Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors.

vidhipandit.com/case/sc-2024-11-1647-2038

Judgment · Supreme Court of India · decided · Bench: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, * (CJI), Sanjiv Khanna, Surya Kant, * J.B. Pardiwala, Dipankar Datta, * Manoj Misra and Satish Chandra Sharma (author)

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1647 : 2024 INSC 856

Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

Issue for consideration

The issues were: 1) ingredients, indicia or criteria for an educational institution to be considered a minority educational institution under Article 30 of the Constitution; 2) whether Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) is a minority educational institution; 3) whether the Constitution Bench decision in Azeez Basha was incorrect, and 4) Whether two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya erred in referring the correctness of the decision rendered in Azeez Basha directly to a Bench of seven Judges.

Reporter's headnote (continued) and case details

(Civil Appeal No. 2286 of 2006)

Headnotes† A1. Educational Institution – No distinction between educational institutions established before and after commencement of the Constitution for purposes of Art. 30(1) – Right guaranteed by Article 30(1) is applicable to universities established before commencement of the Constitution – Constitution of India – Art.30. A2. Educational Institution – Minority institution – Indicia for ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution – Meaning of word ‘establish’ as used in Art.30(1) – Effect of incorporation on minority character of an institution – Distinction between ‘incorporation’ and ‘establishment’ – Constitution of India – Art.30.

* Author Ed. Note: T here are four judgments in the matter. One judgment was pronounced by Hon’ble Dr Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, on behalf of himself, Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Hon’ble Mr Justice J B Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr Justice Manoj Misra. Hon’ble Mr Justice Surya Kant, Hon’ble Mr Justice Dipankar Datta and Hon’ble Mr Justice Satish Chandra Sharma pronounced their separate judgments.

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A3. Educational Institution – Minority institution – Declaration of an institution as one of national importance does not amount to change in minority character of the institution. A4. Educational Institution – Minority educational institution – Whether Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) is a minority educational institution. A5. Constitution of India – Art.30 – Scope of – Purpose of Art.30(1) – Special protection guaranteed by Art.30(1). A6. Constitution of India – Art.30 – Article 30(1) can be classified as both an anti-discrimination provision and a special rights provision. A7. Words and Phrases – ‘establishment’ and ‘incorporation’ of educational institutions – The words ‘incorporation’ and ‘establishment’ cannot be used interchangeably.

Held [per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself, Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.)]: 1.1. A distinction between educational institutions established before and after the commencement of the Constitution cannot be made for the purposes of Article 30(1) – Article 30 will stand diluted and weakened if it is to only apply prospectively to institutions established after the commencement of the Constitution – The adoption of the Constitution reflects a break from the system of sovereign and potentate government under the colonial regime and the dawn of governance based on the rule of law – It secures to the minority educational institutions, rights under the Constitution from the date of its commencement. [Para 83] 1.2. Upon the commencement of the Constitution, citizens received the protective cover of Part III – Article 372 read with Article 13(1) stipulates that laws which pre-date the Constitution are unconstitutional if they contravene the fundamental rights – The provisions do not stipulate that laws which pre-date the Constitution cannot receive the additional protection which the fundamental rights offer – The right to administration in Article 30(1) is one such protection. [Para 84] 2.1. ‘Incorporation’ signifies the legal existence of the institution. In contrast, ‘establishment’ signifies the founding or bringing into existence of the institution – The possibility of distinguishing the establishment and incorporation of universities arose with the advent of teaching Universities – Two kinds of institutions were incorporated as teaching universities – They consisted of institutions which were established and incorporated at the same time, and institutions in which the establishment of the institution predated its incorporation – Universities in the latter category, however, were teaching colleges converted into teaching universities – The instance of conversion of teaching collages to teaching universities elucidates the distinction between the ‘establishment’ and ‘incorporation’ of educational institutions. [Para 94] 2.2. The word ‘establish’ as used in Article 30(1) cannot and should not be understood in a narrow and legalistic sense – The words used in clause (1) of Article 30 have to be interpreted in view of the object and purpose of the article, and the guarantee and protection it confers – The guarantee and protection are not dependent on the basis or the manner in which the legal requirements were/are complied with, rather it concerns the persons who have founded and created the establishment – The incorporation by a statute or the procedure and requirements in law are not determinative factors – The persons behind it, that is, the promoters and founder(s) are important – They should belong to a linguistic or a religious minority – There will always be individuals and groups instrumental in catalysing and setting up the institution – Thus, giving a legal character to an educational institution through state or sovereign action, it does not ipso facto follow that the university so established deprives the group of persons/individuals the guarantee under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution – Universities are as much educational institutions as schools and colleges – The interpretation in Azeez Basha confers a legalistic meaning to the word ‘established’, sans the context of clause (1) of Article 30 – No distinction exists between universities and other educational institutions such as schools and colleges for the purpose of Article 30(1). [Para 95] 2.3. It cannot be argued that a university was established by Parliament merely because the long title and preamble of the statute incorporating the university states that it is an Act to establish and incorporate – If such a formalistic

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interpretation is adopted, fundamental rights would be made subservient to legislative language – The courts must identify the circumstances surrounding the incorporation of the University (including through a reading of the statute) to identify who established the university – Formalism must give way to actuality and to what is real. [Para 112] 2.4. The argument that the test of whether an educational institution is a minority institution must be examined based on whether the community or the group which had established the institution was a minority at the time of its establishment in pre-independent India, is rejected – The purpose of the provision is to ensure that the minorities are able to preserve and promote their linguistic and religious culture – For this purpose, the status of the group/community, that had established the institution, on the date of commencement of the Constitution should be considered – The test of establishment will apply to future situations on the day when new educational institutions are established – The protection under clause (1) of Article 30 cannot be denied to institutions established before the commencement of the Constitution for the reason that at the time of establishment in pre-independent India, the founders were not aware that they would receive protection of Article 30(1). [Para 122] 2.5. ‘establishment’ or formation of an institution can be at any point of time and even before the commencement of the Constitution – If an institution was established before the commencement of the Constitution, the enquiry on the question of ‘establishment’ must relate back to the date when the institution was established or formed to ascertain whether it would qualify as a minority institution upon the commencement of the Constitution. [Para 134] 3.1. To determine who established the institution, the Courts must consider the genesis of the educational institution – For this analysis, the Courts must trace the origin of the idea for the establishment of the institution – The Court must identify who was the brain behind the establishment of the educational institution – Letters, correspondence with other members of the community or with government/State officials and resolutions issued could be valid proof for establishing ideation or the impetus to found and establish – The proof of ideation must point towards one member of the minority or a group from the community. [Para 135] 3.2. The second indicia is the purpose for which the educational institution was established – Though it is not necessary that the educational institution must have been established only for the benefit of a religious or linguistic minority community, it must predominantly be for its benefit – It is not necessary that education must be provided in the language spoken by the minority or on the religion of the minority – For example, it is not necessary that an educational institution established for the Tamils in Uttar Pradesh must necessarily prescribe Tamil as the language of instruction – However, it must be proved that the institution was established for the benefit of the tamil-speaking community – This indicia could be proved by a reference to private communication or speeches about the necessity of establishing an educational institution for the community and a recognition of the educational difficulties faced by the community. [Para 136] 3.3. The third test is tracing the steps taken towards the implementation of the idea – Information on who contributed the funds for its creation, who was responsible for obtaining the land, and whether the land was donated by a member of the minority community or purchased from funds raised by the minority community for this purpose or donated by a person from some other community specifically for the establishment of a minority educational institution are elements that must be considered – Similar questions must be asked of its other assets – Other important questions are: who took the steps necessary for establishing the institution (such as obtaining the relevant permissions, constructing the buildings, and arranging other infrastructure). It is also important to note that the state may grant some land or other monetary aid during or after the establishment of the educational institution – If the land or monies were granted after the establishment, the grant would not have the effect of changing the minority character of the institution – Minority institutions are not barred from receiving aid save at the cost of their minority status – If the land or monies are granted at the time of establishment, the circumstances surrounding the establishment must be considered as a whole to determine who established the institution – The presence of a grant must

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not be automatically interpreted as leading to the erasure of a claim to minority status. [Para 137] 3.4. An educational institution is a minority educational institution if it is established by a religious or linguistic minority – It is not necessary to prove that administration vests with the minority to prove that it is a minority educational institution because the very purpose of Article 30(1) is to grant special rights on administration as a consequence of establishment – To do otherwise, would amount to converting the consequence to a pre-condition – The right to administer is guaranteed to minority educational institutions to enable them to possess sufficient autonomy to model the educational institution according to the educational values that the community wishes to emphasise – It is not necessary that the purpose can only be implemented if persons belonging to the community helm the administrative affairs – This is so particularly because a minority institution may wish to emphasise secular education. [Para 138] 3.5. The test to be adopted by the Court is whether the administrative set up of the educational institution affirms the minority character of the institution – If the administrative structure of the educational institution does not reflect its minority character or when it does not elucidate that the educational institution was established to protect and promote the interests of the minority, it may be reasonably inferred that the purpose was not to establish an educational institution for the benefit of the minority community – [Para 139] 3.6. The test of administration should be evaluated in praesenti, that is, on the date of the commencement of the Constitution – An institution to be a minority institution must satisfy the criteria of being ‘administered’ as a minority institution on the date of commencement of the Constitution, and being a minority institution on the date of formation – Even if an educational institution was established by the minority for the purposes of the community, one must assess the impact of any subsequent events that altered the character of the institution before the commencement of the Constitution – The statutory incorporation of the institution does not ipso facto amount to a surrender of the minority character of the institution – The Court must pierce the veil to identify if the

