AMARENDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA & ORS. v. STATE OF ORISSA & ORS.

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A that Stipendiary Engineers later appointed as ad hoc Assistant Engineers were a class by themselves and any benefit to them under the impugned Enactment could not be grudged by in- service Junior Engineers no matter the latter had in anticipation of the amendment to the recruitment rules also got appointed B as ad hoc Assistant Engineers.

53Copy pinpoint53. Coming then to the question of "under inclusion" we need to keep in mind that a challenge based on "under inclusion" is not readily accepted by Courts. Constitution C Bench's decision of this Court in State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad and Anr. (1974) 4 SCC 656, dealt with the question of a classification which was under inclusive and declared that having regard to the real difficulties under which legislatures operate, the Courts have refused to strike down legislations on the ground that they are under inclusive. The Court observed:

55. A classification is under-inclusive when all who are included in the class are tainted with the mischief but there are others also tainted whom the classification does not include. In other words, a classification is bad as under- inclusive when a State benefits or burdens persons in a manner that furthers a legitimate purpose but does not confer the same benefit or place the same burden on others who are similarly situated. A classification is over- F inclusive when it includes not only those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose but others who are not so situated as well. In other words, this type of classification imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those attended with mischief at which the law aims. Herod ordering the death of all male children born on a particular day because one of them would some day bring about his downfall employed such a classification.

56. The first question, therefore, is, whether the exclusion of establishments carrying on business or trade and

AMARENDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA & ORS. v. 1085 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. [TS. THAKUR, J.] employing less than 50 persons makes the classification under-inclusive, when it is seen that all factories employing 10 or 20 persons, as the case may be, have been included and that the purpose of the law is to get in unpaid accumulations for the welfare of the labour. Since the classification does not include all who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law, the classification might appear, at first blush, to be unreasonable. But the Court has recognised the verv real difficulties under which legislatures operate - difficulties arising out of both the nature of the legislative process and of the society which c legislation attempts perennially to re-shape - and it has refused to strike down indiscriminately all legislation embodying classificatory inequality here under consideration. Mr. Justice Holmes. in urging tolerance of under- inclusive classifications, stated that such legislation 0 should not be disturbed by the Court unless it can clearly see that there is no fair reason for the law which would not require with equal force its extension to those whom it leaves untouched."

(emphasis supplied) E

54Copy pinpoint54. The above was followed by this Court in The Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Girish Kumar Navalakha and Ors. (1975) 4 SCC 754 where this Court held that some sacrifice of absolute F equality may be required in order that legal system may preserve the flexibility to evolve new solutions to social and economic problems. This Court -said:

"8. Often times the courts hold that under-inclusion does not deny the equal protection of laws under Article 14. In G strict theory, this involves an abandonment of the principle that classification must include all who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose. This under- inclusion is often explained by saying that the legislature is free to remedy parts of a mischief or to recognize H

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A degrees of evil and strike at the harm where it thinks it most acute.

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10. There are two main considerations to justify an under- B inclusive classification. First, administrative necessity. Second, the legislature might not be fully convinced that the particular policy which it adopts will be fully successful or wise. Thus to demand application of the policy to all whom it might logically encompass would restrict the c opportunity of a State to make experiment. These techniques would show that some sacrifice of absolute equality may be required in order that the legal system may preseP/e the flexibility to evolve new solutions to social and economic problems. The gradual and piecemeal change is often regarded as desirable and legitimate though in principle it is achieved at the cost of some equality. It would seem that in fiscal and regulatory matters the court not only entertains a greater presumption of constitutionality but also places the burden on the party challenging its validity to show that it has no reasonable basis for making the classification."

55Copy pinpoint55. The above decisions were followed in Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1984) 3 SCC 127 where this Court observed: F "... Article 14 does not prevent legislature from introducing a reform i.e. by applying the legislation to some institutions or objects or areas only according to the exigency of the situation and further classification of selection can be sustained on historical reasons or reasons of administrative exigency or piecemeal method of introducing reforms. The law need not apply to all the persons in the sense of having a universal application to all persons. A law can be sustained if it deals equally with the people of well-defined class-employees of

AMARENDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA & ORS. v. 1087 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.] insurance companies as such and such a law is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it had no application to other persons."

