ASSOCIATION OF MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATE COLLEGES v. ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION & ORS.
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- Supreme Court of India
- Decided
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- Bench
- DR. B.S. CHAUHAN and V. GOPALA GOWDA
- Citation
- [2013] 6 S.C.R. 1054
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defined under clause (f) of Section 2 of the University A Grants Commission Act, 1956 and also to be inclusive of an institution deemed to be a university under Section 3 of the said Act. Section 10 of the Act enumerates the various powers and functions of AICTE as also its duties and obligations to take steps towards fulfilment of the B same. One such as envisaged in Section 10(1)(k) is to "grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned". Section 23, which empowers the Council to make regulations in the c manner ordained therein emphatically and specifically, mandates the making of such Regulations only "not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the Rules". The Act, for all purposes and throughout maintains the distinct identity and existence of "technical institutions" and D "universities" and it is in keeping tune with the said dichotomy that wherever the university or the activities of the university are also to be supervised or regulated and guided by AICTE, specific mention has been made of the university alongside the technical institutions and wherever E the university is to be left out and not to be roped in merely refers to the technical institution only in Sections 10, 11 and 22(2)(b). It is necessary and would be useful to advert to Sections 10(1)(c), (g), (o) which would go to show that universities are mentioned alongside the "technical institutions" and clauses (k), (m), (p), (q), (s) and (u) F wherein there is conspicuous omission of reference to universities, reference being made to technical institutions alone. It is equally important to see that when AICTE is empowered to inspect or cause to inspect any technical institution in clause (p) of sub-section (1) of Section 1O G without any reservation whatsoever, when it comes to the question of universities it is confined and limited to ascertaining the financial needs or its standards of teaching, examination and research. The inspection may be made or cause to be made of any department or H
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A departments only and that too, in such manner as may be prescribed as envisaged in Section 11 of the Act. Clause (t) of sub-section (1) of Section 10 envisages AICTE to only advise UGC for declaring any institution imparting technical education as a deemed university and not do any such B thing by itself. Likewise, clause (u) of the same provision which envisages the setting up of a National Board of Accreditation to periodically conduct evaluation of technical institutions or programmes on the basis of guidelines, norms and standards specified by it to make c recommendation to it, or to the Council, or to the Commission or to other bodies, regarding recognition or derecognition of the institution or the programme. All these vitally important aspects go to show that AICTE created under the Act is not intended to be an authority either superior to or supervise and control the universities and thereby superimpose itself upon such universities merely for the reason that it is imparting teaching in technical education or programmes in any of its departments or units. A careful scanning-through of the provisions of the AICTE Act and the provisions of the UGC Act in juxtaposition, will show that the role of AICTE vis-a-vis the universities is only advisory, recommendatory and a guiding factor and thereby subserves the cause of maintaining appropriate standards and qualitative norms and not as an authority empowered to issue and enforce any sanctions by itself, except submitting a report to UGC for appropriate action. The conscious and deliberate omission to enact any such provision in the AICTE Act in respect of universities is not only a positive indicator but should be also one of the determining factors in adjudging the status, role and activities of AICTE vis-a-vis universities and the activities and functioning of its departments and units. All these vitally important facets with so much glaring significance of the scheme underlying the Act and the language of the various provisions seem to have escaped the notice of the learned Judges, their otherwise well-
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merited attention and con~ideration in their proper and correct perspective. The ultra-activist view articulated in M. Sambasiva Rao case on the basis of supposed intention and imagined purpose of AICTE or the Act constituting it, is uncalled for and ought to have been avoided, all the more so when such an interpretation is not only bound to do violence to the language of the various provisions but also inevitably render other statutory authorities like. UGC and universities irrelevant or even as non-entities by making AICTE a superpower with a devastating role undermining the status, authority and autonomous c functioning of those institutions in areas and spheres assigned to them under the respective legislations constituting and governing them."
3838. Paragraphs 19 and 20 of Parashavananth Charitable Trust's case {supra) read as hereunder: D
"19. Section 10 of the AICTE Act enumerates various powers and functions of AICTE as also its duties and obligations to take steps towards fulfillment of the same. One such power as envisaged in Section 10{1){k) is to E "grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned". It is important to see that the AICTE is empowered to inspect or cause to inspect any technical institution in clause {p) of sub- F section (1) of Section 10 without any reservation whatsoever. However. when it comes to the question of universities. it is confined and limited to ascertaining the financial needs or its standards of teaching. examination and research. The inspection may be made or caused to G be made of any department or departments only and that too. in such a manner as may be prescribed. as envisaged in Section 11 of the AICTE Act.
