise of its constituent power, Parliament can certainly, without in any way violating the basic structure doctrine, set up effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicl.al review. The basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the -)- Constitution so as to substitute in place of the High Court, another alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, provided it is no less efficacious than the High Court. Then, instead of the High Court, it would be another institutional mechanism or authority which would be exercising the power of judicial review with a view to enforcing the constitutional limitations and maintaining the rule of law. Therefore, if any constitutional amendment made by Parliament takes away from the High Court the power of judicial review in any particular area and vests it in any other institutional mechanism or authority, it would not be violative of the basic structure doctrine, so long as the essential condition is fulfilled, namely that the alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by the parliamentary amendment is no less effective than the High Court.

i E Here, in the present case, the impugned Act has been enacted by Parliament in exercise of the power conferred by clause (I) of Article 323A which was introduced in the Constitution by Constitution (42nd Amendemnt) Act, 1976. Gause (2) (d) of this Article provides that a law made by Parliament under clause (1) may exclude the jurisdiction of courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136,.with respect to the disputes or complaints F referred to in clause (!). The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 by any l~w made by Parliament under clause ( 1) of Article 323A is, therefore, specifically authorised by the constitutional amendment enacted in clause (2) (d) of that Article. lt is clear from the discussion in the preceding paragraph that this constitutional amendment authorising exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 G and 227 postulates for its validity that the law made under clause (1) of Article 323A excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 must provide for an effective alternative institutional mechanism or authority for judicial review. If this constitutional amendment were to permit a law made under clause (I) of Article 323A to exclude the jurisdiction of tile High Court under Articles 226 and 227 without setting up an effective alternative H

444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] I S.C.R.

A institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, it would be violative of the basic structure doctdne and hence outside the constituent power of Parliament. It must, therefore, be read as implicit in this constitutional amendment that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 permissible under it must not leave a void but it must set up another effective institutional mechanism or authority and vest the power of B judicial review in it. Consequently, the impugned Act excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 2:26 and 227 in respect of service matters and vesting such jurisdiction in the Administrative Tribunal can pass the test of constitutionality as being within the ambit and coverage of clause (2) (d) of Article 323A, only if it can be shown that the Administrative Tribunal set up under the impugned Act is equally ,efficacious as the High Court, so far as the c power of judicial review over service matter is concerned. We must, therefore, address ourselves to the question whether the Administrative Tribunal established under the impugned Art can be regarded as equally effective and efficacious in exercising the power or judicial review as the High Court acting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

D It is necessary to bear in mind that service matters which are removed from the jurisdiction uf. the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and entrusted to the ,'\d1ninistrative Tribunal set up under the impugned Act for adjudication involve questions of interpretation and applicability of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases. E These questions require for their determination not only judicial approach but also knowledge and expertise in this particular branch of constitutional law. It is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these questions should have same modicum of legal training and judicial experience because we find that some of these questions are so difficult and complex that they baffle the minds of even trained Judges in the High Courts and the Supreme Court. That is the reason why at the time of the preliminary hearing of these writ petitions we insisted that - F every bench of the Administrative Tribunal sh.ould consist of one judicial member and one administrative member 'and there should be no preponderance of administrative n1embers on any bench. Of course, the presence of the administrative menber would provide input of practical experience in the functioning of the services and add to the efficiency of the G Administrative Tribunal but the legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input or not giving it sufficient weightage . ~

would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunal as compared to the High Court. Now section 6 provides that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or should have been a Judge of the High Court or he should have for at least two years held office of H Vice-Chairman or he should have for at least two years held the post of