56Copy pinpoint56. We have in the light of the above no hesitation in holding that the legislation under challenge does not suffer from 8 any constitutional infirmity and that the High Court was in error in having struck it down.

57Copy pinpoint57. Having said that we are of the opinion that even when the challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned enactment fails, the degree holder Junior Engineers currently C working as ad hoc Assistant Engineers are entitled to the relief of regularisation in service, having regard to the fact that they have rendered long years of service as Assistant Engineers on ad hoc basis for 17 to 18 years in some cases. While it is true that those in service degree holders working as Junior D Engineers were not the beneficiaries of the legislation under challenge, the fact remains, that they were eligible for appointment as Assistant Engineers on account of their being degree holders. It is also not in dispute that they were appointed against substantive vacancies in the cadre of Assistant E Engineers no matter by utilizing the direct recruit quota. Even in the case of Stipendiary Engineers the vacancies were utilized out of the 67% quota meant for direct recruitment. What is, however, significant is that the utilization of the quota reserved for direct recruitment for appointing Stipendiary and F Junior Engineers as Assistant Engineers has not been assailed either before the High Court or before us. On the contrary the contention urged on behalf of Junior Engineers degree holders who are still working as Junior Engineers was that the remainder of vacancies comprising 5% of the cadre strength G should be utilised to appoint the eligible degree holder Junior Engineers. We shall presently deal with that contention. Suffice it to say for the present that the appointments granted to degree holder Junior Engineers as Assistant Engineers on ad hoc basis were pursuant to a Government decision whereunder H

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A such degree holders as were already in-service as Junior Engineers, were also given an opening for upward- movement. Appointment of such degree holders was not grudged by their diploma holder colleagues as no challenge was mounted by them to such appointments ostensibly because degree holder B Junior Engineers were getting appointed without in the least affecting the quota of 33% reserved for the promotees. In a way the upward movement of the. degree holders as Assistant Engineers brightened the chances of the rest to get promoted at their turn in the promotees quota. All told, the Junior c Engineers have served for almost a lifetime and held substantive vacancies no matter on ad hoc basis. To revert them at this distant point of time would work hardship to them. Besides, we cannot ignore the march of events especially the fact that Stipendaries appointed at a later point of time with the 0 same qualifications and pursuant to the very same Government policy as took shape for both the categories, have been regularised by the Government through the medium of a legislation. That this Court can suitably mould the relief, was not in serious controversy before us. In the circumstances, we hold the degree holder Junior Engineers currently working as E Assistant Engineers on ad hoc basis writ petitioners in the High Court entitled to the relief of regularisation with effect from the same date as the Validation Act granted such regularisation to the Stipendiary Engineers.

58Copy pinpoint58. We shall advert to the question of inter se seniority between the two categories while we take up question No.3. But before we turn to question No.3 we need to briefly deal with the contention urged on behalf of some of the degree holder Junior Engineers represented by Mr. Dholakia who contended that since the Government resolution had provided for 5% quota for degree holder Junior Engineers the Government was duty bound to make appointments against that quota. It was urged that the cadre strength of the Assistant Engineers had not been presently determined by the Government nor were the figures given by the State Government accurate. The number of Junior

AMARENDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA & ORS. v. 1089 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.] Engineers who should have got appointed against 5% quota reserved for them would have been large, agreed Mr. Dholakia. To the extent of shortfall the State Government was bound to continue the process of appointment, contended the learned counsel. B