20. All these vitally important aspects go to show that the Council {AICTE) created under the AICTE Act is not H
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Footnotes
(emphasis supplied) E The underlined portions from the said decision referred to supra would make it clear that the AICTE Act does not contain any evidence of an intention to belittle and destroy the authority or autonomy of other statutory bodies which they are assigned to perform. Further, the AICTE Act does not intend to be an authority either superior or to supervise or control the universities and thereby superimpose itself upon the said universities merely for the reason that it is laying down certain teaching standards in technical education or programmes formulated in any of the department or units. It is evident that while enacting the AICTE Act, the Parliament was fully alive to the existence of the provisions of UGC Act, 1956 particularly, the said provisions extracted above. Therefore, the definition in Section 2(h) technical institution in AICTE Act which authorizes the AICTE to do certain things, special care has H
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consciously and deliberately been taken to make specific A mention of university, wherever and whenever the AICTE alone was expected to interact with university and its departments as well as constituent institutions and units. It was held after analyzing the provision of Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the AICTE Act that the role of the inspection conferred upon the AICTE B vis-a-vis universities is limited to the purpose of ensuring proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education system so as to conform to the standard laid down by it with no further or direct control over such universities or scope for any direct action except bringing it to the notice of UGC. In that c background, this Court in Bharathidasan University case made it very clear by making the observation that it has examined the scope of the enactment as to whether the AICTE Act prevails over the UGC Act or the fact of competent entries fall in Entry 66 List I vis-a-vis Entry 25 of List Ill of the VII Schedule of the 0 Constitution. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid paragraphs of Bharathidasan University's case which are extracted above makes it very clear that this Court has exempted universities, its colleges, constituent institutions and units from seeking prior approval from the AICTE. Also, from the reading of paragraphs E 19 and 20 of Parashvanath Chartitable Trust case it is made clear after careful scanning of the provisions of the AICTE Act and the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 that the role of AICTE vis-a-vis universities is only advisory, recommendatory and one of providing guidance and has no authority empowering it to issue or enforce any sanctions by itself. It is rightly pointed out from the affidavit filed by UGC as directed by this Court in these cases on the question of affiliated colleges to the university, that the affidavit is very mechanical and it has simply and gratuitously without foundation, added as technical institutions including affiliated colleges without any legal foundation. In paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 19 of the Affidavit filed by the UGC and the assertion made in paragraph 23 is without any factual foundation, which reads as under:
"That it is further submitted that affiliated colleges are H
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A distinct and different than the constituent colleges. Thus, it cannot be said that constituent colleges also include affiliated colleges."
Further, the assertion of UGC as rightly pointed out by Dr. Dhavan in the written submission filed on behalf of the appellant 8 in CA No. 1145 of 2004 that the claim that UGC does not have any provision to grant approval of technical institution, is facile as it has already been laid down by this Court that the AICTE norms can be applied to the affiliated colleges through UGC. It can only advise the UGC for formulating the standard of education and other aspects to the UGC. In view of the law laid down in Bharathidasan University and Parashvanath Charitable Trust cases (supra), the learned senior counsel Dr. Dhavan has rightly submitted for rejection of the affidavit of the UGC, which we have to accept as the same is without any factual foundation and also contrary to the intent and object of the Act
3939. It is also relevant to refer to the exclusion of university from the definition of 'technical institution' as defined under section 2(h) of the AICTE Act. The Institution means an institution not being university, the applicability of bringing the university as defined under clause 2 (f) of UGC Act includes the institution deemed to be a university under Section 3 of the said Act and therefore the affiliated colleges are excluded from the purview of technical institution definition of the AICTE Act. The submission made on behalf of the colleges which are affiliated to the respective universities which are being run by the appellants in the connected appeals will also come within the purview of the university referred to in the above definition of technical institution. The above interpretation sought to be made by the learned senior counsel and another counsel is supported by the provisions of the UGC Act. Section 12A of the UGC Act clearly speaks of regulation of fees and provisions of donation in certain cases which refers to the phrase affiliation together with its grammatical variation included in relation to a
