LALARAM & OTHERS v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY &ANR.

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67Copy pinpoint67. With this preface, the State did, however, in unqualified terms aver in its affidavit dated 22.3.2013 that in terms of the Standing Orders under Rule 21 at item No. 106, the Minister-in-Charge was the competent authority in matters relating to land acquisition and also for releasing the land under B acquisition. It was clarified, that the competent authority in relation to land acquisition/release of land used to be the Minister-in-Charge and that subsequent to the notification dated 8.7.2004, the Rules of Business allocation had been amended whereafter, the matters relating to land under c acquisition/release of land from acquisition, had been brought within the ambit of Second Schedule and thus by virtue of Rule 8 read with 31, the file had to be approved by the Chief Minister of the State. Further, it was stated as well that since the matter of land in lieu of compensation was considered as a matter relating to acquisition or for releasing the land under acquisition, it was within the ambit of Rule 21 and, therefore, the Minister- in-Charge was capable of taking the decision as required.

68Copy pinpoint68. In the face of above overwhelming and unambiguous verified averments made on behalf of the State as well as the sequence of the orders/circulars.on the issue involved, we are of the unhesitant opinion that at the relevant point of time i.e. 13.12.2001, the departmental minister was in exclusive charge and was competent to take a final decision on the issue of · acquisition of land, release thereof from acquisition and allotment of land in lieu of compensation and thus the said · circular indeed does represent an enforceable State policy. In any view of the matter, the State Government had acted on the circular in allotting developed land to others and, thus under the shield of repugnance of the Rules, it cannot be permitted to resile from its policy intended to be invoked.

69Copy pinpoint69. The authorities cited at the Bar now need be traversed to test the conclusions made. The propositions contained therein, being dominantly structured on the textual facts, reference thereof in bare minimum is unavoidable. H

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[AMITAVAROY, J.]

70Copy pinpoint70. In Dattatreya Moreshwar (supra), before a A Constitution Bench of this· Court, in challenge was the order of confirmation of the detention of the petitioner under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, amongst other, on the ground that it was with a confidential letter of the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department and the same not being expressed/made in the name of Governor, as required by Article 166( 1) of the Constitution of India, was not in proper legal form. It was urged with reference to the said constitutional provision, that all executive actions of the Government of State have to be expressed and authenticated in the manner as provided therein. This Court, while observing that every executive action need not be formally expressed, more particularly so when one superior officer directs his subordinate to act or forbear from acting in a particular way, ruled that when an executive decision affects an outsider or is required to be officially notified or to be communicated, it should normally be expressed in the form mentioned in Article 166( 1) of the Constitution of India i.e. in the name of Governor. The plea that an omission to make and authenticate an executive decision in the form mentioned in Article 166 does not per se make the decision itself illegal was, however sustained. It was underlined, that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. It was propounded that when the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it had been the practice of the Courts G to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect thereof not affecting the validity of the acts done. Elaborating on this deduction, it was held, that strict compliance with the requirements of Article 166 would give an immunity to the order so much so, that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it H

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A is not an order made by the Governor and th us in case of non- compliance of the said provision, such an immunity cannot be claimed by the State. It was, however, observed that such a failure would not vitiate the order itself. Jn clear terms, it was expanded that though Article 166 of the Constitution of India B directs all executive action to be expressed and authenticated in the manner laid down therein, an omission to comply therewith does not render the executive action a nullity.

71Copy pinpoint71. Concurring with the majority view as above, Hon'ble Mukherjee, J. observed that Article 166(1) did not lay down how an executive action of the Government of a State is to be performed; it only prescribed the mode in which such an act is to be expressed. It was emphasised that the manner of expression is ordinarily a matter of form but whether a rigid compliance with a form is essential to the validity of an act or not, depends upon the intention of the legislature. It was enunciated that Article 166 of the Constitution of India has to be read as a whole whereunder as per clause (3), the Governor is to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of a State and for allocation thereof among the ministers, insofar as that did not relate to matters with regard to which the Governor was required to act. in his disc.retion. It was reiterated that any executive action as contemplated therein, is to be taken by way of an order or instrument, to be expressed in the name of Governor, in whom the executive power of the State is vested and further to be authenticated in the manner specified in the Rules framed under Article 166(3). That compliance of Article 166(1) & (2) would render such an order or instrument immune from- challenge in a court of Jaw on the ground that it had not been made or executed by the Governor of the State, was reaffirmed. While concluding that even if clause (1) of Article 166 is taken to be an independent provision unconnected with clause (2), it was highlighted that the prescription of the former would only be directory and not imperative and was indeed a formality for H

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[AMITAVAROY, J.]

doing a public act. Following extract from the Maxwell on A lnterpretatio1;1 of Statutes, 11th Edition, page 369 was adverted to: "Where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty, and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, yet not promote the essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only."

72Copy pinpoint72. A letter issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Mysore, Education Department conveying the decision of the Government to award 25% marks in the interview for admission to Engineering Colleges and Technical Institutions suffered the assailment of being non-compliant with the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution of India as it had neither been expressed in the name of Governor nor implemented in the manner as enjoined in R. Chitralekha (supra). A Constitution Bench of this Court, while expressing its view in ~ajority in essence recounted. the proposition enunciated in Dattatraya Moreshwar(supra) and also State of Bombay vs. PurvshottamJog Naik(1952 SCR674)and F Ghaio Mall and Sons vs. State of Delhi (1959 SCR 1424) to the effect that the essentials of Article 166(1) and (2) if not complied with, the order in question would be defective in form. It reiterated that the enjoinments are not mandatory but directory and if not adhered to would only deny the claim of immunity thereof from challenge as to whether the decision in fact had G been of the State Government or the Governor and would not per se render the same a nullity. In such an eventuality, it would be necessary to be established as a question of fact that the decision or the order involved was in fact validly taken by the H

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A State Government or the Governor. That however in any case, there has to exist a decision or order of the Governor as per the Rules of Business framed un.der Article 166(3) and that it would be the burden upon the Government to establish the same was emphasised upon by Hon'ble Mudholkar, J. in B supplementation of the majority view.

73Copy pinpoint73. The vires and constitutional validity of the Goa (Prohibition of Further Payment and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002 was impeached in Goa Glass Fibre Limited vs. State of Goa and another (2010) 6 SCC 499, C amongst others, on the ground that the said legislation was founded on a decision of the High Court of Bombay, Panji Bench rendered on 19.4.2001/24.4.2001 to the effect that Notifications dated 15.5.1996 and 1.8.1996 had been issued without compliance with the requirements of Article 166(3), D though the said verdict was subjudice in appeal before this Court. Resisting the challenge, the State of Goa, not only endorsed the validity of the Statute but also insisted that the notifications involved were illegal, unauthorised and that the legislation had been made to prohibit any further payment there E under in order to save the public exchequer from getting denuded of its coffers. It was urged as well, that the decision of the State Government to issue notifications mentioned above was not authorised by law inasmuch as t~e Council of Ministers had rescinded the same. But despite this, the Power F Minister himself had issued a notification at his own level without making a reference to either the Chief Minister or the Council of Ministers or consulting the Finance Department as mandatorily required under the Rules of business. It was asserted as well that the decision of the then Minister of Power G to issue the notifications was wholly unauthorised as he had no authority in law to issue them at his level and the subject matter was required to be placed before the Cabinet in view of the huge financial implication involved therein and further that the Cabinet had earlier rescinded the notifications offering H

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[AMITAVAROY, J.]

rebate. It was underlined too, that for any modification or variation of such decision, it was required to be placed before the Council of Ministers in view of the business Rules framed under Article .166(3) of the Constitution of India. The State maintained further that the two notifications had imposed a heavy burden on the state exchequer and that the concurrence of the Finance Department of the State Government was mandatory. That not only such concurrence was absent, the note in the concerned file of the Power Minister that he had consulted the Chief Minister was found to be false as per the police investigation conducted. The State pleaded too that despite no budgetary allocation or any provision for making payment, finance was sought to be diverted to the private industrialists by virtue of the two notifications, as a result whereof, an amount of Rs. 16 crores had already been lost and further sum of Rs. 50 crores of public money was in the D CQurse of being siphoned off.

74Copy pinpoint74. This Court in the above overwhelming factual backdrop, supported by the official records, did take note of the amply demonstrated grounds, justifying the legislation and did sustain the validity thereof. In essence, this Court did accept on the face of contemporaneous records that the notifications had already been rescinded by the Council of ..., Ministers and though under the Rules of Business, the Finance V Department was to be mandatorily consulted due to huge financial implication, the then Minister of Power on his own had issued the same resulting in heavy and unwarranted financial burden on the State Exchequer in absence of any budgetary sanction therefor.

