GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

A meaning of that word as defined in Section 2(c-i) of the Private Forests Act. That issue had already been decided, as a matter of fact, by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal against Chintamani and it was held that his land was a forest. The matter ought to have rested there. However, this Court went into B a further question, namely, whether the mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act per se attracted Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act. This Court· noticed (in paragraph 18 of the Report) that where a final notification is issued under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act (obviously after c hearing the objections of the land owner in compliance with the requirements of Section 35(3) thereof), the entire land of the land owner would automatically vest in the State on the appointed date, that is, 30th August 1975 when the Private Forests Act came into force. In such a case, the land owner would, ex hypothesi have an opportunity of showing in the 0 objections to the Section 35(3) notice that the land is not a 'forest' as defined under Section 34A of the Forest Act. If the land owner succeeded in so showing, then clearly a final notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act could not be issued. But if the land owner did not succeed in so showing, ,. only then could a final notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act be issued. It must be recalled, at this stage, that the words "or land" under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act had been deleted by the Indian Forest (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948 being Bombay Act No.62 of 1948 and, additionally therefore, such an objection could validly have been raised.

31Copy pinpoint31. Consequently, the situation that presented itself in Chintamani was that though a notice was issued to the land owner under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act before 30th August G 1975, it could not be decided before that date when the Private Forests Act came into force. (Such a notice was referred to as a 'pipeline notice' by Mr. F.S. Nariman). Clearly, the recipient of a pipeline notice would be entitled to the benefit of Waghmare but this seems to have been overlooked by this H Court in Chintamani. However, to mitigate the '1ardship to a

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 239 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] pipeline noticee who is not given the benefit of Waghmare this A Court read Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act and observed (perhaps as a sop to the land owner) that the "Maharashtra Legislature thought that the entire property covered by the notice in the State need not vest but it excluded 2 hectares out of the forest land held by the landholder. That B was the consideration for not allowing the benefit of an inquiry under Section 35(3) and for not allowing the notification to be issued under Section 35(1) of the 1927 Act".

32Copy pinpoint32. It is in this background that this Court narrowly construed the words "a notice has been issued under sub- C section (3) of section 35 of the Forest Act" occurring in Section · 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act as not requiring "service of such notice before 30-8-1975, nor for an inquiry nor for a notification under Section 35(1)." 14 D

33Copy pinpoint33. In a sense, therefore, not only is there a difference of views between Waghmare and Chintamani but Chintamani has gone much further in taking away the right of a landholder.

Proceedings in the High Court E

34Copy pinpoint34. On or about 24th May 2006, Godrej received six stop- work notices issued by the concerned Assistant Engineer of the Bombay Municipal Corporation stating that the Deputy Conservator of Forests, Thane Forest Division, by a letter dated 8th May 2006 had informed that the disputed land was F "affected" by the reservation of a private forest and therefore no construction could be carried out therein without the permission of the Central Government under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. G

35Copy pinpoint35. On enquiries made by Godrej subsequent to the receipt of the stop-work notices, it came to be known that the Bombay High Court had given a direction on 22nd June 2005 in PIL No. 17/2002 (Bombay Environment Action Group v.

14. Paragraph 19 of Chintamani. H

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.. C.R.

A State of Maharashtra) on the claim of the petitioner therein that in the entire State of Maharashtra the land records were incomplete and a large number of problems were encountered because of not updating the land records which in any event is also an obligation on the State. Accordingly, the High Court B gave a direction granting time to the State of Maharashtra up to 31st May 2006 to complete the entire land records in the State and further directed that quarterly reports regarding the progress of the work be filed before the Registrar General of the High Court. c 36. Godrej learnt that this triggered an ex parte mutation of the revenue records by the State to show that the disputed land was 'affected' by the provisions of the Private Forest Act. Godrej also learnt that the Notice No. WT/53 (referred to above) had been published in the Bombay Government Gazette of 6th D September 1956, but not served on it. ·

37Copy pinpoint37. On these broad facts, Godrej filed Writ Petition No. 2196 of 2006 in the Bombay High Court praying, inter alia, for a declaration that the lands owned by it in village Vikhroli are E not forest land; that the letter dated 8th May 2006 issued by the Deputy Conservator of Forest as well as six stop-work notices dated 24th May 2006 be declared as illegal, ab initio null and void and that the mutation in the revenue records be also declared illegal.