S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [BHAGWATI, C.J.] 445

Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or A State Government carrying a scale of pay which_ is not less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India. I entirely agree with Ranganath Misra, J. tr.at the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or should have beon" Judge of a High Court or he should have forat least two years held office . as Vice-Chairman. If he has held office as Vice-Chairman for a period of at least two years he would have gathered sufficient experience and also within such B period of two years, acquired reasonable familiarity with the constitutional and legal questions involved in service matters, But substituting the Chief Justice of a High Court by a Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal who has merely held the post ofa Secretary to the Government and who has no legal or judicial experience would not only fail to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrative Tribunal a much less effective and . C efficacious mechanism than the,High Court. We eannot afford to forget that it . i~ the High Court which is being supplanted by the Administrative Tribunal and it must be so manned as tp inspire confidence in the public mind that it is a highly competent and expert mechanism with judicial approach and objectivity. Of course, I must make it clear that when I say this, I do not wish to D cast any reflection on the members of the "Civil Services because fortunately we have, in our country, brilliant civil servants who possess treme~dous sincerity, drive and initiative and who have remarkable capacity to resolve and overcome administrative problems of great complexity. But what is needed in a judicial tribunal which is intended to suppbnt the High Court is legal training and r experience. I am, therefore, of the view, in agreement with Ranganath Misra, J. that clause (c) of section 6 (1) must be struck down as invalid. E

• I also fail to see why a District Judge or an advocate who is qualified to . / be a Judge of a High Court should not be eligible to be considered for appointment as Vi=Chairrnan of the .Administrative Tribunal. It may be . noted that since the Administrative Tribunal has been created in substitution F of the High Court, the Vice-Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal would be in the position of a High Court Judge and if a District Judge oran advocate · qualified to be a Judge of the High Court, is eligible to bea IJighCotirtJudge; · there is no reason why he should not equally be eligible to be a Vice-Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal. Can the position of a Vi=Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal be considered higher than that ofa Hig.'1 Court Judge G so that a person who is eligible to be a High Court Judge may yet be regarded as ineligible for becoming a Vi=Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal? It • does appear that the provisions of the ;mpugned Act in regard to the composition of the Adnlinistrative Tribunal · · ; a little weighted in favour of I members of the Services. This weightage in favour of the members of the ·Services and value-discounting of the judicial members does have the effect of H

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A making the Administrative Tribunal less effective and efficacious than the High Court. I would therefore suggest that a District Judge or an Advocate who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court s11ould be regarded as eligible for being Vice-Chairman of the AdministratiYe Tribunal and unless an amendment to that effect is carried out on or b·,fore 31st March, 1987, the B impugned Act would have to be declared to be invalid, because the provision ·in regard to composition of the Administrative Tribunal cannot be severed from the other provisions contained in the impugned Act.

That takes me to another serious infirmity in the provisions of the impugned Act in regard to the mode of appoin:ment of the Chairman, Vice- Chairman and members of the Administrat 1ve Tribunal. So far as the c appointment of judicial members of the Admini >trative Tribunal is concerned, -~- - there is a provision introduced in the impugned Act by way of amendment that the judicial members shall be appointed by the Government concerned in consultatio.n with the Chief Justice of India. Obviously no exception can be taken to this provision, because even so far as Judges of the High Court are concerned, their appointment is required to be made by the President inter alia in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. But so far as the appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and administrative members is concerned, the sole and exclusive power to make such appointment is conferred on the Government under the impugned Act. The·:e is no obligation cast on the Government to consult the Chief Justice of India or to follow any particular selection procedure in this behalf. The result is that it is left to the absolute unfettered discretion of the Government to appoint such person or persons as it likes as Chairman, Vice-Chairman and administrative members of the Administrative Tribun~l. Now it may be noted that almost all cases in regard to service matters which come before the Administrative Tribunal would be against the Government or any of its officers and it would not at all be conducive to judicial independence to leave unfettered and unrestricted discretion in the executive to appoint the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and administrative members; if a judicial member or an administrative member is looking forward to promotion as Vice-Chairman or Chairman, he would h_ave to depend on the goodwill and favourabk stance of the executive and that would be likely to affect tile independence and impartiality of the members of the Tribunal. The same would be the position vis-a-vis promotion to the office of Chairman of the Administrative Tribi..nal. The administrative members of would also be likely to carry a sense obligation to the executive for having been appointed members of the Administrative Tribunal and that would have a tendency to impair the independence and objectivity of the members of the Tribunal. There can be no doubt that the power of appointment and H · promotion vested in the executive cim have prejudicial effect on the