75Copy pinpoint75. In M.R.F. Limited (supra), this Court was in seisin of a challenge to the said two notifications dated 15.5.1996 and G 1.8.1996 granting rebaie of 25% in tariff in respect of power supply to certain categories of industrial consumers, inter alia, on the ground that those were null and void for want of compliance with the concerned Rules of Business of the State H

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A Government framed under Artide 166(3) of the Constitution of India. Skipping over the otherwise chequered background of these notifications, suffice it to state that the challenge thereto was also lai.d on the ground of non-compliance of the mandate of Articles 154 and 166 of the Constitution of India and instead B being the yields of the Minister of Power. It was contended that the said notifications could not be termed as those issued by the State Government on account of non-compliance with the Rules of Business and, therefore, were non est and void ·ab initio and resultantly the consequential actions based c thereon were a nullity. The same issue did arise principally for . the scrutiny of this Court in the appeals preferred by the industrial consumers involved. The State Government in its counter-affidavit in the appeals in support of the judgment impugned, pleaded that the notifications did not embody the . D Government decision inasmuch as the matter was neither placed before the State Cabinet in terms of the business Rules nor was the mandatory concurrence of the Finance Department there under obtained. It was contended as well that in view of the notifications, the State had already paid an amount of Rs. E 16 crores as rebate and that it could not.afford to pay further on account of the financial crunch faced by it. It was urged ,._ further that the Notifications, if upheld, would result in loss of • Rs: 50 crores to the State Exchequer. The pleadings of the ' State, as noticed by this Court, reflected that there was neither the financial sanction nor the budgetary provision, nor a cabinet approval as was mandatorily required under the Rules and that there was clear breach of the mandatory provisions thereof.

76Copy pinpoint76. In the course of adjudication, the plea of estoppel against the State Government in repudiating the notifications was negated on the ground that the issue of validity thereof, being repugnant to the mandatory prqvisions of the Rules of busiriess·had not arisen in the earlier round of litigation. The contention that it was impermissible for the State Government to take contradictory stand in the pleadings was rejected. The H

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conclusion of the High Court that in a democratic set-up, the A validity of the decisions of the Government, that decides the destiny of the people should be decided not only on the basis of the affidavits filed by the officers of the Governments or on incomplete or inadequate information made available by them, but on the basis of constitutional provisions and the Business B Rules framed there under was sustained. Adverting to the directory or mandatory character of the constituents of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, this Court, amongst other, quoted with approval the following excerpts from its earlier decision in Haridwar Singh vs. Sagun Sumbrui & others C (1973) 3 sec 889: "13. Several tests have been propounded in decided cases for determining the question whether a provision in a statute, or a rule is mandatory or directory. No universal rule can be laid down on this matter. In each D case one must look to the subject-matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secuted. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely be directory and are indicative of the intent that the E provisi_on is to be mandatory...

14. Where a prescription relates to performance of a public duty and to invalidate acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty. such prescription is generally understood as mere instruction for the guidance of those upon whom the duty is imposed."

77Copy pinpoint77. The cavil of estoppel against the State on the plea that it did not agitate against the legality or validity of the notifications in the earlier round of litigation, was dismissed in view of the illegality thereof, being repugnant to the mandatory provisions of the Rules. It was held that mere omission on the H

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A part of the State Government to assail the validity of the notifications on the ground of non-compliance of the Rules, would neither debar or disentitle itfrom raising such a plea.

78Copy pinpoint78. Apart from noting the extract from the erudite work, Maxwell on Statutes, referred to hereinabove, this Court did B refer as well to the following quote from the Halsbury"s Laws of England, 4'h Edn. Reissue, Vol. 44(1) at para 1238: · "Mandatory and directory enactments.-The distinction between mandatory and directory enactments concerns c statutory requirements and may have to be drawn where the consequence of ailing to implement the requirement is not spelt out in the legislation. The requirement may arise in one of two ways. A duty to implement it may be imposed directly on a persor:i; or legislation may govern the doing of an act or the carrying on of an activity, and D compel the person doing the act or carrying on the activity to implement the requirement as part of a specified procedure. The requirement may be imposed merely by implication. E To remedy the deficiency of the legislature in failing to specify the intended legal consequence of non- compliance with such a requirement, it has been necessary for the courts to devise rules. These lay down that it must be decided from the wording ofthe relevant enactment whether .the requirement is intended to be mandatory or merely directory. The same requirement may be mandatory as to some aspects and directory as to the rest. The court will be more willing to hold that a statutory requirement is merely directory if any breach of the requirement is necessarily followed by an opportunity to exercise some judicial or official discretion in a way which can adequately compensate for that breach. Provisions relating to the steps to be taken by the parties to legal proceedings (using the term in the widest sense) H are often construed as mandatory. Where, however, a

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requirement, even if in mandatory terms, is purely A procedural and is imposed for the benefit of one party alone, that party can waive the requirement. Provisions requiring a public authority to comply with formalities in orderto render a private individual liable to a levy have generally been hE/ld to be mandatory. B Requirements are construed as directory if they relate to the performance of a public duty, and the case is such that to hold void acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, without at the same time promoting the main object of the legislature. This is illustrated by many decisions relating to the performance of public fun,etions out ofJime, and by many relating to the failure of public officers to comply with formal requirements. On the other hand. the view that provisions conferring private rights have been generally treated as mandatory is less easy to support: the decisions on provisions of this type appear. in fact. to show no really marked leaning either way." E

79Copy pinpoint79. The assertion on behalf of the respondents that there can be no universal rule with regard to violation of Rules of Business and that each case must be decided on the facts and further that prohibitive or negative words in the provision thereof, in matters concerning revenue or finance, exclusive competence of the Cabinet to take a decision on an issue, prior consultation of the Finance Department and the like do indicate mandatory feature thereof, was taken note of. It was held that the Rules of Business in those contingencies, if not complied with, the decision/communication could not be termed as a Government decision and that an individual functionary cannot bypass the Rules of Business.

80Copy pinpoint80. This Court took cognizance, amongst other, of the· decision of this Court in Kripalu Shankar (supra) which proclaimed that a noting by an official in the departmental file H

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A would not amount to an executive decision within the meaning of Article 166 of the Constitution of India. It noted the observation as well that while clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 did relate to the mode of expression of the order and the authentication thereof, clause (3) pertained to the making of the rules by the Governor for more convenient transaction of the business of the Government. Referring to Rules 3, 6 and 7 of the Business Rules of the Government of Goa as involved and judging the same on the touchstone of the above judicially evolved formulations, this Court concluded that any proposal likely to be converted into a decision of the State Government involving expenditure or abandonment of revenue for which there was no provision made in the Appropriation Act or an issue which involved concession or otherwise having a financial implicatton on the State, was required to be processed only after the concurrence of the Finance Department and could not be finalised merely at the level of the Minster-in- charge. It was ruled that after the concurrence of the Finance Department, the proposal had to be placed before the Council of Ministers and/or the Chief Minister and only after a decision was taken in that regard, the same would result in a decision of the State Government. It was held that Rules 3, 6, 7 and 9 were mandatory in nature so much so that any decision taken by any individual minister in violation thereof could not be termed as a decision of the State Government.

81Copy pinpoint81. In arriving at this "conclusion, this Court did acknowledge the decision of the Constitution Bench in R. Chitralekha (supra) which propounded that the provisions, Article 166 (1) &(2)were directory in nature and not mandatory, but observed that the same could not be relied upon to uphold G the contention that Business Rules made under Clause (3) were directory as well.

82Copy pinpoint82. Dwelling on this aspect, this Court elucidated that under Article 154 of the Constitution of India, the Governor was vested with the executive power of the State, to be exercised H

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either directly or through the officers subordinate to him in A accordance· with the provisions of the Constitution. It was set down that the Governor was advised by the Council of Ministers ~ith the Chief Minister as its head in exercise of his functions · except those specifically stated to be in the discharge of his discretion as the Head of the State. It was reiterated that the B Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution were for convenient transaction of the business of the Government and for allocation of the business among the Ministers who collectively in the Council were responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State. !twas emphasised c that any decision taken by the State Government, therefore, reflected the collei;:tive responsibility of the Council of Ministers and their participation in the decision making process and thus the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution are framed in order to fulfil the constitutional o mandate embodied in Chapter II of Part VI of the Constitution ma'king it obligatory for the decision ·of the State Government to be in accord therewith. The following excerpt from the decision in Haridwar Singh (supra) was also referred to:

15. Where however. a power of authority is conferred E with a direction that certain regulation or formality shwl be complied with. it seems neither unjust nor incorrect to exact a rigorous observance of it as essential to the acquisition of the right or authority." ...

