BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.

74Copy pinpoint74. The object of establishing a development authority like BOA is to provide for orderly and planned development so that the haphazard growth of a city is checked. The disastrous · effects of unauthorised and illegal development by some unscrupulous colonisers/developers are well known. In a C planned and authorised standard residential developments, about 30% to 35% of the total area is used to provide broad and adequate roads and footpaths, drains etc., and at least another 10% to 15% of the land is earmarked for parks, playgrounds and community development or civic amenities (schools, hospitals, police stations, post offices, mini markets, D community halls etc). Further the layout will have adequate provision for drainage of rain water as well as sewerage water, adequate water supply and electricity, well laid metalled roads which properly connect the layout to Main Roads and other surrounding areas, by providing approaches and linkages. But E in an unauthorised or illegal development, the roads are narrow and minimal, virtually no open sp-aces for parks and playgrounds, and no area earmarked for civic amenities. There will be no proper water supply or drainage; and there will be a mixed use of the area for residential, commercial and industrial purposes converting the entire area into a polluting concrete jungle. The entries and exits from the layouts will be bottlenecks leading to traffic jams. Once such illegal colonies come up with poor infrastructure and amenities, it will not be possible to either rectify and correct the mistakes in planning nor provide any amenities even in future. Residents of such unauthorised layouts are forever be condemned to a life of misery and discomfort. It is to avoid such haphazard, unhealthy development activities by greedy illegal colonisers and ignorant land-owners, the State Legislatures provided for City Improvement Trusts and H Development Authorities so that they could develop well

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 139

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.] planned citizen friendly layouts with all amenities and facilities. A In this background large tracts of lands running into hundreds of acres are acquired to have integrated layouts. Only when a layout is formed on a large scale, adequate provision can be made for good size parks, playgrounds and community/civil amenities. For example, if a layout is made in 1000 acres of B land, the developer can provide a good sized park of twenty acres and one or two small parks of 2 to 5 acres, have playgrounds of 5 to 10 acres. Instead of such an integrated large layout, if 200 small individual layouts are made in areas ranging from 2 to 10 acres, there will obviously be no provision c for a park or a playground nor any space for civil amenities. Further small private colonies/layouts will not have well aligned unifom1 roads and accesses. While it is true that Municipal and Town Planning authorities can by strict monitoring and licensing procedures arrest haphazard development, it is seldom done. D That is why formation of small layouts by developers is discouraged and development authorities take up large scale · developments. If 200 acres of land on the outskirts of a city, has to be developed, and if 30 to 50 private developers proceed to develop areas ranging from 2 to 15-acres, it will be impossible for them to provide for parks or any playgrounds of reasonable size or make provision for planned civil amenities. Further, there will be no alignment in regard to roads. Each layout will have roads to suit their own convenience and this will lead to mis-alignment and bottlenecks leading to traffic snarls. The width of the roads also will differ from layout to layout depending upon the 'greed' of each private developer, resulting in the size, shape and alignment of roads varying for every stretch of 200 to 500 meters. There will be no proper drainage of rain water or sewerage water leading to constant flooding or stagnation. Therefore large integrated layouts were found to be the answer for orderly development. No small developer can develop a good township in a few acres of land. It was also thought that developers will be mainly profit motivated and will try to minimise the. roads, open spaces and community areas. It is therefore that legislature constituted H

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A statutory development authorities to undertake large scale developments without any profit motive.