59Copy pinpoint59. There is, in our opinion, no merit in the submissions urged by Mr. Dholakia and by learned counsel for some of the interveners. We. say so because the quota which the Government resolution proposed to carve out never fructified by a corresponding amendment of the Service Rules. As noticed in the earlier part of this order, the Orissa Public C Service Commission was not agreeable to the reservation of a quota for the subordinate engineering service members who held a degree qualification. No such classification was, therefore, made or could be made by the Government, nor was the Government resolution translated into a binding rule that could be enforced by a Court of law. Assuming, therefore, that on a true and proper determination of the posts comprising the cadre strength of Assistant Engineers, some more vacancies could fall in the 5% quota proposed to be reserved for the degree holder Junior Engineers and no mandamus could be issued for filing up such vacancies. It is trite that existence of an enforceable right and a corresponding obligation is a condition precedent for the issue of a mandamus. We fail to locate any such right in favour of the writ petitioner degree holders who are still holding posts as Junior Engineers. They F will have, therefore, to wait for their turn for promotion against the 33% quota reserved for them along with their diploma holder colleagues. We hardly need to emphasise that those appointed against 5% quota may also have had no such right, but since they have worked in the higher cadre for a long period G and discharged duties attached to the posts of Assistant Engineers with the benefits attached thereto, their regularisation comes on a totally different juristic basis than the one sought to be urged on behalf of those who were left out. Appointments as Assistant Engineers were from out of Junior Engineers H

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A made strictly according to seniority. The fortuitous circumstance under which the appointments did not extend to the full quota of 5% would make no material difference when it comes to finding out whether the Junior Engineers can claim an enforceable legal right. B

60Copy pinpoint60. Question No.2 is answered accordingly.

Re. Question No.3

61Copy pinpoint61. Section 3(2) of the impugned legislation deals entirely c with the inter se seniority of Assistant Engineers whose appointments are validated/regularised by the said enactment and stipulates that such inter se seniority shall be determined according to the dates of appointment of the officers concerned on ad hoc basis as mentioned in the schedule. It further 0 stipulates that all those regularised under the legislation shall be enbloc junior to the Assistant Engineers of that year appointed to the service in their respective discipline in their cadre in accordance with the provisions of the Recruitment Rules. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 makes the ad hoc service rendered by such Assistant Engineers count for the purpose of their pension, leave and increments and for no other purpose.

62Copy pinpoint62. Appearing for the State of Orissa, Mr. Nageshwar Rao contended that grant of seniority to ad hoc Assistant Engineers regularised under the legislation w.e.f. the date they were appointed on ad hoc basis was legally permissible especially when the ad hoc appointments had continued without any interruption till their regularisation. Reliance in support was placed by Mr. Rao upon a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' G Association v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (1990) 2 SCC

715. The case at hand, according to the learned counsel, fell under proposition (B) formulated in the said decision. Grant of seniority from the date of initial appointments did not, therefore, suffer from any constitutional or other infirmity to warrant interference from this Court.

AMARENDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA & ORS. v. 1091 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

63Copy pinpoint63. Mr. Sisodia appearing for some of the parties, on the other-hand, contended that seniority could be granted only from the date of regularisation under the enactment and not earlier. Learned counsel for some of the interveners adopted that contention, including Ms. Aishwarya appearing for some of the diploma holder Junior Engineers and urged that ad hoc service rendered by the Engineers appointed otherwise than in accordance with the rules could not count for the purposes of seniority and that even if Section 3(1) of the Validation Act was held to be valid, Section 3(2) which gave retrospective seniority from the date they were first appointed on ad hoc basis must c go.

64Copy pinpoint64. In Direct Recruit's case (supra) this Court reviewed and summed up the law on the subject by formulating as many as 11 propositions out of which propositions and stated in Para 47 of the decision in the following words are relevant for our purposes:

"47. To sum up, we hold that:

(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation.

The corollary of.the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority.

