INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC.

Thus, various departures have been made from the old Land Acquisition A Act, in the Act of 2013 relating to Social Impact Assessment, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme, etc. It ensures higher compensation than the old Act; the public purpose has been defined; consent provisions have also been made. The interest of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been adequately protected. Various B Committees and Authorities have been constituted. The definition of ‘affected families’ has been widened.

93Copy pinpoint93. Undoubtedly the Act of 2013 has provided safeguards, in the form of higher compensation and provisions for rehabilitation, which are necessary. In that light, the court has to interpret its provisions, to give full and meaningful effect to the legislative intent keeping in mind the language and tenor of the provisions, it is not for the court to legislate. The Court can only iron out creases to clear ambiguity. The intended benefit should not be taken away. At the same time, since the Act of 2013, envisages lapse of acquisitions notified (and in many cases, completed by the issuance of the award) due to indolence and inaction on the part of the authorities and therefore, intends acquisition at a fast track, the full effect has to be given to the provisions contained in Section 24. Scope of Section 24

94Copy pinpoint94. Section 24 begins with a non-obstante clause, overriding all other provisions of the Act of 2013 including Section 114 of the Act of 2013, dealing with repeal and saving. In terms of Section 114 of the Act of 2013, the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, except otherwise provided in the Act, has been saved. Section 6(a) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal has been made. The effect of the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder is also saved by the provisions contained in Section 6(b). As per Section 6(c), the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred. G

95Copy pinpoint95. Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 read with the non-obstante clause provides that in case of proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 the award had not been made under Section 11, then the provisions of the Act of 2013, relating to the determination of compensation would H

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A apply. However; the proceedings held earlier do not lapse. In terms of Section 24(1)(b), where award under Section 11 is made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It contemplates that such pending proceedings, as on the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force shall continue, and taken to their logical end. However, the exception to Section 24 (1)(b) is provided in Section B 24(2) in case of pending proceedings; in case where the award has been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, the physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and such proceedings cannot continue as per the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013.

96Copy pinpoint96. Section 24(2) carves out an exception to Section 24(1)(b), where the award has been passed, and the proceedings are pending, but in such proceedings, physical possession of the land has not been taken, or compensation has not been paid, proceedings shall lapse. There are twin requirements for the lapse; firstly, physical possession has not been taken and, secondly, compensation has not been paid. In case, possession has been taken but compensation has been paid, there is no lapse of the proceedings. The question which is to be decided is whether the conditions are cumulative, i.e both are to be fulfilled, for lapsing of acquisition proceedings, or the conditions are in the alternative (“either/or”). E According to the State and acquiring agencies, in a situation where possession has been taken, and compensation is not paid, there is no lapse: also in case where compensation has been paid, but possession not taken in a proceeding pending as on 1.1.2014, there is no lapse. Sine qua non is that proceeding must be pending. They argue that the word F “or” used in phrase ‘the physical possession of the land has been not taken, or the compensation has not been paid’, has to be interpreted as “and” as two negative requirements qualify it. Furthermore, argues the State when two negative conditions are connected by “or,” they are construed as cumulative, the word “or” is to be read as “nor” or “and.” Naturally, the landowners argue to the contrary, i.e., that lapse of G acquisition occurred if compensation were not paid, or possession were not taken, 5 years before the coming into force of the Act of 2013.

97Copy pinpoint97. It would be useful to notice rules of Statutory Interpretation in this regard. Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edition) by Justice G.P. Singh, speaks of the following general rule of Statutory H

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Interpretation of positive and negative conditions whenever prescribed by a statute: “…Speaking generally, a distinction may be made between positive and negative conditions prescribed by a statute for acquiring a right or benefit. Positive conditions separated by ‘or’ are read in the alternative71 but negative conditions connected by ‘or’ are construed as cumulative and ‘or’ is read as ‘nor’ or ‘and’72. The above rule of Statutory Interpretation is based upon the decision of this Court in Patel Chunibhai Dajibha, etc. vs. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Anr.73, in which this court held: C “(19) It may be recalled that amendments to S. 32 were made from time to time, and the Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 added to sub-s. (1)(b), cl. (iii) and the preceding “or”. It is to be noticed that the conditions mentioned in sub-ss. (1)(a) and (1)(b) are mutually exclusive. In spite of the absence of the word “or” between sub-ss. (1)(a) and (1)(b), the two sub- sections lay down alternative conditions. The tenant must be deemed to have purchased the land if he satisfies either of the two conditions. The appellant is not a permanent tenant, and does not satisfy the condition mentioned in sub-s.(1)(a). Though not a permanent tenant, he cultivated the lands leased personally, and, therefore, satisfies the first part of the condition specified in sub-s. (1)(b). The appellant’s contention is that sub-ss. (1)(b)(i), (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii) lay down alternative conditions, and as he satisfies the condition mentioned in sub-s. (1)(b)(iii), he must be deemed to have purchased the land on April 1, 1957. Colour is lent to this argument by the word “or” appearing between sub-s.(1)(b)(ii) and sub-s.(1)(b)(iii). But, we think that the word “or” between sub-ss. (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii) in conjunction with the

71 Star Co. Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-tax, AIR 1970 SC 1559: (1970) 3 SCC 864 G 72 Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao, 1965 (2) SCR 328; Punjab Produce & Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, (1971) 2 SCC 540; Brown & Co. v. Harrison, (1927) All ER Rep 195, pp. 203, 204 (CA). For convenience, the numbers in the extracted portion above have been renumbered. 73 AIR 1965 SC 1457 H

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A succeeding negatives is equivalent to and should be read as “nor.” In other words, a tenant (other than a permanent tenant) cultivating the lands personally would become the purchaser of the lands on April 1, 1957, if on that date neither an application under S.29 read with S.31 nor an application under S.29 read with S.14 was pending. If an application B either under S.29 read with S.31 or under S.29 read with S.14 was pending April 1, 1957, the tenant would become the purchaser on “the postponed date”, that is to say, when the application would be finally rejected. But if the application be finally allowed, the tenant would not become the purchaser. C The expression “an application” in the proviso means not only an application under S.31 but also an application under S.29 read with S.14. If an application of either type was pending on April 1, 1957, the tenant could not become the purchaser on that elate. Now, on April 1, 1957, the application filed by respondent No.1 under S.29 read with S.31 was D pending. Consequently, the appellant could not be deemed to have purchased the lands on April 1, 1957.” The decision of this Court in The Punjab Produce and Trading Co. Ltd. vs. The C.I.T., West Bengal, Calcutta74, was relied upon in the discussion mentioned above, where provisions of Section 23A of the E Income Tax Act, 1922 and the Explanation (b)(ii) and (iii) came up for consideration. This Court ruled with respect to “or” and held that it had to be read as “and” construing negative conditions thus: “7. On behalf of the assessee a good deal of reliance has been placed on decision of this Court in Star Company Ltd. v. F The Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Calcutta, (1970) 3 SCC 864. In that case, sub-clause (b)(ii) came up for consideration, and it was held that the two parts of the Explanation contained in that sub-clause were alternative. In other words, if one part was satisfied it was unnecessary G to consider whether the second part was also satisfied. Thus the word “or” was treated as having been used disjunctively and not conjunctively. The same reasoning is sought to be invoked with reference to sub-clause (b)(iii).