38Copy pinpoint38. During the proceedings in the High Court it came to be known that about 170 notices similar to notice No. WT/53 had been issued to various parties in 1956-57, including to the Bhabha Atomic Energy Complex and the Employees State Insurance Scheme Hospital. However, the lands of Bhabha G Atomic Energy Complex and the Employees State Insurance Scheme Hospital were not touched by the State.

39Copy pinpoint39. The writ petition (along with several other similar writ petitions) was contested by the State and it was submitted inter H alia that in view of the judgment of this Court in Chintamani,

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 241 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] the disputed land stood vested in the State in terms of Section A 3 of the Private Forests Act. By the impugned order dated 24th March 2008, the High Court dismissed all the writ petitions. Among other things, it was held in paragraph 152 of the impugned judgment: B "In the light of the authoritative pronouncement in Chintamani's case we see no substance in the argument that the construction activities on the land being in accordance with the sanctioned plans and approvals so also the lands being part of the development plan and affected by Urban Land Ceiling Act, State's action impugned in these petitions is without any jurisdiction or authority in law. All arguments with regard to the user of the land today has no legal basis. User today is after development or continuing development. Once development is on private forest, then, the same could not have been permitted or carried out. Mere omission or inaction of the State Government cannot be the basis for accepting the arguments of the petitioners."

40Copy pinpoint40. The High Court rejected the contention that "mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) without any notification being published in the official gazette within the meaning of Section 35(1) would not mean that the land is excluded from the purview of the Private Forest (Acquisition) Act enacted by the Maharashtra Government." 15 F

It was also held that:

"Once the State Government issues such notice [under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act], then, the intention is apparent. The intention is to regulate and prohibit certain G activities in forest. Merely because such a notice is issued by it in 1957 and 1958 but it did not take necessary steps in furtherance thereof, does not mean that the notices have been abandoned as contended by the petitioners. There

15. Paragraph 123. H

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.

A is no concept of "abandonment or disuse" in such case. Apart from the fact that these concepts could not be imported in a modern statute, we are of the view that they cannot be imported and read into statute of the present nature. Statutes which are meant for protecting and B preserving forests and achieve larger public interest, cannot be construed narrowly as contended. The interpretation, therefore, if at all there is any ambiguity or scope for construction has to be wider and sub-serving this public interest so also the intent and object in enacting c them. The reason for the State Government not being able to pursue the measures for preserving and protecting the forest wealth is obvious." 16

Further, it was held that:

D "The Development Plan proposal and designation so also the user cannot conflict with the character of the land as a private forest. To accept the arguments of the petitioners would mean that despite vesting the private forest continues as a land covered by the development plan and E being within the municipal limits it loses its character as a private forest. A private forest is a forest and upon its vesting in the State Government by virtue of the Private Forest (Acquisition) Act would remain as such. Therefore, we see no conflict because of any change in the situation. Vesting was complete on 30th August, 1975. On 30th F August, 1975 the lands with regard to which the notice was issued under Section 35(3), being a private forest vested in the State, it was a private forest always and, therefore, there is no question of the development plan or any proposal therein superimposing itself on its status." 17 G

41Copy pinpoint41. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petitions in the Bombay High Court, Godrej and other aggrieved writ petitioners preferred petitions for special leave to appeal in this

16. Paragraph 126.

H 17. Paragraph 149

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 243 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] Court. A

Proceedings in this Court

42Copy pinpoint42. During the pendency of these appeals, the State filed I.A. Nos. 2352-2353 of 2008 in W.P. No. 202 of 1995 [T.N. Godavarman v. Union of India (Forest Bench matters)] in which B it was prayed, inter alia, as follows:

(1) The lands coming under the provisions of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act 1975 which were put to non forestry use prior to 25th c October 1980 [when the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 came into force] by way of having been awarded Approval of Plans, Commencement Certificates, IODS or Non Agriculture Permissions by the Competent Authorities be treated deleted from the category of forests and the non forestry activity be allowed on such lands without charging CA, NPV or equivalent non forest land or any charges whatsoever.

(2) The Collectors of all the districts be directed to pass appropriate orders under section 6 or 22A of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 either on an application or suo motu as provided for it under the Act, for all the pieces of lands coming under the provisions of the Act under their jurisdiction within 30 days.

(3) For the lands restored under the Act on which residential complexes have come up/are coming up wherein Non Agriculture Permissions (N.A.) and buildings were fully constructed and completion certificate and occupation certificate were issued by the Competent Authorities after 25th October, 1980 but before 18th May 2006 when the "stop construction work" notices were issued, only H

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.

A afforestation charges be collected for afforesting equivalent forest land. Neither equivalent non forest land nor the Net Present Value be charged to them, as these areas are their own private lands."

