MS. X v. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

A be a letter of resignation or relinquishment of the office, so as to sever her services once and for all. The letter cannot be construed, in our view, to convey any spontaneous intention to give up or relinquish her office accompanied by any act of relinquishment. To constitute a “resignation”, it must be unconditional and with an intention to operate as such. At best, as observed by this Court in the decision in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer [(1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] it may amount to a threatened offer more on account of exasperation, to resign on account of a feeling of frustration born out of an idea that she was being harassed unnecessarily but not, at any rate, amounting to a resignation, actual and simple. The appellant had put in about two decades of service in the hospital, that she was placed under suspension and exposed to disciplinary proceedings and proposed domestic enquiry and she had certain benefits flowing to her benefit, if she resigns but yet the letter dated 9-1-1999 does not seek for any of those things to be settled or the disciplinary proceedings being scrapped as a D sequel to her so-called resignation. The words “with immediate effect” in the said letter could not be given undue importance dehors the context, tenor of language used and the purport as well as the remaining portion of the letter indicating the circumstances in which it was written. That the management of the hospital took up such action forthwith, as a result of acceptance of the resignation is not of much significance in ascertaining the true or real intention of the letter written by the appellant on 9-1-

1999. Consequently, it appears to be reasonable to view that as in the case reported in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer [(1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] the respondents have seized an opportunity to get rid of the appellant the moment they got the letter dated 9-1-1999, without due or proper consideration of the matter in a right perspective or understanding of the contents thereof. The High Court also seems to have completely lost sight of these vital aspects in rejecting the writ petition.”

84. The facts in the above case are somewhat similar to the present case. The present case is also not a case where it is required to consider as to whether the relinquishment envisaged under the Rules and Conditions of Service, is unilateral or bilateral in character. In the present case also, the words “with immediate effect” in the resignation letter could not be given undue importance, dehors the context, tenor of

MS. X v. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF MADHYA 99 PRADESH AND ANOTHER [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

language used therein, indicating the circumstances in which it was written. The resignation letter in the present case, as has already been discussed hereinabove, appears to be on account of exasperationand frustrationactuated by a thought, that injustice was being meted out to her by the very Institution of Judiciary.

85. We further find that the breakneck speed at which the events have taken place in the present matter, gives rise to a suspicion, that there is something more than which meets the eye. On 3rd July 2014, the then D & SJ, Gwalior, who appears to have joined the service a short while ago, addressed a complaint to the then RG. The said D & SJ, Gwalior, in his deposition before the JIC, has clearly admitted that the instances mentioned in the complaint, were not within his personal knowledge, but were on the basis of the complaints made to him by other Judicial Officers. He further admitted that the complaints were with regard to the period, which was before his joining as D & SJ, Gwalior. He further admitted that there were no written complaints by the Judicial Officers and that he had proceeded to write the complaint on the basis of their oral complaints. Within days of the said complaint being made, on 7th July 2014, the Transfer Committee decided to transfer the petitioner from Gwalior to Sidhi. The transfer order was issued on 8th July 2014. The petitioner made a representation on the very next day i.e. 9th July 2014, and the same was rejected within two days i.e. 11th July 2014. On 11th July 2014, the petitioner made another representation. However, E that also did not find favour with respondent No. 1 and was rejected on 14th July 2014, on the ground that the earlier representation on identical grounds was already rejected. It is to be noted that 12th July 2014 was a second Saturday, 13th July 2014 was a Sunday and on the very next working day i.e. 14th July 2014, her second representation was rejected. F On 15th July 2014, the petitioner tendered her resignation. On the next day i.e. 16th July 2014, the MP High Court with the recommendation for acceptance of the same, forwarded it to respondent No.2. On the very next day i.e. 17th July 2014, respondent No. 2 accepted the same.

86. It will not be out of place to mention that in some High Courts, G a practice is followed, that whenever a Judicial Officer having good track record tenders his/her resignation, an attempt is made by the Senior Judges of the High Court to counsel and persuade him/her to withdraw the resignation. Valuable time and money is spent on training of a Judicial Officer. Losing a good Judicial Officer without counselling him/her and without giving him/her an opportunity to introspect and re-think, will not H

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A be in the interest of either the Judicial Officer or the Judiciary. We find that it will be in the interest of judiciary that such a practice is followed by all the High Courts.

87. We are therefore of the considered view that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner’s resignation dated 15th July 2014, could not be construed to be voluntary. In any case, immediately in a fortnight, on 1st August 2014, the petitioner had made a representation to Hon’ble the President of India as well as the Chief Justice of India, with a copy to the Chief Justice of the MP High Court for reconsideration of the circumstances under which, she was left with no option but to resign. Though, it may not be possible to observe that the petitioner was forced to resign, however, the circumstances enumerated hereinabove, would clearly reveal that they were such, that out of frustration, the petitioner was left with no other alternative.