(8) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by -the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted. " H

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65Copy pinpoint65. There was some debate at the bar whether the case at hand is covered by corollary to proposition or by proposition B (supra). But having given our consideration to the submissions at the Bar we are inclined to agree with Mr. Rao's submission that the case at hand is more appropriately covered by proposition B extracted above. We say so because the initial appointment of ad ·hoc Assistant Engineers in the instant case was not made by following the procedure laid down by the Rules. Even so, the appointees had continued in the posts uninterruptedly till the Validation Act regularised their c service. There is, in the light of those two significant aspects, no room for holding that grant of seniority and other benefits referred to in Section 3(3) of the impugned Act were legally impermissible or violated any vested right of the in service Assistant Engineers appointed from any other source. Proposition A, in our opinion, deals with a situation where an 0 incumbent is appointed to a post according to the rules but the question that arises for determination is whether his seniority should be counted from the date of his appointment or from the date of his confirmation in the said service. The corollary under E proposition A, in our opinion, deals with an entirely different situation, namely, where the appointment is ad hoc and made as a stop-gap-arrangement in which case officiation in such post cannot be taken into consideration for seniority. Be that as it may, as between proposition and the case at hand . falls more accurately under proposition B which permits grant F of seniority w.e.f. the date the appointees first started officiating followed by the regularisation of their service as in the case at hand.

66Copy pinpoint66. We may also refer to a three-Judge Bench of this Court G in Union of India and Anr. etc. etc. v. Lalita S. Rao and Ors. etc. etc. (2001) 5 sec 384 where doctors appointed by Railway Administration on ad hoc basis had been upon regularisation granted seniority from the date of their ad hoc appointment. This Court held that proposition B stated in Direct H Recruits case (supra) permitted such seniority being granted.

AMARENDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA & ORS. v. 1093 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.] This Court observed: A "Obviously the Court had in mind the principle evolved by the Constitution Bench in the Direct Recruit Engineering Officers Association case (supra). If the initial appointment had not been made in accordance with the prescribed procedure laid down by the 8 Recruitment Rules, and yet the appointees Medical Officers were allowed to continue in the post uninterruptedly and then they appeared at the selection test conducted by the Union Public Service Commission, and on being selected their services stood regularised then there would be no justification in not applying the principle 'B' of the Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Association case (supra) and denying the period of officiating services for being counted for the purppse of seniority." D

67Copy pinpoint67. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Co!,lrt in State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. V. K. S. Muralidhar & Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 241 where the Government of India gave weightage to service rendered by employees prior to their regularisation. The dispute in that case was regarding inter se E seniority between the Supervisors who were upgraded as Junior Engineers and the degree holders who were directly appointed as Junior Engineers. This Court held that the State Government had as a matter of policy given weightage to both the categories and that there was nothing unreasonable in giving F a limited benefit or weightage to the upgraded Supervisors in the light of their experience. This Court said: "The question to be considered is from which date the weightage of four years' service should be given to the G upgraded Junior Engineers namely the Supervisors. Is it the date of acquiring the degree qualification or the date of their appointment? Having given our earnest consideration and for the reasons stated above we hold that the weightage can be given only from the date of their appointment. H

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A The Tribunal in the course of its order, however, observed that in accordance with the existing rules the appointments of these Junior Engineers from the notional date have to be cleared by the Public Service Commission and the appointments cannot be held to be B regular appointments as long as they are not approved by the Public Service Commission.

Xx xx xx

To sum up, our conclusions are as under: c (i) The weightage of four years in respect of upgraded Junior Engineers as provided in G. 0. Ms. No. 559 has to be reckoned from the date of appointment and not the date of their acquiring the degree qualification: D (ii) On the basis of that notional date. their inter-se seniority has to be fixed:

(iii) The regularisation of the degree-holder·Junior Engineers who passed the SQT by giving retrospective effect cannot be held to be illegal, and their seniority among themselves shall be subject to the order of ranking given by the Public Service Commission on the basis of the SQT;

(iv) The Government shall prepare a common seniority list of the degree-holders Junior Engineers and the upgraded Junior Engineers on the above lines and that list shall be the basis for all the subsequent promotions. Promotions, if any, already given shall be reviewed and readjusted in accordance with the said seniority list; and G (v) The approval of the Public Service Commission in respect of these appointments and their seniority thus fixed need not be sought at this distance of time."