74 H 1971 (2) SCC 540

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8. It is significant that the language of sub-clauses (ii) and A (iii) of clause (b) is different. The former relates to a positive state of affairs whereas the latter lays down negative conditions. The word “or” is often used to express an alternative of terms defined or explanation of the same thing in different words. Therefore, if either of the two negative conditions which are to be found in sub-clause (b)(iii) remains unfulfilled, the conditions laid down in the entire clause cannot be said to have been satisfied. The clear import of the opening part of clause (b) with the word “and” appearing there read with the negative or disqualifying conditions in sub-clause (b)(iii) is that the assessee was bound to satisfy apart from the conditions contained in the other sub-clauses that its affairs were at no time during the previous year controlled by less than six persons and shares carrying more than 50 per cent of the total voting power were during the same period not held by less than six persons. We are unable to find any infirmity in the reasoning or the conclusion of the Tribunal and the High Court so far as question 1 is concerned.” It was observed that if either of the two negative conditions, which are to be found in Sub-clause (b)(iii), remains unfulfilled, the conditions laid down in the entire clause cannot be said to have been satisfied. E

98Copy pinpoint98. It would also be useful to note that in Brown & Co. v. Harrison75, the provisions contained in Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 came up for consideration before the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the word “or” in Article IV, R 2 (q), must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. It has been observed that quite commonly collation of the words “or” can be meant in conjunctive sense and certainly where the disjunctive use of the word, leads to repugnance or absurdity.

99Copy pinpoint99. In this Court’s considered view, as regards the collation of the words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail illogical results. That apart, if the rule of interpretation with respect to two negative conditions qualified by “or” is used, then “or” should be 75 (1927) All ER Rep 195 pp. 203, 204 (CA) H

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A read as “nor” or “and”. Brown & Co. v. Harrison (supra), ruled thus, about the interpretation of two negative conditions connected by the word “or”: “…..I think it quite commonly and grammatically can have a conjunctive sense. It is generally disjunctive, but it may be plain from the collation of words that it is meant in a conjunctive sense, and certainly where the use of the word as a disjunctive leads to repugnance or absurdity, it is quite within the ordinary principles of construction adopted by the court to give the word a conjunctive use. Here, it is quite plain that the word leads to an absurdity, because the contention put forward by the shipowners in this matter amounts to this, as my Lord said, that, if a shipowner himself breaks open a case and steals the contents of it, he is exempted from liability under r 2(q) if none of his servants stole the part of the case or broke it open. That seems to me to be a plain absurdity. In D addition to that, there is a repugnancy because it is plainly repugnant to the second part of r 2(q). Therefore I say no more about that.”

100Copy pinpoint100. In Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry76, the then House of Lords ruled as follows: E “If all these meanings are rejected, there remains the course of treating “or” as expressing a non-exclusionary alternative – in modern logic symbolised by “v.” In lawyer’s terms, this may be described as the course of substituting “and” for “or,” rather the course of redrafting the phrase so as to read: “the owner and the master shall each be guilty,” or, if the phrase of convenience were permitted “the owner and/or the master.” To substitute “and” for “or” is a strong and exceptional interference with a legislative text, and in a penal statute, one must be even more convinced of its necessity. It is surgery rather than therapeutics. But there are sound precedents for so doing: my noble and learned friend, Lord Morris of Borth- y-Gest, has mentioned some of the best known: they are sufficient illustrations and I need not re-state them. I would add, however, one United States case, a civil case, on an Act concerning seamen of 1915. This contained the words: “Any 76 H 1974 (1) WLR 505

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failure of the master shall render the master or vessel or the A owner of the vessel liable in damages.” A District Court in Washington D.C. read “or” as “and” saying that there could not have been any purpose or intention on the part of Congress to compel the seamen to elect as to which to pursue and thereby exempt the others from liability – The Blakeley, 234 Fed. 959. B Although this was a civil, not a criminal case, I find the conclusion and the reasoning reassuring.”

101Copy pinpoint101. In M/s. Ranchhoddas Atmaram and Anr. v. The Union of India and Ors.77, a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that if there are two negative conditions, the expression “or” has to be read as conjunctive and conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled. It was observed: “(13) It is clear that if the words form an affirmative sentence, then the condition of one of the clauses only need be fulfilled. In such a case, “or” really means “either” “or.” In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary one of the meanings of the word “or” is given as “A particle co-ordinating two (or more) words, phrases or clauses between which there is an alternative.” It is also there stated, “The alternative expressed by “or” is emphasised by prefixing the first member or adding after the last, the associated adv. EITHER.” So, even without “either,” E “or” alone creates an alternative. If, therefore, the sentence before us is an affirmative one, then we get two alternatives, any one of which may be chosen without the other being considered at all. In such a case it must be held that a penalty exceeding Rs. 1,000 can be imposed. F (14) If, however, the sentence is a negative one, then the position becomes different. The word “or” between the two clauses would then spread the negative influence over the clause following it. This rule of grammar is not in dispute. In such a case the conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled and the result would be that the penalty that can be imposed G can never exceed Rs. 1,000. (15) The question then really comes to this: Is the sentence before us a negative or an affirmative one? It seems to us 77 AIR 1961 SC 935 H

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A that the sentence is an affirmative sentence. The substance of the sentence is that a certain person shall be liable to a penalty. That is a positive concept. The sentence is therefore not negative in its import.” (emphasis supplied) B Thus, for lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated under the old law, under Section 24(2) if both steps have not been taken, i.e., neither physical possession is taken, nor compensation is paid, the land acquisition proceedings lapse. Several decisions were cited at Bar to say that “or” has been treated as “and” and vice versa. Much depends upon the C context. In Prof. Yashpal & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.78, the expression “established or incorporated” was read as “established and incorporated.” In R.M.D.C (supra), to give effect to the clear intention of the Legislature, the word “or” was read as “and.”

102Copy pinpoint102. In Ishwar Singh Bindra (supra) it was observed that: “11. Now if the expression “substances” is to be taken to mean something other than “medicine” as has been held in our previous decision it becomes difficult to understand how the word “and” as used in the definition of drug in S. 3(b)(i) E between “medicines” and “substances” could have been intended to have been used conjunctively. It would be much more appropriate in the context to read it disconjunctively. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. it is stated at page 135 that “and” has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein F it is the antithesis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of a contexts, read as “or.” Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., it has been accepted that “to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions G “or” and “and’ one for the other.”

103Copy pinpoint103. In Joint Director of Mines Safety v. Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd79, “and” was read disjunctively considering the legislative intent. In Samee Khan (supra), the term “and” was 78 (2005) 5 SCC 420 H 79 (1987) 3 SCC 308

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construed as “or” to carry out the legislative intention. In Mobilox A Innovations Private Limited (supra), similar observations were made. In Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. L.R80, it has been laid down that sometimes word “or” read as “and” and vice versa, but does not do so unless it becomes necessary because “or” does not generally mean “and” and “and” does not generally mean “or”. B