Significantly, it was stated in the applications as follows:- B "26. As stated earlier since the records did not reveal that these are acquired Private Forests the erstwhile owners went on selling these lands to several persons who also in turn went on selling them to the strangers without there c being any fault on their part. Subsequently developers purchased these lands and after getting requisite permissions from the Planning Authority carried on constructions thereon. Thereafter individuals and members of the public who wanted accommodation for housing probably invested their lifetime savings and/or raising loans entered into transactions of purchasing the flats constructed on these lands without their fault. In some of these areas commercial activities have also come up with due permission from the Government authorities. In such cases, injustice is being alleged by the subsequent purchasers who claimed to be bonafide purchasers. This has necessitated the State of Maharashtra to come out with the present application. Abstract of constructions made on private forest lands in Mumbai Suburban and Thane City F makes it very clear that the problem is more severe for the common man. Errors were also committed while declaring the lands as having been acquired by the Government under the Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act,

1975. Some of the lands/properties owned by the Government like Bhabha Atomic Energy complex and G Employees State Insurance Scheme hospital also came to be declared as acquired under the Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975."

43Copy pinpoint43. The Forest Bench referred the matter to the Central H Empowered Committee which, in its Report dated 13th July

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 245 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] 2009 noted in paragraphs 25 and 26 as follows:- A

"25. It is thus clear that after the issue of notices under Section 35(3) or Notification under 35(1) of the Indian Forest Act, no follow-up action was taken by the State Govt. Even after the Private Forest Act came into force, neither physical possession of the land was taken nor were the areas recorded as 'forest'. A substantial part of such area falls in urban conglomerations and have been used for various non-forest purpose including construction of buildings for which permissions have been granted by the concerned State Government authorities. Sale/purchase and resale have taken place and third party interests have been generated. People are residing for last 30-40 years in hundreds of buildings constructed with the then valid approvals. It was only after the order dated 26.5.2005 of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court, that these areas are now being treated as falling in category of "forest". Many of such areas are surrounded all around by other buildings and within metropolitan areas and are no longer suitable for afforestation or to be managed as 'forest'. E "26. In the above complex background, at this belated stage, it is neither feasible nor in public interest to demolish the existing buildings/structures, re-locate the existing occupants/owners and physically convert such area into forest. The CEC in these circumstances considers that the F balance of convenience lies in granting permission under the Forest (Conservation) Act for de-reservation and non- forest use of such area on a graded scale of payment depending upon the category/sub-category in which such land falls." G

44Copy pinpoint44. The Central Empowered Committee made certain other recommendations as a result of which Godrej paid an amount of Rs.14. 7 crores towards NPV and this has been recorded in the order passed by the Forest Bench in its order dated 17th February 2010. The relevant extract of the order H

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.

A dated 17th February 2010 passed by the Forest Bench reads as under:-

"Pursuant to the report filed by the C.E.C. regards the property owned and possessed by the Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. ltd., a sum of Rs.14,71,98,590/-was deposited B as NPV and the deposit of this amount has been confirmed by the learned counsel appearing for the State.

We have passed an interim order of status quo restraining the petitioners from further construction on the lands and c also not to create third party rights. That interim order is vacated. The petitioners are at liberty to go on with the construction and complete it. The direction of not to create third party rights is also vacated. This order is subject to the order, if any, to be passed by MOEF in this regard and also subject to the final outcome of this matter.

Learned counsel for the petitioner states that he will not claim any refund of the amount so deposited."

45Copy pinpoint45. When the present set of appeals came up for hearing before this Court on 9th February 2011, the correctness of Chintamani was doubted by learned counsel on the question whether the word "issued" as occurring in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forest Act in the context of "any land in respect of which a notice has been issued under sub-section (3) of section 35 F of the Forest Act" should be interpreted literally or whether it postulates service of notice on the landholder. It is under these circumstances that these appeals were listed before us.

The primary question

46Copy pinpoint46. The initial question is whether the disputed land is at all a forest within the meaning of Section 2(c-i) of the Private Forests Act.

47Copy pinpoint47. It is quite clear from a reading of Waghmare that the H "means and includes" definition of forest in Section 2(c-i) of the

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 247 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] , Private Forests Act does not detract or take away from the A primary meaning of the word 'forest'. We are in agreement with this view.