83Copy pinpoint83. It was, thus, concluded that the Business Rules F framed under the provisions of Article 166(3) are mandatory and must be strictly adhered to so much so that any decision of the Government in breach thereof would be a nullity in the eye of the law. G

84Copy pinpoint84. In the facts of the above reported case, this Court, on a consultation of the official records and being convinced that the notifications concerned had·been issued in non-compliance · of the Rules, sustained the verdict of the High Court proclaimed as above. H

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A 85.Allusion to Article 166 as a whole, figured in a different context before this Court in Jaipur Development Authority (supra), to assay the attributes of the letter dated 6.12.2001 iss\,Jed by the Deputy Secretary (Administration), Urban Development and Housing Department to the Secretary, Jaipur B Development Authority, Jaipur in the matter of allotment of plots in addition to the compensation paid to the awardees in connection with the acquisition of land involved. For the construction of new building of the .Legislative Assembly, educational institutions, stadium complex, district shopping C centre, MLA quarter~ etc., under the project "Lal Kathi Scheme", notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Act were issued on 13.5.1960 and 11.5.1961 respectively whereafter, notice was issued to the land owners/khatedars under Sections 9 (1) and (3) of the D Rajasthan Act. The claimants for compensation, included persons who had purchased portions of the acquired land. Initially, 65 khatedars filed claims for compensation, but this figure rose to more than 137 because those who purchased land from the khatedars after publication of the notification issued under Section 4 and their nominees/sub-nominees, also filed claims for compensation.

86Copy pinpoint86. The Land Acquisition Officer, Jaipur by his award dated 9.1.1964 not only determined the amount of compensation payable to the land owners and the beneficiaries of transfers which were illegal being made after the notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Act, but also directed allotment ·of plots measuring varying areas to the owners/their transferees and nominees/sub-nominees out of the acquired land. Initially, neitherthe State Government nor the Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur, the architect of the project, did challenge the direction contained in the award of the Land Acquisition Officer. However, as the execution applications by the beneficiaries mounted with time, they did so. While the litigation was pending, the functionaries of the State, in their H

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bid to confer legitimacy on the illegal transactions involving purchases of the acquired land after the .notification under Section 4, caused a Committee to bf'! constituted at the instance of the then Minister of Urban Development and Housing, who was also the Chairman of the Trust for suggesfing the methodology for allotment of land in terms of the directions given by the Land Acquisition Officer. The Committee, accordingly, recommended that the land be allotted to the beneficiaries of illegal transactions at the rate fixed-by it and a circular representing to be a policy decision, was issued in 1978 to that effect. The draw of lots was held c thereafter for allotment of plots to the awardees and the _beneficiaries of illegal transfers of the acquired land. Those unsuccessful in the process, approached the High Court which held that the directions given by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Minister for allotment of plots were ex facie illegal and o had the effect of defeating the public purpose for which the land was acquired. The recorded facts revealed, that an inquiry was made into the episode by the Lokayukta of the State, who returned a finding, that the persons named therein including the then departmental minister had misused their official E position to favour a few influential and highly placed individuals and had also thereby caused wrongful gain to them and wrongful loss to the JOA (successor of Jaipur Improvement Trust) and the public at large.

87Copy pinpoint87. This Court recalled its adjudication in Jaipur . F Development Authority vs. Radhey Shyam (1994) 4 SCC 370 to the effect that the Land Acquisition Officer did not have any jurisdiction, power or authority to direct allotment of land to the claimants und"EH the Rajasthan Act in lieu of compensation. It was also noted that as held in Jaipur G Development Authority vs. Dau/at Mal Jain (1997) 1 SCC 35 that there was no policy laid by the Government to this effect .and that it could not have. been so, being contrary to the Rajasthan Improvement Trust (Disposal of Urban Land) Rules, H

470 SUPREME COl:JRT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.

A 1974 and that no such power was given to the individual minister by executive action to that effect.· This Court also recalled its observation that the decision taken by the Minister and the actions of the bureaucrats were meant to benefit only those who had illegally secured transfer of land after the publication of the notification issued under Section 4 and that the so-called policy was an artifice to feed corruption and to deflect the public purpose.

88Copy pinpoint88. The facts divulged that the purchasers involved initially challenged the notice dated 19.12.1996 issued by the JOA for auction of their plots before the Tribunal and being unsuccessful in view of the pronouncement in Radhey Shyam Case (supra) and Dau/at Mal Jain (supra), challenged the determination made by the Tribunal before the learned Single judge of the High Court which met the same fate. The Division D Bench of the High Court however, though did uphold the finding of the learned Single Judge that the dispute relating to title of the property could not be decided under Article 226 of the Constitution, sustained the plea of the purchasers that in terms of the policy decision taken by. the State Government, E expressed in the letter dated 6.12.2001 and the order dated 9.1 .2002 passed by another Division Bench, they were entitled to regularisation of the plots in question.

89Copy pinpoint89. In the contextual facts, this Court noticed that the F vendors of the purchasers had no valid title, they having purchased the land involved from the khatedars, after the publication of the notification under Section 4 and that thus the intervening transactions did not convey any title. It recorded that till the disposal of the writ petitipn by the learned Single Judge, the letter dated 6.12.2001, sought to be passed off as G a policy decision, was not in existence and that a Committee of Ministers was formed vide order 30.10.2001 to suggest a solution of the problem in the regularisation of illegal constructions/encroachments of land under the Lal Kothi and

LALARAM v~ JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 471 [AMITAVAROY, J.]

Prithviraj Nagar Schemes in relation to which several cases A were pending in differenf courts.· It was observed that the recommendations made by the Committee were given the colour of Governme11t decision, though no material had been produced to establish that the same were accepted by the State Government. That such a lacuna was discernible from· B the letter dated 6.12.2001 was also observed. Apart from holding that the Division Bench of the High Court had erred in entertaining a new case without the essential pleadings, the reliance on the said policy decision which was in flagrant violation of the judgments of this Court in Radhey Shyam C (supra) and Dau/at Mal Jain (supra) was strongly disapproved. Holding that the letter dated 6.12.2001, by no means, could be construed to be a policy decision ofthe State Government, this Court ruled that the High Court had impermissibly sought to legitimise the illegal transactions in D violation of the dictum of this Court in Radhey Shyam (supra) and Dau/at Mal Jain (supra).

90Copy pinpoint90. It is in this context that the prescriptions of Articles 77 .& 166 of the Constitution of India were adverted to, with special reference to the decision of this Court in Kripalu Shankar E (supra) to the eff~ct that a noting by an official in the departmental file could not be construed to be an executive decision. It was thus concluded, that unless an order is expressed in the name of President or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the Rules of F Business, the same cannot be treated as an order made on behalf of the Government. The letter dated 6.12.2001 in the opinion of this Court, having failed to meet this prescript, it was discarded as a policy decision of the Government within the meaning of Article 166 of the Constitution. It was held as G well, that in any case, even if this letter dated 6.12.2001 could be treated to be a policy decision, it being contrary to the determinations made in Radhey Shyam (supra) and Dau/at Mal Jain (supra), it was non est. H

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91Copy pinpoint91. This Court had an occ;:asion to dilate on the prescriptions of Articles 166 and 77 of Constitution of India in Delhi International Airport Ltd. vs. International Lease Finance Corporation and others 2015 (8) SCC 446. While testing the validity of the minutes of the meeting of the B Committee, comprised amongst others of the representatives of Ministry of Civil Aviation, Airport Authority of India (AAI), Delhi International Airport Pvt. Ltd. (DIAL) and Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC), regarding release of aircrafts of the respondent Kingfisher Airlines (KAL) by Delhi c International Airport Ltd., the issue that surfaced was whether the minutes of the meeting could override theAirportAuthority of India (Management of Airports) Regulations, 2003 (for short, hereinafter referred to as "Regulations"). Under Regulation 10 of Regulations, the competent authority, as defined in D Regulation 3(8) only was empowered to detain or stop the departure of an aircraft unless otherwise provided by the Airport Authority of India Act, 1994 or by general or speaking order in writing of the Central Government. Responding to the plea of the appellant that the minutes of the meeting dated 26.3.2013. E permitting release of aircrafts, as mentioned therein, being not a general or speaking order passed by the Central Government, it could not override the powers oftheAAI under Regulation 10, this court referring to Articles 77 and 166 of the Constitution of India held that in terms of Rule 3 of the concerned F Rules of business, the decision taken in the meeting dated 26.3.2013 should have been sanctioned by/under the general or special directions of the Minister-in-Charge and further as stakes of different departments headed by different ministries were concerned, the decision should have been taken by the concerned Committee of the Cabinet. The concurrence of the Finance Depar:tment due to the financial bearing, was also necessary. It was held that the minutes of the meeting purportedly stated to be an order in writing by Central Government and later communicated to all concerned, were not disposed of in pursuance of Rule 4 of the Rules i.e. neither

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the decision was sanctified by the Cabinet nor the concurrence A of Finance Department was taken. This Court held the view that from a combined reading of Rules 3,4 and 4(2), the minutes of the meeting were required to be proceeded only after the concurrence of the Finance Department and could not have been finalised at the level of officers(representatives of Civil B Aviation, Central Board of Excise and Customs etc. Additionally, after the concurrence of the Finance Ministry, the minutes of the meeting ought to have been placed before the concerned Minister as per the Rules of Business. It was held that sanctification by the concerned ministry and the c concurrence of the Finance Department was a mandatory requirement in order to construe the minutes of the meeting to be a general or special order in writing by the Central Government. That there was nothing on record to prove that the minutes of the rieeting had the concurrence of the Finance D Department or had either been confirmed or approved by the concerned Minister or such directions had been issued pursuant to any decision taken by a competent authority in terms of Rules of Business framed under Article 77 of the Constitution of India, was noted. The intervention of this Court was, thus on E a clear and demonstrable infraction of Rules of Business framed under Article 77 of the Constitution of India enjoining peremptory compliance of the requirements for fructification of the minutes of the meeting to be a general or special order in writing by the Central Government, as contemplated by the F Rules.