88. It is contended on behalf of the MP High Court that the petitioner, who was on probation, had voluntarily tendered her resignation, which was accepted and as such, led to an irrevocable severance of relationship of the employer and employee. In this regard, it is to be noted that the petitioner was initially appointed on probation for a period of two years on 1st August 2011. Her probation was completed on 1st August 2013. Admittedly, there has been no order extending the period of probation of the petitioner from 1st August 2013 onwards. On the contrary, she was assigned with various additional duties in the year

2013. Not only this, but her assessment for the assessment year 2013, during which, she would be deemed to be confirmed, was ‘very good’. We therefore find that the said contention is nothing but an after-thought.

89. Insofar as the contention with regard to delay is concerned, we find no merit in the said contention also. Immediately after the petitioner resigned on 15th July 2014, she made a representation to Hon’ble the President of India as well as the Chief Justice of India, with a copy to the Chief Justice of the MP High Court, requesting to reconsider the circumstances in which she was left with no option but to resign. The petitioner thereafter had also pursued a writ petition before this Court. Thereafter, she had participated in the proceedings before the G JIC and after the JIC expressed its opinion, that it would be in the interest of justice that she should be re-instated in service, she made a representation to the MP High Court, for re-instatement in service. After the said representation was rejected, she has immediately approached this Court in the present matter. We therefore find that the petitioner H cannot be denied the reliefs on the so-called grounds of delay and laches.

MS. X v. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF MADHYA 101 PRADESH AND ANOTHER [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

90. That leaves us with the last submission of the learned Solicitor A General, that if we hold the resignation in the present case to be actuated by coercion, it will have far-reaching implications and will open floodgates to the similarly situated Judicial Officers. Another submission made is that, if a decision of the Full Court of the MP High Court is interfered with, it will stigmatize the entire Institution and have catastrophic effects. B

91. We find the said submissions to be totally uncalled for. At the outset, we have clarified that we are only examining the correctness and otherwise of the order of transfer, the rejection of the representations and the question as to whether the resignation in the facts of the present case, could be construed to be voluntary or not. We have not at all gone into the question, regarding the correctness or otherwise of the decisions of the Full Court of the MP High Court with regard to the rejection of the petitioner’s representation. As already discussed hereinabove, there might be reasons and factors which might have weighed with the Full Court of the MP High Court for taking such a decision. At the cost of repetition, we reiterate that we have full respect for the authority of the Full Court to arrive at such a decision. As such, there is no question of stigmatizing the Full Court of the MP High Court. It is a different matter, that if the suggestions made by this Court on more than one occasion would have been accepted, the exercise of examining the factual scenario, could have been avoided. In any case, we have restricted our inquiry only to the facts, which we found necessary to decide the present case. E We have refrained ourselves from going into the details of the findings of the JIC, so as to protect the dignity of all concerned. We have refrained ourselves from mentioning a single name in our judgment.

92. In that view of the matter, the contention of the learned Solicitor General with regard to stigmatizing the MP High Court is without substance. F

93. Insofar as the contention, that if this Court holds the resignation in the present case to be coercive, it will have far-reaching effects on the administration of judiciary is concerned, the same is also without substance. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations made by this Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. Dhanwanti G Devi and Others14: “9. …….. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and 14 (1996) 6 SCC 44 H

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A for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates— (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found……” D It could thus be seen that this Court has held that a decision is an authority only for what it actually decides. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts, proved or assumed to be proved. The generality of the expressions found there, is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.

94. This Court in the case of The Regional Manager and Another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey15 has succinctly observed thus: “7. …..Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would, we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.” G The ratio decidendi is a rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. It has been held that one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between 15 H (1976) 3 SCC 334

MS. X v. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF MADHYA 103 PRADESH AND ANOTHER [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.

95. As has already been discussed hereinabove, we may reiterate that we have decided the present matter only on the basis of the peculiar facts and circumstances, as are found in the present matter. We do hope, that in future, similar facts would never arise for consideration, at least in a lis between a High Court and a Judicial Officer. However, we may remind ourselves of the dictum that law is supreme and no one is above law. It would be apt to reproduce the words of Thomas Fuller, which have been quoted by Lord Denning, “Be ye never so high, the law is above you”.

96. Before we part with the judgment, we find it our duty to place on record our appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Smt. Indira Jaising, learned Senior Counsel and Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India.

97. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed in the following terms: D (i) We hold and declare that the petitioner’s resignation from the post of Additional District & Sessions Judge, Gwalior dated 15th July 2014, cannot be construed to be voluntary and as such, the order dated 17th July 2014, passed by the respondent No. 2, thereby accepting the resignation of the petitioner, is quashed and set aside; and (ii) The respondents are directed to re-instate the petitioner forthwith as an Additional District & Sessions Judge. Though the petitioner would not be entitled to back wages, she would be entitled for continuity in service with all consequential benefits with effect from 15th July 2014.

98. No order as to cost. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms.

Ankit Gyan Writ petition partly allowed. (Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA) G