PASCHIMANCHAL VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM LTD. v. RAMAN ISPAT PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.

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Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
Bench
S. RAVINDRA BHAT and DIPANKAR DATTA
Citation
[2023] 10 S.C.R. 1221 : 2023 INSC 625
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Judgment · Supreme Court of India · decided · Bench: S. RAVINDRA BHAT and DIPANKAR DATTA

[2023] 10 S.C.R. 1221 : 2023 INSC 625

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p. 1263

ISPAT PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

liquidator payable during the liquidation proceedings. However, the dues payable to the government are placed much below those of secured creditors and even unsecured and operational creditors. This design was either not brought to the notice of the court in Rainbow Papers(supra)or was missed altogether. In any event, the judgment has not taken note of the provisions of the IBC which treat the dues payable to secured creditors at a higher footing than dues payable to Central or State Government.

5050. The Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 no doubt creates a charge in respect of amounts due and payable or arrears. It would be possible to hold [in the absence of a specific enumeration of government dues as in the present case, in Section 53(1)(e)] that the State is to be treated as a ‘secured creditor’. However, the separate and distinct treatment of amounts payable to secured creditor on the one hand, and dues payable to the government on the other clearly signifies Parliament’s intention to treat the latter differently - and in the present case, having lower priority. As noticed earlier, this intention is also evident from a D reading of the preamble to the Act itself.

5151. According to the principles of statutory interpretation, when an enactment uses two different expressions, they cannot be construed as having the same meaning. It was held in Member, Board of Revenue v. Anthony Paul Benthall36 that: E “When two words of different import are used in a statute, in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense…” This idea is reflected in a subsequent judgment in Brihan Mumbai Mahanagarpalika & Anr. v. Willington Sports Club & Ors.37 F

5252. The views expressed by the present judgment finds support in the decision reported as Sundaresh Bhatt, Liquidator of ABG Shipyard v. Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs38. In that case, Section 142A of the Customs Act 1962 was in issue – authorities had submitted that dues payable to it were to be treated as ‘first charge’ on the property G

36 Member, Board of Revenue v. Anthony Paul Benthall(1955) 2 SCR 842. 37 Brihan Mumbai Mahanagarpalika & Anr. v. Willington Sports Club & Ors., (2013) (16) SCR 216. 38 Sundaresh Bhatt, Liquidator of ABG Shipyard v. Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, 2022 SCC Online SC 1101. H

p. 1264

A of the assessee concerned. In the resolution process, it was argued that the Customs Act, 1962 acquired primacy and had to be given effect to. This court, after noticing the overriding effect of Section 238 of the IBC, held as follows: “55. For the sake of clarity following questions, may be B answered as under: (a) Whether the provisions of the IBC would prevail over the Customs Act, and if so, to what extent? The IBC would prevail over the Customs Act, to the extent that once moratorium is imposed in terms of Sections 14 or C 33(5) of the IBC as the case may be, the respondent authority only has a limited jurisdiction to assess/determine the quantum of customs duty and other levies. The respondent authority does not have the power to initiate recovery of dues by means of sale/confiscation, as provided under the Customs Act. D (b) Whether the respondent could claim title over the goods and issue notice to sell the goods in terms of the Customs Act when the liquidation process has been initiated? Answered in negative.

56. On the basis of the above discussions, following are our conclusions: (i) Once moratorium is imposed in terms of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC as the case may be, the respondent authority only has a limited jurisdiction to assess/determine the quantum of customs duty and other levies. The respondent authority does not have the power to initiate recovery of dues by means of sale/confiscation, as provided under the Customs Act. (ii) After such assessment, the respondent authority has to submit its claims (concerning customs dues/operational debt) in terms of the procedure laid down, in strict compliance of the time periods prescribed under the IBC, before the adjudicating authority. (iii) In any case, the IRP/RP/liquidator can immediately secure goods from the respondent authority to be dealt with appropriately, in terms of the IBC.” H

