CHAIRMAN, INDORE VIKAS PRADHIKARAN v. MIS PURE INDUSTRIAL COCK & CHEM. LID. AND ORS.

E "In summary, the application of the second appellant for a rebuilding,, certificate conferred no right on him which was preserved after the repeal of Sections 3-A to 3-E, but merely conferred hope or expectation that the Governor-in-Council would exercise his executive or ministerial discretion in his favour and the first appellant would thereafter issue a certificate. Similarly, the issue by the first appellant of notice of intention to grant a rebuilding certificate conferred no right on the second appellant which was preserved after the repeal, but merely instituted a procedure whereby the matter could be referred to the Governor-in-Council. The repeal disentitled the first appellant from thereafter issuing any rebuilding certificate where the matter had been referred by petition to the Governor-in-Council· but had not been determined by the Governor."

[See also Lakshmi Amma v. Devassy, (1970) KL T 204]

114. The question again came up for consideration in Howrah Municipal H Corpn. v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd., [2004] 1 SCC 663, wherein this Court

- > CHAIRMAN, INDORE VIKAS PRADHIKARAN '·PURE INDUSTRIAL COCK & CHEM.LTD. [S.B. SINHA. J. J

categorically held :

"The context in which the respondent Company claims a vested 841

---,. .. right for sanction and which has been accepted by the Division Bench of the High Court, is not a right in relation to ownership or possession of any property for which the expression vest is generally used. What we can understand from the claim of a vested right set up by the B respondent Company is that on the basis of the Building Rules, as applicable to their case on the date of making an application for sanction and the fixed period allotted by the Court for its consideration, -1- it had a legitimate or settled expectation to obtain the sanction. In our considered opinion, such settled expectation, if any, did not create any vested right to obtain sanction. True it is, that the respondent c Company which can have no control over the manner of processing ---i of application for sanction by the Corporation cannot be blamed for delay but during pendency of its application for sanction, if the State Government, in exercise of its rule-making power, amended the Building Rules and imposed restrictions on the heights of buildings on G. T. D Road and other wards, such settled expectation has been rendered • impossible of fulfilment due to change in law. The claim based on the alleged vested right or settled expectation cannot be set up against ')- statutory provisions which were brought into force by the State Government by amending the Building Rules and not by the Corporation against whom such vested right or settled expectation is being sought to be enforced. The vested right or settled expectation has been nullified not only by the Corporation but also by the State by amending the Building Rules. Besides this, such a settled expectation or the so-called vested right cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the Building Rules and the resolution of the Corporation issued thereupon."

115. In Union ofIndia v. Indian Charge Chrome, [1999] 7 SCC 314, yet again this Court emphasized : G "The application has to be decided in accordance with the law applicable on the date on which the authority granting the registration is called upon to apply its mind to the prayer for registration." - )..

I 16. In S.B. International Ltd. v. Asstt. Director General of Foreign Trade, [1996] 2 SCC 439, this Court repelled a contention that the authorities H

842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 6 S.C.R.

A cannot take advantage of their own wrong viz. delay in issuing the advance licence, stating : ,...._ - "We have mentioned hereinbefore that issuance of these licences is not a formality nor a mere ministerial function but that it requires due verification and formation of satisfaction as to compliance with B all the relevant provisions."

[See also Ku/deep Singh v. Govt. NCT of Delhi. (2006] 5 SCC 702]

i 17. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these appeals ~ which are dismissed accordingly. There shall, however, be no order as to c costs.

B.S. Appeal dismissed. ..