RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE v. INDORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.

A compensation in such cases could have been appropriately specified. We did not get any satisfactory reply. It appears to us that this very difficulty in specifying any known rule of compensation is responsible for the wording of Section 216 and Section 389 of the Act which, in our opinion, gets over the difficulty by providing full indemnification for the loss or deprivation suffered B by the owner of the building or other interests in the property. We have referred to the provisions with regard to appeals. The first appeal lies to the Judge of the Small Causes Courts and a second appeal to the District Judge. The involvement of civil courts in finally determining compensation imports judicial norms. Since full c indemnification in accordance with .judicial norms is the goal set by the Act it is implicit in such a provision that the rules for determination of compensation shall be appropriate to the property acquired and such as will achieve the goal of full indemnity against loss. In other words, the Act provides for compensation to be determined in accordance with judicial principles by the employment ofappropriate methods of valuation so that the person who is deprived of property is fully indemnified against the loss. This, by itself, in our opinion, is a specification of a principle for the determination of compensation.

16. As regards the manner of determination of compensation, it is provided in Section 390 of the Corporations Act. Under that section the Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorised by him shall hold such enquiry as he thinks fit and dete1mine the amount of compensation to be paid. Either the Commissioner or an Officer authorised by him has to hold an appropriate enquiry before determining the amount of compensation. Since, as already seen, there is an appeal from such determination to the Judge of the Small Causes Court under Section 391 and a second appeal to the District Court under Section 411 it is clear that the enquiry must be made on broad judicial lines. Any arbitrary determination is bound to be set aside in appeal because the Judges in appeal will be chiefly concerned to see whether the enquiry is made in accordance with normal judicial procedures for evaluating the loss by the application of methods of valuation appropriate to the particular acquisition before them. Since no limitations are placed on the powers of the Appellate Judges in determining the loss in a just and appropriate manner, it H

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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

is expected that the Commissioner or his authorised officer, who A holds the enquiry in the first instance, will be guided by principles which meet with the approval of the Appellate authorities. In our opinion, therefore, the manner of the determination of compensation is also specified by the Act.

17. It is conceded before us that if this Court holds that the B Corporations Act has provided for the payment of compensation and also specified the principle on which and the manner in which compensation is to be determined, it would not be possible to say that the Act is either in violation of the provisions of Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 or Article 31 of the Constitution." c Thus with respect to the compensation, considering more or less similar provisions, a Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly laid down that as a matter of fact actual compensation has to be determined in the first instance, the value of the total loss or deprivation actually suffered. It has to be balanced with the other relevant aspects for compensation. The Act provides for payment of compensation. The view of the High Court that the principle for determination of compensation has not been specified under section 212 was also not agreed to by this Court. This Court has also held that the Land Acquisition Act makes market value at a certain date the basis for determination of compensation. But there is no one sure way of applying the principle. As is well known when set back is imposed by the line of the street, the land actually acquired by the Corporation may be in some cases a few square yards or even a few square inches. Then again the land acquired may be of no significant use to anybody except for the Corporation as a part of the street. The land acquired may be of different shapes, irregular in contour and often shapeless. If the principle of willing buyer and willing seller is applied there can possibly be no market at all for the property acquired. This Court opined that the owner gets full indemnification for the loss or deprivation suffered to the building or other interests in the property. Involvement of civil courts in finally determining compensation imports judicial norms. There is no limitation on the power of the appellate Judge. Thus this Court held that the provisions contained in sections 212, 216 and 3 89 were not violative of the provisions of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 or Article 31 of the Constitution. The case was remanded by this Court to the High Court for examining H

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A infringement of Articles 14 and 19 after laying down the aforesaid propositions. We have on merits found no violation ofArticles 14 and 19 also in the instant cases.

72Copy pinpoint72. It was also submitted that the provisions of sections 305 and 306 are required to be read down by incorporating the requirement of B computation of compensation in the light of the principles laid down under the Act of2013 while correlating it with the provisions of section 387 of the Act of 1956. In view of the aforesaid dictum of this Court in Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad (supra), we find no scope to entertain the submission and the reliance by the appellants on Yogendra Kumar Jaiswa/ v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2016) 3 SCC 183 c is of no avai I.