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University was established by a minority for the purpose of promoting the interest of the community – The Court may on a holistic reading of the statutory provisions relating to the administrative set-up of the educational institution deduce if the minority character or the purpose of establishment was relinquished upon incorporation – The question is whether the regulatory measures wrest the administrative control from the founders of the institution – This is a question of fact which must be determined on the facts of each case – The Court must make that determination upon a comprehensive analysis of the administrative framework which includes host of factors such as the representation of the interests of the community in the administrative set-up. [Para 140] 3.7. Taken together, these are the main indicia which assist the Court in determining who established an educational institution under Article 30 – However, the complex nature of establishing an educational institution is not lost on us – Undoubtedly, there can be no straitjacket formula which may be applied – The above indicia of establishment must be considered as a whole, along with any relevant facts which are available to the Court – The matter must be considered in totality and competing factors must be weighed against each other depending on the facts and circumstances of each institution. [Para 141] 3.8. The above indicia must be proved through the submission of cogent material – Reliance must be placed on primary sources such as office documents, letters and resolutions or memorandums issued to implement the resolutions – Secondary sources must only be used to corroborate the primary sources – The onus to prove that the educational institution was established by a minority is on the claimants. [Para 142]

4. The declaration of an institution as one of national importance does not amount to a change in the minority character of the institution – This is for multiple reasons – First, Entries in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule delineate the legislative competence of Parliament and of the legislatures of the States – The State may regulate various aspects of education and educational institutions – The field of legislative competence over universities does not amount to a surrender of minority character – The distribution of legislative competence between Parliament and the State legislatures does not bear upon the minority character of the institution – Second, as a matter of principle, nothing prevents a minority educational institution from being an institution of national importance – The qualities denoted by the terms ‘national’ and ‘minority’ are not at odds with each other nor are they mutually exclusive – The former indicates that the institution has a pan-India or national character, as opposed to relatively more local or regional institutions – It is indicative of the importance of the institution on the national stage – The latter is evidence of the religious or linguistic background of the founders and the constitutional rights which vest in them – Each term indicates distinct attributes which are not antithetical to one another – A university may well be both national and ergo, of national importance, as well as minority in character – There is no reason why a minority educational institution cannot also be an institution of national importance – Third, Entries 63 and 64 provide Parliament with the power to declare an institution to be of national importance – An interpretation that an institution of national importance cannot be a minority institution would amount to rendering the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) subservient to the legislative power of Parliament – Parliament can in terms of Entries 63 and 64 declare any institution to be of national importance. [Para 148]

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5. Article 30(1) can be classified as both an anti-discrimination provision and a special rights provision – A legislation or an executive action which discriminates against religious or linguistic minorities in establishing or administering educational institutions is ultra vires Article 30(1) – This is the anti-discrimination reading of the provision – Additionally, a linguistic or religious minority which has established an educational institution receives the guarantee of greater autonomy in administration – This is the ‘special rights’ reading of the provision. [Para 160(b)]

6. Religious or linguistic minorities must prove that they established the educational institution for the community to be a minority educational institution for the purposes of Article 30(1). [Para 160(c)]

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7. The right guaranteed by Article 30(1) is applicable to universities established before the commencement of the Constitution. [Para 160(d)]

8. The right under Article 30(1) is guaranteed to minorities as defined upon the commencement of the Constitution – A different right-bearing group cannot be identified for institutions established before the adoption of the Constitution. [Para 160(e)]

9. The incorporation of the University would not ipso facto lead to surrendering of the minority character of the institution – The circumstances surrounding the conversion of a teaching college to a teaching university must be viewed to identify if the minority character of the institution was surrendered upon the conversion – The Court may on a holistic reading of the statutory provisions relating to the administrative set-up of the educational institution deduce if the minority character or the purpose of establishment was relinquished upon incorporation. [Para 160(f)]

10. The following are the factors which must be used to determine if a minority ‘established’ an educational institution: i. The indicia of ideation, purpose and implementation must be satisfied – First, the idea for establishing an educational institution must have stemmed from a person or group belonging to the minority community; second, the educational institution must be established predominantly for the benefit of the minority community; and third, steps for the implementation of the idea must have been taken by the member(s) of the minority community; and ii. The administrative-set up of the educational institution must elucidate and affirm (I) the minority character of the educational institution; and (II) that it was established to protect and promote the interests of the minority community. [Para 160(g)]

11. The question of whether AMU is a minority educational institution must be decided based on the principles laid down in this judgment – The papers of this batch of cases shall be placed before the regular bench for deciding whether AMU is a minority educational institution. [Para 161]

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Held [per Surya Kant, J.]:

1. The minority institutions established in the pre-Constitution era are also entitled to the protection conferred by Article

30. [Para 192(g)]

2. Educational institutions, with reference to Article 30 include universities as well. [Para 192(h)]

3. In order to seek protection under Article 30 of our Constitution, the minority institution must satisfy the conjunctive test, namely that it was established by a minority community and has been/ is being administered by such a community. [Para 192(i)]

4. The true import and meaning of the expressions ‘establish’ and ‘administer’, which comprise the very core of Article 30, are to be construed and understood strictly in accordance with the indicia in paragraphs 141 and 181. [Para 192(j)]

5. The question pertaining to whether AMU satisfies the abovementioned test of ‘establish’ and ‘administer’ so as to seek protection of Article 30 of the Constitution, and which will concomitantly entail a mixed question of facts and law, will be determined by a Regular Bench. [Para 192(k)]

Held [per Dipankar Datta, J.]:

1. While the majority opinion seems to have identified establishment as the sole indicium, Hon’ble Surya Kant and Hon’ble Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ – have laid equal stress on administration apart from establishment as the indicia – Inasmuch as the broad criteria which can be used to assess the status of an educational institution is concerned, I express my agreement with the indicia laid out by Their Lordships. [Para 54]

2. Certain broad indicia, which are universally applicable, may be applied prospectively to facilitate identification of minority institutions – However, any indicium or the indicia, as identified or formulated, for treating an institution as a minority institution may not be exhaustive so as to cater to all situations – Previous decisions of this Court have also determined the minority character of educational institutions vis-à-vis Article 30, as per indicia tailored to the specific factual matrices – It could be well-nigh difficult, if not impossible, to fix indicia without regard to a whole lot of relevant facts and circumstances, which might have escaped notice or may not have been visualized – A flexible framework rather than a rigid one-size-fits-all model is always desirable and essential for accurately assessing minority institution status – Having regard to special features that each minority institution is most likely to have, a nuanced approach would be required to identify minority institutions by balancing the general guidelines with unique institutional circumstances – The indicia, which have been proposed, could partly inform classification of minority institutions but a tailored evaluation is all the more necessary to account for distinct characteristics which each such institution is associated with; more so, when AMU is unique in itself and its status is under consideration as a standalone institution. [Para 57]

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3. It is no longer res integra that even institutions established prior to the Constitution would be eligible to seek the protection of Article 30(1), as was expressed by this Court in Re: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957. [Para 67]

4. The claim of the appellants cannot stand – AMU was neither established by any religious community, nor is it administered by a religious community which is regarded as a minority community; hence, AMU does not qualify as a minority institution – Protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution is, thus, not available – This submission of the appellants has no historic, legal, factual, or logical basis. [Para 149]

5. In terms of clause (5) of Article 145 of the Constitution, not only do the references not require an answer, it is also declared that AMU is not a minority educational institution and that the appeals seeking minority status for it should fail. [Para 150]

Held [per Satish Chandra Sharma, J.]:

1. The ‘establishment’ of an institution by the minority is necessary for the said minority to claim right of administration under Article 30 – The words ‘establish’ and ‘administer’ are used conjunctively in Article 30 of the Constitution. [Para 266]

2. The term ‘establish’ in Article 30 means ‘to bring into existence or to create’ and cannot be conflated with generic phrases such as ‘genesis of the institution’ or the ‘founding moment of the institution’. [Para 266]

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3. The real positive indicia for determining the question of establishment of an institution would have to be developed on a case to case basis with the following broad parameters in mind: Firstly, to claim ‘establishment’, the minority community must actually and tangibly bring the entirety of the institution into existence – The role played by the minority community must be predominant, in fact almost complete to the point of exclusion of all other forces – The indicia which may be illustrative and exhaustive in this regard may be the nature of the institution, the legal/statutory basis required for establishing the institution, whether the establishment required any ‘negotiation’ with outside forces, the role in acquiring lands, obtaining funds, constructing buildings, and other related matters must have been held completely by the minority community – Similarly, while teachers, curriculum, medium of instruction, etc. can be on secular lines, however, the decision-making authority regarding hiring teachers, curriculum decisions, medium of instruction, admission criteria, and similar matters must be the minority community – The choice of having secular education in the institution must be made expressly by the minority community, demonstrating the link between institution and the persons claiming to establish it. Secondly, the purpose of the institution must have been to predominantly serve the interests of the minority community or the sole betterment of the minority community, irrespective of the form of education provided and the mode of admission adopted – Therefore, as per the choice of the minority community, an institution may have secular education, but such secular education and the resultant institution, must be predominantly meant for the overall betterment of the minority community. Thirdly, the institution must be predominantly administered as a minority institution with the actual functional, executive and policy administration vested with the minority – The minority community should determine the selection, removal criteria, and procedures for hiring teaching, administrative staff, and other personnel – The authority to hire and fire staff must be from the minority community – Further, even if teaching or administrative staff may include non-minority persons, the final authority exercising functional, directional, and policy control over these authorities must be from the minority community – This ensures that the thoughts, beliefs, and ideas of the minority community regarding administration are implemented in reality – This represents the real decision- making authority of the institution being of the minority community – In ascertaining the above, it would be open for the Court to look at the true purpose behind each of the above factors and to pierce the veil. [Para 266]

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4. The minority community may conceptualize the idea of an institution and may advocate for the same, however, if during exchange or negotiation, the actual institution which was established had primacy of governmental efforts and control, then such institution cannot be held to be predominantly established by the efforts and actions of the minority community. [Para 266]

5. In the pre-independence and pre-UGC era, in the absence of a provision like Section 23 of the UGC Act, 1956, it was open for any institutions to adopt the titles such as ‘university’ or in some cases ‘vidyapeeth’ or ‘jamia’ asserting their capability to grant degrees – The absence of a legislative embargo from private establishment of Universities prior to 1956 would be critical for the scope of enquiry. [Para 266]