75Copy pinpoint75. If authorities like BDA notify 3000 acres of land for development and then delete from the proposed acquisition several pockets which aggregate to about 1000 to 1500 acres, then the result is obvious. There will be no integrated development at all. What was intended to be a uniform, contiguous and continuous layout of 3000 acres will get split into small pockets which are not connected with the other pockets or will be intersected by own illegal pockets of private colonies thereby perpetuating what was intended to be prevented, that is haphazard growth without proper infrastructure. It will then not be possible to provide proper road connections and drainage and impossible to provide appropriate parks, playgrounds and civic amenities of appropriate and adequate size and situation. When a development authority starts developing pockets of lands measuring 2 acres to 5 acres, obviously it also cannot provide open spaces and civic amenities and may end up with one pocket having plots, another far away pocket having a E playground and another far away pocket having a park and their being no uniformity or continuity of roads. As noticed above, a large layout enables formation of long and straight roads for easy movement of traffic. On the other hand, short and disjointed roads affect smooth movement of traffic. Therefore, if a F development authority having acquired a large tract of land withdraws or deletes huge chunks, the development by the development authority will resemble haphazard developments by unscrupulous private developers rather than being a planned and orderly development expected from a Development G Authority. Therefore when a large layout is being planned, the development authorities should exercise care and caution in deleting large number of pockets/chunks of land in the middle of the proposed layout. There is no point in proposing a planned layout but then deleting various portions of land in the middle H merely on the ground that there is a small structure of 100 sq.ft

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 141

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.] or 200 sq.ft. which may be authorized or unauthorized. Such A /deletions make a mockery of development. Further such 1 deletions/exclusions encourage corruption and favouritism and - bring discontent among those who are not favourably treated.

76Copy pinpoint76. The complaint by appellants is that in the proposed B Arkavathi layout, rich and powerful with "connections" and "money power" were able to get their lands, (even vacant lands) released, by showing some imaginary structure or by putting up some unauthorised structure overnight. Though we do not propose to go into motives, the concurrent finding by the learned Single Judge and Division Bench is that there are arbitrary unexplained deletions. While we may not comment on policy, it is obvious that deletion from proposed acquisition should be only in regard to areas which are already well developed in a planned manner. Sporadic small. unauthorised constructions in unauthorised colonies/ layouts, are not to be deleted as the very purpose of acquisition for planned development is to avoid such unauthorised ,development. If hardship is the reason for such deletion, the appropriate course is to give preference to the land/plot owners in making allotments and help them to resettle and not to continue the illegal and haphazard pockets merely on the ground that some temporary structure or a dilapidated structure existed therein. A development authority should either provide orderly development or should stay away from development. It cannot act like unscrupulous private developers//colonisers attempting development of small bits of land with only profit motive. When we refer to private developers/colonisers by way of comparison, our intention is not to deprecate all private developers/ colonisers. We are aware that several private developers/ colonisers provide large, well planned authorized developments, some of which are even better than developments by development authorities. What is discouraged and deprecated is small unauthorized layouts without any basic amenities. Be that as it may. H

77Copy pinpoint77. What do we say about a 'development', where with

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A reference to the total extent of a village, one-third is not notified at all, and more than half is deleted from proposed acquisition of the remaining two-third and only the remaining about 20% to 30% area is acquired, that too not contiguously, but in different parcels and pockets. What can be done with such B acquisition? Can it be used for orderly development? Can it avoid haphazard and irregular growth? The power of deletion and withdrawal unless exercised with responsibility and fairly and reasonably, will play havoc with orderly development, will add to haphazard and irregular growth and create discontent c among sections of society who were not fortunate to have their lands deleted.

78Copy pinpoint78. Learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench have concurrently found that BOA had indulged in pick and choose deletions !=!nd acquisitions. The learned Single Judge and the D Division Bench have found discrimination and irregularities, both in initial omission of certain lands and in deleting of some lands which were notified. They have also recorded a finding that having regard to the nature of deletions, the acquisition lands do not form a continuous or contiguOLJS area and E acquisition of small extents of land surrounded by large chunks of un-acquired lands and lands which have been omitted from acquisition would make the development of acquired pockets exceedingly difficult.

79Copy pinpoint79. The Division Bench was of the view that -quashing of the entire acquisition may not the remedy. It, therefore, decided to salvage the situation by issuing a series of directions, whereby the land owners were permitted to apply for deletion of their lands also from acquisition on the ground that (a) the lands were situated within green belt area; (b) the lands were totally built up; (c) the lands had buildings constructed by charitable, educational and/or religious institutions; (d) the lands were used for nurseries; (e) lands where running factories had been set up; and (f) lands were similar to the adjoining lands which were not notified for acquisition. The Court directed that

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 143

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.] ff the BOA comes to the conclusion that the lands of applicants were released are similar to those which have been excluded from acquisition their lands should also be deleted from acquisition. This direction requires clarification.