104Copy pinpoint104. In R.M.D.C. (supra) the definition under Section 2(1)(d) came up for consideration. The qualifying clause consisted of two parts separated from each other by the disjunctive word “or”. Both parts of the qualifying clause indicated that each of the five kinds of prize competitions that they qualified were of a gambling nature. The court held considering the apparent intention of the legislature, it has perforce to read the word “or” as “and”. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v State of Rajasthan & Ors81, this Court considered the composition of the Board prescribed under Section 5. The expressions used were not belonging to professing the Hindu religion or not belonging to the Pushti-Margiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. Two negative conditions were used. This Court has observed that “or” in clause (g) dealing with disqualification must mean “and”. The relevant portion of the same is extracted hereunder: “(39) …The composition of the Board has been prescribed by Section 5; it shall consist of a President, the Collector of E Udaipur District, and nine other members. The proviso to the section is important: it says that the Goswami shall be one of such members if he is not otherwise disqualified to be a member and is willing to serve as such. Section 5(2) prescribes the disqualifications specified in clauses (a) to (g) – unsoundness of mind adjudicated upon by competent court, conviction involving moral turpitude; adjudication as an insolvent or the status of an undischarged insolvent; minority, the defect of being deaf-mute or leprosy; holding an office or being a servant of the temple or being in receipt or any emoluments or perquisites from the temple; being interested in a subsisting contract entered into with the temple; and lastly, not professing the Hindu religion or not belonging to the Pushti- MargiyaVallabhi Sampradaya. There can be no doubt that 80 (1928) 1 KB 561 81 AIR 1963 SC 1638 H

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A “or” in clause (g) must mean “and,” for the context clearly indicates that way. There is a proviso to Section 5(2) which lays down that the disqualification as to the holding of an office or an employment under the temple shall not apply to the Goswami and the disqualification about the religion will not apply to the Collector; that is to say, a Collector will be a B member of the Board even though he may not be a Hindu and a follower of the denomination. Section 5(3) provides that the President of the Board shall be appointed by the State Government and shall for all purposes be deemed to be a member. Under Section 5(4) the Collector shall be an ex- C officio member of the Board. Section 5(5) provides that all the other members specified in sub-clause (1) shall be appointed by the State Government so as to secure representation of the Pushti-Margiya Vaishnavas from all over India. This clearly contemplates that the other members of the Board shall not only be Hindus, but should also belong to the denomination, for it is in that manner alone that their representation can be adequately secured.” (emphasis supplied)

105Copy pinpoint105. In Prof. Yashpal (supra), the word “or” occurring in the expression “established or incorporated” was read as “and” so that the State enactment did not come in conflict with the Central legislation and create any hindrance or obstacle in the working of the latter. This court has observed: “59. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi has also submitted that insofar as private universities are concerned, the word “or” occurring in the expression “established or incorporated” in Sections 2(f), 22 and 23 of the UGC Act should be read as “and.” He has submitted that the normal meaning of the word “established” is to bring into existence. In order to avoid the situation which has been created by the impugned enactment where over 112 universities have come into existence within a short period of one year of which many do not have any kind of infrastructure or teaching facility, it will be in consonance with the constitutional scheme that only after establishment of the basic requisites of a university H (classrooms, library, laboratory, offices, and hostel facility,

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etc.) that it should be incorporated and conferred a juristic personality. The word “or” is normally disjunctive and “and” is normally conjunctive, but at times, they are read vice versa to give effect to the manifest intentions of the legislature, as disclosed from the context. If literal reading of the word produces an unintelligible or absurd result, “and” maybe read for “or” and “or” maybe read for “and.” (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh, 7th Edn., p. 339 and also State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699, AIR at p. 709 and Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1958 SC 861) We are of the opinion that having regard to the constitutional scheme and in order to ensure that the enactment made by Parliament, namely, the University Grants Commission Act is able to achieve the objective for which it has been made and UGC is able to perform its duties and responsibilities, and further that the State enactment does not come in conflict with the Central legislation and create any hindrance or obstacle in the working of the latter, it is necessary to read the expression “established or incorporated” as “established and incorporated” insofar as the private universities are concerned.” (emphasis supplied) E

106Copy pinpoint106. Reference has also been made to Pooran Singh v. State of M.P82, in which the Court considered the scheme of the M.V. Act. The magistrate was bound to issue summons of the nature prescribed by sub-section (1) of Section 130. The Court held that there was nothing in the sub-section which indicated that he must endorse the summons in terms of both the clauses (a) and (b), that he is so commanded would be F to convert the conjunction ‘or’ into ‘and’. There is nothing in the language of the legislature which justifies such a conversion and there are adequate reasons which make such an interpretation wholly inconsistent with the scheme of the Act.

107Copy pinpoint107. Reliance has been placed on Sri Nasiruddin v. State G Transport Appellate Tribunal83. The word ‘or’ was given grammatical meaning. The order states that the High Court shall sit as the new High Court and the Judges and Division Bench thereof shall sit at Allahabad 82 1965 (2) SCR 853 83 1975 (2) SCC 671 H

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A or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may appoint. It was held that the word ‘or’ cannot be read as ‘and’. They should be considered in an ordinary sense. If two different interpretations are possible, the court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible. The Court observed thus: B “27. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court that the permanent seat of the High Court is at Allahabad is not quite sound. The order states that the High Court shall sit as the new High Court and the judges and Division Bench thereof shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint. The word “or” cannot be read as “and”. If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, they are bound to be construed in their ordinary sense. The mere fact that the results of a statute may be unjust does not entitle a court to refuse to give it effect. If there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things. If the inconvenience is an absurd inconvenience, by reading an enactment in its ordinary sense, whereas if it is read in a manner in which it is capable, though not in an ordinary sense, there would not be any inconvenience at all; there would be reason why one should not read it according to its ordinary grammatical meaning. Where the words are plain, the Court would not make any alteration.”

108Copy pinpoint108. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia 84, F for interpretation of ‘and’ and ‘or’ in the context of the term ‘adulterated’ as defined in section 2(i)(f), the Court observed: “7. We are of the opinion that the High Court was clearly wrong in its interpretation of Section 2(i)(f). On the plain language of the definition section, it is quite apparent that G the words “or is otherwise unfit for human consumption” are disjunctive of the rest of the words preceding them. It relates to a distinct and separate class altogether. It seems to us that the last clause “or is otherwise unfit for human consumption”

84 H (1980) 1 SCC 158

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is residuary provision, which would apply to a case not covered by or falling squarely within the clauses preceding it. If the phrase is to be read disjunctively the mere proof of the article of food being “filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed . . . or insect-infested” would be per se sufficient to bring the case within the purview of the word “adulterated” as defined in sub-clause (f), and it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption. ***

11. In the definition clause, the collection of words “filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed and insect-infested,” which are adjectives qualifying the term “an article of food,” show that it is not of the nature, substance, and quality fit for human consumption. It will be noticed that there is a comma after each of the first three words. It should also be noted that these qualifying adjectives cannot be read into the last portion of the definition i.e., the word’ “or is otherwise unfit for human consumption,” which is quite separate and distinct from others. The word “otherwise” signifies unfitness for human consumption due to other causes. If the last portion is meant to mean something different, it becomes difficult to understand how the word “or” as used in the definition of “adulterated” in Section 2(i)(f) between “filthy, putrid, rotten, etc.” and “otherwise unfit for human consumption” could have been intended to be used conjunctively. It would be more appropriate in the context to read it disjunctively. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn., Vol. 1, it is stated at p. 135: F

“And” has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of “or”. Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of a context, read as “or”. G While dealing with the topic ‘OR is read as AND, and vice versa’, Stroud says in Vol. 3, at p. 2009: “You will find it said in some cases that ‘or’ means ‘and’; but ‘or’ never does mean ‘and’. H

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109Copy pinpoint109. In State of Punjab v. Ex-Constable Ram Singh85, ‘or’ was read as ‘nor’ and not as ‘and’ in the context of Section 2 of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1948. In Naga People’s Movement of E Human Rights (supra), the Court held that the language of section 4(a) does not support the said construction.