6. The use of the phrase ‘establish and incorporate’ by the Legislature may be relevant in the larger enquiry but cannot be said to be conclusively determinative of the factum of establishment or not by the minority community – If the intention of the Legislature is to establish or incorporate or recognise a minority University, the Legislatures have incorporated suitable provisions to colour the University with a minority identity. [Para 266]

7. There were no rights, fundamental or otherwise, prior to the Constitution coming into force and therefore, there is no question of surrendering any right – The British Indian Government was a supreme Imperial power in the country, and the question of surrender is illusionary and does not arise in the present case – The coming into force of the Constitution and fundamental right after 1950, cannot alter the events that occurred during the decade of 1910-1920 which led to the establishment of the AMU. [Para 266]

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8. There is no legal requirement for the AMU ‘Court’ to be manned by the people from the minority community ever since 1951 and therefore, merely because de facto the persons from the minority community may have manned the posts in the institution, would not be relevant to adjudicate the question. [Para 266]

9. The assertion that ‘neutral’ institutions or non-minority institutions would in the natural course of things be ‘majoritarian’ or that Article 30 contemplates constitutionally protecting certain educational spaces from such ‘majoritarianism-by- default’ tendencies, is wholly erroneous – The purpose of Article 30 is not to create ‘minority only’ ghettos rather provide positive rights to the minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice and kind. [Para 266]

10. Article 30, as a feature of the Constitution, provides important rights which function within the larger penumbra of fundamental rights – There is substantial interplay, intermixing and balancing of rights inter se within the fundamental rights and Article 30 is not absolute and certainly do not exist in a silo. [Para 266]

11. The crux of Article 30(1) lies in its mandate to ensure parity between non-minority [or ‘neutral’] institutions and minority institutions – Its fundamental aim is to prevent any form of discrimination or preferential treatment to non-minority communities, thereby advocating for equal treatment under the law for one and all – This provision underscores that no specific category or type of institution should be disadvantaged or unduly favoured over another within the legal framework. [Para 266]

12. To assume that the minorities of the country require some ‘safe haven’ for attaining education and knowledge is wholly incorrect – The minorities of the country have not just joined the mainstream but comprise an important facet of the mainstream itself. The institutions of national character of the country always serve the interests of the minorities and are diverse centers of learning. [Para 266]

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B. Educational Institution – Minority educational institution – Status of AMU vis-à-vis minority rights – Whether the Constitution Bench decision in Azeez Basha was incorrect.

Held [per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself, Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.)]: The view taken in Azeez Basha that an educational institution is not established by a minority if it derives its legal character through a statute, is overruled. [Para 161] Held [per Surya Kant, J.]: The Constitution Bench in Azeez Basha, when it holds that since Section 6 of the AMU Act, 1920 stipulates that degrees conferred by AMU would be recognised by the Government, it could not have been ‘brought into existence by a private individual or body’, is seemingly incorrect – There is no conflict between the seven-judge bench opinion in Kerala Education Bill and the five-judge Constitution Bench in Azeez Basha on the other – The six-judge Constitution Bench in Sidhajbhai Sabhai, laying down that the right under Article 30 is absolute and unconditional, is not the correct principle of law; the judgement is no more binding in nature and stands effectively overruled in TMA Pai, to that extent – Consequently, Azeez Basha does not suffer from any legal infirmity on the premise that it did not cite or follow Sidhajbhai Sabhai. [Para 192(a), (b) and (f)] Held [per Dipankar Datta, J.]: Not only is Azeez Basha a judicial verdict more than half a century old on the status of AMU vis-à- vis minority rights, but it has a strong foundational basis and is anchored in robust legal reasoning – The view taken therein, in the given facts and circumstances, is indeed a plausible view which demands due deference rather than the view being overruled at this distance of time. [Para 14] Held [per Satish Chandra Sharma, J.]: The notion that Azeez Basha categorically prohibits minorities from establishing universities due to statutory requirements is unfounded – The bench in Azeez Basha and present bench are faced with a unique situation and needs to adopt a suitably modulated approach – The judgment in Azeez Basha does not preclude minorities from establishing universities but rather highlights the importance of legislative intent and statutory provisions in determining an institution’s character – The UGC Act or the judgment in Yashpal, in no manner, comes to the aid of the parties challenging the correctness of the judgment in Azeez Basha – The amendment in the NCMEI Act 2004 does not come to the aid of the parties questioning the correctness of the decision in Azeez Basha.

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C. Judicial discipline – Preliminary objection to reference – Whether two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Anjuman- e-Rahmaniya could not have referred the correctness of the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in Azeez Basha directly to a Bench of seven Judges.

Held [per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself, Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.)]:

1. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community, a Constitution Bench discussed the legal precepts which apply to orders of reference and reiterated the position of law as below:- a. Decisions of this Court rendered by a Bench of larger strength are binding on Benches of a less or equal strength; b. If a Bench of lower strength is doubtful about the correctness of a judgment delivered by a Bench of larger strength, it cannot disagree or dissent from the view taken by the larger Bench – In case of doubt, it can invite the attention of the Chief Justice of India to its opinion and request the Chief Justice to list the matter before a Bench, the strength of which is greater than that which delivered the judgment which has been doubted; c. The correctness of the view taken by any Bench can only be doubted by a Bench of equal strength – The matter will then be placed for hearing before a Bench of greater strength; d. There are two exceptions to the rules: i. The discretion of the Chief Justice is not bound by the rules – As the master of the roster, the Chief Justice may list any case before any Bench of any strength; ii. Despite the rules, if a particular case has come up for hearing before a Bench of larger strength and that Bench is of the opinion that the judgment of the Bench of lower strength requires reconsideration or correction, or is otherwise doubtful of its correctness, it may dispense with the need for a reference in the terms described above or an order of the Chief Justice and hear the matter for reasons given by it. [Para 37]

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2. The position of law laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community is correct – Decisions of a larger Bench are binding precedent, and judicial discipline and propriety dictate that Benches of lower strength must adhere to such decisions – This will also avoid inconsistencies in the development of law – Questions concerning the correctness of judgments must ordinarily be referred only by a Bench which is equal in strength to the Bench whose judgment is doubted – We also agree with the two exceptions to this rule, as detailed by this Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community – They must remain exceptions and not transmogrify into the rule itself. [Para 38]

3. The three issues which required an authoritative pronouncement in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya, were not directly a point of contention in Azeez Basha – However, the decision would have a bearing on them – Doubting the correctness of the opinion in Azeez Basha, without disagreeing with it, the two-Judge Bench requested that the matter may be placed before the Chief Justice of India for being heard by a Bench of seven Judges – This falls within the permissible limits laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community – Further, the Solicitor General has also stated that he is not pressing the Union’s preliminary objection – The order of reference dated 12 February 2019 (wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the correctness of the question arising from the decision in Azeez Basha was unanswered, and then referred the matter to a seven-Judge Bench), too, noted that although a three-Judge Bench could not ordinarily refer a case directly to a seven-Judge Bench, it was doing so in this case because the question was already referred to a Bench of seven Judges but was not answered. [Para 39]

4. The reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya of the correctness of the decision in Azeez Basha was valid – The reference was within the parameters laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community. [Para 160(a)]

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Held [per Surya Kant, J.]: 1.1. The two-judge bench in Anjuman, after expressing doubt about the correctness of Azeez Basha and its principles, referred the matter for reconsideration to a larger bench – Additionally, the bench in Anjuman specifically stated that the larger bench reviewing Azeez Basha — A decision by a five-judge bench—Should consist of seven judges – The decision further directed that the matter be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for appropriate directions – Such a reference is not consistent with the established norms of judicial propriety. [Paras 90, 91] 1.2. The principles enunciated in Dawoodi Bohra re-enforce the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules referred to earlier, and also reiterate the well-established principles based upon doctrines of predictability, consistency, finality and the principle of stare decisis – The two-judge bench in Anjuman, ought to have understood and applied the law, consistent with these principles – The two-judge bench in Anjuman being of lesser strength than the five-judge bench in Azeez Basha, lacked the authority to explicitly question the correctness of Azeez Basha and refer the matter to a seven-judge bench. [Para 93] 1.3. In Anjuman, the bench not only referred the matter but also specified the numerical strength of the bench to which it should be referred, with a further direction that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice for the limited purpose of notifying the composition of the seven-judge bench – This effectively impaired the Chief Justice’s authority as the master of the roster – Allowing such a practice would enable benches of lesser strength, such as a two-judge bench, to undermine the decisions of larger benches, potentially even an eleven-judge bench – This would also place the Chief Justice in an untenable position, who would be bound by a judicial order while acting in an administrative role, leading to procedural complications and embarrassment. [Para 94]

2. There is no substantial difference between ‘doubting’ or ‘disagreeing’ with a judgement – That being so, the reference by a two-judge bench in Anjuman doubting the correctness of the five-judge bench in Azeez Basha and referring it to a seven-judge bench suffers from multiple illegalities, including judicial impropriety. [Para 192(c)]

p. 1665

3. In view of the dictum of the Constitution Bench in Dawoodi Bohra, a two-judge bench has no authority whatsoever to doubt or disagree with a judgement of the larger bench, and directly refer the matter to a bench having a numerically greater strength than the matter so doubted – The reference by the two judge bench in Anjuman is nothing but a challenge to the authority of the Chief Justice of India being the master of the roster and in derogation of the special powers enjoyed upon under Article 145 of the Constitution read with Order VII Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 (as was applicable) – Consequently, the said reference is not maintainable – However, the subsequent reference dated 12.02.2019, in which the then Hon’ble Chief Justice of India was the presiding judge, is maintainable. [Para 192(d)]

4. The reference in Anjuman to a seven-judge bench for the reconsideration of the five-judge decision in Azeez Basha is bad in law and ought to be set aside. [Para 192(e)]