92Copy pinpoint92. In Rajasthan Housing Board (supra), land was acquired for the purpose of housing scheme of the Board and a notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Act was issued on 12.1.1982. The possession was handed over to the Board G on 22.5.1982. The .award was passed in four cases on 30.11.1982 and in remaining cases on 2.1.1989 by the Land Acquisition Officer in favour ofthe khatedars. The respondent society applied for reference under Section 18 of the H

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A Rajasthan Act and the Reference Court determined the compensation at Rs. 260 per square yard. The High Court, in appeal, reduced the compensation to Rs. 100 per square yard. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, in addition directed consideration for allotment of 25% of the developed B land in view of the circular dated 27.10.2005.

93Copy pinpoint93. According to the respondent society, it had entered into an agreement of sale with the khatedars on various dates prior to the notification dated 12.1.1982 and that it also obtained a decree in a suit on the basis of compromise. That C it had developed the land by making a huge investment, was also asserted. The claim of the respondent society for compensation was resisted by the State Government and the Rajasthan Housing Board contending that the transactions, on the basis of which it claimed the same, were ab intio void being in contravention of provisions of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It was contended as well that the circulars dated 13.11.2001and27.10.2005 relied upon by the Society, were not applicable to the facts of the case and were not enforceable as well. The direction for allotment of developed land was, thus, seriously assailed.

94Copy pinpoint94. Referring to Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, this Court upheld the objection of nullity of the v transactions for sale as claimed by the respondent-society as it prohibited sale, gift or bequest by a member ofa Scheduled Caste in favour of a person who is not a member of the Scheduled Caste, or by a member of a Scheduled Tribe in favour of a person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribe. It was recorded that the cast of the original khatedars was G "Bairwa" which was a Scheduled Caste.

95Copy pinpoint95. Reverting to the circular dated 27 .10.2005, this Court marked that the applicability thereof depended on the land surrendered by the khatedars without compensation, thus entitling them to obtain 25% of the developed residential area H

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[AMITAVA ROY, J.]

in lieu thereof. It was held that as it was not a case of surrender A of land, the said circular was inapplicable which, in fact, was in the form of guidelines for future acquisition, conditionally on the surrender of the land by the khatedars. The ratio of the decisions of this Cour:t in Radhey Shyam(supra), Dau/at Mal Jain (supra) and VijayKumar Data (supra) was reiterated. B

96Copy pinpoint96. In the context of the circular dated 27.10.2005, reference was again made to the decision of this Court in Kripalu Shankar(supra) involving the noting in a file, which as held, did not amount to an executive decision by itself. The mandate of Article 166 with regard to mode of expression of the decision of the Government, the manner of authentication thereof and making of the rules by the Governor for more convenient transaction of the business of the Government was revisited. In the contextual facts, the circular dated 27.10.2005 was held to be inapplicable besides being beneficial to the purchasers, who claimed to have acquired right in the land, after issuance of the notifica.tion Linder Section 4 and in violation of the mandate of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The direction of the High Court to allot land on the basis of the circular dated 27 .10.2005 was, thus, interfered with. E

97Copy pinpoint97. The decision of this Court in Hari Ram (supra) pertains to the grievance of discrimination in the matter of release of acquired lands. Following the commencement of the initiative for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition F Act 1894, writ petitions were filed in the High Court of Punjab · & Haryana challenging the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the said Act on various grounds, The writ petitioners al:;o prayed for release of their respective lands. During the pendency of writ petitions, a ·committee was constituted to inspect the site and make recommendations as to whether G the land of the writ petitioners could be released or not. The Committee submitted its report whereby, however, it did not recommend release of land of the appellants before this Court. The High Court, acting on the report; though ordered release H

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A· of land in favour of some of the writ petitioners, dismissed the claim of others including the appellants. During the pendency of appeal before this Court, the appellants were granted liberty to make representations before the State Government for release of their land. The representations filed were, however, rejected on the basis of policy dated 26.10.2007.

98Copy pinpoint98. In the facts of that case, this Court noticed that prior to 26.10.2007, the State of Haryana did not have any uniform policy governing the release of land from acquisition, though a letter dated 26.6.1991 pertaining to review the progress of various schemes of Haryana Urban DevelopmentAuthority was sought to be pressed into service in that regard. The same, however, was not of any decisive significance. This Court held, that neither the letter dated 26.6.1991 nor any other policy had ever been followed by the State Government while releasing the land of various land owners acquired in the same acquisition proceedings. That the policy dated 26.10.2007 had not been applied to any of the land owners whose land had been acquired along with the appellants' land was also noted. It was noticed that lands of more than 40 land owners out of the same acquisition proceedings had been released by the State Government which also included those, who had not even challenged the acquisition proceedings and whose cases had not been recommended by the Committee for withdrawal from acquisition. Concluding thus, that no firm policy had been applied for release of lands from the acquisition proceedings involved, this Court entered a finding that it was unfair on the part of State Government in not considering the representations of the appellants by applying the same standards. A direction was made to the State to issue appropriate order(s) concerning the appellants' land on the same terms and in the same manner as done qua the others similarly situated. In adopting this course, this Court observed in no uncertain terms that the land owners who were similarly situated have a right of similar treatment by the State Government as equality of citizens' right H

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[AMITAVAROY, J.]

was one of the fundamental pillars on which the edifice of the rule of law rested.

99Copy pinpoint99. The postulations judicially adumbrated vis-a-vis Article 166 of the Constitution of India, as can be gleaned from the above referred decisions, verily convey the quintessence of the content and expanse thereof. Needless it is thus to burden this adjudication by referring to other pronouncements on the issue.

100Copy pinpoint100. Article 154 of the Constitution of India vests the executive power of the State in· the Governor to be exercised c by him either dir~ctly or through officers subordinates to him in accordance with the Constitution. As per Article 163, there would be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except insofar as he is by or under the Constitution 0 required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. It is in this presiding premise that the conduct of Government business is designed under Article 166 which for ready reference is extracted herein under: ·

166. Conduct of business of the Government of a State - E il}All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor.. ill Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such F manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor. G @.)The Governor shall make. rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to H

4·1a SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.

A which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion.

101Copy pinpoint101. Whereas under Clause (1 ), all executive action of the Government of a State is enjoined to be expressed to be taken in the name of Governor, as predicated by clause (2), B orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of Governor have to be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor and if so done, the V§lidity of an order or instrument, which is so authenticated, shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor. Clause (3) makes it incumbent on the Governor to frame rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State and for the allocation among the Ministers of the said business, insofar as it is not one with respect to which, the Governor is by or under the Constitution required to act in his discretion. 102.Acombined reading of these provisions, thus would evince that the executive power of the State is vested in the E Governor and is to be exercised by him either directly or through the officers subordinate to him, however, in accordance with the Constitution and except insofar as he is required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion, there would be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head to act and advise him in the discharge of his other functions. The Rules of Business as contemplated in clause (3) of Article 166 unmistakably relate to the transactions to be undertaken by the Governor with the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister, subject however to the allocation of business in terms thereof.

103Copy pinpoint103. The essentials of Article 166, as a corollary, are a valid executive decision in terms of the Rules of Business framed under clause (3), expressed in the name of Governor and authentication of the resultant orders and instruments in H

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[AMITAVAROY, J.]

the manner specified in the rules to be made by the Governor. A Thtts, Article 166(3) mandates the making of the Rules of Business for more convenient transactions of the affairs of the Government. Clause (1) stipulates the mode of expression of an executive action taken in conformity therewith and clause (2) ordains the manner of authentication of the consequential B orders and instruments. Having regard to the role assigned to the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the summit, the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) meant for convenient transaction of the affairs of the Government, by allocation thereof among the Ministers, secures their collective c participation in the administration of the governance of the State. This scheme of executive functioning, assuredly thus, is in assonance with the constitutional edict with regard thereto, _modelling the steel frame of the State machinery.