S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [BHAGWATJ, C.J.] 447

independence of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and members of the A Administrative Tribunal, if such power is absolute and unfettered. If the members have to look to the executive for advancement, it may tend, directly or indirectly, to influence their decision-making proCess particularly since the Government would be a litigant in most of the cases coming before the Administrative Tribunal and it is the action of the Government which would be challenged in such cases. That is the reason why in case of appointment of B High Court Judges, the power of appointment vested in the executive is not an absolute unfettered power but it is hedged in by a wholesome check and safeguard and the President cannot make an appointment of a High Court Judge without consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India and a healthy convention has grown up that no appointment would be made by the Government which is not approved by the C Chief Justice of India. This check or safeg1:1ard is totally absent in the case of appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and administrative members of the Administrative Tribunal and the possibility cannot be ruled out- indeed the litigating public would certainly carry a feeling-that the decision- making process of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and ·members of the Administrative Tribunal might be likely to be affected by reason of dependence on the executive for appointment and promotion. It can no longer be disputed that total insulation of the judiciary from all forms of interference from the coordinate branches of Government is a basic essential feature of the Constitution. The Constitution makers have made anxious provision to secure tOtal independence of the judiciary from executive pressure or influence. Obviously, therefore if the Administrative Tribunal is created in substitution of the High Court and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 is taken away and vested in the Administrative Tribunal, tlie same independence from possibility of executive pressure or influence must also be ensured to the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and members of the Administrative Tribunal. Or else the Administrative Tribunal would cease to be an equally effective and efficacious substitute for the High Court. and the provisions of the impugned Act would be rendered invalid. I am, therefore, of the view that the appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and administrative members should be made by the concerned Government only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and such consultation must be meaningful' and effective and ordinarily the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India must be accepted unless there are cogent reasons, in which event the reasons must be disclosed to the Chief Justice oflndia and his response must be invited to such reasons. There is also another alternative which may be adopted by the Government for making appointments of Chairman, Vice- Chairmen and members and that may be by setting up a High Powered Selection Committee headed by the Chief Justice oflndia or a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court or concerned High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of H

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] I S.C.R.

A India. Both these modes of appointment will ensure selection of proper and competent persons to man the Administrative Tribunal and give it prestige and reputation which would inspire confidence in the public mind in regard to the competence, objectivity and impartiality of those manning the Administrative Tribunal. If either of these two modes of appointment is adopted, it would save the impugned Act from invalidation. Otherwise, it will be outside the scope of B the power conferred on Parliament under A!.ticle 323-A. I would, however hasten to add that this judgment will operate only prospectively and will not invalidate appointments already made to the Administrative Tribunal. But if

·--\. - any appointments of Vice-Chairmen or administrative members are to be made hereafter, the same shall be made by the Government in accordance with either of the aforesaid two modes of appointment. c I may also add that if the Administrative Tribunal is to be an equally effective and efficacious substitution for the High Court on the basis of which alone the impugned Act .:an be sustained, there must be a permanent or if there is not sufficient work, then a Circuit Bench ~f the Administrative Tribunal at o every place where there is a seat of the High Court. I would, therefore, direct the Government to set up a permanent bench and if that is not feasible having regard to the volume of work, then at least a Circuit Bench of the Administrative Tribunal wherever there is a seat of the High Court, on or before 31st March, 1987. That would be necessary if the provisions of the impugned Act are to be sustained. So far a< rest of the points dealt with in the judgment of Ranganath Misra, J. are concerned, I express my entire agreeement with the view taken by him.

RANGANATH MISRA J: The challenge raised to the vires of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, (hereinafter referred to as 1he Act) in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution and the other connected matters has been referred to the Constitution Bench for adjudication. Indisputably the Act has been framed within the ambit of Article 323A which was brought into the Constitution by th'' Forty-Second Amendemnt Act in

1976. In exercise of power vested under Section 1(3) of the Act, the Central Government appointed 1.11.1985 as the date from which the Act would come into force. Thereupon Sampat Kumar and others (W.P. 12460 of 1985) moved this Court and the connected matters were brought before this Court or different High Courts which have since been transferred to this Court to be analogously heard. On 31.10.1985 a Div'.sion Bench of this Court gave certain interim directions including stay of tram.fer of the pending applications under Article 32 which were liable to be transferred to the Tribunal and also for continuance of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 in regard to disputes covered under the Act notwithstanding the bar provided in Section 28.