Held [per Dipankar Datta, J.]: 1.1. It has been considered uniformly to be an act of breach of judicial propriety and discipline if a bench of lesser strength [of 2 (two) Judges] casts doubt in respect of a decision rendered by a bench of greater strength [of 5 (five Judges] and a request is made to the Chief Justice of India to constitute a still larger Bench [of 7 (seven Judges] – This concept was extensively ratiocinated in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community vs. State of Maharashtra. [Para 24] 1.2. If “doubting the correctness of the opinion in Azeez Basha, without disagreeing with it” could permit the bench in Anjuman- e-Rahmania to request the Chief Justice of India to place the matter for being heard by a bench of 7 (seven) Judges and such a course of action were held to be permissible and within the limits of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community, as proposed in the majority opinion - I am afraid, tomorrow, a bench of 2 (two) Judges, referring to opinions of jurists [as in Anjuman-e-Rahmania] could well doubt the ‘basic structure’ doctrine and request the Chief Justice of India to constitute a bench of 15 (fifteen) Judges – The reasoning in the majority opinion, with due respect, appears to be based on an incomplete reading of paragraph 12(2) of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community – Though the second sentence of the said paragraph is a bit ambiguous, but the same read harmoniously with the other sentences would lead to the inevitable conclusion that even in case of a doubt being expressed by a bench of 2 (two) Judges in respect of the ratio laid down by a bench of 5 (five) Judges, the case on a reference being made (with sufficient reasons) ought to be first placed before a bench of 3 (three) Judges, and not to a bench of either 5 (five) or 7 (seven) Judges – If, indeed, the proposed view in the majority opinion were accepted, all the precedents referred to above would stand overruled and a legal principle, which hitherto no bench of this Court did, would be laid down and, in the process, the floodgates for unmeritorious references opened – That would be an incorrect and improper approach – Hence, the order of reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmania must be regarded as completely flawed and non-est. [Para 28]

p. 1666

2. The essence of the law laid down in State of Kerala vs. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, which is a decision of the Constitution Bench of 6 (six) Judges of this Court rendered more than half a century back, and has never been doubted by any subsequent bench, is that the minority institution should have been established for the benefit of a minority community by a member of that community – Attention of the bench of 2 (two) Judges in Anjuman-e-Rahmania was not invited to this and one is left to wonder whether the reference would have at all been made if Very Rev. Mother Provincial was cited – There being no reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmania of Very Rev. Mother Provincial, a binding decision, certainly the said decision of the Constitution Bench had not been placed before the bench of 2 (two) Judges by the set of counsel appearing before it who agreed with the bench on the question of (in)correctness of Azeez Basha – Also, there cannot be any comparison of chalk and cheese – The case dealt with by Azeez Basha and the one arising for decision in Anjuman-e-Rahmania were fundamentally different and in stark contrast with each other – Therefore, even on merits, there was no good reason to make a reference for being placed before a bench of 7 (seven) Judges which Anjuman- e-Rahmania ordered. [Para 42]

p. 1667

Held [per Satish Chandra Sharma, J.]: The bench of two judges in Anjuman-e-Rehmania & Ors v. Distt. Inspector of School & Ors. could not have referred the matter to a bench of seven Hon’ble Judges directly, without the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, being a part of the bench. [Para 266]

Case Law Cited

In the judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI: S Azeez Basha v. Union of India [1968] 1 SCR 833 : AIR 1968 SC 662 – overruled. Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh [2005] 2 SCR 23 : (2005) 5 SCC 420 – held inapplicable. Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1054 : (2005) 2 SCC 673; TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay [1962] 3 SCR 837; In re Kerala Education Bill [1958] 1 SCR 995 – relied on. Dalco Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Satish Prabhakar Padhye [2010] 4 SCR 15 : (2010) 4 SCC 378 – distinguished. Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya v. District Inspector of Schools [Supreme Court decision in W.P.(C) No. 54-57 of 1981] – affirmed. Indira Sawhney (II) v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 498; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC 248; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. [1975] 1 SCR 173 : AIR 1974 SC 1389; Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [1969] 2 SCR 73; PA Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 603 : (2005) 6 SCC 537; State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial [1971] 1 SCR 734 : (1970) 2 SCC 417; Manager, St. Thomas UP School v. Commr. & Secy, to general Education Dept. (2002) 2 SCC 497; DAV College trust & Management Society v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 4 SCR 821 : (2013) 4 SCC 14; SP Mittal v. Union of India [1983] 1 SCR 729 : (1983) 1 SCC 51; The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali [1962] 1 SCR 383 : (1962) 1 S.C.P 383; Rev. Bishop SK Patro v. State of Bihar [1970] 1 SCR 172 : (1969) 1 SCC 863; In re Special Courts Bill [1979] 2 SCR 476 : (1979) 1 SCC 380; SEBI v. Rajpur Nagpal [2022] 15

p. 1668

SCR 1 : (2023) 8 SCC 274; Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay [1951] 1 SCR 228 : AIR 1951 SC 128; Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975] 3 SCR 619 : (1975) 1 SCC 421; Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain [1976] 2 SCR 1006 : (1976) 2 SCC 58; S.S. Dhanoa v. MCD [1981] 3 SCR 864 : (1981) 3 SCC 431 – referred to. Dr. Naresh Agarwal v. Union of India, 2005 SCC OnLine All 1705 – referred to. Aligarh Muslim University v. Malay Shukla Judgment in Special Appeal No 1321 of 2005 and connected matters, High Court of Allahabad – referred to. St. David’s College, Lampeter v. Ministry of Education, 1951 All ER 559 – referred to.

In the judgment of Surya Kant, J.: S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India [1968] 1 SCR 833 – modified and clarified to an extent. Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay [1963] 3 SCR 837 – held overruled. Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and another v. State of Maharashtra and another (2005) 2 SCC 673; Right Rev. Bishop S.K. Patro v. State of Bihar [1970] 1 SCR 172 : (1969) 1 SCC 863; A.P. Christian Medical Educational Society v. Govt. of A.P. [1986] 2 SCR 749 : (1986) 2 SCC 667; T. Varghese George v. Kora K. George [2011] 12 SCR 1070 : (2012) 1 SCC 369; Dayanand Anglo Vedic (DAV) College Trust and Management Society v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 4 SCR 821 : (2013) 4 SCC 14; St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 121 : (1992) 1 SCC 558; State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial [1971] 1 SCR 734 : (1970) 2 SCC 417; Dalco Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Satish Prabhakar Padhye [2010] 4 SCR 15 : (2010) 4 SCC 378; Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain [1976] 2 SCR 1006 : (1976) 2 SCC 58; – relied on. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal [2009] 2 SCR 907 : (2020) 13 SCC 737; TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh [2005] 2 SCR 23 : (2005) 5 SCC 420; P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 603 : (2005) 6 SCC 537; Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka

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[2003] Supp. 2 SCR 474 : (2003) 6 SCC 697; Secy., Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose [2006] Supp. 9 SCR 644 : (2007) 1 SCC 386; In re the Kerala Education Bill,1957 [1959] 1 SCR 995; Krishen Kumar v. Union of India [1990] 3 SCR 352 : (1990) 4 SCC 234; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajay Kumar Sharma [2015] 12 SCR 627 : (2016) 15 SCC 292; Shanker Raju v. Union of India [2011] 2 SCR 1 : (2011) 2 SCC 132; SEBI v. Rajkumar Nagpal [2022] 15 SCR 1 : (2023) 8 SCC 274; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 4 SCR 1 : (2008) 6 SCC 1; S.P. Mittal v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 51; Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [1969] 2 SCR 73; Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. [1975] 1 SCR 173 : AIR 1974 SC 1389; Gandhi Faiz-e-am-College v. University of Agra and Anr. [1975] 3 SCR 810 : (1975) 2 SCC 283; Kolawana Gram Vikas Kendra v. State of Gujarat and Anr. [2009] 15 SCR 272 : (2010) 1 SCC 133; All Saints High School v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors. [1980] 2 SCR 924:(1980) 2 SCC 478 Christian Medical College Vellore Assn. v. Union of India [2020] 5 SCR 516 : (2020) 8 SCC 705; Modern School v. Union of India and Ors. [2004] Supp. 1 SCR 668 : (2004) 5 SCC 583; Father Thomas Shingare and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 636 : (2002) 1 SCC 758; Andhra Kesari College of Education v. State of A.P. [2019] 12 SCR 669 : (2019) 9 SCC 457; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India [2012] 2 SCR 715 : (2012) 6 SCC 1; Icon Education Society v. State of M.P. and Ors. [2023] 2 SCR 728 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 289; Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka and Ors. [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 474 : 2003 6 SCC 697; Cochin University of Science & Technology and Anr. v. Thomas P. John and Ors. [2008] 7 SCR 887 : (2008) 8 SCC 82; Board of Secondary Education and Teachers Training v. Jt. Director of Public Instructions (1998) 8 SCC 555; Ivy C.Da. Conceicao v. State of Goa and Ors. [2017] 1 SCR 445 : (2017) 3 SCC 619; The Manager, Corporate Educational Agency v. James Mathew and Ors. [2017] 6 SCR 498 : (2017) 15 SCC 595; R. Sulochana Devi v. D.M. Sujatha & Ors. [2004] Supp. 5 SCR 1 : (2005) 9 SCC 335; Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and Ors. [1979] 1 SCR 820 : AIR 1979 SC 52; State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary & Secondary Schools and Ors. [2014] 5 SCR 1104 : (2014) 9 SCC 485; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India and Anr. [2012] 2 SCR 715 : (2012) 6 SCC 1; Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

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[2014] 11 SCR 712 : (2014) 8 SCC 1; G. Vallikumari v. Andhra Education Society (2010) 2 SCC 497; Frank Anthony Public School Employees’ Assn. v. Union of India and Ors. [1987] 1 SCR 238 : (1986) 4 SCC 707; State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary & Secondary Schools and Ors. [2014] 5 SCR 1104 : (2014) 9 SCC 485 – referred to. Sehajdhari Sikh Federation v. Union of India and others, 2011 SCC Online P&H 17374; Manager, Rajershi Memorial Basic Training School v. State of Kerala, 1972 SCC OnLine Ker 111; Rt. Rev. Dr. Aldo Maria Patroni v. Assistant Educational Officer, 1973 SCC OnLine Ker 60; A. Raju and Ors. v. Manager, Nallor Narayana L.P. Basic School & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 16483; Dipendra Nath Sarkar v. State of Bihar & Ors., 1960 SCC OnLine Pat 205; Rt. Rev. Dr. Aldo Maria Patroni v. Assistant Educational Officer, 1973 SCC OnLine Ker 60, para 7; A. Raju and Ors. v. Manager, Nallor Narayana L.P. Basic School & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 16483 and Dipendra Nath Sarkar v. State of Bihar & Ors., 1960 SCC OnLine Pat 205 – referred to. Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya v. District Inspector of Schools. [Supreme Court decision in W.P.(C) No. 54-57 of 1981] – bad in law.