48Copy pinpoint48. In Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar18 the interpretation of the word "owner" in Section 2(d) of the Bihar Taxation on 8 Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961 came up for consideration. While interpreting "owner" which 'means' and 'includes', this Court held:

"The definition of the term "owner" is exhaustive and intended to extend the meaning of the term by including within its sweep bailee of a public carrier vehicle or any manager acting on behalf of the owner. The intention of the legislature to extend the meaning of the term by the definition given by it will be frustrated if what is intended to be inclusive is interpreted to exclude the actual owner."

49Copy pinpoint49. The proposition was more clearly articulated in Black Diamond Beverages v. Commercial Tax Officer19 wherein this ·Court considered the use of the words 'means' and 'includes' E in the definition of "sale price" in Section 2(d) of the W.B. Sales Tax Act,· 1954. It was held in paragraph 7 of the Report:

"The first part of the definition defines the meaning of the word "sale price" and must, in our view, be given its ordinary, popular or natural meaning. The interpretation F thereof is in no way controlled or affected by the second part which "includes" certain other things in the definition. This is a well-settled principle of construction."

50Copy pinpoint50. In coming to this conclusion, this Court referred to a G passage from Craies on Statute Law2° which in tum referred

18. (1976) 2 sec 942.

19. (1998) 1 sec 458.

20. 7th Edition 1.214. H

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.

A to the following passage from Robinson v. Barton-Eccles Local Boarc/2 1 : "An interpretation clause of this kind is not meant to prevent the word receiving its ordinary, popular, and natural sense whenever that would be properly applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act ... to be applied to something to which it would not ordinarily be applicable."

51Copy pinpoint51. In the case of Godrej, the admitted position, as per the consent decree dated 8th January 1962 is that the disputed land was not a waste land nor was it a forest. In so far as the other appeals are concerned, the disputed lands were built upon, from time to time, either for industrial purposes or for commercial purposes or for residential purposes. Under the circumstances, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that any of these disputed lands are 'forest' within the primary meaning of that word, or even within the extended meaning given in Section 2(c-i) of the Private Forests Act.

52Copy pinpoint52. The next question is whether the notice said to have been issued to Godrej being Notice No. WT/53 can be described as a 'pipeline notice'. Again, the answer must be in the negative in as much as it cannot be reasonably said that the pipeline extends from 1956-57 up to 1975. Assuming that a notice issued in 1956-57 is a pipeline notice even in 1975, the question before us would, nevertheless, relate to the meaning and impact of "issued" of Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act read with Section 35 of the Forest Act. This is really the meat of the matter.

53Copy pinpoint53. Undoubtedly, the first rule of interpretation is that the words in a statute must be interpreted literally. But at the same time if the context in which a word is used and the provisions of a statute inexorably suggest a subtext other than literal, then the context becomes important.

H 21. (1883) 8 AC 798.

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 249 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

54Copy pinpoint54. In R.L. Arora v. State of U.P. 22 it was observed that "a A literal interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to look at the setting in which the words are used and the circumstances in which the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal meaning of the words used in a provision of the statute."

Similarly, in Tata Engg. & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihaf3 it was held:

"The method suggested for adoption, in cases of doubt as to the meaning of the words used is to explore the intention of the legislature through the words, the context which gives the colour, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequences or the spirit and reason of the law. The general words and collocation or phrases, howsoever wide or comprehensive in their literal sense are interpreted from the context and scheme underlying in the text of the Act."

Finally, in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Beha/24 it was held:

"It is true that ordinary rule of construction is to assign the word a meaning which it ordinarily carries. But the subject of legislation and the context in which a word or expression is employed may require a departure from the rule of literal construction."

55Copy pinpoint55. Applying the law laid down by this Court on interpretation, in the context of these appeals, we may be missing the wood for the trees if a literal meaning is given to the word "issued". To avoid this, it is necessary to also

22. (1964) 6 SCR 784.

23. c2000) s sec 346.

24. c2002) s sec 397. H

250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.

A appreciate the scheme of Section 35 of the Forest Act since that scheme needs to be kept in mind while considering "issued" in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act.

56Copy pinpoint56. A notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is 8 intended to give an opportunity to the owner of a forest to show cause why, inter alia, a regulatory or a prohibitory measure be not made in respect of that forest. It is important to note that such a notice pre-supposes the existence of a forest. The owner of the forest is expected to file objections within a reasonable time as specified in the notice and is also given an opportunity to lead evidence in support of the objections. After these basic requirements are met, the owner of the forest is entitled to a hearing on the objections. This entire procedure obviously cannot be followed by the State and the owner of the forest unless the owner is served with the notice. Therefore, service of a notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is inherent in the very language used in the provision and the very purpose of the provision.