80Copy pinpoint80. The principles relating to grant of relief in cases of discrimination are well settled. The classic statement is found in Chandigarh Admn. & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr. [1995 (1) SCC 745), wherein this Court held:

"Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent- authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed D · in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/ unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High ·court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law - indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law - but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint H

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A of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it B can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners' case is similar to the other persons' case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and c seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course - barring exceptional situations - would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles".

In Gurshanan Singh & Ors. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee & Ors. 1996 (2) SCC 459 this court held:

"There appears to be some confusion in respect of the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. This guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. To put it in other words, if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in H

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DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

favour of any individual or a group of individualsi the others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court, that the same irregularity or illegality be committed by the State or an authority which can be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, so far such petitioners are concerned, on the reasoning that they have been denied the benefits which have been extended to others although in an irregular or illegal manner. Such petitioners can question the validity of orders which are said to have been passed in favour of persons who were not entitled to the same, but they cannot claim orders which c are not sanctioned by law in their favour on principle of equality before law. Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall 0 amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been discrimination".

In State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann-· 1997 (3) SCC 321 - this court held that the doctrine of discrimination is found upon existence of an enforceable right and that Article 14 would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf. This court further held that a person who has no legal right cannot be given relief merely because such relief has been wrongly given to others and a wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming equality, nor does a wrong decision by the Government give a right to enforce the benefit thereof and claim parity or equajity. There are several other decisions which reiterate this position. It is not necessary to refer to all of them. H

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81Copy pinpoint81. We are conscious of the fact tliat when a person subjected to blatant discrimination, approaches a court seeking equal treatment, he expects relief similar to what others have been granted. All that he is interested is getting relief for himself, as others. He is not interested in getting the relief B illegally granted to others, quashed. Nor is he interested in knowing whether others were granted relief legally or about the distinctic)ll qetween positive equality and negative equality. In fact he will be reluctant to approach courts for quashing the relief granted to others on the ground that it is illegal, as he does c not want to incur the wrath of those who have benefited from the wrong action. As a result, in most cases those who benefit by the illegal grants/ac!ions by authorities, get away with the benefit, while others who are not fortunate to have 'connections' or 'money power' suffer. But these are not the grounds for courts to enforce negative equality and perpetuate the illegality. The 0 fact that an Authority has extended favours illegally in the case of several persons cannot be a ground for courts to issue a mandamus directing repetition thereof, by applying the principle of equality. Article 14 guarantees equality before law and not equality in subverting law nor equality in securing illegal E benefits. But courts cannot be silent bystanders if acquisition process is used by officers of the Authority with ulterior or malafide motives. For example, let us take a case where 2000 acres are required for a project as per the Development Scheme, but the preliminary notification is issued in respect of F 3000 acres; and when the land owners 'apply' or 'approach' the Authority, 1000 acres of lands are released. Or take a case where a project required 1000 acres of contiguous land for a development project. and preliminary notice is accordingly issued for acquisition of a compact contiguous extent of 1000 G acres; but thereafter without any logical explanation or perceivable reason, several large areas in the midst of the proposed layout, are denotified or deleted making it virtually impossible to execute the development scheme, as proposed. In the absence of satisfactory explanations in such a case, it H may be necessary to presume that there was misuse or abuse

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 147

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.] of the acquisition process. Be that as it may. A

82Copy pinpoint82. We may illustrate the principle relating to positive and negative equality with reference to following notional acquisition cases:

(i) Where a petitioner's land and his neighbour's land are B of similar size and have similar structures and are similarly situated, and the policy of the Development Authority is to withdraw the acquisition in respect of lands which are 'constructed', if the neighbour's land is deleted from the proposed acquisition on the ground that it has a C construction of 1000 sq.ft. and the petitioner's land is not so deleted, the petitioner will be entitled to relief on the ground of discrimination. But if the neighbour's land measures 2000 sq.ft. and contains a house of 1000 sq.ft and the petitioner's land measures one acre and contains D a house measuring 1000 sq.ft., the petitioner cannot obviously contend that because his neighbour's property was deleted from acquisition, being a land with a construction, his one acre land should also be deleted in entirety from the acquisition, as it had a 1000 sq.ft. E construction. But it may be possible for him to contend that an extent equal to what was released to his neighbour, should be released.

(ii) Where the lands owned by two neighbours are equal in size having similar structures, but one was constructed before the preliminary notification after obtaining a licence and the other was constructed after the preliminary notification unauthorisedly, the owner of the land with the unauthorised structure cannot obviously claim parity with the owner of the land-with the authorised structure, for seeking deletion from acquisition.

(iii) Where the vacant lands of 'A' and 'B' - two neighbours are acquired. The Authority had a policy to delete H

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A properties with constructions, as on the date of preliminary notification. Both put up unauthorised structures clandestinely overnight, after the preliminary notification. The land of 'B' is deleted from acquisition on the ground that it has a construction. If 'A' approaches court and B claims release of his land claiming parity with 'B', the claim will have to be rejected. But, where the Authority admits that B's land was deleted even though the construction was subsequent to preliminary notification, the court may direct the Authority to take appropriate action c in accordance with law for cancelling the deletion.

(iv) If in a village all the lands are notified and subsequently all lands except two or three small pockets are deleted without any valid ground, the persons whose lands were acquired can also seek deletion, on the ground that all the· D surrounding lands have been deleted. Court cannot direct deletion merely because the surrounding lands were deleted, as those deletions were illegal and not based on any valid policy. But the petitioners can contend that the very purpose of acquisition had been rendered infructuous by deletion of the majority of lands from the proposed acquisition, and the project or the scheme has ceased to exist and cannot be executed only with reference to their lands. In such a case, relief can be granted not on the ground that there has been discrimination, but on the ground that the proposed development scheme became non-existent on account of most of the lands being deleted from acquisition. Therefore, a land owner is not entitled to seek deletion of his land from acquisition, merely on the ground that lands of some others have been deleted. He should make out a justifiable cause for deleting his land from acquisition. If the Rules/ Scheme/Policy provides for deletion of certain categories of land and if the petitioner falls under those categories, he will be entitled to relief. But if under the Rules or Scl1.cme or policy H

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE · 149 DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.] for deletion, his land is not eligible for deletion, his land cannot be deleted merely on the ground that some other land similarly situated had been deleted (even though that land also did not fall under any category eligible to be deleted), as that would amount to enforcing negative equality. But where large extents of land of others are indiscriminately and arbitrarily deleted, then the court may grant relief, if on accou11t of such deletions, the development scheme for.Jhat area has become inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme. Alternatively, if a common factor can, ~e identified in respect of other lands which were deleted, and~lf the petitioner's land c also has that common factor, relief ~an be granted on the ground that the Authority had adopted the common factor as the criterion in the case of others and therefore adopting the same yardstick, the land of petitioners also should be deleted. These principles may be kept in view while implementing 0 direction in para 105D(i)(f) of the Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court.

83Copy pinpoint83. It is necessary to refer another aspect of land acquisition for urban development. 'Public purposes' may be of different degrees of import.ance/priority/urgency. An E acquisition for laying a road or a water supply canal may be of higher priority category when compared to acquisitions for formation of an urban residential layout. Planned urban development \by forming residential layouts, is carried out not only by statutory development authorities, but also by private developers/ colonisers. The reason why legislature has created Development Authorities for executing 9evelopment schemes, is because they can undertakENarge scale developments · providing better quality facilities with no profit motives. But in trying to achieve planned development and thereby benefit the urban middle class or urban poor by providing them housing plots, the interests of agriculturists/land owners who lose their livelihood on account of such acquisition, should not be ignored. Though the legislature intended that the land-loser should get reasonable compensation at the time of dispossession or H