H (emphasis supplied)

AMARENDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA & ORS. v. 1095 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

68Copy pinpoint68. In Narender Chadha & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. A (1986) 2 sec 157, this Court was dealing with a somewhat similar fact situation. The petitioners in that case were not promoted by following the actual procedure prescribed by the relevant Service Rules even though the appointments were made in the name of the President by the competent authority. B They had based on such appointments, continuously held the post to which they were appointed and received salary and allowances payable to incumbent of such post. The incumbents were entered in the direct line of their promotion. The question, however; was whether it would be just and proper to hold that c such promotees had no right to the post held by them for 15- 20 years and could be reverted unceremoniously or treated as persons not belonging to the service at all. Repelling the argument that such service would not count for the purposes of seniority, this Court observed: 0 " It would be unjust to hold at this distance of time that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the petitioners are not holding the posts n Grade IV. The above contention is therefore without sub-stance. But we, however, make it clear that it is not our view that whenever E a person is appointed in a post without following the Rules prescribed for appointment to that post. he should be treated as a person regularly appointed to that post. Such a person may be reversed from that post. But in a case of the kind before us where persons have been allowed to function in higher posts for 15 to 20 years with due deliberation it would be certainly unjust to hold that they have no sort of claim to such posts and could be reverted unceremoniously or treated as persons not: belonging to the Service at all. particularly where the Government is endowed with the power to relax the Rules to avoid unjust results. In the instant case the Government has also not expressed its unwillingness to continue them in the said posts. The other contesting respondents have also not H

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A urged that the petitioners should be sent out of the said posts. The only question agitated before us relates to the seniority as between the petitioners and the direct recruits and such a question can arise only where there is no dispute regarding the entry of the officers concerned into B the same Grade. In the instant case there is no impediment even under the Rules to treat these petitioners and others who are similarly situated as persons duly appointed to the posts in Grade IV because of the enabling provision contained in the Rule 16 c thereof. Rule 16 as it stood at the relevant time read as follows:

16. The Government may relax the provisions of these rules to such extent as may be necessary to ensure satisfactory working or remove in- D equitable results."

(emphasis supplied)

69Copy pinpoint69. The ratio of the decision in the above case was not faulted by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit's case (supra). As a matter of fact the Court approved the said decision holding that there was force in the view taken by this Court in that case. This Court observed:

"In Narender Chadha v. Union of India the officers wera promoted although without following the procedure prescribed under the rules, but they continuously worked for long periods of nearly 15-20 years on the posts without being reverted. The period of their continuous officiation was directed to be counted for seniority as it was held that any other view would be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16. There is considerable force in this view also. We, therefore, confirm the principle of counting towards seniority the period of continuous officiation following an appointment made in accordance with the rules H

AMARENDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA & ORS. v. 1097 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.] ptescribed for regular substantive appointments in the A service."

70Copy pinpoint70. In the light of what we have said above, we do not see any illegality or constitutional infirmity in the provisions of Section 3(2) or 3(3) of the impugned legislation. B

71Copy pinpoint71. Having said so, there is no reason why a similar direction regarding the writ-petitioners degree holder Junior Engineers who have been held by us to be entitled to regularisation on account of their length of service should also not be given a similar benefit. We must mention to the credit C of Dr. Dhawan, appearing for the Stipendiary Engineers who have been regularised under the provisions of the Legislation that such Stipendiary-ad hoc Assistant Engineers cannot, according to the learned counsel, have any objection to the degree holder Junior Engineers currently working as Assistant D Engineers on ad hoc basis being regularised in service or being given seniority from the date they were first appointed. It was also conceded that Stipendiary Engineers all of whom were appointed after the appointment of the Junior Engineers would enbloc rank junior to such ad hoc Assistant Engineers E from out of degree holder Junior Engineers. But all such regularised Assistant Engineers from Stipendiary Stream and from Junior Engineers category would together rank below the promotee Assistant Engineers. F

72Copy pinpoint72. Question No.3 is answered accordingly.