57Copy pinpoint57. Additionally, Section 35(4) of the Forest Act provides that a notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act may provide that for a period not exceeding six months (extended to one year in 1961) the owner of the forest can be obliged to adhere to one or more of the regulatory or prohibitory measures mentioned in Section 35(1) of the Forest Act. On the failure of· F the owner of the forest to abide by the said measures, he/she is liable to imprisonment for a term upto six months and/or a fine under Section 35(7) of the Forest Act. Surely, given the penal consequence of non-adherence to a Section 35(4) direction in a Section 35(3) notice, service of such a notice must be interpreted to be mandatory. On the facts of the case in Godrej, such a direction was in fact given and Godrej was directed, for a period of six months, to refrain from the cutting and removal of trees and timber and the firing and clearing of vegetation. Strictly speaking, therefore, despite not being served with Notice No. WT/53 and despite having no

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 251 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] knowledge of it, Godrej was liable to be punished under A Section 35(7) of the Forest Act if it cut or removed any tree or timber or fired or cleared any vegetation.

58Copy pinpoint58. This interplay may be looked at from another point of view, namely, the need to issue a direction under Section 35(4) 8 of the Forest Act, which can be only to prevent damage to or destruction of a forest. If the notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is not served on the owner of the forest, he/she may continue to damage the forest defeating the very purpose of the Forest Act. Such an interpretation cannot be given to C Section 35 of the Forest Act nor can a limited interpretation be given to the word "issued" used in the context of Section 35 of . the Forest Act in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act.

59Copy pinpoint59. Finally, Section 35(5) of the Forest Act mandates not only service of a notice issued under that provision "in the D manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the service of summons" (a manner that we are all familiar with) but also its publication "in the manner prescribed by rules". This double pronged receipt and confirmation of knowledge of the show cause notice by the owner of a forest makes it clear that E Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is not intended to end the process with the mere issuance of a notice but it also requires service of a notice on the owner of the forest. ·The need for ensuring service is clearly to protect the interests of the owner of the forest who may have valid reasons not only to object to the issuance of regulatory or prohibitory directions, but to also enable him/her to raise a jurisdictional issue that the land in question is actually not a forest. The need for ensuring service is also to prevent damage to or destruction of a forest.

60Copy pinpoint60. Unfortunately; Chintamani missed these finer details because it was perhaps not brought to the notice of this Court that Section 35 of the Forest Act as applicable to the State of Maharashtra had sub-sections beyond sub-section (3). This Court proceeded on the basis of Section 35 of the ·Indian Forest Act, 1927 as it existed without being aware of the amendments H

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.

A made by the State of Maharashtra and the erstwhile State of Bombay. This, coupled with the factually incorrect view that two hectares of forest land 25 were excluded for the benefit of the landholder led this Court to give a restrictive meaning to "issue".

61Copy pinpoint61. In Chintamani this Court relied on the decision rendered in CIT v. Bababhai Pitamberdas (HUF) 26 to conclude that a word has to be construed in the context in which it is used in a statute and that, therefore, the decisions rendered in Banarsi Debi v. IT027 and CWT v. Kundan Lal Behari La/28 to the effect that "the word 'issue' has been construed as C amounting to 'service' are not relevant for interpreting the word 'issued' used in Section 2(f) [of the Private Forests Act]." It is true, as observed above, that a word has to be construed in the context in which it is used in a statute. By making a reference in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act to 'issue' in Section D 35 of the Forest Act, it is clear that the word is dressed in borrowed robes. Once that is appreciated (and it was unfortunately overlooked in Chintamant) then it is quite clear that 'issued' in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act must include service of the show cause notice as postulated in E Section 35 of the Forest Act.

62Copy pinpoint62. We have no option, under these circumstances, but to hold that to this extent, Chintamani was incorrectly decided and it is overruled to this extent. We may add that in Chintamani F the land in question was factually held to be a private forest and therefore the subsequent discussion was riot at all necessary.

63Copy pinpoint63. Assuming that the word 'issued' as occurring in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act must be literally and strictly construed, can it be seriously argued that it also has reference G

25. The correct factual position is that Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act excluded "an area not exceeding two hectares".

26. 1993 Supp (3) sec 530.

27. (196~) 7 SCR 539.

H 20. (1975) 4 sec 844.