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A immediately thereafter, it seldom happens in practice. This court had occasion to refer to the travails of land-losers in getting the compensation in Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Mahaboob [2009 (3) SCALE 263] thus:

"The Collector (LAO) is supposed to offer fair B compensation by taking all relevant circumstances relating to market value into account. To safeguard the interests of the land-loser, the Act requires the collector to make the award before the land owner is dispossessed. The intention is that the land-loser will immediately be able to c draw compensation and purchase some other suitable land or make appropriate arrangements for his livelihood. But in practice the Collectors (LAOs) seldom make reasonable offers. They tend to err on the 'safer' side and invariably assess very low compensation. Such meagre awards force the land-loser to seek reference to civil court for increase in compensation in regard to almost every award made by the LAO. In fact, many a time, even the reference courts are conservative in estimating the market value and it requires further appeals by the land-loser to the High Court and Supreme Court to get just compensation for the land. We can take judicial notice of the fact that in several States the awards of the reference court or the judgments of the High Court and this court increasing the compensation, are not complied with and the land-losers are again driven to courts to initiate time consuming execution process (which also involves considerable expense by way of lawyers fee) to recover what is justly due. Resultantly the land-losers seldom get a substantial portion of proper compensation for their land in one lump sum immediately after the acquisition. The effect may be highlighted by the following illustration:

"A farmer owns 3 acres of land in a village, which is his sole means of livelihood. The land is acquired for some project in the year 1990. The true market value of the land H

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DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

was around Rs.1,50,000/- per acre in 1990. If he got the ·A said price, that is, Rs. 4,50,000/- with solatium, additional amount and interest in the year 1991, he has a reasonable opportunity of purchasing some alternative land, so that he can eke out his livelihood and continue to live with dignity. But this rarely happens in practice. The final notification is B made in 1992 and the LAO makes an award in the year 1993 offering Rs.50,000/- per acre. So the land-loser is constrained to seek a reference to the court. The reference court takes three to four years to decide the reference and increases the compensation to Rs. one lakh per acre in c the year 1996. The increased amount is dP.posited in 1997-

1998. The land-loser is constrained to file a further appeal to the High Court and the High Court takes another three to four years and increases the compensation to Rs.1.5 lakh per acre in the year 2000 and such increase is 0 deposited in the year 2001-02. That is, the loser is forced to fight at least in two courts to get the compensation commensurate with the market value of Rs.1.5 lakhs per acre. To add to his woes, when the reference court or the High Court increases the compensation, the Government does not pay the increased amount immediately and drives E him to execution proceedings also. This means that the land owner gets compensation piecemeal, that is, Rs. 50,000/- per acre in 1993, another Rs. 50,000/- per acre in 1997-98, and another Rs.50,000/- per acre in 2001-02. At every stage he has to incur expenses for litigation. As F he does not get the full compensation in one lump sum, he is not in a position to purchase an alternative land. When the land is acquired, he loses his means of livelihood, as he knows no other type of work. The result is, he is forced to spend the compensation received in piecemeal, on sustenance of his family when he fights the legal battles for increasing the compensation and for recovering the increases granted, by levying execution. The result is that whatever compensation is received piecemeal, gets spent for the sustenance of the family, and H

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A litigation cost during the course of prolonged litigation. At the end of the legal battle, he is hardly left with any money to purchase alternative land and by then the prices of land would have also increased manifold, making it impossible to purchase even a fraction of the land which he originally 8 possessed. Illiteracy, ignorance, and lack of counselling add to his woes and the piecemeal compensation is dissipated leaving him with neither land, nor money to buy alternative land, nor any means of livelihood. In short, he is stripped of his land and livelihood." c 84. Frequent complaints and grievances in regard to the following five areas, with reference to the prevailing system of acquisitions governed by Land Acquisition Act, 1894, requires the urgent attention of the state governments and development authorities: D (i) absence of proper or adequate survey and planning before embarking upon acquisition;