In the judgment of Dipankar Datta, J.: Supertech Ltd. v. Emerald Court Owner Residents Association [2021] 10 SCR 569 : (2023) 10 SCC 817; Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay [1975] 1 SCR 1 : (1974) 2 SCC 402; Re: Kerala Education Bill [1959] 1 SCR 995; Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Shri Ram Chand [1965] 3 SCR 218; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1054 : (2005) 2 SCC 673; Union of India v. Hansoli Devi & Ors. [2002] Suppl. 2 SCR 324 : (2002) 7 SCC 273; Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 460 : (2002) 1 SCC 1; Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of India [2017] 12 SCR 331 : (2018) 1 SCC 196 – relied on. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 : (1985) 3 SCC 398; S. Azeez Basha and Anr. v. Union of India [1968] 1 SCR 833; Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal and Ors. [2020] 4 SCR 706 : (2020) 13 SCC 737; M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra [1954] 1 SCR 1077 : (1954) 1 SCC 385; T.M.A. Pai

p. 1671

Foundation and ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; Shahal H. Musaliar and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 331 of 2005; Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 474 : (2003) 6 SCC 697; P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] 2 Supp. SCR 603 : (2005) 6 SCC 537; Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh [2005] 2 SCR 23:(2005) 5 SCC 420; State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial [1971] 1 SCR 734 : (1970) 2 SCC 417; St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 121:(1992) 1 SCC 558; A.P. Christian Medical Educational Society v. Govt. of A.P. [1986] 2 SCR 749 : (1986) 2 SCC 667; Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat [1975] 1 SCR 173:(1974) 1 SCC 717; Dayanand Anglo Vedic (DAV) College Trust and Management Society v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 4 SCR 821 : (2013) 4 SCC 14 – referred to. Anjuman-e-Rahmania and Ors. v. Distt. Inspector of School and Ors. [Supreme Court decision in Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 54-57 of 1981] – non-est in law.

In the judgment of Satish Chandra Sharma, J.: S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India [1968] 1 SCR 833 – clarified. Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh [2005] 2 SCR 23 : (2005) 5 SCC 420 – held inapplicable. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; In Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957 [1959] 1 SCR 995; Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat [1975] 1 SCR 173 : (1974) 1 SCC 717 – relied on. Dalco Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. Satish Prabhakar Padhye [2010] 4 SCR 15 : (2010) 4 SCC 378 – distinguished. P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 603 : (2005) 6 SCC 537; St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 121 : (1992) 1 SCC 558 [5-Judge Bench]; Rev. Father W Proost v. State of Bihar [1969] 2 SCR 73 [5-Judge Bench]; Right Rev. Bishop SK Patro v. State of Bihar [1970] 1 SCR 172 : (1969) 1 SCC 863 [5-Judge Bench]; Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay [1963] 3 SCR 837; A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [1986] 2 SCR 749 : (1986) 2 SCC 667; Dir. of Endowments Gov.

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of Hyderabad v. Syed Akram Ali, AIR 1956 SC 60; State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial [1971] 1 SCR 734 : (1970) 2 SCC 417; Bal Patil v. Union of India [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 459 : (2005) 6 SCC 690; Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products v. Union of India [1999] Supp. 5 SCR 155 : (2000) 1 SCC 426; M. Siddiq (Ram Janambhumi Temple Reference-5J) v. Mahant Suresh Das [2019] 18 SCR 1 : (2020) 1 SCC 1; Indira Sawhney v. Union of India & Anr. [1999] Supp. 5 SCR 229 : (2000) 1 SCC 168; Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union Of India & Ors. [2006] 2 SCR 740 : (2006) 3 SCC 643; Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975] 3 SCR 619:(1975) 1 SCC 421; Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay [1962] 2 Supp. SCR 496; Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha [2001] 3 SCR 208 : (2001) 4 SCC 448; Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 460 : (2002) 1 SCC 1; Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. [2002] 2 SCR 913 : (2002) 4 SCC 234; Vishweshwaraiah Iron & Steel Ltd. v. Abdul Gani (2002) 10 SCC 437; Arya Samaj Education Trust v. Director of Education (2004) 8 SCC 30; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1054 : (2005) 2 SCC 673; Govt. of A.P. v. B. Satyanarayana Rao (2000) 4 SCC 262; Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly [2019] 16 SCR 886 : (2020) 2 SCC 595; Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Surat v. Saheli Leasing & Industries Ltd. [2010] 6 SCR 747 : (2010) 6 SCC 384; Kantaru Rajeevaru (Right to Religion, In re-9 J.) (2) v. Indian Young Lawyers Association [2019] 17 SCR 599 : (2020) 9 SCC 121; S.P. Mittal v. Union of India [1983] 1 SCR 729 : (1983) 1 SCC 51; Dayanand Anglo Vedic (DAV) College Trust and Management Society v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 4 SCR 821 : (2013) 4 SCC 14; Sakshi v. Union of India [2004] Supp. 2 SCR 723 : (2004) 5 SCC 518; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream Private Ltd. (2004) 7 SCC 288; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2014] 4 SCR 1012 : (2014) 6 SCC 466; Shah Faesal v. Union of India [2020] 3 SCR 1115 : (2020) 4 SCC 1; D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab (1971) 2 SCC 269; Gandhi Faiz-e-am-College v. University of Agra [1975] 3 SCR 810 : (1975) 2 SCC 283; Rt. Rev. Msgr. Mark Netto v. State of Kerala [1979] 1 SCR 609 : (1979) 1 SCC 23; Lily Kurian v. Lewina [1979] 1 SCR 820 : (1979) 2 SCC 124; Christian Medical College Hospital Employees’ Union v. Christian Medical College Vellore Association [1988] 1 SCR 546 : (1987)

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4 SCC 691; Al-Karim Educational Trust v. State of Bihar (1996) 8 SCC 330; Yunus Ali Sha v. Mohamed Abdul Kalam (1999) 3 SCC 676; Society of St. Joseph’s College v. Union of India (2002) 1 SCC 273; Secy., Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose [2006] Supp. 9 SCR 644 : (2007) 1 SCC 386; Satimbla Sharma v. St Paul’s Senior Secondary School [2011] 10 SCR 203 : (2011) 13 SCC 760; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali [1962] 1 SCR 383; P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. & Ors. [2004] Supp. 5 SCR 188 : (2004) 11 SCC 672; Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain [1976] 2 SCR 1006 : (1976) 2 SCC 58; S.S. Dhanoa v. MCD [1981] 3 SCR 864 : (1981) 3 SCC 431; CIT v. Canara Bank [2018] 7 SCR 866 : (2018) 9 SCC 322; Sri Jagadguru Kari Basava Rajendraswami of Govimutt v. Commr. of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments [1964] 8 SCR 252 : [1964] 8 SCR 252; Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 84; Guru Datta Sharma v. State of Bihar [1962] 2 SCR 292]; KS Puttaswamy (Privacy-9 J.) v. Union of India [2018] 8 SCR 1 : (2017) 10 SCC 1; Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay [1951] 1 SCR 228 : [1951] SCR 228 and Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India [1957] 1 SCR 233 – referred to. Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board v. Automobile Propriety Ltd (1968) 1 WLR 1526 – referred to. Anjuman-e-Rahmania and Others v. District Inspector of Schools and Others [Supreme Court decision in W.P. (C) 54-57 of 1981] – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited

In the judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI: Ronald Dworkin, “The Moral Reading of the Constitution” (March 21, 1996) – referred to.

In the judgment of Surya Kant, J.: Jennifer Jackson Preece, “Minority rights in Europe: from Westphalia to Helsinki” Review of International Studies (1997), Vol. 23, pp. 75– 92; Joseph B. Kelly, “National Minorities in International Law”, Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y, (1973) Vol. 3, pp. 253; Liebich, Andre. “Minority as Inferiority: Minority Rights in Historical Perspective” Review of International Studies, (2008) Vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 243–63; Greece