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 253 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] to a show cause notice issued under Section 35(3) of the A Forest Act at any given time (say in 1927 or in 1957)? Or would it be more reasonable to hold that it has reference to a show cause notice issued in somewhat closer proximity to the coming into force of the Private Forests Act, or a 'pipeline notice' as Mr. Nariman puts it? B

64Copy pinpoint64. In the absence of any time period having been specified for deciding a show cause notice issued under Section 35 of the Forest Act, it must be presumed that it must be decided within a reasonable time". Quite recently, in Ramlila C Maidan Incident, In re29 it was held: "It is a settled rule of law that wherever provision of a statute does not provide for a specific time, the same has to be done within a reasonable time. Again reasonable time cannot have a fixed connotation. It must depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case." D

65Copy pinpoint65. Similarly, in Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak3° it was held: "But when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time." E

So also, in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale31 it was held:

"It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the

29. (2012) 5 sec 1 paragraph 232.

30. (1984) 1 sec 125.

31. c2009) 9 sec 352. H

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.

A authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein."

66Copy pinpoint66. According to the State, a show cause notice was issued to Godrej in 1957 (and assuming it was served) but no decision was taken thereon till 1975 that is for about 18 years. 8 This is an unusually long period and undoubtedly much more than a reasonable time had elapsed for enabling the State to take a decision on the show cause notice. Therefore, following the law laid down by this Court, the show cause notice must, for all intents and purposes be treated as having become a C dead letter and the seed planted by the State yielded nothing.

67Copy pinpoint67. The entire problem may also be looked at from the perspective of the citizen rather than only from the perspective of the State. No citizen can reasonably be told after almost half D a century that he/she was issued a show cause notice (which was probably not served) and based on the show cause notice his/her land was declared a private forest about three decades ago and that it vests in the State. Is it not the responsibility of· the State to ensure that its laws are implemented with reasonable dispatch and is it not the duty of the State to appreciate that statute books are not meant to be thrown at a citizen whenever and wherever some official decides to do so? Basic principles of good governance must be followed by every member of the Executive branch of the State at all times keeping the interests of all citizens in mind as also the larger public interest.

68Copy pinpoint68. In our opinion, the failure of the State to take any decision on the show cause notice for several decades (assuming it was served on Godrej) is indicative of its desire to not act on it. This opinion is fortified by a series of events that have taken place between 1957 and 2006, beginning with the consent decree of 8th January 1962 in Suit No. 413 of 1953 whereby the disputed land was recognized as not being forest land; permission to construct a large number of buildings (both residential and otherwise) as per the Development Plans of

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 255 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] 1967 and then of ~ 991; exemptions granted by the Competent A Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 leading to Godrej making unhindered but permissible constructions; and finally, the absence of any attempt by the State to take possession of the 'forest land' under Section 5 of the Private Forests Act for a couple of decades. The B subsequent event of the State moving an application in Godavarman virtually denying the existence of a private forest on the disputed land also indicates that the State had come to terms with reality arid was grudgingly prepared to accept that, even if the law permitted, it was now too late to remedy the c situation. This view was emphatically reiterated by the Central Empowered Committee in its report dated 13th July 2009.

69Copy pinpoint69. In its written submissions, the Bombay Environment Action Group has alleged collusion between Godrej and other · appellants and the State of Maharashtra to defeat the purpose D of the Private Forests Act. It is stated that prior to the said Act coming into force, the Secretary in the Revenue and Forests Department of the State Government had written to the Collector on 27th August 1975 enclosing a copy of the said Act and informing that under Section 5 thereof, the Range Forest E Officers and the Divisional Forest Officers will be authorized to take possession of the private forests from the land owners. It is stated that the letter was issued to enable the Collector to coordinate with the Divisional Forest Officers to ensure that the large private forests are taken over physically as early as F possible. Subsequently, by another letter {variously described as dated 3rd February 1977, 14th February 1977 and 3rd February 1979) the Secretary in the Revenue and Forests Department advised the Conservator of Forests to go slow with the taking over of possession of private forests in Thane, Kulaba G and Ratnagiri districts.

70Copy pinpoint70. It is difficult at this distant point of time to conclude, one way or the other, whether there was or was not any collusion (as alleged) or whether it was simply a case of poor H

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.

A governance by the State. The fact remains that possession of the disputed land was not taken over or attempted to be taken over for decades and the issue was never raised when it should have been. To raise it now after a lapse of so many decades is unfair to Godrej, the other appellants, the institutions, the B State and the residents of the tenements that have been constructed in the meanwhile.

71Copy pinpoint71. Given this factual scenario, we agree that Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act is not intended to apply to notices that had passed their shelf-life and that only 'pipeline C notices' issued in reasonably close proximity to the coming into · force of the Private Forests Act were 'live' and could be acted upon.