104Copy pinpoint104. It is no longer res integra that the enjoinment of clauses ( 1) and (2) of Article 166, is not mandatory so much so, that any non compliance therewith, ipso facto would render the executive action/decision, if otherwise validly taken in-terms of the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3), invalid. Any decision however, to be construed as an executive decision as contemplated under Article 166, would essentially has to be in accordance with the Rules of Business. _The Rules depending upon the scheme thereof, may or may not, accord an inbuilt flexibility in its provisions in the matter of compliance. It is possible that the provisions of the Rules en bloc may not be relentlessly rigid, obligatory or peremptory proscribing even a minimal departure ensuing in incurable vitiations. Contingent on the varying imperatives, some provisions may warrarit compulsory exaction of compliance therewith e.g. negative/ prohibitive expression/clauses, matters involving revenue or G_ finance,. prior approval/concurrence of the Finance Department, consultation/approval/ concurrence of the Finance and Revenue departments in connection therewith and issues not admitting of any laxity so as to upset, dislodge or mutilate H

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· A the prescribed essentiality of collective participation, involvement and contribution of the Council of Minist~rs, headed by the Chief Minister in aid of the Governor in transacting the affairs of the Stat13 to effectuate the imperatives ·of federal democratic governance as contemplated by the B Constitution.

105Copy pinpoint105. As noticed hereinabove, it is affirmatively acknowledged as well that where provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of these have the potential of resulting in serious general inconvenience or injustice· to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time wo1:1ld not promote the main object of the legislature, such prescriptions are gener;illy understood as mere instructions for the guidance of those on whom the duty is imposed and are regarded as directory. It has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, neglect of those, though punishable, would not however affect the validity of the acts done. At the same time where however, a power or authority is conferred with a direction that certain regulation or formality shall be complied with, it would neither be unjust nor incorrect to exact a rigorous observan'ce of it as essential to the acquisition of the right of authority.

106Copy pinpoint106. Obviously, thus the mandatory nature of any provision of any Rule of Business would be. conditioned by the construction and the purpose thereof to be adjudged in the context of the scheme as a whole. Th~ interpretation of the Rules, necessarily, would be guided by the framework thereof and the contents and purport of its provisions, and the status and tenability of an order/instrument, represented as an executive decision would have to be judged in the conspectus . of the attendant facts and circumstances. No straight jacket formula can, thus be ordained, divorced from the Rules applicable and the factual setting accompar:iying the order/ H decision under scrutiny.

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107Copy pinpoint107. Viewed in this precedential backdrop, the annulment of the circular dated 13.12.2001 only on the ground of its non conformance with the mandate of Article 166 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of India, without any reference to Rules of business under Article 166(3), in our comprehension does riot commend for acceptance. Admittedly and as the impugned judgment would unmistakably attest, no plea was either raised or examined, based on its repugnance with the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3). The facts as obtained in the decisions cited at the Bar are distinctly different from those in the case in hand. Having regard . to the overwhelming judicial exposition of the purport and purp9se of Article 166 of the Constitution, the status of the circular dated 13.12.2001 and the bearing thereof would have to be adjudged in the prevailing facts and circumstances attendant there on.

108Copy pinpoint108. It has not been argued before us that non- D compliance of Article 166 (1) and (2) per se did vitiate the circular dated 13.12.2001. The gravamen of the impugnment thereof is founded on the non-observance of the Rule 31 of the Ru.les followi.ng its amendment on 5.3.1999, namely failure to lay the issue with regard to the allotment of developed land before the Chief Minister of the State. The march of events qua the decision to allot the developed land in lieu of· compensation, in order to speed up the completion of the acquisition process and to secure timely delivery of possession of the land, by curtailing the impeding litigations, is traceable as herein before referred, to the circulars from 22.4.1992 and did continue with variation in the percentage of land to be allotted even after the circular dated 13.12.2001.

109Copy pinpoint109. Noticeably, no plea has been raised emphasising ·on the obligatory requirement of concurrence of the Finance G Department, as a condition precedent or disapproval of the decision of the departmental minister and the Committee constituted by him for the purpose either by the Chief Minister of the State or the other Ministers of the Council. To reiterate, H

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A the State Government in its affidavit in reply to the queries of this Court made with order dated 15.1.2013, in unmistakable terms did vouch the competence and authority of the departmental minister to exclusively take a decision on this issue. As the text of the said affidavit would clearly B demonstrate, the State Government was then fully aware of the amendment to the Rules on 5.3.1999. Our attention has not been drawn to any circular/notification superseding the Order dated 20. 7.1998 whereby the departmental minister in terms of the Standing Orders under Rules 21 and 22 of the C Rules was entrusted with the duty and jurisdiction of dealing with the matters relating to land acquisition and deacquisition. It was only with the Order dated 8.7.2004, that as per Rule 31 of the Rules, matters re,lating to deacquistion of land under acquisition and acquired land were to be presented before o the departmental minister with the approval of the Chief Minister. Nothing has come forth in the interregnum as to the working arrangement for the transaction of business in this regard under the Rules contrary to the one envisaged by the Order dated 20.07.1998. We have not been led to any provision in the Rules incorporating any determinative mandate prohibiting in absolute terms, the continuance of the arrangement under the Standing Order as conveyed by Order dated 20.7 .1998 permitting transaction of the matters relating to land acquisition and deacquisiton solely by the departmental minister. This assumes importance as well in view of Rule 21 requiring disposal of business by means of Standing Orders as envisaged therein.

110Copy pinpoint110. Rule 31 as well, though required submission of the enumerated cases before the Chief Minister prior to the issuance of the orders, there is nothing to suggest exclusion of the departmental minister from taking a decision on any issue if otherwise authorised by the Standing Order. Rule 14 of the Rules, on the other hand, prescribes that all cases referred to in the 2"d Schedule shall be ~ubmitted to the Chief H Minister through the Secretary to the Council after consideration

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[AMITAVAROY, J.]

by the Minister-in-charge or the Minister of State-in-charge, A as the case may be; with a view to obtain his orders for · circulation of the case under Rule 15 or for bringing it up for consideration at a meeting of the Council or Sub-Committee thereof. Significantly, the Second Schedule mentions, amongst others, any proposal which would affect the finances of the B State which does not have the consent of the Finance Minister, or a proposal in\(olving any important change of policy or practice or cases required by the Chief Minister to be brought before the Council. Equally significant is the residuary power of the Chief Minister, reserved under Rule 31 (2)(xix) whereby C he/she would be competent to call for the relevant papers/file(s), report and pass orders in any case involving a policy or a matter of urgent public importance relating to any department, when he considers it necessary or expedient so to do or when the case is referred to him by the Minister-in-Charge or the Chief D . Secretary. The suo moto intervention of the Chief Minister in .. these contingencies thus is also conceptualized.

111Copy pinpoint111. Having regard to the progression of events pertaining to the decision of allotment of developed land and the conscious initiatives taken by the State Government in furtherance thereof, it is impossible as well as impermissible to conclude, that it had remained unaware thereof. The laruJ of the appellants had been compulsorily acquired, in the exercise of the State's power of eminent domain by invoking an expropriatory legislation. Admittedly as well, the compensation as guaranteed by the Reference Court for the land has not been paid to them. To reiterate, the facts demonstrate that the State Government had taken a pre- meditated decision to allot developed land to the land oustees in lieu of compensation. As per the successive circulars including the one dated 13.12.2001, it was incumbent on the State Government to allot developed land with all the essential attributes thereof. As is apparent from the order dated 7.5.2015 of this Court, the plots offered to the appellants till now are not developed. The land had been acquired in the year 1981 and H

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A more than three decades have elapsed. In our view, the delay cannot be attributed to the appellants for the obvious failure of the State Government to allot developed land in lieu of compensation as represented.

112Copy pinpoint112. The records produced pertain to the decision dated B 1.7.2005 taken at the level of Ministerial Sub-Committee to allot 15% developed land to the awardees of acquisition for Field Firing Range including the appellants, at JDA Scheme Lalchandpura and Anantpura. It reveals that the process was initiated at the level of the Director of Land Records on the basis of the circular/policy dated 13.12.2001 and was routed through the Chief Minister for placing the approval of the proposal of developed land elsewhere due to non-availability of land at Vidyadhar Nagar, before the Ministerial Sub- committee. On the approval of the Chief Minister, the matter was laid before the Ministerial Sub-Committee and eventually on 1.7.2005, the Sub-Committee resolved that 15% developed land be allotted at JDAscheme Lalchandpura and Anantpura.

113Copy pinpoint113. The note accompanying the original file No. F6()/ E UDH/2004, however, discloses that the file regarding the policy dated 13.12.2001 and maintained by the Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan is not traceable. The revelation from the file thus produced, authenticates that the process for allotment of land at F Lalchandpura andAnanatpura, as resolved by the Ministerial Sub-Committee was initiated on the basis of the circular/policy dated 13.12.2001 and was steered through the Chief Minister of the State. It is, thus, amply clear that all State functionaries including the Chief Minister of the State were aware of the G process undertaken in terms of the circular/policy dated 13.12."2001 and had affirmatively associated themselves therewith. Significantly, even at that stage, the circular dated 13.12.2001 was neither discarded as non est being not the repository of a state policy nor a decision repugnant to the

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[AMITAVA ROY, J.]