(ii) indiscriminate use of emergency provisions in section 17 of the LA Act; E . (iii) notification of areas far larger than what is actually required, for acquisition, and then making arbitrary deletions and withdrawals from the acquisitions;

F (iv) offer of very low amount as compensat - 1-., ;i,i'.'l Acquisition Collectors, necessitating refe1:.. .:;es to court in almost all cases;

(v) inordinate delay in payment of compensation; and

G (vi) absence of any rehabilitatory measures.

While the plight of project oustees and landlosers affected by acquisition for industries has been frequently highlighted in the media, there has been very little effort to draw attention to the

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 153

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.] plight of farmers affected by frequent acquisitions for urban development.

85Copy pinpoint85. There are several avenues for providing rehabilitation and economic security to landlosers. They can be by way of offering employment, allotment of alternative lands, providing s housing or house plots, providing safe investment opportunities for the compensation amount to generate a stable income, or providing a permanent regular income by way of annuities. The nature of benefits to the landlosers can vary depending upon the nature of the acquisition. For this limited purpose, the acquisitions can be conveniently divided into three broad categories:

(i) Acquisitions for the benefit of the general public or in national interest. This will include acquisitions for roads, bridges, water supply projects, power projects, defence establishments, residential colonies for rehabilitation of victims of natural calamities.

(ii) Acquisitions for economic development and industrial growth. This will include acquisitions for Industrial Layouts/ E Zones, corporations owned or controlled by the State, expansion of existing industries, and setting up Special Economic Zones.

(iii) Acquisitions for planned development of urban areas. This will include acquisitions for formation of residential layouts and construction of apartment Blocks, for allotment to urban middle class and urban poor, rural poor etc.

86Copy pinpoint86. In acquisitions falling under the first category, the general public are the direct beneficiaries. In the second category, the beneficiaries are industrial or business houses, though ultimately, there will be indirect benefit to the public by way of generation of employment and overall economic development. In the third category, the beneficiaries are individual members of public who, on account of allotment of H

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A plots/flats, will be able to lead a better quality of life by having a shelter with comforts, apart from the fact that the planned development of cities and towns is itself in public interest. At present, irrespective of the purpose, in all cases of acquisition, the landloser gets only monetary compensation. Acquisitions B of the first kind, does not normally create any resistance or hostility. But in acquisitions of the second kind, where the beneficiaries of acquisition are industries, business houses or private sector companies and in acquisitions of the third kind where the beneficiaries are private individuals, there is a c general feeling among the land-losers that their lands are taken away, to benefit other classes of people; that these amount to robbing Peter to pay Paul; that their lands are given to .others for exploitation or enjoyment, while they are denied their land and their source of livelihood. When this grievance and 0 resentment remains unaddressed, it leads to unrest and agitations. The solution is to make the land-losers also the beneficiaries of acquisition so that the land-losers do not feel alienated but welcome the acquisition.

87Copy pinpoint87. It is necessary to evolve tailor-made schemes to suit E particular acquisitions, so that they will be smooth, speedy, litigation free and beneficial to all concerned. Proper planning, adequate counselling, and timely mediation with different groups of landlosers, should be resorted. Let us consider the different types of benefits that will make acquisitions land:oser- F friendly.

(87.1) In acquisitions of the first kind (for benefit of general public or in national interest) the question of providing any benefit other than what is presently provided in the Land G Acquisition Act, 1894 may not be feasible. The State should however ensure that the landloser gets reasonable compensation promptly at the time of dispossession, so that he can make alternative arrangemel)ts for his rehah!litation and survival.