72Copy pinpoint72. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur . o Chenai32 this Court dealt with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and held that the legislation being an expropriatory legislation, it ought to be strictly construed since it deprives a person of his/her land. In this decision, reliance was placed on State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharrna 33 and E Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan. 34 The same rationale would apply to Section 2(f)(iii} of the Private Forests Act since it seeks to take away, after a few decades, private land on the ostensible ground that it is a private forest. Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act must not only be reasonably construed F but also strictly so as not to discomfit a citizen and expropriate his/her property.

73Copy pinpoint73. The fact that the Private Forests Act repealed some sections of the Forest Act, particularly Sections 34A and 35 thereof is also significant Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests G Act is in a ser:ise a saving clause for pipeline notices issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest' Act but which could not, for

32. c2005) 1 sec 627.

33. (1966) 3 SCR 557.

H 34. (1967) 1 SCR 120.

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 257 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] want of adequate time be either withdrawn or culminate in the ·A issuance of a regulatory or prohibitory final notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act, depending on the objections raised by the ·1and owner. Looked at from any point of view, it does seem crear that Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act was intended to apply to 'live' and not stale notices issued under B Section 35(3) of the Forest Act The second question:

74Copy pinpoint74. The next question is whether at all the unstated decision of the State to take over the so-called forest land can be. successfully implemented. What the decision implies is the C- demolition, amongst others, of a large number of residential buildings, industrial buildings, commercial buildings, Bhabha Atomic Energy Complex and the Employees State Insurance Scheme Hospital and compulsorily rendering homeless thousands of. families, some of whom may have invested D considerable savings in the disputed lands. What it also implies is demolition of the municipal and other public infrastructure works already undertaken and in use, clearing away the rubble and then planting trees and shrubs to 'restore' the 'forest' to an acceptable condition. According to learned counsel for the E State, this is easily achievable. But it is easier said than done. According to the Bombay Environment Action Group a patent, incurable illegality has been committed and the natural consequences (demolition) must follow. Reliance was placed, inter alia, on K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Chief Office/'35, M.I. F Builders v. Radhey Shyam Sahu36, Pleasant Stay Hotel v. Palani Hills Conservation Counci/37 and Pratibha Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 38 to suggest that no party should be allowed to take the benefit or advantage of their own wrong and a patent illegality cannot be cured. G

75Copy pinpoint75. The broad principle laid down by this Court is not in

35. (1974) 2 sec 506.

36. (1996) 6 sec 464.

37. (1995) 6 sec 121.

38. (1991) 3 sec 341. H.

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.

A doubt. An unauthorized construction, unless compoundable in law, must be razed. In question are the circumstances leading to the application of the principle and the practical application of the principle. More often than not, the municipal authorities and builders conspiratorially join hands in violating the law but B the victim is an innocent purchaser or investor who pays for the maladministration. In such a case, how is the victim to be compensated or is he or she expected to be the only loser? If the victim is to be compensated, who will do so? These issues have not been discussed in the decisions cited by the Bombay C Environment Action Group.

76Copy pinpoint76. In so far as the practical application of the principle is concerned, in Shenoy permission was granted to convert a Kalyana Mantap-cum-Lecture Hall into a cinema hall. A reading of the decision suggests that no construction was made and it is not clear whether any money was actually spent on the project. The question of compensation, therefore, did not arise.

77Copy pinpoint77. M.I. Builders was an extreme case in which partial demolition was ordered since the agreement between the Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika and the builder was not only unreasonable for the Mahapalika, but atrocious. In paragraph 59 of the Report, this Court said, "The agreement defies logic. It is outrageous. It crosses all limits of rationality. The Mahapalika has certainly acted in a fatuous manner in entering into such an agreement." F It was further held in paragraph 71 of the Report that, "The agreement smacks of arbitrariness, unfairness and favouritism. The agreement was opposed to public policy. It was not in public interest. The whole process of law was subverted to benefit the builder."

78Copy pinpoint78. Pleasant Stay Hotel was a case of deliberately flouting the law. The Hotel was granted sanction for the construction of two floors but despite the rejection of its revised plan, it went ahead and constructed seven floors. This Court noted that, therefore, five floors had been constructed illegally and

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 259 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

unauthorisedly. Under these circumstances, and subject to certain clarifications, the demolition order passed by the High Court was upheld. Payment of compensation in a case of knowingly and deliberately flouting the law does not arise.