S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [MISRA, J.] 449

In the writ applications as presented the main challenge was to the abolition of the Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 .in r£spect of specified service disputes. Challenge was also raised against the taking away of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227. It was further canvassed that establishment of benches of the Tribunal at ·Allahabad, ·Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta, Gauhati, Madras. and Nagpur with the principal seat at Delhi' would still prejudice the parties whose cases were already pending before the respective High Courts located at places other than . these places and unless at the seat of every High Court facilities for presentation of applications and for hearing thereof were provided the parties and their lawyers would be adversely affected. The interim order made on October 31, 1985, made provisions to meet the working difficulties. Learned Attorney General on behalf of the Central Government assured the Court that early steps would be taken to amend the law so as to save the jurisdiction under C Article 32, remove other minor anomalies and set up a bench of the Tribunal at the seat of every High Court. By the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986, these amendments were brought about and by now an appropriate Act of Parliament has replaced the Ordinance. Most of the original grounds of attack thus do not survive and the contentions that. D were canvassed at the hearing by the counsel appearing for different parties are these:

(I) Judicial review is a fundamental aspect of the basic structure of our Constitution and bar of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 as contained in Section E 28 of the Act cannot be sustained; ·

(2) Even if the bar of jurisdiction is upheld, the Tribunal being a substitute of the High Court, its constitution and set up should be such that it would in fact function as such substitute and become an institution in which the parties could repose faith F and trust;

(3) Benches of the Tribunal should not only be established at the seat of every High Court but should be available at every place where the High Courts have permanent benches; G (4) So far as Tribunals set up or to be set up by the Central or the State Governments are concerned, they should have no jurisdiction in respect of employees of the Supreme Court or members of the subordinate judiciary and employees working in such establishments inasmuch as exercise of jurisdiction of the Tnbunal would interfere with the control absolutely vested in H

450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] I S.C.R.

A the respective High Courts in regard to the judicial and other subordinate officers under Article 235 of the Constitution.

After oral arguments were over, learned Attorney General, after obtaining instructions from the Central Government filed a memorandum to the effect that section 2( q) of the Act would be suitably amended so as to exclude officers and servants in tLe employment of the Supreme Court and members and staff of the subordinatejudiciary from the purview of the Act. in the same memorandum it has also been said that Government would arrange for sittings of the benches of the ·:~ribunal at the seat or seats of each High .·~·, Court on the basis that 'sittings' will include 'circuit sittings' and the details thereof would be worked out by the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman concerned.

With these concessions made by the learned Attorney General, only two aspects remain to be dealt with by us, namely, those covered by the first and the second contentions. D Strong reliance was placed on the judgment of Bhagwati, J (one of us- presently the learned Chief Justice) in Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] l SCR 206, 287 where it was said:

"The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no Government of laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and ;1 promise ofunreality. I am of the vie"· that if there is one featur'' of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the powerofjudicial review and it is unquestionably, to my mind, part of the basic structure of the Constituion. Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest tha-:, however effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. But what I wish to emphasise is that judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. If-by 1 constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it is provided that the validity of any law made by the Legislature shall not be liable to be called in question on any ground, even if it is outside the legislative competence of the Legislature or is violative of any H

S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDlA [MISRA, J.] 451

fundamental rights, it would be nothing short of subversion of A the Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States and render the fundamental rights meaningless and futile. So also if a constitutional amendment is made which has the effect of taking away the power of judicial review." B Article 32 was described by Dr. Ambedkar in course of the debate in the Constituent Assembly as the 'soul' and 'heart' of the Constitution and it is in recognition of this position that though Article 323A(2)(d) authorised _} exclusion of jurisdiction under Article 32 and the original Act had in Section 28 provided for it, by amendment jurisdiction under Article 32 has been left untouched. The Act thus saves jurisdiction of this Court both under Article 32 C in respect of original proceedings as also 1111der Article 136 for entertaining appeals against decisions of the Tribunal on grant of Special Leave. Judicial review by the apex court has thus been left in tact.