73Copy pinpoint73. Several intervention applications have been filed in these appeals to which we may briefly refer at this stage. In IA No.5 of 2012 filed in Civil Appeal No.8324 of 2009, the interveners have sought permission for the State Government G to complete the re-structuring process and to fill up the vacancies subject to a final decision of this Court in these appeals. In IA Nos.6 and 7 of 2012 also filed in Civil Appeal No.8324 of 2009, the interveners seek a direction to the State of Orissa to upgrade the post of Assistant Engineers Class II H

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A (Group B) to Assistant Executive Engineer Junior Class I (Group A) and to make such up-gradation retrospective w.e.f. 28th February, 2009. IA No.8 of 2012 has been filed in the very same appeal in which the interveners have sought a direction against the State of Orissa to give effect to the up-gradation B of posts considering inter se seniority of in-service degree holder Junior Engineers who are otherwise eligible for appointment against the vacancies reserved for direct recruits. In IA No.3 of 2009 in SLP No.29765 of 2008, the interveners seek permission to support the judgment of the High Court c whereby the impugned legislation has been struck down as unconstitutional. Similarly, IAs filed in some other appeals either seek to support the judgment passed by the High Court or pray for permission to argue the case on behalf of one or the other party.

74Copy pinpoint74. We have heard counsel for the interveners also at some length. We, however, do not consider it necessary to enlarge the scope of these proceedings by examining issues that are not directly related to the controversy at hand. Three questions that have primarily engaged our attention in these petitions relate to (a) the validity of the impugned Validation Act. (b) regularization of in-service degree holder Junior Engineers who have been working for considerable length of time as Assistant Engineers on ad hoc basis and (c) the seniority position of those being regularized either under the Validation Act or in terms of the directions being issued by us in these appeals. Other issues which the interveners seek to raise especially issues regarding grant or denial of the benefit of reservation to SC and ST candidates, have not been touched by us in these proceedings for want of proper pleadings on the subject and also for want of any pronouncement by the High Court on the said questions. In the circumstances, this order shall be taken to have settled only what we have specifically dealt with or what would logically follow therefrom. Any question whether the same relates to inter se seniority of those regularized under the legislation or by reason of the directions which we propose to

AMAR~NDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA & ORS. v. 1099 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.] issue or issues relating to the benefit of seniority on the basis of roster points if any prescribed for that purpose are left open and may be agitated by the aggrieved party before an appropriate forum in appropriate proceedings. To the extent any such questions or aspects have not been dealt with by us in this order, may be dealt with in any such proceedings. B Beyond that we do not consider it proper or necessary to say anything at this stage.

75Copy pinpoint75. In the result we pass the following order:

(1) Civil Appeals No.8324-8331 of 2009 filed by the C State of Orissa and Civil Appeals No.8322-8323 of 2009 and 1940 of 2010 filed by the Stipendiary Engineers are allowed and the impugned judgment and order dated 15th October, 2008 passed by the High Court of Orissa set aside. D

(2) Writ Petitions No.9514/2003, 12494/2005, 12495/ 2005, 12627/2005, 12706/2006 and 8630/2006 filed by the degree holders Junior Engineers working as Assistant Engineers on ad hoc basis E are also allowed but only to the limited extent that the services of the writ-petitioners and all those who are similarly situated and promoted as ad hoc Assistant Engineers against the proposed 5% quota reserved for in-service Junior Engineers F degree holder shall stand regularized w.e.f. the date Orissa Service of Engineers (Validation of Appointment) Act, 2002 came into force. We further direct that such in-service degree holder Junior Engineers promoted as Assistant Engineers on ad hoc basis shall be placed below the G promotees and above the Stipendiary Engineers regularized in terms of the impugned Notification. The inter se seniority of the Stipendiary Engineers regularized as Assistant Engineers under the H

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A impugned Legislation and Junior Engineer degree holders regularized in terms of this order shall be determined on the basis of their date of first appointment as Assistant Engineers on ad hoc basis. B {3) Civil Appeal No.1768 of 2006 is resultantly allowed, the judgment and order impugned therein set aside and Writ Petitions OJC Nos.6354-55 of 1999 disposed of in terms of the above direction.

c {4) Intervention applications filed in these appeals are also disposed of in the light of observations in Para 74 of this judgment.

(5) Parties are left to bear their own costs. D R.P. Appeals allowed.