110Copy pinpoint110. In Marsey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd.86, the Court observed as follows: (at page 603) F “…unless the context makes the necessary meaning of “or” “and,” as in some instances it does; but I believe it is wholly unexampled so to read it when doing so will upon one construction entirely alter the meaning of the sentence unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it G requires that to be done,……It may indeed be doubted whether some of the cases of turning “or” into “and” and vice versa have not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation, but I think none of them would cover this case.” 85 (1992) 4 SCC 54 H 86 LR (AC) Vol.XIII 1888 595

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111Copy pinpoint111. In Re Hayden Pask v. Perry87, the expression “or their issue” A had been considered, and it was observed that the words “or their issue” must be read as words of limitation and not of substitution. The word “or” was construed to mean “and.” The learned SG placed reliance on the Queen’s Bench decision in Metropolitan Board of Works v. Street Bros88 to submit that the issue was whether, in terms of its grammatical B meaning, if two things were prohibited, both were permitted and not merely permitted in the alternative. It would have been more strictly grammatical to have written “nor” instead of “or.” The following discussion was made in the decision: “Dec.13. GROVE, J. The main question before us turns on the meaning of the word “or,” used in 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, C s.98. Read shortly, s. 98 enacts that no existing road, passage or way, shall be hereafter formed or laid out for carriage traffic unless such road shall be forty feet wide, or for the purposes of foot traffic, unless such road be of the width of twenty feet, or unless such streets respectively shall be open at both ends. The question is whether that word “or” should be read in the disjunctive or conjunctive, or perhaps read as either “and” or “nor:” I think it means “nor;” that is to say, that the two things comprised in the prohibition are both prohibited, and not merely prohibited in the alternative. If the sense which I attribute to the word is right, it would have been more strictly grammatical to have written “nor” instead of “or.” But I think that the meaning of the enactment is that the road must be of the width specified, and that no road shall be allowed unless it is of the width specified, nor unless it is open at both ends. That seems to me to be the object of the statute, which was passed for sanitary purposes, and also for the purpose of comfort and traffic. It was contended that the object of the provision is sanitary only, and that if a street is forty feet wide, or if however narrow, it is open at both ends, good ventilation is secured. G But a very long narrow street would hardly be more salubrious with both ends open than if one end were closed and the street were a cul de sac. 87 (1931) 2 Ch.333 88 (1881) VIII QBD 445 H

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A Our construction of the Act is according to the ordinary use of language, although it may not be strictly grammatical. We might have referred to authorities by good writers, shewing that where the word “or” is preceded by a negative or prohibitory provision, it frequently has a different sense from that which it has when it is preceded by an affirmative provision. For instance, suppose an order that “you must have your house either drained or ventilated.” The word “or” would be clearly used in the alternative. Suppose again, the order was that “you must have your house drained or ventilated,” that conveys the idea to my mind that you must have your house either drained or ventilated. But supposing the order were that “you must not have your house undrained or unventilated.” The second negative words are coupled by the word “or,” and the negative in the preceding sentence governs both. In s. 98 there is a negative preceding a sentence; “no existing road” shall be formed as a street for carriage traffic unless such road be widened to forty feet, or for the purposes of foot traffic only unless such road or way be widened to the width of twenty feet, “or” unless such streets shall be open at both ends. Probably, if the word “or” in the sentence, “or for purposes of foot traffic only,” had been written “nor,” the language there too would have been more clear and more decidedly prohibitory; but with regard to the sentence “or unless such streets shall be open at both ends” I think that by reading the word “or” as “nor” we carry out the intention of the Act, which was to have streets of a proper width and properly opened at both ends, and that there should not be incommodious and unhealthy cross streets which are culs de sac, shut up at one end. There have been frequently cases on the construction of statutes where the Courts have held “or” to mean “and,” taking the rest of the sentence in which the word “or” G occurred, the object and intention being prohibition, and the two things prohibited being coupled by the word “or.” I think the prohibition in s.98 relates to both the width and open ending of streets. The street must be both of the width prescribed and also open at both ends.” H

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112Copy pinpoint112. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is, in our opinion, a penal provision - to punish the acquiring authority for its lethargy in not taking physical possession nor paying the compensation after making the award five years or more before the commencement of the Act of 2013 in pending proceedings, providing that they would lapse. The expression where an award has been made, then the proceedings shall continue used in Section 24(1)(b) under the provisions of the Act of 1894 means that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013 are not concluded proceedings, and in that context, an exception has been carved out in section 24(2).

113Copy pinpoint113. Even if possession has been taken, despite which payment has not been made nor deposited, (for the majority of the land-holdings), C then all beneficiaries holding land on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, are to be paid compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 frowns upon indolence and stupor of the authorities. The expression “possession of the land has not been taken” or “compensation has not been paid” indicates D a failure on the part of the authorities to take the necessary steps for five years or more in a pending proceeding under Section 24(1)(b). Section 24(2) starts with a non-obstante clause overriding what is contained in Section 24(1). Thus, Section 24(2) has to be read as an exception to Section 24(1)(b). Similarly, the proviso has to be read as a proviso to Section 24(2) for the several reasons to be discussed hereafter. Parliament E enacted a beneficial provision in case authorities delayed in taking of the possession for more than five years nor paid compensation, meaning thereby acquisition has not been completed. Section 24(2) clearly contemplates inaction on the part of the authorities not as a result of the dilatory tactics and conduct of the landowners or other interested persons. F

114Copy pinpoint114. There are other reasons to read the word ‘or’ in Section 24 as ‘and.’ When we consider the scheme of the Act of 1894, once the award was made under Section 11, the Collector may, undertake possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 G enables the Collector to take possession of acquired land, when an award is made under Section 11. Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 confers special powers in cases of urgency. The Collector could, on the expiration of 15 days from the publication of notice under Section 9(1), take possession of any land needed for a public purpose and such land was to H

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A thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Under Section 17(3A) before taking possession, the Collector had to tender payment of 80% of the compensation, as estimated by him and also had to pay the landowners or to persons interested, unless prevented by exigencies mentioned in Section 31(2). It is also provided in sub- section (3B) of Section 17 of the Act of 1894 that the amount paid or deposited under Section 17(3A) shall be taken into account for determining the compensation required to be tendered under Section 31.

115Copy pinpoint115. It is apparent from a plain reading of Section 16 (of the Act of 1894) that the land vests in the Government absolutely when possession is taken after the award is passed. Clearly, there can be lapse of proceedings under the Act of 1894 only when possession is not taken. The provisions in Section 11A of the Act of 1894 states that the Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and if no award is made within two years, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall lapse. The period of two year excludes any period during which interim order granted by the Court was in operation. Once an award is made and possession is taken, by virtue of Section 16, land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Vesting of land is automatic on the happening of the two exigencies of passing award and taking possession, as provided in Section 16. Once possession is taken under E Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the owner of the land loses title to it, and the Government becomes the absolute owner of the land.

116Copy pinpoint116. Payment of compensation under the Act of 1894 is provided for by Section 31 of the Act, which is to be after passing of the award under Section 11. The exception, is in case of urgency under Section 17, F is where it has to be tendered before taking possession. Once an award has been passed, the Collector is bound to tender the payment of compensation to the persons interested entitled to it, as found in the award and shall pay it to them unless “prevented” by the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 31. Section 31(3) contains a G non-obstante clause which authorises the Collector with the sanction of the appropriate Government, in the interest of the majority, by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land revenue on other lands or in such other way as may be equitable.