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Liberated– London Protocol, (United Kingdom, France & Russia) (adopted on 03 February, 1830); Mazohl, Brigitte, ‘‘Equality among the Nationalities’ and the Peoples (Volksstämme) of the Habsburg Empire”, Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power: Nineteenth- Century Experiences Chapter 9, Oxford University Press (2014); Holloway, Jonathan Scott,“Civilization, race, and the politics of uplift”, African American History: A Very Short Introduction, Chapter 4, (Oxford University Press) (2023); Treaty of Peace with Poland [Polish Minorities Treaty], (adopted on 28 June 1919); 11 Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15 (Apr. 26) (Permanent Court of International Justice); Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series A/B no 64, ICGJ 314 (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1935); Greco-Bulgarian “Communities”, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series B. No 17 (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1928); Dosabhoy Framjee, “History of the Parsis: including their manners, customs, religion and present position” Volume 2, Discovery Publishing House, (1986); Justice R. A. Jahagirdar (Retd.), “Secularism: the Road Behind and the Road Ahead,” Secularism: Collected Works, Rationalist Foundation, pp. 9; Rochana Bajpai,“Debating Difference: Group Rights and Liberal Democracy in India, Oxford University Press, (2011); Sumit Mukherjee, “Conceptualisation and Classification of Caste and Tribe by the Census of India,” Journal of the Anthropological Survey of India, (2013), Vol. 62 no. 2 pp.807; Tariq Rahman, “Punjabi Language during British Rule,” International Journal of Punjab Studies (2007); Meetika Srivastava, “Evolution of the System of Public Administration in India from the Period 1858- 1950: A Detailed Study Highlighting the Major Landmarks in Administrative History Made During this Period” (2009), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1482528. Dick Kooiman, “Communalism and Indian Princely States: A Comparison with British India” Economic and Political Weekly (1995) Vol. 30 No. 34 pp. 2123-2133; Francesca R. Jensenius, “Mired in Reservations: The Path-Dependent History of Electoral Quotas in India” The Journal of Asian Studies (2015) Vol. 74 No. 1; McMillan, Alistair, “Standing at the Margins: Representation and Electoral Reservations in India” Oxford University Press (2005); Owen, Hugh “Negotiating the Lucknow Pact”, Journal of Asian Studies, (1972) Vol. 31 No. 3 pp. 561–87; Proceedings of the Indian Round Table Conference (12th November, 1930–19th January, 1931); Krishna, K.B., The Problem of Minorities in India or Communal Representation in India, G. Allen and Unwin, (1939);

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Rochana Bajpai, “Constituent Assembly Debates and Minority Right ” Economic and Political Weekly, (2000) Vol. 35 No. 21- 22; Navin Pal Singh, Dr. Balvinder Singh Slathia, “Intricacies of Educational and Cultural Rights of Minorities in India: Efficacy of Constitutional Safeguards” UGC Care Journal (2020) Vol. 43, no.4; Kamlesh Kumar Wadhwa, Minority Safeguards in India, Thomas Press (India) Limited, (1975); “Partition of 1947 Continues to Haunt India, Pakistan” Stanford Report (2019) available at https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2019/03/partition- 1947-continues-haunt-india-pakistan-stanford-scholar-says; B Shiva Rao (ed), The Framing of India’s Constitution, Vol. I-V, Indian Institute of Public Administration, (1967); Christina George, “Begum Aizaz Rasul: The only Muslim Woman to oppose minority reservations in the Constituent Assembly” The Indian Express, (14 February, 2018), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/ gender/begum-aizaz-rasul-the-only-muslim-woman-to-oppose- minority-reservations-in-the-constituent-assembly-5057096/; Constituent Assembly Debate, Speech by Mohammad Ismail Khan, (26 May 1949); Ministry of Human Resource Development, No. F.7-5/2005-MC(P) (Notified on 18 January, 2005) available at https://www.education.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/ Notification18012005.pdf; Ministry of Minority Affairs, S.O. 267(E) (Notified on 27 January, 2014) available at https://ncm.nic.in/ legislations/Gazette_JainInclusion_27Jan2014.pdf; Theodore Beck, “The Principal’s Annual Report for 1898—99” (‘Principal’s Report), (1898—99), Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College Magazine (Aligarh) (MAOCM), and Aligarh Institute Gazette (Aligarh) (AIG), New Series VII, No. 11 (15 July 1899) (At this time the two journals were temporarily merged); Shamim Akhtar, “Aligarh: From College to University” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress (2018-19) Vol. 79, pp. 623; Rafiuddin Ahmad, ‘The Proposed Muslim University in India’, The Nineteenth Century, XLIV (1898), 915-21; Sushila Rao, “The Doctrine of Eclipse in Constitutional Law: A Critical Reappraisal of its Contemporary Scope and Relevance” National Law School of India Review, (2006) Vol. 18 No. 1 pp. 49; Lukas Meyer et. Al. (ed.), Rights, Culture, and the Law, Oxford University Press (2003) pp. 181; Justice GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Lexis Nexis (2016), 14th edn.’ Henry Sharp, “The Development of Indian Universities” Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, (1925), Vol. 73, No. 3778 pp. 523; Indian Statutory Commission, Interim Report- Review of Growth of Education in British India, Calcutta,

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Government of India, Central Publication Branch (1929) pp. 123, available at https://archive.org/details/dli.csl.1000/page/ n157/mode/2up?view=theaterDr. Vishwanath Pandey (editor), Founder of Banaras Hindu University: Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya, Publication Cell, Banaras Hindu University (2006), pp. 19, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120412191310/ http://www.bhu.ac.in/MMMMM.pdf – referred to.

In the judgment of Dipankar Datta, J.: Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9, 30th August 1949 (9.127.209); Lok Sabha Debates, Twelfth Session, Third Series Vol. XLIV – No. 9, 27th August 1965; Lok Sabha Debates, Twelfth Session, Third Series Vol. XLV- No. 13, 2nd September 1965; History of the Aligarh Muslim University, Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, p. 110, Idarah-i-Adbiyat-i-Delli, Delhi, 1995 and Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Edition – referred to,

In the judgment of Satish Chandra Sharma, J.: Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies (OCHS), Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, and Delhi University’s Centre for Hindu Studies – referred to.

List of Acts Constitution of India; Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920; Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act, 1951; Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act, 1965; Entry 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution; National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004.

List of Keywords Educational institution; Minority institution; Indicia for ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution; Aligarh Muslim University (AMU); Azeez Basha case; Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya case; Scope and purpose of Art.30(1); Special protection guaranteed by Art.30(1); Anti-discrimination provision; Special rights provision; Right guaranteed to minorities; Educational institutions established before and after commencement of the Constitution; Distinction between ‘incorporation’ and ‘establishment’; Effect of incorporation on minority character of an institution; Declaration as institution of national importance.

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Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2286 of 2006 From the Judgment and Order dated 05.01.2006 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in SA No. 1324 of 2006 With Civil Appeal Nos. 2321, 2320 and 2318 of 2006, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 32490 of 2015, Writ Petition (C) No. 272 of 2016, Civil Appeal Nos. 2861, 2316, 2319 and 2317 of 2006 and T.C. (C) No. 46 of 2023

Appearances for Parties By Courts Motion. R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, K M Nataraj, Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.Gs., Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Nikhil Nayyar, Kapil Sibal, Rakesh Dwivedi, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Guru Krishna Kumar, Vinay Navare, Sridhar Potaraju, Ms. Archana P. Dave, Salman Khurshid, Sr. Advs., T. V. S. Raghavendra Sreyas, N Sai Vinod, Naveen Hegde, Siddharth Vasudev, Ms. Gayatri Gulati, Gurmeet Singh Makker, V. Mohna, Ms. Sonali Jain, Kartikay Aggarwal, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Raman Yadav, Chitvan Singhal, Gaurang Bhushan, Madhav Sinhal, Padmesh Mishra, Kanu Agrawal, Ankur Talwar, Rohit Khare, Apoorv Kurup, R Bala, Siddhartha Sinha, Prashant Rawat, Abhishek Singh, Ms. Sushma Suri, Prashant Bhushan, Debadutta Kanungo, Govind Jee, Omanakuttan K K, Ramesh Kumar Mishra, Aftab Ali Khan, Bahar. U. Barqui, Nizam Pasha, Ms. Aparajita Jamwal, Ali Safeer Farooqi, Ms. Ruppali Samuels, Ms. Sumedha Ray Sarkar, Rishabh Parikh, Mohd. Taiyub Khan, Shahid Hussain Rizvi, Mansoor Ali, Z. K. Faizan, Mohd. Yunus, Shadan Farasat, Gautam Bhatia, Aman Naqvi, Harshit Anand, Ms. Hrishika Jain, Ms. Natasha Maheshwari, Ms. Mreganka Kukreja, Abhishek Babbar, Ajesh K. Chawla, Ms. Shivangi Singh, Ms. Saket Gautam, Ms. Mahesh Sharma, Nachiketa Joshi, Vikas Chandra Shukla, Ms. Aditi Tripathi, Eklavya Dwivedi, Ms. Sanskriti Pathak, Merusagar Samanatray, Aditya Shekhar, Pashupati Razdan, Akash Vajpai, Bhakti Vardhan Singh, Vvv Pattabhiram, Atulesh Kumar, Alabhya Dhamija, T. Bhaskar Gautham, Anirudh Sharma, Aditya Kashyap, Shubhendu Anand, Amit Sharma,