H (87.2) Where the acquisition /is for industrial or business

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 155

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.] houses (for setting-up industries or special economic zones etc.), the Government should play not only the role of a land acquirer but also the role of the protector of the land-losers. As most of the agriculturists/small holders who lose their land, do not have the expertise or the capacity for a negotiated settlement, the state should act as a benevolent trustee and safeguard their interests. The Land Acquisition Collectors should also become Grievance Settlement Authorities. The various alternatives including providing employment, providing equity participation, providing annuity benefits ensuring a regular income for life, providing rehabilitation in the form of housing or new businesses, should be considered and whichever is found feasible or suitable, should be made an integral process of the scheme of such acquisitions. If the government or Development Authorities act merely as facilitators for industrial or business houses, mining companies and developers or colonisers, to acquire large extent of land ignoring the legitimate rights of land-owners, it leads to resistance, resentment and hostility towards acquisition process.

(87.3) Where the acquisition is of the third kind, that is, for urban development (either by formation of housing colonies by Development Authorities or by making bulk allotment to colonisers, developers or housing societies), there is no scope for providing benefits like employment or a share in the equity. But the landlosers can be given a share in the development itself, by making available a reasonable portion of the developed land to the landloser so that he can either use it personally or dispose of a part and retain a part or put it to other beneficial use. We may give by way of an illustration a model scheme for large scale acquisitions for planned urban development by forming residential layouts: Out of the total acquired area, 30% of the land area can be earmarked for roads and footpaths; and 15% to 10% for parks, open spaces and civic amenities. Out of the remaining 55% to 60% area available for forming plots, the Development Authority can H

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] e S.C.R. A auction 10% area as plots, allot 15% area as plot• to urban middle class and allot 15% area aa plot8 to ~~6nomically weaker sections (at cost or subsidised cost), and release the remaining 15% to 20% area in the form of plots to the land- lose rs whose lands have been acquired, in lieu of compensation. {The percentages mentioned above are me~ly illustrative and can vary from scheme to 8eheme depending upon the local conditions, relevant Bye-laws/Rules, value of ma acquired land, the estimated cost of devetoph1ent etc.). Such a model makes the land·loser a stake-holder and direct beneficiary of the acquisition leading to co-operation for the urban development scheme.

88Copy pinpoint88. In the preceding para, we have touched upon matters that may be considered to be in the realm of government policy. We have referred to them as acquisition of lands affect the vital rights of farmers and give rise to considerable litigations and agitations. Our suggestions and observations are intended to draw attention of the government and development Authorities to some probable solutions to the vex~d problems associated with land acquisition, existence of which can neither be denied nor disputed, and to alleviate the hardships of the land owners. It may be possible for the government and development authorities to come up With better solutions. There is also a need for the Law Commission and the Parliament to revisit the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is more than a century old. F There is also a need to remind Development Authorities that they exist to serve the people and not vice versa. We have come across Development Authorities which resort to 'developmental activities' by acquiring lands and forming layouts, not with the goal of achieving planned development or G provide plots at reasonable costs in well formed layouts, but to provide work to their employees and generate funds for payment of salaries. Any development scheme should be· to benefit the society and improve the city, and not to benefit the development authority. Be that as it may. H

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 157

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

89Copy pinpoint89. When BOA prepares a development Scheme it is requited to conduct an initial survey about the availability and suitability of the lands to be acquired. While acquiring 16 villages at a stretch, if in respect of any of the villages, about 30% area of the village is not included in the notification under section 4(1) though available for acquisition, and out of the remaining 70% area which is notified, more than half (that is about 40% of the village area) is deleted when final notification is issued, and the acquisition is only of 30% area which is non- contiguous, it means that there was no proper survey or application of mind when formulating the development sch'eme c or that the deletions were for extraneous or arbitrary reasons. Inclusion of the land of a person in an acquisition notification, is a traumatic experience for tne landowner, particularly if he was eking out his ljvelihood Jrom that land. If large areas are notified and then large extents are to b.e .deleted, it breeds 0 corruption and nepotism among officials. lt also .creates hostility, mutual distrust and disharmony among the villagers, dividing them on the lines of 'those who can influence and get their lands deleted' and 'those who cannot'. Touts and middlemen flaunting political connections flourish, extracting money for getting lands E deleted. Why subject a large number to citizens to such traumatic experience? Why not plan properly before embarking upon acquisition process? In this case, out of the four villages included at the final stages of finalising the development scheme, irregularities have been found at least in regard to three villages, thereby emphasising the need for proper planning F · and survey before embarking upon acquisition.