117Copy pinpoint117. Section 31(1) enacts that the Collector has to tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled

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thereto according to the award and shall pay such amount to a person interested in the land, unless he (the Collector) is prevented from doing so, for any of the three contingencies provided by sub-section (2). Section 31 (2) provides for deposit of compensation in Court in case State is prevented from making payment in the event of (i) refusal to receive it; (ii) if there be no person competent to alienate the land; (iii) if there is any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation; or (iv) if there is dispute as to the apportionment. In such exigencies, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the court to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted.

118Copy pinpoint118. Section 34 deals with a situation where any of the obligations under Section 31 is not fulfilled, i.e., when the amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of 9% per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited; and after one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest payable shall be at the rate of 15% per annum. The scheme of the Act of 1894 clearly makes it out that when the award is passed under Section 11, thereafter possession is taken as provided under Section 16, land vests in the State Government. Under Section 12(2), a notice of the award has to be issued by the Collector. Taking possession is not dependent upon payment. Payment has to be tendered under Section 31 unless the Collector is “prevented from making payment,” as provided under section 31(2). In case of failure under Section 31(1) or 31(3), also Collector is not precluded from making payment, but it carries interest under Section 34 @ 9% for the first year from the date it ought to have been paid or deposited and thereafter @ 15%. Thus, once land has been vested in the State under Section 16, in case of failure to pay the compensation under Section 31(1) to deposit under Section 31(2), compensation has to be paid along with interest, and due to non-compliance of Section 31, there is no lapse of acquisition. The same spirit has been carried forward in the Act of 2013 by providing in Section 24(2). Once possession has been taken though the payment has not been made, the compensation has to be paid along with interest as envisaged under section 34, and in a case, payment has been made, possession has not been taken, there is no lapse under Section 24(2). In a case where possession has been taken under the Act of 1894 as provided by Section 16 or 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances, if compensation is not paid, there is no H

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A divesting there will be no lapse as compensation carries interest @ 9% or @ 15% as envisaged under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. Proviso to Section 24(2) makes some wholesome provision in case the amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, in such an event, not only those persons but all the beneficiaries, though for minority of holding compensation has been paid, shall be entitled to higher compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. The expression used is “all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act”, i.e., Act of 1894, means that the persons who are to be paid higher compensation are those who have been recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4. The proviso gives effect to, and furthers the principle that under the Act of 1894, the purchases made after issuance of notification under Section 4 are void. As such, the benefit of higher compensation under the proviso to Section 24(2) is intended to be given to the beneficiaries mentioned in the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. D

119Copy pinpoint119. It is apparent from the Act of 1894 that the payment of compensation is dealt with in Part V, whereas acquisition is dealt with in Part II. Payment of compensation is not made pre-condition for taking possession under Section 16 or under Section 31 read with Section 34. Possession can be taken before tendering the amount except in the case of urgency, and deposit (of the amount) has to follow in case the Collector is prevented from making payment in exigencies as provided in Section 31(3). What follows is that in the event of not fulfilling the obligation to pay or to deposit under Section 31(1) and 31(2), the Act of 1894 did not provide for lapse of land acquisition proceedings, and only increased interest follows with payment of compensation.

120Copy pinpoint120. The terms of object clause No. 18 (of the Statement of Objects and Reasons) to the Act of 2013 reveals that the option of taking possession (of acquired land) upon making of an award the new law would be available in the cases of land acquisition under the Act of 1894 G where award has not been made, or possession of land has not been taken. It is apparent that the benefits under the Act of 2013 envisage that where the award had not been made, or award has been made, but possession has not been taken (because once possession is taken, land is vests in the State) there can be lapse of acquisition. No doubt about that payment is also to be made: that issue is taken care of by the provision of payment of interest under Section 34: also, in case of non-deposit- in

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respect of majority of holdings in a given award, higher compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to all beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4 issued under the Act of 1894. There is nothing in the Statement of Objects and Reasons making specific reference to non-payment of compensation where an award has been made, and possession has been taken. While interpreting the provisions of an Act, B the court to consider the objects and reasons of the legislature, which the legislature had in mind also emphasised that once vesting is complete, there is no divesting as held in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate 89, thus: “(9) A little careful consideration will show, however, that the expression “any person” occurring in the third part of the definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must relate to (i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that E

“the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety F of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained.” (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition, p. 55).” G

121Copy pinpoint121. In Mukesh K. Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC & Ors.90, the decision in Workmen of Dimakuchi Estate (supra) was reiterated, on the issue of discerning the object of an enactment.

89 1958 SCR 1156 90 (2004) 8 SCC 387 H

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122Copy pinpoint122. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 deals with a situation only where the award has been made 5 years or more before the commencement of the Act, but physical possession of the land has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid. It does not visualize a situation where possession has been taken under the urgency provision of Section 17(1), but the award has not been made. In such cases, under B Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013, there is no lapse of entire proceedings: but compensation is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In case of urgency, possession is usually taken before the award is passed. Thus, where no award is passed, where urgency provision under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 had been invoked, there is no lapse, only higher compensation would follow under Section 24(1)(a) even if payment has not been made or tendered under Section 17(3A) of the Act of 1894.

123Copy pinpoint123. The provision for lapsing under Section 24 is available only when the award has been made, but possession has not been taken within five years, nor compensation has been paid. In case word ‘or’ is read disjunctively, proceedings shall lapse even after possession has been taken in order to prevent lapse of land acquisition proceedings, once the land has vested in the Government and in most cases, development has already been made. The expressions used in Section 24(2) “possession of the land has not been taken” and “the compensation has not been paid” are unrelated and carry different consequences under the Act of 1894. As already discussed above, these conditions are merely exclusive conditions and cannot be used as alternative conditions. There is a catena of cases where compensation has been paid, but possession has not been taken due to one reason or the other for no fault of authorities or otherwise, and there are cases where possession is taken, but compensation has not been paid.

124Copy pinpoint124. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is to be given full effect. Section 24(2) has been carved out as an exception to the otherwise general applicability of the provisions contained in Section 6 of the General G Clauses Act and Section 24(1)(a) and (b) apply to the proceedings which are pending. Sub-section (2) is an exception to sub-section (1) which reads: “Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)” where an award has been made, but possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid, an exception has been carved in Section 24 where an award has been passed, but no steps have been taken to H

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take the possession nor payment of compensation has been made in A pending proceedings under Section 24(1). The provision has to be construed in the spirit behind what is saved under Section 6 (of the General Clauses Act) as provided in Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and the non-obstante clause in Section 24(2).