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college, recognition of such college by, association of such college with, and admission of such college to the privileges of universities. A careful reading of sub-sections (2)(c), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 12A of the UGC Act makes it abundantly clear about colleges which are required to be affiliated to run the courses for which sanction/approval will be accorded by the university or under the control and supervision of such universities. Therefore, affiliated colleges to the university/ universities are part of them and the exclusion of university in the definition of technical institution as defined in Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act must be extended to the affiliated colleges to c the university also, otherwise, the object and purpose of the UGC Act enacted by the Parliament will be defeated. The enactment of UGC Act is also traceable to Entry 66 of List I. The aforesaid provisions of the UGC Act have been examined by this Court with reference to the provisions of AICTE Act in D Bharathidasan University's case. Therefore, it has clearly laid down the principle that the role of the AICTE Act is only advisory in nature and is confined to submitting report or giving suggestions to the UGC for the purpose of implementing its suggestions to maintain good standards in technical education in terms of definition under Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act and to see that there shall be uniform education standard throughout the country to be maintained which is the laudable object of the AICTE Act for which it is enacted by the Parliament. The provisions of the AICTE Act shall be implemented through the UGC as the universities and its affiliated colleges are all governed by the provisions of the said Act under Section 12A of the UGC Act read with Rules Regulations that will be framed by the UGC in exercise of its power under Sections 25 and 26 of the said Act. Therefore, the conclusions arrived at in Bharathidasan University case is supported by the eleven G Judge Constitution Bench decision in T.M.A. Pai case (supra) wherein this Court has overruled the directions given in Unni Krishnan J.P. & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors6. to
6. 1993 (1) sec 645 . H •
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A the Central Government and others regarding the reservations and schemes. The relevant paragraphs of TM.A. Pai case read as under:-
"37. Unni Krishnan judgment has created certain problems, and raised thorny issues. In its anxiety to check B the commercialization of education, a scheme of "free" and "payment" seats was evolved on the assumption that the economic capacity of the first 50% of admitted students would be greater than the remaining 50%, whereas the converse has proved to be the reality. In this scheme, the c "payment seat" student would not only pay for his own seat, but also finance the cost of a "free seat" classmate. When one considers the Constitution Bench's earlier statement that higher education is not a fundamental right, it seems unreasonable to compel a citizen to pay for the education of another, more so in the unrealistic world of competitive examinations which assess the merit for the purpose of admission solely on the basis of the marks obtained, where the urban students always have an edge over the rural students. In practice, it has been the case of the marginally less merited rural or poor student bearing the burden of a rich and we/I-exposed urban student.
38. The scheme in Unni Krishnan case has the effect of nationalizing education in respect of important features viz. F the right of a private unaided institution to give admission and to fix the fee. By framing this scheme, which has led to the State Governments legislating in conformity with the scheme, the private institutions are indistinguishable from the government institutions; curtailing all the essential features of the right of administration of a private unaided G educational institution can neither be called fair nor reasonable. Even in the decision in Unni Krishnan case it has been observed by Jeevan Reddy, J., at p. 749, para 194, as follows:
H "194. The hard reality that emerges is that private
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educational institutions are a necessity in the present-day A context. It is not possible to do without them because the governments are in no position to meet the demand - particularly in the sector of medical and technical education which call for substantial outlays. While education is one of the most important functions of the B Indian State it has no monopoly therein. Private educational institutions - including minority educational institutions - too have a role to play."
It has been clearly held that the decision in Unni Krishnan's C case in so far as it framed the scheme relating to the grant of admission and the existing of fee, is not correct and the consequent directions given to UGC, AICTE and Medical Council of India, Central Government and the State Government etc. are overruled. It is worthwhile to mention paragraphs 29 and 31 of the UGC Report of the University Education D Commission headed by late Dr. S. Radhakrishnan as its Chairman and nine other renowned educationists as its members. The report which is extracted at paragraph 51 in the said T.M.A. Pai case reads thus: E "51. A University Education Commission was appointed on 4-11-1948, having Dr S. Radhakrishnan as its Chairman and nine other renowned educationists as its members. The terms of reference, inter alia, included matters relating to means and objects of university F education and research in India and maintenance of higher standards of teaching and examination in universities and colleges under their control. In the report submitted by this Commission, in paras 29 and 31, it referred to autonomy in education which reads as follows: G "University autonomy.-Freedom of individual development is the basis of democracy. Exclusive control of education by the State has been an important factor in facilitating the maintenance of totalitarian tyrannies. In such States institutions of higher learning controlled and H
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A managed by governmental agencies act like mercenaries, promote the political purposes of the State, make them acceptable to an increasing number of their population and supply them with the weapons they need. We must resist, in the interests of our own democracy, the trend towards B the governmental domination of the educational process.