73Copy pinpoint73. We find the principles laid down in sections 305, 306 and 387 are quite reasonable. Reasonable compensation is payable by the Corporation for building or part thereof excluding the land under proviso to section 305(1) and compensation for inclusion of land in public street is payable under section 306(3) of the Act. We do not find any ground so as to read down the provisions. We refrain to comment upon the submission with respect to the granting additional FAR is not acceptable to some appellants, as it is not the stage of dealing with compensation how the total indemnification is to be made, whether FAR is acceptable to the appellants or not, cannot be decided at this stage. It need not be decided at this stage whether they have a right to leave the FAR and claim monetary compensation alone which is to be adjudged by the concerned authorities within the pale of the provisions contained in sections 305, 306 read with section 387 of the Act of 1956. How the compensation is to be worked out at the appropriate stage, is the outcome of the authorities concerned and the job of the arbitrator/District Court, as the case may be. The appellants are at liberty to raise the question with respect to the adequacy of compensation and how the provision of section 387 has to be interpreted and what would be the just compensation at the appropriate stage of determination of compensation. G

74Copy pinpoint74. Reliance has been placed on Laxmi Devi v. State qf Bihar & Ors. (supra) and Rajendra Shankar Shukla & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (supra). The decision in Laxmi Devi (supra) is based on the specific provision contained in section I OA of the Land Acquisition Act which requires compensation to be paid in a case where H

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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

emergency clause has been invoked. Collector is required to tender A payment of 80% of compensation before taking possession of the land. The said provision is not at all attracted to the Act of 1956. As compensation is offered after vesting, is quite reasonable procedure as envisaged by Article 300Aofthe Constitution oflndia, at which point of time it is offered would not make the provision confiscatory or repugnant. B The compensation under section 305 or 306 read with section 387 is on the happening of certain exigency, and various factors are taken into consideration for determination of compensation is a quite valid procedure. The Corporation cannot be compelled as per the special scheme of sections 305, 306 and 387 to offer the compensation before removal and vesting. Reliance on the decision in KN. Palsikar (supra) so as to contend c that the possession should be taken after payment of compensation is totally misplaced. This Court has simply narrated in para 11 what was held by the High Court and the points which were decided were capsual ised by this Court in para 12 of the report. The aforesaid question was neither raised nor decided by this Court. This Court has not laid 0 down any such proposition in K.N. Palsikar (supra), as canvassed.

75Copy pinpoint75. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court in Bhusawal Municipal Council v. Nivrutti Ramchandra Phalak & Ors. (2015) 14 SCC 327 in which this Court has considered right to property under Article 300-A and held that such right is a human right and delayed payment of compensation leads to alienation of section of society against the system, further public purpose that is setting up of school, is no justification for delaying/denying compensation in the garb of undertaking developmental projects, without paying the compensation to the concerned landowner as per the statutory provisions. It was also submitted that the time period was not prescribed within which compensation was to be paid. In our opinion, the appellants have questioned the very notice, initiation of action and when no time limit is fixed for payment of compensation, it goes without saying that it has to be awarded within a 'reasonable time'. Law envisages speedy action without unreasonable delay and that is what is expected of the concerned authorities, in respect of the obligation imposed on them to be discharged. Due to this, the provision cannot be struck down as arbitrary nor it can be said to be confiscatory in nature. We expect that the concerned Corporations would do wellwhile offering the compensation to the appellants as expeditiously as possible that is sufficient to take care of their unfounded fear. H

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76Copy pinpoint76. In the case of Bhuwan Bhandari v. Indore Municipal Corporation (SLP (C) No.31541/2011) it was submitted that building is a heritage building and there is bar on any kind of construction. The boundary wall has been demolished by the Corporation and possession has been taken of that part without compensation. The fact has been denied by the respondc;nts that the building has been declared as heritage B one. It was also pointed out that the Corporation for the purpose of widening of the road required removal of part of the boundary wall which is quite external to the main building and is falling within the set back. It is clear that the main building is not being demolished. The submission is thus untenable. c 77. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeals being devoid of merits are hereby dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs as incurred. Devika Gujral Appeals dismissed.