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Pranaya Kumar Mohapatra, Baijnath Patel, Ms. Sneh Lata Mishra, Ms. Himadri Haksar, Narayan Dev Parashar, Santosh Kumar, Praneet Pranav, Rahul G. Tanwani, Aman Jha, Sudipto Sircar, Ms. Sindoora V.N.L, Mohit Pandey, Ms. Ankita Sharma, Yashraj Bundela, Dhruv Sharma, Ms. Shriya Gilhotra, Rishi Tutu, Raghav Agarwal, Piyush Beriwal, Sanyat Lodha, Sandeep Singh, Toshiv Goyal, R. C. Kohli, Avnish Dave, Vaibhav Dwivedi, Shuchi Singh, Gautam Singh, Aditya Sharma, Ms. Ankita Choudhary, Kumar Prashant, Ms. Rashmi Singhania, Varun Chugh, Rajan Chaurasia, Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Ayush Anand, Baij Nath Patel, Ms. Alpana Sharma, Pravartak Pathak, Ranjeet Mishra, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Pramod Kumar Vishnoi, Akshat, Ramesh Thakur, Shaswat Nath, Shespal Sai, Gopal Jha, Sayooj Mohandas, Govind Kumar, Nisarg Choudhary, Gobind Kumar, Hrishikesh Haridas, Aishvary Vikram, Raghav Agrawal, Prakash Gautam, Anjuman Tripathi, Pankaj Singh, Ms. Ranjana Singh, Sanjay Kumar Dubey, Krishna Kant Dubey, Ujjwal Kumar Dubey, Vivek Kumar Pandey, Rakesh Kumar Tewari, Devendra Kumar Shukla, Rajeev Ranjan, Pratyush Prakash, Jitendra Kumar Tripathi, Ms. Isha Singh, Ms. Snehil Sonam, Mukesh Kumar, Arun Kanwa, Vignesh Singh, Aniruth Sharma, P. V. Yogeswaran, Ashish Kumar Upadhyay, Y. Lokesh, V. Kandha Prabhu, Ms. Maitri Goal, Sachin Kumar Verma, Neeleshwar Pavani, Prem Prakash, Ms. M. Vidhya, Dr. Vivek Sharma, Mrs. Naghma Imtiaz, Ms. Azra Rehman, Ms. Sommya Chaturvedi, Ms. Sonika Choudhary, Ms. Satakshi Mathur, Zargham Ahmed, Saif Naseem, Md Irshad Ahmed, Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Tanveer Khan, Mrs. Seema Khan, Mrs. Rubina Javed, Sheikh Imran, Ms. Sanchita Ain, (for M/S. Equity Lex Associates), M.R. Shamshad, Arijit Sarkar, Ms. Nabeela Jamil, Zaki Ahmad Khan, Sarwar Raza, Attarup Bannerjee, Sunado Raha, Pulkit Agarwal, Abu Sohel, Ms. Sampriti Baksi, Kunal Malik, Nishant Kumar Singh, Ankur Parihar, Pratyush Prasanna, Ishan Jain, Sushmit Phatale, Sudhanshu Kaushesh, Palav Agarwal, Prashant Kumar Yadav, Raghav Sehgal, Avnish Chaturvedi, Md Tasnimul Hassan, Martin G George, Gholam Mohiuddin, Anindo Mukherjee, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ejaz Maqbool, Saif Zia, Gaurav Sharma, Dhawal Mohan, Prateek Bhatia, Paranjay Tripathi, Rajesh Raj, Ms. Ankita Dogra, Syed Mehdi Imam, Mohd Parvez Dabas, Uzmi Jamil Husain, Tabrez Ahmad, Mohammad Noorullah, Atif Shuhrawardy, Aqib Baig, Saheb, Abdul Nasir Khan, Amir Dabas, Anisul Haque, Advs. for the appearing parties.

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Judgment

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI*

Table of Contents**

A. Background ....................................................................... 5 B. The reference and related events .................................... 10 C. Submissions .................................................................... 19 D. Issues ............................................................................... 33 E. Analysis ............................................................................ 36 i. The preliminary objection by the Union of India.... 36 ii. The scope of Article 30 ........................................... 39 a. The purpose of Article 30(1) ................................ 44 b. The ‘special protection’ guaranteed by Article 30(1) ........................................................ 49 iii. Indicia for a Minority Educational Institution ......... 55 iv. Applicability of Article 30 to a ‘University’ established before the commencement of the Constitution ............................................................. 64 a. Article 30(1) applies to educational institutions established before the commencement of the Constitution ........................................................ 65 b. There is no difference between ‘Universities’ and ‘colleges’ established before the commencement of the Constitution .............................................. 69 c. The minority character of the institution is not ipso facto surrendered upon the incorporation of the University .................................................. 77 d. ‘Minority’ as on the commencement of the Constitution ......................................................... 88 v. Indicia for the ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution ............................................. 91

* For himself, Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Mishra, JJ. ** Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.

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vi. Impact of Entry 63 of List I on the minority status of educational institutions ..................................... 103 vii. The decision of this Court in Prof. Yashpal ........... 107 viii. The amendment of the NCMEI Act in 2010 ............. 112 ix. Registration under the Societies Registration Act ............................................................................ 114 F. Conclusion ........................................................................ 115

11. Article 30 of the Constitution of India guarantees to religious and linguistic minorities, the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The issues which arise for adjudication in this reference pertain to the criteria to be fulfilled to qualify as a minority educational institution for the purpose of Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution.

A. Background

22. In 1977, the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College was established in Aligarh. The college was a teaching institution affiliated to the Calcutta University at first and subsequently to the Allahabad University. The imperial legislature passed the Aligarh Muslim University Act 1920.1 The enactment, as the preamble indicates, “established and incorporated” Aligarh Muslim University.2 The AMU Act was amended by the Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act 19513 and Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act 1965.4 The amendments related to the religious instructions of Muslim students5

1 “AMU Act” 2 “AMU” 3 “1951 Amendment Act” 4 “1965 Amendment Act” 5 Section 8 was amended to stipulate that it would be unlawful for the University to adopt or impose any test of religious belief for admission or recruitment except where the religious test was made a condition for benefaction. The amended proviso to the provision stipulated that nothing in the Section shall be deemed to prevent the provision of religious instruction to those who consent to it. Section 9 which empowered the Court to mandate religious instruction for Muslim students was deleted by the amendment. Section 23(1), which provided that all members of the Court would be Muslims, was also deleted.

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and the administrative set-up of the university.6 Proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution were instituted before this Court for challenging the constitutional validity of the 1951 Amendment Act and the 1965 Amendment Act. A Constitution Bench in the decision in S Azeez Basha v. Union of India7 upheld the constitutional validity of the Amendments. The petitioners made a three-fold argument: (a) AMU was established by Muslims, who are a religious minority for the purposes of Article 30(1); (b) Article 30(1) guarantees Muslims the right to administer the University established by them; and (c) the 1951 and 1965 Amendments are violative of Article 30(1) to the extent that it infringed the right of the Muslim community to administer the institution. Article 30 is extracted below: “30. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.—(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. (1A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause. (2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.” The amendments were also impugned on the ground that they violated Articles 14, 19, 25, 26, 29 and 31 of the Constitution.

6 Section 23 of the AMU Act was amended to delete clauses (2) and (3). By this amendment, the powers of the Court were significantly reduced. The Court which was the supreme governing body of the University now only had the power to advise the Visitor or any other authority of the University on matters which may be referred to it for advice and exercise powers assigned to it by the Visitor. The powers of the Court were instead placed in the hands of the Executive Council. The composition of the Court (which was an all-Muslim body) was also amended. The process of constituting the Court and the Executive Council was also amended. 7 (1968) 1 SCR 833 : AIR 1968 SC 662

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33. The Union of India opposed the petitions, arguing that the Muslim minority did not have the right to administer AMU since they had not established the institution. It was submitted that AMU was established by Parliament. That being the case, it was contended that the amendments were not violative of Article 30(1).

44. A Constitution Bench dismissed the writ petitions in Azeez Basha (supra). The challenge on the ground of violation of Article 30(1) was rejected on the following grounds: a. The phrase “establish and administer” in Article 30(1) must be read conjunctively. Religious minorities have the right to administer those educational institutions which they established. Religious minorities do not have the right to administer educational institutions which were not established by them, even if they were administering them for some reason before the commencement of the Constitution; b. The word “establish” in Article 30(1) means “to bring into existence”; c. AMU was not established by the Muslim minority for the following reasons: i. AMU was brought into existence by the AMU Act, which was enacted by Parliament in 1920. Section 6 of the AMU Act provides that the degrees conferred to persons by the University would be recognised by the government. This provision indicates that AMU was established by the Government of India because the Muslim minority could not have insisted that the degrees conferred by a university established by it ought to be recognized by the Government. The AMU Act may have been passed as a result of the efforts of the Muslim community but that does not mean that AMU was established by them; ii. The conversion of the College to the University was not by the Muslim minority but by virtue of the 1920 Act; and iii. Section 4 of the AMU Act by which the MAO College and the Muslim University Association were dissolved, and the properties, rights and liabilities in the societies were vested in AMU shows that the previous bodies legally ceased to exist;

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d. Since the Muslim community did not establish AMU, it cannot claim a right to administer it under Article 30(1). Thus, any amendment to the AMU Act would not be ultra vires Article 30 of the Constitution; e. The argument that the administration of the University vested in the Muslim community though it was not established by them was rejected. The administration of AMU did not vest in the Muslim minority under the AMU Act for the following reasons: i. Although all the members of the Court (which was the supreme governing body in terms of Section 23 of the AMU Act) were required to be Muslims, the electorate (which elected the members of the Court) did not comprise exclusively of Muslims; ii. Other authorities of AMU such as the Executive Council and the Academic Council were tasked with the administration of the University and were given significant powers. The members of these bodies were not required to be Muslims; iii. The Governor General (who was the Lord Rector) was also entrusted with certain “overriding” powers concerning the administration of the University. The Governor General was not required to be a Muslim. In terms of Section 28(3), the Governor General had overriding powers to amend or repeal the Statutes. The Governor General possessed similar powers with respect to amending or repealing Ordinances. In terms of Section 40, the Governor General had the power to remove any difficulty in the establishment of the University; and iv. The Visiting Board which consisted of the Governor of the United Provinces, the members of the Executive Council and Ministers were not necessarily required to be Muslims; f. The term “establish and maintain” in Article 26 must be read conjunctively, like the phrase “establish and administer” in Article

30. Assuming that educational institutions fall within the ambit of Article 26, the Muslim community does not have the right to maintain AMU because it did not establish it; and g. The impugned amendments do not violate Articles 14, 19, 25, 29 and 31.