Higher education is, undoubtedly, an obligation of the State but State aid is not to be confused with State control over academic policies and practices. Intellectual progress demands the maintenance of the spirit of free inquiry. The c pursuit and practice of truth regardless of consequences has been the ambition of universities. Their prayer is that of the dying Goethe: 'More light', or that of Ajax in the mist 'Light, though I perish in the light.'
D • • • The respect in which the universities of Great Britain are held is due to the freedom from governmental interference which they enjoy constitutionally and actually. Our universities should be released from the control of politics. E Liberal education.-All education is expected to be liberal. It should free us from the shackles of ignorance, prejudice and unfounded belief. If we are incapable of achieving the good life, it is due to faults in our inward F being, to the darkness in us. The process of education is the slow conquering of this darkness. To lead us from darkness to light, to free us from every kind of domination except that of reason, is the aim of education."
G Para 71 of the said decision, which deals with the rights of the private aided non-minority professional institutions, is extracted hereunder:
"Private aided professional institutions (non-minority)
H 71. While giving aid to professional institutions, it would
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be permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe by A rules or regulations, the conditions on the basis of which admission will be granted to different aided colleges by virtue of merit, coupled with the reservation policy of the State. The merit may be determined either through a common entrance test conducted by the university or the B Government followed by counselling, or on the basis of an entrance test conducted by individual institutions - the method to be followed is for the university or the Government to decide. The authority may also devise other means to ensure that admission is granted to an aided c professional institution on the basis of merit. In the case of such institutions, it will be permissible for the Government or the university to provide that consideration should be shown to the weaker sections of the society."
At paragraph 72 in the said judgment, it has been held that D once aid is granted to a private professional educational institution, the Government or the State agency, as a condition of the grant of aid, can put fetters on the freedom in the matter of administration and management of the institution. It is stated as under: E
"72 .............. The State, which gives aid to an educational institution, can impose such conditions as are necessary for the proper maintenance of the high standards of education as the financial burden is shared by the State. F The State would also be under an obligation to protect the interest of the teaching and non-teaching staff. In many States, there are various statutory provisions to regulate the functioning of such educational institutions where the States give, as a grant or aid, a substantial proportion of G the revenue expenditure including salary, pay and allowances of teaching and non-teaching staff. It would be its responsibility to ensure that the teachers working in those institutions are governed by proper service conditions. The State, in the case of such aided H
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A institutions, has ample power to regulate the method of selection and appointment of teachers after prescribing requisite qualifications for the same. Ever since In Re, Kera/a Education Bill, 1957 this Court has upheld, in the case of aided institutions, those regulations that served the B interests of students and teachers. Checks on the administration may be necessary in order to ensure that the administration is efficient and sound and will serve the academic needs of the institutions. In other words, rules and regulations that promote good administration and c prevent maladministration can be formulated so as to promote the efficiency of teachers, discipline and fairness in administration and to preserve harmony among affiliated institutions. At the same time it has to be ensured that even an aided institution does not become a government-owned and controlled institution. Normally, the aid that is granted is relatable to the pay and allowances of the teaching staff. In addition, the management of the private aided institutions has to incur revenue and capital expenses. Such aided institutions cannot obtain that extent of autonomy in relation to management and administration as would be available to a private unaided institution, but at the same time, it cannot also be treated as an educational institution departmentally run by Government or as a wholly owned and controlled government institution and interfere with constitution of the governing bodies or thrusting the staff without reference to management."