90Copy pinpoint90. Where arbitrary and unexplained deletions and exclusions from acquisition, of large extents of notified lands, render the acquisitions meaningless, or totally unworkable, the G court will have no alternative but to quash the entire acquisition. But where many landlosers have accepted the acquisition and received the compensation, and where possession of considerable portions of acquired lands has already been . taken, and development activities have been carried out by . H

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A laying plots and even making provisional or actual allotments, those factors have to be taken note of, while granting relief. The Division Bench has made an effort to protect the interests of all parties, on the fact and circumstances, by issuing detailed directions. But implementation of these directions may lead to B further litigations and complications. To salvage the acquisition : and to avoid hardships to BDA and its allottees and to avoid prolonged further round litigations emanating from the directions of the High Court, a more equitable way would be to uphold the decision of the division bench, but subject BDA's actions c to certain corrective m~asures by requiring it to re-examine certain aspects and provide an option to the landlosers to secure some additional benefit, as an incentive to accept the acquisition. A direction to provide an option to the land-losers to seek allotment of developed plots in lieu of compensation or to provide for preferential allotment of some plots at the 0 prevailing market price in addition to compensation will meet the ends of justice. Such directions will not be in conflict with the BOA (Allotment of sites) Rules, as they are intended to save the acquisitions. If the acquisitions are to be quashed in entirety by accepting the challenges to the acquisition on the ground of arbitrary deletions and exclusions, there may be no development scheme at all, thereby putting BDA to enormous loss. The directions of the High Court and this Court are warranted by the peculiar facts of the case and are not intended to be general directions applicable to regular acquisitions in accordance with law, without any irregularities.

Conclusion

91Copy pinpoint91. In view of the foregoing, we affirm the directions of the G Division Bench subject to the following further directions and clarifications:

(i) In regard to the acquisition of lands in Kempapura and Srirampura, BDA is directed to re-consider the objections to the acquisitions having regard to the fact that large areas were not initially notified for acquisition, and more

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 159

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.] than 50% of whatever that was proposed for acquisition was also subsequently deleted from acquisition. BOA has to consider whether in view of deletions to a large extent, whether development with respect to the balance of the acquired lands has become illogical and impractical, and if so, whether the balance area also should be deleted from B ,acquisition. If BOA proposes to continue the acquisition, it shall file a report within four months before the High Court so that consequential orders could be passed.

(ii) In regard to villages of Venkateshapura, Nagavara, Hennur and Challakere where there are several very small pockets of acquired lands surrounded by lands which were not acquired or which were deleted from the proposed acquisition, BOA may consider whether such small pockets should also be deleted if they are not suitable for forming self contained layouts. The acquisition thereof cannot be justified on the ground that these small islands of acquired land, could be used as a stand alone park or playground in regard to a layout formed in different unconnected lands in other villages. Similar isolated pockets in other villages should also be dealt with in a E similar manner.

(iii) BOA shall give an option to each writ petitioner whose land has been acquired for Arkavathy layout:

(a) to accept allotment of 15% (fifteen percent) of the land F acquired from him, by way of developed plots, in lieu of compensation (any fractions in excess of 15% may be charged prevailing rates of allotment).

OR G (b) in cases where the extent of land acquired exceeds half an acre, to claim in addition to compensation (without prejudice to seek reference if he is not satisfied with the quantum), allotment of a plot measuring 30' x 40' for every H

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A half acre of land acquired at the prevailing allotment price.

(iv) Any allotment made by BOA, either by forming layouts or by way of bulk allotments, will be subjept to the above.

The appeals are disposed of accordingly. All pendiniJ B applications also stand disposed of.

K.K.T. Matters disposed of.