Rules. It would thus be indefensible and too farfetched forthe A respondents to contend that the circular dated 13.12.2001 cannot be construed to be a policy reflecting the executive decision as contemplated under Article 166 and is not enforceable, as the subject matter thereof had not been laid before the Chief Minister under Rule 31 of the Rules. The non- B acceptability of the land at Lalchandpura and Anantpura by the appellants, being undeveloped, does not detract from these conclusions. . 114. In our comprehension, it is the burden of the State Government, in view of the belated attempt on its part to wriggle C out of its commitment. under the circular/policy dated 13.12.2001 to demonstrate on the basis of contemporaneous records that it was never intended to be acknowledged as its policy. As the file pertaining to the circular/policy dated 13.12.2001 is not traceable, in our unhesitant opinion, the State D Government has failed to discharge its burden in this regard. The appellants understandably have no access either to the official records of the Government or control over the manner of discharge of the role of the functionaries under the Rules. In this view of the matter, in the face of the predominant facts testifying the reflective and consistent decision of the State Government in the matter of allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation,-spanning over a decade from the year 1992 to 2005, the endeavour on its part to disown the policy/ circular dated 13.12.2001, in our estimate, betrays its truant disposition, cavalier indifference and impervious display of superior bargaining power which is constitutionally impermissible.

115Copy pinpoint115. On a concatenation of the stream of events, traced from the acquisition of the land involved, we are thus of the view that the circular dated 13.12.2001 is indeed a policy decision of the State Government regarding the allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation to the persons referred to therein and is thus enforceable against it. H

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116Copy pinpoint116. Even otherwise, having regard to the consistency in approach of the State Government in the matter of allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation as is evident from the series of circulars commencing from 22.4.1992 to 27.10.2005 in continuum, motivated by the objective of early B culmination of the process of acquisition of land on the spirit of mutual settlement, the same irrefutably present an inviolable scheme of proclaimed State action for compliance, thereby making it invocable against the respondents, more particularly as the same had been acted upon over the years. The plea of c the respondents, at this belated stage, to take refuge of unenforceability of the circular dated 13.12.2001 in isolation, as not being a binding policy, cannot receive judicial imprimatur.

117Copy pinpoint117. The process leading to the allotment of !and at D Lalchandpura and Anantpura villages, as the records produced discloses, did originate from the circular dated 13.12.2001, and received the approval of the Chief Minister at an appropriate stage. It would thus be conspicuously patent, that all concerned State functionaries were not only aware of the relevance and the obligatory bearing of the said circular, but also had participated in the exercise, contemplated by it for allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation. The respondents, in the totality of the existent facts and circumstances are thus estopped from questioning the status and efficacy of the said circular in vesting a right in the appellants to claim their due in law there under.

118Copy pinpoint118. To recall, not only in the meeting dated 18.10.2001 under the chairmanship of the departmental minister, which indeed, as the minutes thereof would disclose, was called to formulate a composite policy on various aspects and procedures in relation to allotment of 15% developed land in lieu of compensation, but also in the resultant circular dated 13.12.2001, it had been resolved in clear terms that the developed land would normally be allotted in the scheme area H

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[AMITAVA ROY, J.]

and at the place where the land had been acquired and that, if it was not possible to develop the scheme within a fixed period of five months or it was not possible to give land in the same area, it was only then that land would be allotted in some other area. In that eventuality as well, a sincere endeavour was to be made to allot land nearthe scheme area. Developed status of the land to be allotted and its proximity to the site from where the land had been acquired for a scheme, were thus the two ,. imperatives to identify the land to be allotted. It was only if the developed land within the scheme area was not available for allotment, that a plot near the scheme area was to be made available. In any case, the requirement of developed character of the land could not be undermined, disregarded or waived.

119Copy pinpoint119. As by the time, the allotment was contemplated, the JDAAct had been brought into force, the concept of developed land was clearly traceable to one informed with the concept of D "development" and "amenities" defined thereunder. Any land to be allotted in lieu of compensation, thus, was required to mandatorily comply with the requisites of 'development' and 'amenities' as envisaged under the JOA Act. As only a certain percentage of land acquired was offered by way of allotment and understandably as the same was in lieu of compensation i.e. the market value along with the incidentals, it was expectedly assessed to be proportionate thereto in value/ worth. 15% developed land was, thus construed to be equivalent to the amount of compensation then payable for the land acquired. However, for the purpose of identification of developed land as on today, equivalence of the value thereof with that of the land acquired as on date after three decades would not be a correct measure. The appellants were entitled to 15% developed land in the year 2001, the point of time when the value thereof was comparable to the compensation then payable for the acquisition of their land. Had the developed land, as conceived of, been allotted to them, then the value thereof over the years, as on date, would have been much H

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A higher than their land so acquired. Though the development of a plot of land depends upon various factors e.g. location, potential, facilities, use etc., it. is a matter of common experience that the pace of enhancement of the value of an already developed land would be increasingly higher in comparison to the one not developed. The value of the acquired land of the appellants, thus, as on today, cannot be taken to be an unmistakable index to identify the developed land to be allotted to them.

120Copy pinpoint120. Be that as it may, the land offered to the appellants at Lalchandpura and Anantpura as well as at Boytawala and Mansarampura have been held by this Court, as recently on 7.5.2015, to be not fully developed and more importantly ·conceded to be so by the JOA as recorded in the said order. According to the JOA, it would require further two years to 0 develop the land thereat. The land of the appellants, as acquired, was situated at Boytawala which, thus.has not yet been fully developed as on date. Thus, in any view of the matter, the market value of the land at Boytawala cannot be an acceptable yardstick to identify the developed land to which they are entitled. This is more so, as for the last thirty years and above, the respondents have failed to allot 15% developed land as envisaged by the policy to the appellants. Admittedly, two of the land oustees had been allotted developed land at Vidyadhar Nagar and as the letter dated 16.10.2007 referred to hereinabove would reveal, till then, land at the same site was available. As a matter of fact, allotment of land at Lalchandpura, Anantpura, Boytawala and Mansarampura, which admittedly had not been fully developed, was in breach of the promise engrafted in the policy dated 13.12.2001. The G approach of the respondents, when viewed in the backdrop of compulsory acquisition of land in the exercise of the State's power of eminent domain and its persistent failure to act on this policy, only demonstrates a highly insensitive and evasive orientation at the cost of its citizenry by a show of dominant .H

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[AMITAVAROY, J.]

bargaining power. The policy, though was to allot developed land in lieu of compensation to ensure quick and unhindered completion of the process of acquisition, the respondents have remained apathetically inert, having obtained the land, without living up to their commitments. To gloss over this inexplicable default, would signify effacement of decades of indifference and mute inaction of the respondents, more particularly.the State, inspite of a binding policy decision, to the suffering detriment and preiudice to the appellants without their fault. In this overwhelming conspectus of facts, the respondents cannot be permitted to dictate terms to the appellants in the matter of allotment of land inter alia on the consideration of equivalence· of the value of their land as acquired with the one offered to them as developed land as on date.

121Copy pinpoint121. The assertions founded on the right to property and the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation assumes significance at this juncture.

122Copy pinpoint122. The rightto property though no longer a fundamental right is otherwise a zealous possession of which one cannot be divested save by the authority of law as is enjoined by Article E 300A of the Constitution of India. Any callous inaction or apathy of the State and its instrumentalities, in securing just compensation would amount to dereliction of a constitutional duty, justifying issuance of writ of mandamus for appropriate remedial directions. F

123Copy pinpoint123. This Court in Indore Vikas Pradhikaran (supra) had an occasion to refer to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (dated 26.8.1789) to expound that though earlier, human rights existed to the claim of individuals' right to health, livelihood, shelter and· employment etc., these have G started gaining a multifaceted approach, so much so that property rights have become integrated within the definition of human rights.

124Copy pinpoint124. The right of the owner of a land to receive just H

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A compensation, in the context of his claim to access to justice as declared by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, had been underlined by this Court in Steel Authority of India Limited (supra).