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ISPAT PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

Similarly, in Duncans Industries Ltd. v. AJ Agrochem39, Section A 16G of the Tea Act, 1953 which required prior consent of the Central Government (for initiation of winding up proceedings) was held to be overridden by the IBC. In a similar manner, it is held that Section 238 of the IBC overrides the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 despite the latter containing two specific provisions which open with non-obstante B clauses (i.e., Section 173 and 174). The position of law with respect to primacy of the IBC, is identical with the position discussed in Sundaresh Bhatt and Duncan Industries (supra) [refer also: Innoventive Industries (supra), CIT v. Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd.40, Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd.41, and Jagmohan Bajaj v. Shivam Fragrances Private Limited42]. C

5353. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the reliance on Rainbow Papers (supra) is of no avail to the appellant. In this court’s view, that judgment has to be confined to the facts of that case alone. D. EFFECT OF SECTION 77 OF THE COMPANIES ACT D

5454. Lastly, the liquidator had urged that without registration of charge, the same was unenforceable under liquidation proceedings. Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013reads as follows: “77. Duty to register charges, etc.—(1) It shall be the duty of every company creating a charge within or outside India, on E its property or assets or any of its undertakings, whether tangible or otherwise, and situated in or outside India, to register the particulars of the charge signed by the company and the charge-holder together with the instruments, if any, creating such charge in such form, on payment of such fees and in such manner as may be prescribed, with the Registrar F within thirty days of its creation: Provided that the Registrar may, on an application by the company, allow such registration to be made within a period of three hundred days of such creation on payment of such additional fees as may be prescribed: Provided further that if registration is not made G within a period of three hundred days of such creation, the company shall seek extension of time in accordance with 39 Duncans Industries Ltd. v. AJ Agrochem, (2019) 9 SCC 725. 40 (2018) 18 SCC 786 41

[2021] 13 SCR 737

42 2018 SCC OnLine NCLAT 413 H

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A section 87: Provided also that any subsequent registration of a charge shall not prejudice any right acquired in respect of any property before the charge is actually registered. (2) Where a charge is registered with the Registrar under sub- section (1), he shall issue a certificate of registration of such charge in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed to the company and, as the case may be, to the person in whose favour the charge is created. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no charge created by a company shall be taken into account by the liquidator or any other creditor unless it is duly registered under sub-section (1) and a certificate of registration of such charge is given by the Registrar under sub-section (2). (4) Nothing in sub-section (3) shall prejudice any contract or obligation for the repayment of the money secured by a charge.”

5555. Section 78 enacts, that when a company whose property is subject to charge, fails to register it, the charge holder (or the person entitled to the charge over the company’s assets) can seek its registration. E Section 3 (31) of the IBC defines “security interest” in the widest terms. In this court’s opinion, the liquidator cannot urge this aspect at this stage, because of the concurrent findings of the NCLT and the NCLAT that PVVNL is a secured creditor.

5656. The record further shows that after the NCLT passed its order, the appellant preferred its claim on 10.04.2018. Based on that application, the liquidator had filed an application before the NCLT for modification of its order dated 21.08.2018, and contended that PVVNL also came under the definition of ‘secured operational creditor’ in realization of its dues in the liquidation proceedings as per law. The G application sought amendment of the list of stakeholders. The application was allowed. In view of these factual developments, this Court does not consider it appropriate to rule on the submissions of the liquidator vis-a- vis the fact of non-registration of charges under Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013. H

p. 1267

ISPAT PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

V. CONCLUSION A

5757. For the above reasons, it is held that the appeal deserves to fail. At the same time, the liquidator is directed to decide the claim exercised by PVVNL in the manner required by law. It shall complete the process within 10 weeks from the date of pronouncement of this decision, after providing such opportunity to the appellant, as is necessary B under law.

5858. The appeal is dismissed, subject to the above direction, without order on costs.

Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed. C (Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

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