125Copy pinpoint125. It was also submitted on behalf of the States that neither a B transitory provision nor a repealing law could be interpreted so as to take away, disturb or adversely affect rights created by operation of law. It cannot divest the State Government of the land absolutely vested in it. Reliance has been placed on K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala & Ors91 thus: C “12. It is further necessary to bear in mind that the amending Act has added, among others, the provisions of Section 23(1- A) and Section 28-A and has amended the provisions of Section 23(2). It has also made independent transitional provision in its Section 30. The relevant provisions of Section 30 read as follows: D

30. Transitional provisions.— (1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to,— E (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People], in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date; F (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act. (2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section G 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order 91 1994 (5) SCC 593 H

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A passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People] and before the commencement of this Act. B The date of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act is 30-4-1982 and the date of its commencement is 24-9-1984. ***

38. The transitional provision is by its very nature an enabling one and has to be interpreted as such. In the present case, it is made to take care of the period between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, i.e., between the date of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act and the date of the commencement of the Act. Since some awards might have been made by the Collector and the reference Court during the said interregnum, the legislature did not want to deprive the awardees concerned either of the newly conferred benefit of Section 23(1-A) or of the increased benefit under Sections 23(2) and 28. The second object was to enable the Collector and the Court to give the said benefits in the proceedings pending before them where they had not made awards. The only limitation that was placed on the power of the Collector in this behalf was that he should not reopen the awards already made by him in proceedings which were pending before him on 30-4-1982 to give the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to such awardees. This was as stated earlier, for two reasons. If the said awards are pending before the reference Court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, viz., 24-9-1984, the reference Court would be able to give the said benefit to the awardees. On the other hand, if the awardees in question had accepted the awards, the same having become final, should not be reopened. As regards the increased benefit under Sections 23(2) and 28, G the intention of the legislature was to extend it not only to the proceedings pending before the reference Court on 24-9-1984 but also to those where awards were made by the Collector and the reference Courts between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. Hence these awards could not only be reopened but if they were the subject-matter of the appeal before High Courts or

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the Supreme Court, the appellate orders could also be reopened to extend the said benefits. ***

71. Section 30 of the amending Act bears the heading “Transitional provisions.” Explaining the role of transitional provisions in a statute, Bennion has stated: B

“Where an Act contains substantive, amending or repealing enactments, it commonly also includes transitional provisions which regulate the coming into operation of those enactments and modify their effect during the period of transition. Where an Act fails to include such provisions expressly, the court is C required to draw inferences as to the intended transitional arrangements as, in the light of the interpretative criteria, it considers Parliament to have intended.” (Francis Bennion: Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., p. 213) D The learned author has further pointed out: “Transitional provisions in an Act or other instrument are provisions which spell out precisely when and how the operative parts of the instrument are to take effect. It is important for the interpreter to realise, and bear constantly E in mind, that what appears to be the plain meaning of a substantive enactment is often modified by transitional provisions located elsewhere in the Act.” (p. 213) Similarly Thornton in his treatise on Legislative Drafting [3rd Edn., 1987, p. 319 quoted in Britnell v. Secretary of State for F Social Security, (1991) 2 All ER 726, 730 Per Lord Keith], has stated: “The function of a transitional provision is to make special provision for the application of legislation to the circumstances which exist at the time when that legislation comes into force.” G

For the purpose of ascertaining whether and, if so, to what extent the provisions of sub-section (1-A) introduced in Section 23 by the amending Act are applicable to proceedings that were pending on the date of the commencement of the H

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A amending Act it is necessary to read Section 23(1-A) along with the transitional provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act.” (emphasis supplied)

126Copy pinpoint126. For interpretation of repeal and saving clauses, reliance has been placed on Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd92 thus: “70. Section 85 of the 1996 Act repeals the 1940 Act. Sub- section (2) of Section 85 provides for a non-obstante clause. Clause (a) of the said sub-section provides for saving clause stating that the provisions of the said enactments shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before the said Act came into force. Thus, those arbitral proceedings which were commenced before coming into force of the 1996 Act are saved and the provisions of the 1996 Act would apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after the said Act came into force. Even for the said limited purpose, it is necessary to find out as to what is meant by commencement of arbitral proceedings for the purpose of the 1996 Act wherefor also necessity of reference to Section 21 would arise. The court is to interpret the repeal and savings clauses in such a manner so as to give a pragmatic and purposive meaning thereto. It is one thing to say that commencement of arbitration proceedings is dependent upon the facts of each case as that would be subject to the agreement between the parties. It is also another thing to say that the expression “commencement of arbitration proceedings” must be understood having regard to the context in which the same is used; but it would be a totally different thing to say that the arbitration proceedings commence only for the purpose of limitation upon issuance of a notice and for no other purpose. The statute does not say so. Even the case-laws do not suggest the same. On the contrary, the decisions of this Court operating in the field beginning from Shetty’s Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Konkan Rly. Construction, (1998) 5 SCC 599 are ad idem to the effect that Section 21 must be taken recourse to for the purpose of interpretation of Section 85(2)(a) of the Act. There is no 92 H 2004 (7) SCC 288

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reason, even if two views are possible, to make a departure from the decisions of this Court as referred to hereinbefore. ***

105. In the present matter, one is concerned with transitional provision i.e. Section 85(2)(a) which enacts as to how the statute will operate on the facts and circumstances existing on the date it comes into force and, therefore, the construction of such a provision must depend upon its own terms and not on the basis of Section 21 (see Singh, G.P.: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 8th Edn., p. 188). In Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (1999) 9 C SCC 334 Section 48 of the old Act and Section 85(2)(a) of the 1996 Act came for consideration. It has been held by this Court that there is a material difference between Section 48 of the 1940 Act, which emphasised the concept of “reference” vis-à-vis Section 85(2)(a) of the 1996 Act which emphasises the concept of “commencement”; that there is a material difference in the scheme of the two Acts; that the expression “in relation to” appearing in Section 85(2)(a) refers to different stages of arbitration proceedings under the old Act; and lastly, that Section 85(2)(a) provides for limited repeal of the 1940 Act, therefore, I am of the view that one cannot confine the concept of “commencement” under Section 85(2)(a) only to Section 21 of the 1996 Act which inter alia provides for commencement of arbitral proceedings from the date on which a request to refer a particular dispute is received by the respondent. …. F ***

109. To sum up, in this case, the question concerns interpretation of transitional provisions; that Section 85(2)(a) emphasises the concept of “commencement” whereas Section 48 of the 1940 Act emphasised the concept of “reference”; G that Section 85(2)(a) provides for implied repeal; that the scheme of the 1940 Act is different from the 1996 Act; that the word “reference” in Section 48 of the old Act had different meanings in different contexts; and for the said reasons, I am of the view that while interpreting Section 85(2)(a) in the H

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A context of the question raised in this appeal, one cannot rely only on Section 21 of the 1996 Act.” (emphasis supplied)

127Copy pinpoint127. Under Section 48 of the Act of 1894, withdrawal of the land acquisition proceedings was permissible only if the possession has not B been taken under Section 16 or 17(1). Section 48(1) is extracted hereunder: “48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed. –

C (1) Except in the case provided for in section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such D acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land. E (3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this section.” In case possession has been taken, there cannot be any withdrawal from the land acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1894. F

128Copy pinpoint128. Various decisions were referred on behalf of the State of Haryana that once possession has been taken and land has not been utilised, there cannot be withdrawal from the acquisition of any land. Land cannot be restituted to the owner after the stage of possession is over. Following decisions have been pressed into service: G (a). In Gulam Mustafa & Ors (supra), it was observed: “5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony. H Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity,

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once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration.” Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil & Anr. (supra) when restitution of land was sought, on the basis of some Government resolutions, after possession had been taken, this observed thus: “2… Since he had sought enforcement of the said government resolution, the writ petition could not be dismissed on the ground of constructive res judicata. He also seeks to rely upon certain orders said to have been passed by the High Court in conformity with enforcement of the government resolution. We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions.” (emphasis supplied) Again, in C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary & Ors93, this court stated that: G “4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (for short “the Act”) in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in 93 (1997) 2 SCC 627 H

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A Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in GOMs No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the Company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs No. 439 Industries dated 10-5-1985. In GOMs No. 546 Industries dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. F Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.

5. Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, contends that when by operation of Section 44-B read with Section 40 of the Act, the public purpose ceased to be existing, the acquisition became bad and G therefore, the GO was bad in law. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that after the notification in GOR 1392 dated 17-10-1962 was published, the acquisition proceeding had become final, the compensation was paid to the appellants’ father and thereafter the lands stood vested in the State. In H terms of the agreement as contemplated in Chapter VII of the

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Act, the Company had delivered possession subject to the terms A and conditions thereunder. It is seen that one of the conditions was that on cessation of the public purpose, the lands acquired would be surrendered to the Government. In furtherance thereof, the lands came to be surrendered to the Government for resumption. The lands then were allotted to SRVS Ltd., B 5th respondent which is also a subsidiary amalgamated company of the original company. Therefore, the public purpose for which acquisition was made was substituted for another public purpose. Moreover, the question stood finally settled 32 years ago and hence the writ petition cannot be entertained after three decades on the ground that either C original purpose was not public purpose or the land cannot be used for any other purpose.

6. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was right in refusing to entertain the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied) D

The decision in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh & Ors94 thus: “9…There is no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions. Merely because full enhanced compensation amount was not paid to the respondents, that itself was not a ground to condone the delay and laches in filing the writ petition. In our view, the High Court was also not right in ordering restoration of land to the respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used for which it had been acquired. It is a well-settled position in law that after passing the award and taking possession under Section 16 of the Act, the acquired land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the landowner does not get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask for restitution of the possession. This Court as early as in 1976 in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 in para 5 has stated thus: (SCC p. 802, para 5)

94 (2003) 1 SCC 335 H

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A “5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony. Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of B the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long after the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration.”” C (emphasis supplied) Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi (supra) 95 the Court observed that: “28. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid judgments would reveal that while taking possession, symbolic and notional possession is perhaps not envisaged under the Act but the manner in which possession is taken must of necessity depend upon the facts of each case. Keeping this broad principle in mind, this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259 after considering the judgment in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700, observed that while taking possession of a large area of land (in this case 339 acres) a pragmatic and realistic approach had to be taken. This Court then examined the context under which the judgment in Narayan Bhagde case had been rendered and held as under: (Viswam case, SCC p. 262, para 9) “9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or panchnama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. G It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/ interested person may not be cooperative in taking possession of the land.” *** *************** ************ 95 H (2009) 10 SCC 501

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40. In Narayan Bhagde case one of the arguments raised by the landowner was that as per the communication of the Commissioner the land was still with the landowner and possession thereof had not been taken. The Bench observed that the letter was based on a misconception as the landowner had re-entered the acquired land immediately after its possession had been taken by the Government ignoring the scenario that he stood divested of the possession, under Section 16 of the Act. This Court observed as under: (Narayan Bhagde case, SCC p. 712, para 29) “29. … This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal position is clear that even if the appellant entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land was actually taken possession of and became vested in the Government, such act on the part of the appellant did not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting.” To our mind, therefore, even assuming that the appellant had re-entered the land on account of the various interim orders granted by the courts, or even otherwise, it would have no effect for two reasons, (1) that the suits/petitions were ultimately dismissed and E (2) that the land once having vested in the Government by virtue of Section 16 of the Act, re-entry by the landowner would not obliterate the consequences of vesting.” This court stated, in Leelawanti & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors96 thus: F “19. If Para 493 is read in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants then in all the cases the acquired land will have to be returned to the owners irrespective of the time gap between the date of acquisition and the date on which the purpose of acquisition specified in G Section 4 is achieved and the Government will not be free to use the acquired land for any other public purpose. Such an interpretation would also be contrary to the language of Section 16 of the Act, in terms of which the acquired land 96 (2012) 1 SCC 66 H

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A vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the law laid down by this Court that the lands acquired for a particular public purpose can be utilised for any other public purpose. ***

B 22. The approach adopted by the High Court is consistent with the law laid down by this Court in State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, (1997) 5 SCC 432 and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558. In the first of these cases, the Court considered the validity of an executive order passed by the C Government for assignment of land to the erstwhile owners and observed: (M. Bhaskaran Pillai case, SCC p. 433, para 4) “4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, LA by operation D of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. E In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles F of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government G should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value.” ***

24. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the appellants have failed to make out a case for issue of a mandamus to the H

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respondents to release the acquired land in their favour. In A the result, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.” (emphasis supplied)

129Copy pinpoint129. Section 31 of the Act of 1894 is in pari materia with the provisions Section 77 of the Act of 2013; Section 34 (of the Act of1894) B is pari materia with Section 80 of the Act of 2013. Section 77 of the Act of 2013 deals with payment of compensation or deposit of the same in the Authority. Section 77 is reproduced hereunder: “77. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Authority.–(1) On making an award under section 30, the C Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them by depositing the amount in their bank accounts unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2). D (2) If the person entitled to compensation shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Authority to which a reference under section 64 would be submitted: E Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount: Provided further that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any F application under sub-section (1) of section 64: Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.” G

130Copy pinpoint130. The Collector has to tender payment under Section 77(1) and to pay the persons interested by depositing the amount in their bank accounts unless prevented under Section 77(2) which are the same contingencies as provided in Section 31(2) mentioned above. Section 80 of the Act of 2013 is pari materia to Section 34 of the Act of 1894, is reproduced hereunder: H

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A “80. Payment of interest.–When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent, per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited: B Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per cent, per annum shall be payable from the date or expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.”

131Copy pinpoint131. The provisions are identical concerning the rate of interest in case there is a failure to make payment of compensation before taking possession of the land. The award amount has to be paid @ 9% per annum for the first year and after that @ 15% per annum.

132Copy pinpoint132. Since the Act of 1894 never provide for the lapse in case the compensation amount was not deposited, non-deposit carried higher interest. The provisions under the new Act are identical: there is no lapse of any acquisition proceeding by non-compliance with Section 77. E Interpreting “or” under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 disjunctively, would result in an anomalous situation - because, once compensation has been paid to the landowner, there is no provision for its refund. It was fairly conceded on behalf of the landowners that they must return the compensation in the case of lapse if possession has not been taken. In case possession is with the landowner and compensation has been paid, according to landowners’ submission, there is deemed lapse under Section 24(2) by reading the word “or” disjunctively. It would then be open to the State Government to withdraw the money deposited in the Reference Court. It was also submitted that it is inherent in the notion of lapse that the State may recover the compensation on the ground of restitution. In our opinion, the submissions cannot be accepted as an anomalous result would occur. In case physical possession is with the landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision in the Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation. In the absence of any provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State cannot recover compensation paid. The landowner would be unjustly enriched. H

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This could never have been the legislative intent of enacting Section A 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The principle of restitution, unless provided in the Act, cannot be resorted to by the authorities on their own. The absence of provision for refund in the Act of 2013 reinforces our conclusion that the word “or” has to be read as conjunctively and has to be read as “and.” The landowners’ argument about the State’s ability to recover such amounts, in the absence of any provision, by relying on the principle of restitution, is without merit, because firstly such principle is without any legal sanction. The State would have to resort to the remedy of a suit, which can potentially result in litigation of enormous proportions; besides, the landowners can well argue that the property (i.e. the amounts) legally belonged to them and that the limitation for claiming it back would have expired. Several other potential defences would be available, each of which would result in multifarious litigation. Therefore, the contention is ex-facie untenable and insubstantial.