4040. A reading of the aforesaid paragraphs extracted from TMA Pai's case makes it very clear that in view of decision of the eleven Judges Constitution Bench of this Court, the scheme framed under the Unni Krishnan's case has been overruled. Therefore, the autonomy of the university is recognized in the said case and the object and intendment of the Parliament in excluding the universities from the definition of technical institution as defined under Section 2{h) of the AICTE Act H makes is explicitly clear, after scanning the definition of
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education institution with reference to the exclusion of universities and Sections 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the AICTE Act. The object of the statutory enactment made by the Parliament has been succinctly examined by this Court in Bharathidasan University and Parshvanath Charitable Trust cases referred to supra therefore they have rightly made observations that the role of the AICTE Act in view of the UGC Act and the powers and functions conferred by the UGC for controlling and regulating the universities and its affiliated colleges has been explicitly conferred upon the UGC. Hence, they have been given the power to regulate such universities and regulations in relation c to granting sanctions/approvals and also maintaining educational standards and over-seeing the prescription of the fee structure including the admission of students in various courses and programmes that will be conducted by the university and its institutions, constituent colleges, units and the D affiliated colleges. Therefore, we have to hold that the Bharathidasan University case (supra) on all fours be applicable to the fact situation of these appeals and we have to apply the said principle in the cases in hand whereas in the decisions of Adhiyaman Education and Research Institute E case and Jaya Gokul Education Trusfs case (supra) this Court has not examined the cases from the aforesaid perspective. Therefore, the same cannot be applied to the fact situation. The reliance placed upon those judgments by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the AICTE is misplaced. F Accordingly, point nos.1 and 2 are answered in favour of the appellants.
Answer to Point No.3
4141. Learned senior counsel for AICTE, Mr. Rakesh G Dwivedi, with reference to the definition of technical education under the provisions of the AICTE Act, urged that the definition of engineering and technology has to be construed and interpreted to bring MCA course under its fold in view of the H
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A meaning assigned to those words occurred in the definition clause by placing reliance on the different dictionaries, which are extracted as hereunder:
As per the Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary, 'Technology' means: 8 "(1) Theoretical knowledge of industry and the industrial arts.
(2) The application of science to the arts. c (3) That branch of ethnology which treats of the development of the arts''.
Wharton's Law Lexicon defines 'Technology' as:
D "any information (including information embodied in software) other than information in the public domain, that is capable of being used in- (i) the development, production or use of any goods or software; (ii) the development of, or the carrying out of, an industrial or commercial activity or the provision of a service of any kind. Explanation, when technology is described wholly or partly by reference to the uses to which it (or the goods to which it relates) may be put, it shall include services which are provided or used, or which are capable of being used, in the development, production or use of such technology or goods. [Weapons of Mass Destruction and their delivery system ... ]. Means a branch of knowledge; the knowledge and means used to produce the material necessities of a society .... "
G Further, Encyclopedia Law Lexicon presents 'Technology' as:
"any information (including information embodied in software) other than information in the public domain, that is capable of being used in- (i) the development production H or use of any goods or software; (ii) the development of,
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or the carrying out of, an industrial or commercial activity A or the provision of a service of any kind. [Section 4(1), The Weapons of Mass Destruction and their delivery system (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities Act, 2005)."
The New Shorter Oxford English dictionary defines 'Technology' B as:
"1 (a) The branch of knowledge that deals with the mechanical arts of applied sciences; a discourse or treaties on (one of) these subjects, orig. on an art or arts. (b). The terminology of a particular subject; technical C nomenclature. 2(a). The mechanical arts or applied sciences collectively; the application of (any of) these. (b). A particular mechanical art or applied science."
Further, 'Technology', in Advanced Law Lexicon is defined as D
"any special or technical knowledge or any special service required for any purpose whosoever by an industrial concern under any foreign collaboration, and includes designs, drawings, publication and technical personnel." E and 'knowledge' is defined in the same dictionary as
"the means and methods of producing goods and services, or the application of science to production or distribution, resulting in the creation of new products, new F manufacturing processes, or more efficient methods of distribution. (WTO)."
The meaning of Engineering as given in Dictionaries are read as under: G Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary - Engineering - Enginering in the broader sense, is that branch of human endeavour by which the forces of nature are brought under human control and the properties of matter made useful in structures and machines" H
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A Advanced Law Lexicon - The activity or the functions of an Engineer; the science by which the properties of matter and the sources of energy in nature are made useful to man in structures, machines and products; relating to engineering. B The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary - The work done by or the occupation of, an engineer, the application of the science for directly useful purposes as, construction, propulsion, communication or manufacture. The action of working artfully to bring something about. A field of study c or activity concerned with deliberate alteration or modification in some particular area.