The question that arises, however, for consideration is whether bar of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 affects the provision for judicial review. D The right to move the High Court in its writ jurisdiction-unlike the one under Article 32, is not a fundamental right. Yet, ihe High Courts, as the working experience of three and a half decades shows have in exercise of the power of judicial review played a definite and positive role in the matter of preservation of fundamental and other rights and in keeping administrative action under reasonable control. In these thirty-six years following the enforcement of the E Constitution, not only has India's population been more than doubled but also the number of litigations before the courts including the High Courts has greatly increased. As the pendency in the High Courts increased and soon became the pressing problem of backlog, the nation's attention came to be bestowed on this aspect. Ways and means to relieve the High Courts of the load began to engage the attention of the Government at.the Centre as also in F the various States. As early as 1969, a Committee was set up by the Central Government under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Shah of this Court to make recommendations suggesting ways and means for effective, expeditious and satisfactory disposal of matters relating to service disputes of Government servants as it was found that a sizable portion of pending litigations related to· G this category. The Committee recommended the setting up of an independent Tribunal to handle the pending cases before this Court and the High Courts. While this report was still engaging the attention of Government, the Administrative Reforms Commission also took note of the situation and recommended the setting up of Civil Services Tribunals to deal with appeals of Government servants against disciplinary action. In certain States, Tribunals H of this type came into existence and started functioning. But the Central

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] I S.C.R.

Government looked into the matter further as it transpired that the major chunk of service litigation related to matters other than disciplinary action. In May 1976, a Conference of Chief Secretaries of the States discussed this problem. Then ·came the Forty-Second Amendment of the Constitution bringing in Article 323A which authorised Parliament to provide by law "for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment ar:d conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connexion with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or ot"ler authority within the territory of India or under the controt of the Government of India or of any Corporation owned or controlled by the Government." As already stated this Article envisaged exclusion of the jurisdiction of 111 courts, except the jurisdiction of. the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or c complaints referred to in clause (I). Though the Constitution now contained the enabling power, no immediate steps were taken to set up any Tribunal as contemplated by Article 323A. A Consfr:ution Bench of this Court in K.K. Dutta v. Union of India, (1980] 3 SCR HI I observed:

D "There are few other litig,ative areas than disputes between members of various services inter se, where the principle that public policy requires that all litigation must have an end can apply with greater force. Public servants ought not to be driven or required to dissipate their time and energy in court-room battles. Thereby their a!':ention is diverted from public to private affairs and their inter se disputes affect their sense of oneness Without which DC• institution can function effectively. The constitution of Servke Tribunals by State Governments with an apex Tribunal at the Centre which in the generality of the cases, should be the final arbiter of controversies relating to conditions of service, including the vexed question of seniority, may save the couris frorr the avalanche of writ petitions and appeals in service matters. The proceedings of such Tribunals can have the merit of informality and if they will not be tied down to strict rules of evidence, they might be able to produce solutions which will satisfy many .... "

G In the meantime the problem of the backlog of cases in the High Courts becomes more acute and pressing and came to be further discussed in Parliament and in conferences and seminars. Ultimately in January 1985, both Houses of Parliament passed the Bill anJ with the Presidential assent on 27th February, 1985, the law enabling the long awaited Tribunal to be constituted came into existence. As already noticed, the Central Government notified the H Act to come into force with effect from 1.11.1985.