79Copy pinpoint79. In Pratibha the eight unauthorized floors were constructed in clear and flagrant violation and disregard of the FSI. The demolition order had already attained finality in this Court and thereafter six of the unauthorized floors had been demolished and the seventh was partially demolished. This Court found no justification to interfere with the demolitions. C Again, the issue of compensation does not arise in such a situation.

80Copy pinpoint80. The application of the principle laid down by this Court, therefore, depends on the independent facts found in a case. The remedy of demolition cannot be applied per se with a D broad brush to all cases. The State also seems to have realized /this and that is perhaps the reason why it moved the application that it did in Godavarrnan.

81Copy pinpoint81. Looking at the issue from point of view of the citizen and not only from the point of view of the State or a well meaning pressure group, it does appear that even though the basic principle is that the buyer should beware and· therefore if" the appellants and purchasers of tenements or commercial establishments from the appellants ought to bear the consequences of unauthorized construction, the well-settled principle of caveat emptor would be applicable in normal circumstances and not in extraordinary circumstances as these appeals present, when a citizen is effectively led up the garden path for several decades by the State itself. The present appeals do not relate to a stray or a few instances of unauthorized constructions and, therefore, fall in a class of their own. In a case such as the present, if a citizen cannot trust the State which has given statutory permissions and provided municipal facilities, whom should he or she trust? H

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C~R.

82Copy pinpoint82. Assuming the disputed land was a private forest, the State remained completely inactive when construction was ' going on over acres and acres of land and of a very large number of buildings thereon and for a few decades. The State permitted the construction through the development plans and B by granting exemption under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and providing necessary infrastructure such as roads and sanitation on the disputed land and the surrounding area. When such a large scale activity involving the State is being carried on over vast stretches of land exceeding c a hundred acres, it is natural for a reasonable citizen to assume that whatever actions are being taken are in accordance with law otherwise the State would certainly step in to prevent such a massive and prolonged breach of the law. The silence of the State in all the appeals before us led the appellants and a large number of citizens to believe that there was no patent illegality 0 in the constructions on the disputed land nor was there any legal risk in investing on the disputed land. Under these circumstances, for the State or the Bombay Environment Action Group to contend that only the citizen must bear the. consequences of the unauthorized construction may not be E appropriate. It is the complete inaction of the State, rather its active consent that has resulted in several citizens being placed in a precarious position where they are now told that their . investment is actually in unauthorized constructions which are liable to be demoli~hed any time even after several decades. F There is no reason why these citizens should be the only victims of such a fate and the State be held not responsible for this state of affairs; nor is there any reason why under such circumstances this Court should not come to the aid of victims of the culpable failure of the State to implement and enforce the law for several decades.

83Copy pinpoint83. In none of these cases is there an allegation that the State has acted arbitrarily or irrationally so as to voluntarily benefit any of the appellants. On the contrary, the facts show that the appellants followed the due legal process in making·

GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF 261 MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] the constructions that they did and all that can be said of the A State is that its Rip Van Winkleism enabled the appellants to obtain valid permissions from various authorities, from time to time, to make constru,ctions over a long duration. The appellants and individual citizens cannot be faulted or punished for that. B

84Copy pinpoint84. These appeals raise larger issues of good administration and governance and the State has, regrettably, come out in poor light in this regard. It is not necessary for us to say anything more on the subject except to conclude that even if the State were to succeed on the legal issues before C us, there is no way, on the facts and circumstances of these appeals, that it can reasonably put the clock back and ensure that none of the persons concerned in these appeals is prejudiced in any manner whatsoever.

Conclusion: D

85Copy pinpoint85. Accordingly, for the reasons given, all these appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the ·Bombay High Court is set aside in all of them and the notices impugned in the writ petitions in the High Court are quashed. E Orders in Interlocutory Applications

Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.25747/2010 and 25748/2010 ' F

86Copy pinpoint86. Delay condoned.

SLP (Cl No.34691/2011

87Copy pinpoint87. Permission to file the special leave petition is declined. However, the petitioner is at liberty to take such appropriate G action as is now permissible under·the law.

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.

A Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10677 of 2008, _ 10760 of 2008, 11509 of 2008 and 11640 of 2008

88Copy pinpoint88. Applications for impleadment/intervention stand allowed.

B Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P. (Cl Nos. 10760 of 2008 and 11509 of 2008

89Copy pinpoint89. Applications for modification of the order dated 5th May, 2008 in these appeals and the applications for directions c in all other appeals are disposed of in terms of the judgment pronounced.

D.G. Appeals allowed.