Law Lexicon - The activity or the functions of an engineer; the science by which the properties of matter and the sources of energy in nature are made useful to man in structures, machines and products."
4242. The above meanings of the words 'technology' and 'engineering' as per the dictionaries referred to supra would clearly go to show that MCA also comes within the definition of technology. Therefore, the contention that technical education includes MCA as raised by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the AICTE stand to its reasoning and logic in view of the nature of MCA course which is being imparted to the students at post graduation level which is being conducted by the institutions, constituent colleges and affiliated colleges to the universities. The same is a technical education and therefore, it comes within the definition of technical education but for its proper conduct of courses and regulation the role of AICTE must be advisory and for the same, a note shall be given to the UGC for its implementation by it but not the AICTE. Accordingly, point no.3 is answered in favour of respondent AICTE.
4343. As per definition of 'technical education' under Section H 2(g) of the AICTE Act and non production of a: 1y material by
. ASSON. OF MAGMT. OF PVT. COLLEGES v. ALL INDIA 1121 COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
the AICTE to show that MBA course is a technical education, A we hold that MBA course is not a technical course within the definition of the AICTE Act and in so far as reasons assigned for MCA course being 'technical education', the same does not hold for MBA course. Therefore, for the reasons assignkd while answering the points which are framed in so far as the MCA B course is concerned, the approval from the AICTE is not required for obtaining permission and running MBA course by the appellant colleges.
4444. So far as point nos.4 and 5 are concerned, the amended Regulation Nos. 8(c) and 8(iv) of 2000 were introduced by the AICTE in exercise of its power under section 10(k) of AICTE Act by adding the MBA and MCA courses within the purview of the provisions of AICTE as it is included in the Regulation as a technical education. It is the case made out by learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Prashant Bhushan that the amended Regulation has not been placed before the Parliament which is mandatory as per the provisions of Section 24 of the AICTE Act, the said contention has not been disputed by the AICTE in these cases. The provision of Section 24 reads fu• E "24. Rules and regulations to be laid before Parliament:- Every rule and every regulation made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirly days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and it before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions, aforesaid, both Houses agree that the rule or regulation should not be made, the rule or regulation shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule or regulation." H
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A The position of law is well settled by this Court that if the Statute prescribes a particular procedure to do an act in a particular way, that act must be done in that manner, otherwise it is not at all done. In the case of Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kera/a 7 , after referring to this Court's earlier decisions and B Privy Council and Chancellors Court, it was held as under:
"31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor c v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor-who stated as under:
32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep D Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognised as a salutary principle of administrative law."
In view of the above said decision, not placing the amended Regulations on the floor of the Houses of Parliament as required under Section 24 of the AICTE Act vitiates the amended Regulations in law and hence the submissions· made on behalf of the appellants in this regard deserve to be accepted. Accordingly, point Nos. 4 and 5 are answered in favour of the appellants.
4545. In so far as point no.6 is concerned, the law laid down in Bharathidasan University case, for the reasons recorded by us while answering point nos.1 and 2 in favour of the appellants, the said decision on all fours be applicable. We have
H 7. 1999 (3) sec 422.
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distinguished Adhiyaman Education and Research Institute A and Jaya Gokul Educational Trust cases from Bharathidasan University case in the reasoning portion while answering point nos.1 and 2. Therefore, the said two cases need not be applied to the present case. B
4646. For the foregoing reasons, the common impugned . judgment and order passed in W.A. 2652 of 2001, W.A. No. 3090 of 2001, WA 2835 of 2001, WA 3087 of 2001, WA 2836 of 2001, WA 3091 of 2001, WA 3092 of 2001, WA 2837 of 2001, WA 3088 of 2001, WA 2838 of 2001 and WA 3089 of 2001 is hereby set aside. The civil appeals are allowed. The C relief sought for in the Writ Petitions is granted in so far as not to seek approval from the AICTE for MBA and MCA courses are concerned.
There will be no order as to costs. D B.B.B. Appeals allowed.
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