125Copy pinpoint125. While recognising the power of the State to acquire B the land of its citizens, it has been proclaimed in Dev Sharan (supra) that even though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right and was never a natural right, it has to be accepted that without the right to property, other rights become illusory. c

126Copy pinpoint126. In a catena of decisions of this court, this prize privilege has also been equated to human right. Jn Mukesh Kumar (supra), this Court has succinctly propounded this proposition in the following terms: D "The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutorv right but also a human right. Human rights have already been considered in the realm of individual rights such as the right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc. But now human rights are gaining a multifaceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even the claim of adverse· possession has to be read in that context. The changing attitude of the English courts is quite visible from the judgment of Beaulane Properties Ltd. vs. Palmer (2005)4All ER 461. The Court here tried to read the human rights position in the context of adverse possession. But what is commendable is that the dimensions of human rights have widened so much that now property dispute issues are also being raised within the contours of human rights. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European Courts of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession. H

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127Copy pinpoint127. In sum ma, the right to property having been elevated to the status of human rights, it is inherent in every individual, and thus has to be venerably acknowledged and can, by no means, be belittled or trivialized by adopting an unconcerned and nonchalant disposition by anyone, far less the State, after compulsorily acquiring his land by invoking an expropriatory legislative mechanism. The judicial mandate of human rights dimension, thus, makes it incumbent on the State to solemnly respond to its constitutional obligation to guarantee that a land looser is adequately compensated. The proposition does not admit of any compromise or laxity. c

128Copy pinpoint128. Added to this, is the promissory estoppel perspective, the State being the promisor. Estoppel is a rule of equity which has entrenched itself with time in the domain of public life. A new class of estoppel recognised as "promissory estoppel" has assumed considerable significance D in the recent years. So far as this Court is concerned, it invoked the doctrine in Anglo Afghan Agencies (supra) in which it was enounced that even if a case would not fall within the purview of Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it would still be open to a party, who had acted on a E representation made by the Government, to claim that it should be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution of India. This principle, evolved by equity, to avoid injustice is trC1ceable as F well in the leading case on the subject in Central London Property Trust Ltd. vs. High Trees House Ltd ( 1947) 1 KB 130.

129Copy pinpoint129. In a later decision of this Court in Motila/ Padampat G Sugar Mills Co. (supra), responding to the plea of the State Government, inter alia, that there could be no promissory estoppel against it, so as to inhibit it from formulating and implementing its policies in public interest, this Court

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A underlined, in reiteration, the well-known preconditions for the operation of the doctrine as under: (1) A clear and unequivocal promise, knowing and intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee; B (2).0n such acting upon the promise by the promise, it would be inequitable to allow the promisorto go back on the promise.

130Copy pinpoint130. This Court in Nestle India Limited (supra), while referring to the decision of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills C (supra) quoted para 24 of that judgment to the effect that the Government stood on the same footing as a prjvate individual so far as the obligation in law was concerned and that the former was equally bound as the latter and it was difficult to see on what principle, could a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory . estoppel.

131Copy pinpoint131. This hallowed notion of equitable estoppel has stood the test of time with peripheral variations to reverberate in the following exposition in Monnet /spat (supra) in the following terms: 182.1. Where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future. knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is. in fact. so acted upon by the other party. the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it. if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. H

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[AMITAVA ROY, J.]

182.2 The doctrine of promissorv estoppels may be A applied against the Government where the interest of justice. morality and common fairness dictate such a course. The doctrine is applicable against the State even in its governmental. public or sovereign capacity where it is necessary to present fraud or manifest injustice. B - However, the Government or even a private party under the doctrine of promissory estoppels cannot be asked to do an act prohibited in law. The nature and function which the Government discharges is not very relevant. The Government is subject to the rule of promissory c estoppels and if the essential ingredients of this doctrine are satisfied, the Government can be compelled to carry out the promise made by it.

132Copy pinpoint132. Adding a caveat to the State Government otherwise inescapably bound by the doctrine, this Court in S. V.A. Steel D Re-Rolling Mills (supra) ruled that before extending benefits to its subjects by laying down any policy, it must ponder over the pros and cons thereof and its capacity to accord the same, as it would be unfair and immoral on its part thereafter, not to act as per its promise. E

133Copy pinpoint133. A parallel doctrine founded .on the doctrine of fairness and natural justice baptised as "legitimate expectation" has grown as well in the firmament of administrative law to ensure the predication of fairness in State F action. The concept of "legitimate expectation" is elaborated in Halsbury"s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume. 1( 1) 151 as hereunder: .. "81. Legitimate expectations.- A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way G by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The · expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation. or from consistent past practice. H

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A The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences; it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public B policy to justify its doing so: or it may mean that, if the authority proposes to defeat a person's legitimate expectation. it must afford him an opportunity to make representations on the matter: The courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between c original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not to do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than o a mere applicant for a grant."

134Copy pinpoint134. In espousing this equitable notion of exacting fairness in governmental dealings, this Court in Food Corporation of India (supra) proclaimed that there was no unfettered discretion in public law and that a sovereign authority possessed powers only to use them for public good. Observing that the investiture of such power imposes with it, the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fair play in action', it was underlined that it also raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his dealings with the State and its instrumentalities.

135Copy pinpoint135. The observance of this obligation as a part of good administration, is obligated by the requirement of non- arbitrariness in a state action, which as a corollary, makes it incumbent on the State to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons, likely to be affected by the decision, so much so that any failure to do so would proclaim unfairness in the exercise of power, thus vitiating the decision by its abuse or lack of bona fide. The besieged decision would then be exposed to the challenge H

. LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 495 [AMITAVAROY, J ..J

on the ground of arbitrariness. It was propounded that mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, may not by itself be a di~tinct enforceable right in all circumstances, but· the failure to consider and give due weight to it, may render the decision arbitrary. It was thus, set down that the requirement of due consideration of legitimate expectation formed a part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. In reiteration to the above enunciation, this· Court in Monnet /spat (supra) did rule as well, that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded on the principle of reasonableness and fairness and arises out of the principles c of natural justice and can be invoked as a substantive and enforceable right.

136Copy pinpoint136. In course of the arguments, as adverted to hereinabove, host of pleadings have been exchanged portraying contrary view points on the developed status of the D · land sought to be allotted, the summary whereof has been extracted hereinabove. It appears there from that the sites at Boytawala, Lalchandpura, Anantpura and Mansarampura are located within a range of 14.70 K.M. to 39 K.M. from the central point Jaipur, the nearest being at Boytawala. All these lands E have been recorded by this Court, as admitted by the JDA, to be not fully developed. The plots offered by the respondents at .Rohini Phase I, Anupam Vihar, Pitambara Scheme including Rajbhawan Yojana , Rohini Phase II, Abhinav Vihar Vistar and Harit Vihar are situated within a distance of 25.40 K.M. to 36.80 · F K.M. from the central point, Jaipur.

137Copy pinpoint137. The appellants, in categorical terms, have asserted that the plots at these places are not developed inasmuch as they are bereft of the essential facilities like water, electricity, G communication/connectivity, sewerage, drainage etc. and . have sought to substantiate their plea on the basis of recent . photographs along with sworn pleadings. On the other hand, ... they have suggested plots at Vidyadhar Nagar, Gokul Nagar, Truck Terminal and Vaishali Nagar, located within a distance H

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 148.C.R.

A of 5 K.M. to 15.6 K.M. from the central point Jaipur for allotment. That these plots of land are developed has been unreservedly admitted by the respondents, their ~lea being chat, the appellants are not entitled thereto, judged by the factor Qf equivalence of the value of the acquired land.

138Copy pinpoint138. At this distant point of time, we are disinclined to sustain this demur of the respondents. As the facts have unfolded, the appellants cannot be held accountable for the delay in between, the respondents having failed to offer developed land as contemplated in the policy. This stands fortified, amongst others, by the order dated 7 .5.2015 vis-a- vis the land at Boytawala, Lal Chandpura, Anantpura and Man sarampura. The other plots offered by the respondents, also having regard to the attributes of developed land as envisioned by the Rajasthan Act do not accord with the letter and spirit of the policy.

139Copy pinpoint139. Administrative discretion, irrespective of its ostensible expanse, it is a trite proposition, can never be unregulated, omnipotent and fanciful. A public authority vested with power has to essentially exercise its discretion, if . conferred, conditioned by the dictates of duty as envisaged, to effectuate the exercise of the prerogative to achieve the objective therefor. The central and cardinal canon of administrative governance, enjoins a framework of controlled use of discretion coupled with duty which is inscribed in felicitous terms in Administrative Law, 10th Edition by H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth at Page 286 as quoted: "The first requirement is the recognition that all power has legal limits. The next requirement. no less vital. is that the courts should draw those limits in a way which strikes the most suitable balance between executive efficiency and legal protection of the citizen. Parliament constantly confers upon public authorities powers which on their face might seem absolute and arbitrary. But H arbitrary power and unfettered discretion are what the

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[AMITAVAROY, J.]

courts refuse to countenance. They have woven a network A of restrictive principles which require statutory powers to be exercised reasonably and in good faith, for proper purposes only, and in accordance with the spirit as well as the letter of the empowering Act." Vis-a-vis public duties it has been expressed at page B 496.thus: · · "As well as illegal action, by excess or abuse of power. there may be illegal inaction. by neglect of duty. Public authorities have a great many legal duties. under which c they have an obligation to act, as opposed to their legal powers. which give them discretion whether to act or not. The remedies so far investigated deal with the control of powers. The remedies for the enforcement of duties are necessarily different. The most important of them is mandamus.