S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION Of INDIA [MISRA, J.) 453

Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Courts in service matters and its propriety as also validity have thus to be examined in the background indicated above. We have already seen tl;iat judicial review by this Court is left . wholly unaffected and thus there is a forum where matters of importance and grave injustice can be brought for determination or rectification. Thus exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court does not totally bar judicial review. This Court in .Minerva Mills' case did point out that "effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review" can be made by Parliament. Thus it is possible to set up an alternative institution in place of the High Court for providing judicial review. The debates and - )- deliberations spread over almost two decades for exploring ways and means for relieving the High Courts of the load of backlog of cases and for assuring quick settlement of service disputes in the interest of the public servants as also C. the country cannot be lost sight of while considering this aspect. It has not been disputed before u<-and perhaps could not have been-that the Tribunal under the scheme of the Act would take overa part of the existing backlog and a share of the normal load of the High Courts. The Tribunal has been contemplated as a substitute and not as supplemental to the High Court in the scheme of administration of justice. To provide the Tribunal as an additional D forum from where parties could go to the High Court •.vould certainly have been a retrograde step considering the situation and circumstances to meet which the innovation has been brought about. Thus barring of the jurisdiction of the High Court can indeed not be a valid ground of attack.

What, however, has to be kept in view is that the Tribunal should be a E real substitute of the High Court-not only in form and de jure but in content and de facto. As was pointed out in 'Minerva's Mills, the alternative arrangement has to be effective and efficient as also capable of upholding the constitutional limitations. Article 16 of the Constitution guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Article 15 bars discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. The F touch-stone of equality enshrined in Article 14 is the greatest of guarantees for the citizen. Centring around these articles in the Constitutiorl a service jurisprudence has already grown in this country. Under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act all the powers of the Courts except those of this Court in regard to matters specified therein v.est in the Tribunal-either Central or State. Thus the Tribunal is the substitute of the 'High Court and is entitled to exercise the G powers thereof.

The High Courts have been functioning over a century and a quarter and until the Federal Court was established under the Government of India Act, 1935, used to be the highest courts within their respective jurisdiction subject to an appeal to the-Privy Council in a limited category of cases. In this H

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] I S.C. R.

A long period ofabout six scores of years, 1he High Courts have played their role effectively, efficiently as also satisfactorily. The litigant in this country has seasoned himself to look upto the High Court as the unfailing protector of his person, property and honour. The instiV1tion has served its purpose very well and the common man has thus come to repose great confidence therein. Disciplined, independent and trained Judges well-vei:..ed in law and working B with all openness in an unattached and objective manner have ensured l" dispensation of justice over the years. Aggrieved people approach the Court- the social mechanism to act as the arbiter-not under legal obligation but under the belief and faith that justice shall be done to them and the State's authorities would implement the decision of the Court. It is, therefore, of ·( paramount importance that the substitu1e institution-the Tribunal-must be C a worthy successor of the High Court in all respects. That is exactly what this Court intended to convey when it spoke of an alternative mechanism in • Minerva Mills' case . • Chapter II of the Act deals with escablishment of Tribunals and Benches D thereof. Section 4 provides for establishment while Section 5 deals with composition of the Tribunal and Benches thereof. Section 6 lays down the qualifications of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and members. So far as the Chairman is concerned, sub-section (!) requires that he should be or have been- (a) a Judge of a High C>urt; or E (b) has for at least two years, held office as Vice-Chairman; or

(c) has, for at least two years, held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than ~. F that of a Secretary to the Government of India. ·~

Sub-section (2) prescribing the qualification for Vice-Chairman provides that he should be or have been-

(a)' a Judge of a High Court; or G (b) for at least two years, held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India; or ' H .. (bb) for at least five y'ars, held the post of an Additional

S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [MISRA, J.] 455

Secretary to Government of India or any other post carrying A equivalent pay; or. (c) for a period of not less than three years held office as a judicial member of an Administrative Tribunal.

Sub-section (3) prescribes the qualification of a judicial member and' B requires that: (a) he should be or should have been or qualified to be a Judge of a High Court; or (b) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I of that service for at least three years.