133Copy pinpoint133. It was submitted that in the case State had taken possession without paying compensation as required under the Act of 1894, there cannot be absolute vesting free from all encumbrances under Section

16. It is clear that vesting under Section 16 of the Act of 1894 does not depend upon payment of compensation. Vesting takes place as soon as possession is taken after the passing of the award. Undoubtedly, compensation has also to be paid. For that, provisions have been made in Sections 31 and 34 of the Act of 1894. Section 31(1) requires tender and payment, which is making the money available to the landowner and in case State is prevented: i.e., in case the landowner does not consent to receive it for three other exigencies provided in Section 31(2), the amount has to be deposited in the court. Deposit in the court absolves the Government of liability to make payment of interest. However, if payment is not tendered under Section 31(1) nor deposited in court as envisaged under Section 31(2) from the date of taking possession, the interest for the first year is 9% and thereafter 15% per annum follows. The effect of vesting, under no circumstance, is taken away due to non- compliance of Section 31(1) or 31(2) as the case may be as the payment is secured along with interest under the provisions of Section 34 read with Section 31. The State cannot be asked to restore possession once taken but in case it fails to make deposit under Section 31(3) or otherwise with respect to majority of the landholdings, in that exigency, all the beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4 shall be entitled to higher compensation under the Act of 2013 and there would be no lapse in that case. H

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134Copy pinpoint134. The landowners had complained that in some cases, under various schemes, close to 80% of the compensation amount was not handed over to the concerned Collector. It was also submitted that in some of the schemes, 50% beneficiaries, for whose benefit the land had been acquired, had not paid even a single rupee. Since this Court is not deciding individual cases here, what is the effect of the interpretation of the law, in the light of this decision, has to be considered in each and every case. We refrain from commenting on the merits of the said submissions as we are not deciding the cases on merits in the reference made to us. Various aspects may arise on the merits of the case as the schemes were framed at different points of time and the dates of notifications under Section 4 issued thereunder, whether there is one or different notifications and various other attendant circumstances have to be looked into like whether possession has been taken or not, to what extent compensation has been paid and whether proviso to Section 24(2) is attracted for the benefits of those entitled to it. In case there is failure to deposit the compensation with respect to the majority of the holdings, the facts have to be gauged in individual cases and then decided. In re: Vesting and divesting

135Copy pinpoint135. In Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors 97, the concept of vesting under the Act of 1894 had been taken into consideration. The Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48, once it has taken the possession. This Court has observed that once possession has been taken under Section 17(1), prior to the making of the award, the owner is divested of the title to the land, which is vested in the Government and there is no provision by which land can be reverted to the owner. This Court has observed thus: F “14. There are two judgments of this Court, which we must note. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC 84 it was held that the Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 once it had taken possession of the land. In Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, (1970) G 2 SCC 149 it was held that: (SCC p. 152, para 8) “… after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled under 97 H (1993) 4 SCC 369

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Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification A be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government. B There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification.”

15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section C

11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period D of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, E lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. F Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.” G (emphasis supplied) This Court further observed in Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) that even if compensation was not paid to the appellant under Section 17(3-A), it could not be said that possession was taken illegally. Vesting is absolute. This Court has observed thus: H

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A “17. In the instant case, even that 80 per cent of the estimated compensation was not paid to the appellants although Section 17(3-A) required that it should have been paid before possession of the said land was taken but that does not mean that the possession was taken illegally or that the said land did not thereupon vest in the first respondent. It is, at any rate, not open to the third respondent, who, as the letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated June 27, 1990 shows, failed to make the necessary monies available and who has been in occupation of the said land ever since its possession was taken, to urge that the possession was taken illegally and that, therefore, the said land has not vested in the first respondent and the first respondent is under no obligation to make an award.” (emphasis supplied)

136Copy pinpoint136. In Tika Ram and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.98, D the question considered was in case possession is taken, and compensation is not paid, what is the effect? This Court has held that there is no lapse of acquisition and observed thus: “91. However, the question is as to what happens when such payment is not made and the possession is taken. Can the whole acquisition be set at naught?

92. In our opinion, this contention on the part of the appellants is also incorrect. If we find fault with the whole acquisition process on account of the non-payment of 80% of the compensation, then the further question would be as to whether the estimation of 80% of compensation is correct or not. A further controversy can then be raised by the landlords that what was paid was not 80% and was short of 80% and therefore, the acquisition should be set at naught. Such extreme interpretation cannot be afforded because indeed under G Section 17 itself, the basic idea of avoiding the enquiry under Section 5-A is in view of the urgent need on the part of the State Government for the land to be acquired for any eventuality discovered by either sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act. 98 H (2009) 10 SCC 689

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93. The only question that would remain is that of the estimation of the compensation. In our considered view, even if the compensation is not paid or is short of 80%, the acquisition would not suffer. One could imagine the unreasonableness of the situation. Now suppose, there is state of emergency as contemplated in Section 17(2) of the Act and the compensation is not given, could the whole acquisition come to a naught? It would entail serious consequences. ***

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A It has further been observed that the only result that may follow by the non-payment would be the payment of interest as contemplated in Section 34 of the Act of 1894.

137Copy pinpoint137. In Pratap & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors99, this Court held that when the possession of land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances and the Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 and provisions of Section 11-A of passing the award within two years were not attracted. The proceedings would not lapse on failure to make an award within the period prescribed under Section 11-A, once possession had been taken. The part payment of compensation would also not render the possession illegal. This Court observed thus: “12. The provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 52 are somewhat similar to Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, LA. Just as the publication of a notification under Section 52(1) vests the land in the State, free from all encumbrances, as provided by Section 52(4), similarly when possession of land is taken under Section 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. A question arose before this Court that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A and an award is not made in respect to the land so acquired, would the acquisition proceedings lapse. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 this Court held that once possession had been taken under Section 17(1) and the land vested in the Government then the Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 and the provisions of Section 11-A were not attracted and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings would not lapse on failure to make an award within the period prescribed therein. It was further held that non-compliance of Section 17(3-A), regarding part payment of compensation before taking possession, would also not render the possession illegal and entitle the Government to withdraw from acquisition. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by this Court in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31. In view of the aforesaid ratio it follows that the provisions of Section 11-A are not attracted in the present case and even if H 99 (1996) 3 SCC 1

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it be assumed that the award has not been passed within the stipulated period, the acquisition of land does not come to an end. (emphasis supplied)”

138Copy pinpoint138. In Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors100, question was raised with respect to the lapse of acquisition proceedings in view of the provisions contained in Section 11-A as award had not been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984. Possession had been taken by the Government under Section 17(1). It was held that it was not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition. Provisions of Section C 11-A was not attracted. Following is the relevant portion of the observations made by this Court: “8. ..It was contended that in view of Section 11-A of the Act the entire land acquisition proceedings lapsed as no award under Section 11 had been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, D

1984. We are of the view that the above plea has no force. In this case, the Government had taken possession of the land in question under Section 17(1) of the Act. It is not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition (Section 48 of the Act). In such a case, Section 11-A of the Act is not attracted and the acquisition proceedings would not lapse, even if it is assumed that no award was made within the period prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act. ….”

139Copy pinpoint139. In P. Chinnanna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors.101 question again arose with respect to possession taken under Section 17(1) invoking urgency clause, this Court has held that once possession is taken, there is absolute vesting and subsequent proceedings were void. This Court stated as follows: “10. The said provision enables the appropriate Government to take possession of the land concerned on the expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in G Section 9 sub-section (1) notwithstanding the fact that no award has been made in respect of it. When the possession of the land concerned is once taken as provided for thereunder 100 (1995) 6 SCC 31 101 (1994) 5 SCC 486 H

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