140Copy pinpoint140. Dwelling· upon the constitutional imperative of fairness in State action in Naida Entrepreneurs Association vs. Naida and others (2011 )6 SCC 508, this Court revisited the dynamics of the interplay between administrative power and discretion vis-a-vis public duty accompanying the same. Underlying the essentiality of non-arbitrariness and transparency in executive functioning as a guarantee of certitude and probity, it was observed thus: "39: State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality must be in conformity with -some principle which meets the test of · reason and relevance. Functioning of a "democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination". The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of H

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A discrimination. nor even apparently give an impression of bias. favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any"principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. B 40: The public trust doctrine is a part of the law of the land. The doctrine has grown from Article 21 of the Constitution. In essence. the action/order of the State or State instrumentality would stand vitiated if it lacks bona tides, as it would only be a case of colourable exercise c of power. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. [Vide Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State ofW.B., Ramana Dayaram Shettyv. /nternationa/ Airport Authority of India, Haji T.M. Hassan Rawtherv. Kera/a Financial Corpn, Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of D U.P and M./. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu.] 41: Power vested by the State in a public authoritv should be viewed as a trust coupled with duty to be exercised in larger public and social interest. Power is to be exercised strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and fact situation of a case. "Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them." A decision taken in an arbitrarv manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In this context, "in good faith" means "for legitimate reasons". It must be exercised bona fide for the purpose and for none other. [Vide Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, Sirsi Municipalityv. Cecelia Kom G Francis Tellis, State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, Collector (District Magistrate) v. Raja Ram Jaiswa/, DelhiAdmn. v. ManoharLaland N.D. Jaya/v. Union of India.]

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[AMITAVAROY, J.]

141Copy pinpoint141. In the over!lll perspectives, in our discernment, the A respondents have utterly failed to abide by a public policy upon which, the appellant had altered their position and had suffered immense prejudice. The persistent denial to the appellants of their right to the developed land in lieu of compensation and that too without any legally acceptable justification, has ensued · B in manifest injustice to the appellants over the years. Neither have they been paid just compensation for the land acquired nor have they been provided with the developed land in place thereof, as assured. They are thus predominantly entitled for the remedial intervention of this court to ensure fair, just, C efficacious, tangible and consummate relief in realistic terms. lffaimess is an indispensable and innate constituent of natural justice, this imperative indubitably has to inform as well the judicial remedy comprehended. In the overwhelming factual scenario, as obtains in the instant case, refusal to gr<mt the o. relief to which they are entitled, would amount to perpetuation of gross illegality, unjustness and unfairness meted out to them. The textual facts demand an appropriate response of the judicial process to effectu;;ite the guarantee of justice, engrafted in the preamble of the Constitution reinforced by the canons of equity.

142Copy pinpoint142. The remedy indeed has to be commensurate to the cause and the prejudice suffered. The invocable judicial tools, predominantly in the form of a writ of mandamus, and the plentitude of the powers of constitutional courts, and more particularly, this court under Article 142 of the Constitution are assuredly the potential redressal aids in fact situations akin to . the one in hand.

143Copy pinpoint143. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is intended to supply deficiencies in law and is thus discretionary in nature. The issuance of writ of mandamus pre-supposes a clear right of the applicant and unjustifiable failure of a duty imposed on an authority otherwise obliged· in law to imperatively discharge the same. H

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [2015) 14 S.C.R.

144Copy pinpoint144. The dominant features of a writ of mandamus authoritatively figures in the following exfract from the Halswbusy Laws of England, 4'h Edition (page 111 ): "Nature of mandamus. The order of mandamus is of a most extensive remedial nature, and is, in from, a B command issuing from the High Court of Justice, directed to any person, corporation, or inferior tribunal, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. Its purpose is to remedy defects of c justice; and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less D convenient. beneficial and effectual.

145Copy pinpoint145. An insight into the equitable theory in the application of law was explored by the celebrated jurist Roscoe Pound in his treatise "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law'' in the following excerpts: E "To the adherents of this theory the essential thing is a reasonable and just solution of the individual controversy. They conceive of the legal precept. whether legislative or traditional. as a guide to the judge, leading him toward the just result. But they insist that within wide limits he should be free to deal with the individual case so as to meet the demands of justice between the parties and accord with the reason and moral sense of ordinary men. They insist that application of law is not a purely mechanical process. They contend that it involves not logic only but moral judgments as to particular situations and courses of conduct in view of the special circumstances which are never exactly alike. They insist that such judgments involve intuitions based upon H

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[AMITAVA ROY, J.]

experience and are not to be expressed in definitely A formulated rules. They argue that the cause is not to be ·fitted to the rule but the rule to the cause

Equity uses its powers of individualizing to the best 8 advantage in connection with the conduct of those in whom trust and confidence has been reposed

Philosophically the apportionment of the field between C rule and discretion which is suggested by the use of rules and of standards respectively in modern law has its basis in the respective fields of intelligence and intuition. Bergson tells us that the former is more adapted to the inorganic, the latter more to life. D The rule. mechanically applied, works by repetition and precludes individuality in results, which would threaten the security of acquisitions and ·the security of transactions. On the other hand. in the hand-made as distinguished from the machine-made product. the specialized skill of the workman gives us something infinitely more subtle than can be expressed in rules. In law some situations cal or the product of hands, not of machines, for they involve not repetition. where the . general elements are significant. but unique events, in which the special circumstances are significant.

Where the call is for individuality in the product of the legal mill we resort to standards. And the sacrifice of certainty in so doing is more apparent than actual. For G the certainty attained by mechanical application of fixed rules to human conduct has always been illusory."

502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [2015] 14 S.C.R.

146Copy pinpoint146. The above extracts authoritatively underscore the indispensable essentiality 6f individuality in results in a persuasive fact situation to obviate mechanical application of fixed rules, by invoking equity and discretion to secure realistic remedies tailor-made to the situational demands justifying the paramountcy of the rule of law.

147Copy pinpoint147. Our national charter, being a living and organic document, no provision thereof can remain static or stale and must be accorded a vibrant import to guarantee the effectuation of the preambular pledge in its fullest.content. The plenary powers of this Court enshrined in Article 142 of the Constitution of India for achieving complete justice is only an insignia of empowerment so that the constitutional guarantees are not reduced to mere ritualistic incantations.

148Copy pinpoint148. This Court extra-ordinarily does exercise its power 0 under Article 142 of the Constitution of India as warranted in a given fact situation, for making order (s) as is felt necessary for doing completejustice in a case a matter pending before it.

149Copy pinpoint149. As the nature and extent of the power indicates, there can be no straight jacket formula, for its exercise nor there can be any fetter thereto, it being plenary in nature. The invocation of this power is to reach injustice and redress the same, if it is not feasible otherwise to achieve this avowed F objective. In doing so, this Court acts in its equity jurisdiction to balance the conflicting interests of the parties and advance the cause of administration of even handed justice. The purport and purpose of this power being justice oriented and guided by equitable principles, it chiefly aims at the enforcement of a G public duty, if not forthcoming on legitimate justification ensuing in oppressive injustice, militating against the constitutional ordainment of equality before law and equal protection of laws enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India and entrenched as are, among others, in the invaluable right to life H

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[AMITAVAROY, J.]

envisioned in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. A

150Copy pinpoint150. The Constitutional Courts are sentinels of justice and vested with the extra-ordinary power of judicial review to ensure thatthe rights of the citizens are duly protected. That the quest for justice is a compulsion of judicial conscience, found its expression in C. Chenga Reddy and Others vs. B State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC 193 in the following extract: "A court of equity must so act. within the permissible limits so as to prevent injustice. "Equity is not past the age of child-bearing" and an effort to do justice between the c parties is a compulsion of judicial conscience. Courts can and should strive to evolve an appropriate remedy. in the facts and circumstances of a given case. so as to further the cause of justice. within the available range and forging new tools for the said purpose. if necessarv to 0 chisel hard edges of the law."

151Copy pinpoint151. This underlying thought found erudite elaboration in Manohar Lal Sharma ~s. Principal Secretary and Others (2014) 2 sec 532 .. "The Supreme Court has been conferred very· wide powers for proper and effective administration of justice. The Court has inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any exceptional situation in larger public interest which builds confidence in the rule of law and strengthens democracy. The Supreme Court as the sentinel on the qui vive, has been invested with the powers which are elastic and flexible and in certain areas the rigidity in exercise of such powers is considered inappropriate."

152Copy pinpoint152. Thus failure to discharge an obligatory duty defined by public policy without any justification in disregard thereto viewed in the context of the sacrosanct content of human rights in Article 300A is an inexcusable failure of t!le state to discharge its solemn constitutional obligation, the live purpose for its existence. The predominant facts herein, justifiably demand a H

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