~- Sub-section (3-A) provides the qualification for appointment as , administrative member and lays down that such person should have, for at least C two years, held the post of an Additional Secretary to the Government oflndia or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of "'illf pay not less than that of an Additional Secretary to Government oflndia; or (b) has, for at least three years, held the post ofa Joint Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or the State Government earrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Joint Secretary to Government of D India. So far as the Chairman is concerned, we are of the view that ordinarily a retiring or retired Chief Justice of a High Court or when such a person is not available, a Senior Judge of proved ability either in office or retired should be appointed. That office should for all practical purposes be equated with the. office of Chief Justice of a High Couri. We must immediately point out that we .• have no bias, in any manner, against members of the Service. Some of them do E exhibit great candour, wisdom, capacity to deal with intricate problems with understanding, detachment and objectiveness but judicial discipline generated by experience and training in an adequate dose is, in our opinion, a necessary qualification for the post of Chairman. We agree that a Vice-Chairman with these qualifications and experience of two_ years may be considered for appointment as Chairman but in order that the Tribunal maybe acceptable to F

l - the litigants who are themselves members of the various services, section 6( 1)(c) should be omitted. We do not want to say anything about Vire-Chairman and members dealt with in sub-sections (2), (3) or (3A) because so far as their selection is concerned, we are of the view that such selection when it is not of a sitting Judge or retired Judge of a High Court should be done by a high- powered committee with a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court to be nominated G by the Chief Justice of India as its Chairman. This will ensure selection of proper and competent people to man these high offices of trust and help to } build up reputation and acceptability. Once the qualifications indicated for appointment of Chairman are adopted and the manner of selection of Vice- Chairman and members is followed, we are inclined to think that the manning. of the Tribunal would be proper and conducive to appropriate functioning. We H

456 SUPREME COUR r REPORTS [1987] I S.C.R.

A do not propo•e to strike down the prescriptions containing dilforent requirements but would commend to the Central Government to take prompt steps to bring the provisions in accord w,th what we have indicated. We must state that unless the same be done, tLe constitution of the Tribunal as a substitute of the High Court would be open to challenge. We hasten to add that our judgment shall operate prospectivel:1 and would not affect appointments already made to the offices of Vice-Chairman and Member-both administrative and judicial.

Section 8 of the Act prescribes th' term of office and provides that the term for Chairman, Vice-Chairman or r.lembers shall be of five years from the __ - ( - date on which he enters upon his office or until he attains the age of 65 in the case of Chairman or Vice-Chairman and 62 in the case of member, whichever is earlier. The retiring age of 62 or 65 for the different categories is in accord with the pattern and fits into the scheme in comparable situations. We would, however, like to indicate that appoirtment for a term of five years may occasionally operate as a dis-incentive ior well-qualified people to accept the offer to join the Tribunal. There may be competent people belonging to younger age groups who would haw more than five years to reach the prevailing age of retirement. The fact that such people would be required to go out on completing the five year period but long before the superannuation age is reached is bound to operate as a deterrent. Those who come to be Chairman, Vice-Chairman or members resign ap·oointments, if any, held by them before joining the Tribunal and, as such, there would be no scope for their return to the place or places from where they co me. A five year period is not a long one. Ordinarily some time would be taken for most of the members to get used to· the service-jurisprudence and when the period is only five years, many would have to go out by the time they are full:1 acquainted with the law and have good grip over the job. To require retirement at the end of five years is thus neither convenient to the person selected for the job nor expedient to the scheme. At the hearing, learned Attorney-General referred to the case of a member of the Public Service Commission who is appointed for a term and even suffers the disqualification in the matter of furth·:r employment. We do not think that is a comparable situation. On the other hand, membership in other high-powered Tribunals like the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal or the Tribunal under the G Cust9ms Act can be referred to. When amendments to the Act are undertaken, this aspect of the matter deserves to be considered, particularly because the choice in that event would be wide leaving scope for proper selection to be made.

H We hope and trust that within a reasonable period not beyond 31st

S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [MISRA, J.] 457

March, 1987, the amendments iiidicated shall be brought about so as to A remove the defects found in the Act.

Khalid, Oza and Dutt J.J.

We have read both the Judgments just delivered-the main judgment of learned Brother Ranganath Misra and the other of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. B We agree with both.

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