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B. The reference and related events

55. In 1981, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya v. District Inspector of Schools8 was faced with a question of whether V.M.H.S Rehmania Inter College is a minority educational institution. By an order dated 26 November 1981, the Bench questioned the correctness of Azeez Basha (supra) and referred the matter to a Bench of seven Judges, in the following terms: “After hearing counsel for the Parties, we are clearly of the opinion that this case involves two substantial questions regarding the interpretation of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The present institution was founded in the year 1938 and registered under the Societies Registration Act in the year 1940. The documents relating to the time when the institution was founded clearly shows that while the institution was established mainly by the Muslim community but there were members from the non-Muslim community also who participated in the establishment process. The point that arises is as to whether Art. 30(1) of the Constitution envisages an institution which is established by minorities alone without the participation for the factum of establishment from any other community. On this point, there is no clear decision of this court. There are some observations in S. Azeez Basha & ors. Vs. Union of India 1968(1) SCR 333, but these observations can be explained away. Another point that arises is whether soon after the establishment of the institution if it is registered as a Society under the Society Registration Act, its status as a minority institution changes in view of the broad principles laid down in S. Azeez Basha’s case. Even as it is several jurists including Mr. Seervai have expressed about the correctness of the decision of this court in S. Azeez Basha’s case. Since the point has arisen in this case we think that this is a proper occasion when a larger bench can consider the entire aspect fully. We, therefore, direct that this case may be placed before

8 W.P.(C) No. 54-57 of 1981

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Hon. The Chief Justice for being heard by a bench of at least 7 judges so that S. Azeez Basha’s case may also be considered and the points that arise in this case directly as to the essential conditions or ingredients of the minority institution may also be decided once for all. A large number of jurists including Mr. Seervai, learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Garg and learned counsel for respondents and interveners Mr. Dikshit and Kaskar have stated that this case requires reconsideration. In view of the urgency it is necessary that the matter should be decided as early as possible we give liberty to the counsel for parties to mention the matter before Chief Justice.” (emphasis supplied)

The above extract indicates that the following three questions were of concern to this Court: (i) the essential conditions or ingredients of a minority educational institution; (ii) whether the expression ‘establish’ in Article 30 means that the institution should be established only by a minority without any association by other communities; and (iii) whether the registration under the Societies Registration Act 1860 after the establishment of the institution alters its character.

66. About a month after the order referring the matter to a Bench of seven Judges, the AMU Act was amended. On 31 December 1981, the Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act 19819 received the assent of the President. Various provisions of the AMU Act were amended, including the long title and preamble from which the words “establish and” were omitted.10 Section 2(l) which defined the term ‘University’ was also amended.11 After the amendment, ‘University’ was defined to mean “the educational institution of their choice established by the Muslims of India, which originated as the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, and which was subsequently incorporated as the Aligarh Muslim University.” The amendment included Section 5(2)(c) by which the University was required to promote “the educational and cultural advancement of the Muslims of India”.12

9 AMU (Amendment) Act 1981 10 AMU (Amendment) Act 1981, Section 2 11 AMU (Amendment) Act 1981, Section 3 12 AMU (Amendment) Act 1981, Section 4

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77. In 2002, an eleven-Judge Bench of this Court in TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka13 heard a batch of tagged matters which included Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra). This Court formulated a question which reflected the reference made in Anjuman-e- Rahmaniya (supra). The question was as follows: what is the indicia for an educational institution to be a minority education institution to which the rights in Article 30 would apply: “3(a) What are the indicia for treating an educational institution as a minority educational institution? Would an institution be regarded as a minority educational institution because it was established by a person(s) belonging to a religious or linguistic minority or its being administered by a person(s) belonging to a religious or linguistic minority?”

88. Despite framing the question arising from the reference, this Court did not answer it in TMA Pai (supra). The decision stated that a regular Bench would adjudicate the question. However, the regular Bench disposed of the matters before it on 11 March 2003 without answering the question.

99. Separately, AMU proposed a policy for admission into its post- graduate medical course by which 50% of the seats were reserved for Muslim candidates. The proposal was accepted by the Union of India. Proceedings were initiated under Article 226 for challenging the constitutional validity of the reservation policy.

1010. The petitioners argued that the reservation policy by which 50% of the seats were earmarked for Muslims was unconstitutional because AMU was not a minority educational institution in view of the judgment of this Court in Azeez Basha (supra). They averred that the amendments to Sections 2(l) and 5(2)(c) of the AMU Act by the AMU (Amendment) Act 1981 attempted to overrule the judgment in Azeez Basha (supra) without altering the basis of the decision in that case. In response, AMU contended that the AMU (Amendment) Act 1981 had the effect of changing the basis of Azeez Basha (supra) and that AMU was a minority institution after the amendment, and thus was entitled to reserve seats for candidates from the Muslim community.

13 (2002) 8 SCC 481

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1111. A Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the decision in Dr. Naresh Agarwal v. Union of India declared the reservation policy unconstitutional on the following grounds:14 a. The basis for the decision in Azeez Basha (supra) was Sections 3, 4, and 6. These provisions were not amended by the AMU (Amendment) Act 1981. The deletion of the word ‘establish’ from the long title and the preamble, and the amendment to the definition of the term ‘University’ in Section 2(l) are not sufficient to hold that AMU is a minority institution under Article 30; b. The Muslim community willingly surrendered the right to administer the University to statutory bodies; c. The amendment to Section 2(l) is a legislative action which encroaches on judicial power and is akin to Parliament functioning as an appellate court or tribunal. To prevent Section 2(l) from being struck down for overruling Azeez Basha (supra), it is necessary to read down the term “established” in the amended AMU Act as referring to MAO College; and d. AMU, not being a minority institution, is not entitled to the protection of Article 30 and shall not provide for reservation on the basis of religion as this would amount to a violation of Article 29(2).

1212. The Court declared AMU’s reservation policy unconstitutional and directed the cancellation of the admissions made under this policy. It directed the University to conduct a fresh entrance examination without reservation on the basis of religion.

1313. The judgement in appeal by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court was reported as Aligarh Muslim University v. Malay Shukla.15 The Division Bench affirmed the judgment of the Single Judge, with some modifications. AN Ray, C.J. speaking for the Division Bench held that: a. When the minority status is not assumed or admitted, the factor of administration and control by non-minority groups becomes important. The indicia for the determination of whether an

14 2005 SCC OnLine All 1705 15 Judgment in Special Appeal No 1321 of 2005 and connected matters, High Court of Allahabad

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educational institution is a minority educational institution is (i) who established it; (ii) who is responsible for administration; and (iii) the purpose of the establishment; b. By amending Section 2(l), Parliament attempted to overrule the decision in Azeez Basha (supra). This amendment does not change the basis of that decision because the incorporation of the University was not the sole factor which influenced the decision; c. Section 5(2)(c) is discriminatory. Further, it does not change the basis of the decision in Azeez Basha (supra); d. The removal of the words “establish and” from the long title and preamble of the AMU Act is impermissible because Azeez Basha (supra) held that incorporation and establishment are intimately connected. Permitting the omission of the word “establish” may give rise to doubts as to whether incorporation alone is sufficient for the surrender of the minority character of the institution; e. AMU is not merely a university but a field of legislative power in Entry 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Section 2(l) modified the definition of a word in an entry in the Seventh Schedule. The definition of a word in the Constitution cannot be altered except through a constitutional amendment. The AMU (Amendment) Act 1981 therefore suffers from lack of legislative competence; and f. Parliament lacks the authority to create a minority institution. Only a minority can do so and courts may declare whether a minority has succeeded in establishing an institution under Article 30.

1414. Ashok Bhushan, J. concurred with AN Ray, C.J. in a separate judgment. The learned Judge observed that the institution must have been both established and administered by a minority to seek the protection of Article 30(1). The 1981 Amendment, in his view, has dealt with the establishment component of the judgment but has left the administration component untouched. Further, the learned Judge agreeing with Chief Justice Ray observed that the requirements for a minority to establish an institution cannot be secured by merely altering the definition of the institution and the long title and the preamble of

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the Act. In view of the findings detailed above, the Court declared that AMU was not a minority institution within the meaning of Article 30 and struck down Sections 2(l) and 5(2)(c) as amended by the AMU (Amendment) Act 1981. The High Court held that the removal of the words “establish and” from the long title and preamble was invalid and restored them. It affirmed the conclusion of the Single Judge that the reservation policy was unconstitutional. However, it overruled the direction issued by the Single Judge to AMU to cancel the admission of students who had already been accommodated in the University on the basis of the reservation policy.

1515. On 12 February 2019, while hearing the appeal against the judgment of the Division Bench, a three-Judge Bench of this Court presided over by Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi noticed that the High Court relied on the decision in Azeez Basha (supra). It also noticed that the reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) on the correctness of Azeez Basha (supra) was yet to be determined. The observations in Azeez Basha (supra) that the words “establish” and “administer” in Article 30(1) must be read conjunctively were referred to. Having noticed all of the above, the three-Judge Bench observed that the correctness of the question arising from the decision in Azeez Basha (supra) is unanswered: “1. This Court in S. Azeez Basha and Anr. Vs. Union of India, inter alia, has observed as follows: “It is to our mind quite clear that Art. 30(1) postulates that the religious community will have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice meaning thereby that where a religious minority established an educational institution, it will have the right to administer that. An argument has been raised to the effect that even though the religious minority may not have established the educational institution, it will have the right to administer it, if by some process it had been administering the same before the Constitution came into force. We are not prepared to accept this argument. The Article in our opinion clearly shows that the minority will have the right to administer

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educational institutions of their choice provided they have established them, but not otherwise. The Article cannot be read to mean that even if the educational institution has been established by somebody else, any religious minority would have the right to administer it because, for some reason or other, it might have been administering it before the Constitution came into force. The words “establish and administer” in the Article must be read conjunctively and so read it gives the right to the minority to administer an educational institution provided it has been established by it. ……….We are of the opinion that nothing in that case justifies the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the minorities would have the right to administer an educational institution even though the institution may not have been established by them. The two words in Art. 30(1) must be read together and so read the Article gives the right to the minority to administer institutions established by it. If the educational institution has not been established by a minority it cannot claim the right to administer it under Art. 30(1).” […]

8. The said facts would show that the correctness of the question arising from the decision of this Court in S. Azeez Basha (supra) has remained undetermined.

9. That apart, the decision of this Court in Prof. Yashpal and another vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others and the amendment of the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004 made in the year 2010 would also require an authoritative pronouncement on the aforesaid question formulated, as set out above, besides the correctness of the view expressed in the judgment of this Court in S. Azeez Basha (supra) which has been extracted above.” (emphasis supplied)

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1616. The three-Judge Bench then referred the matter to a seven-Judge Bench.

1717. When this matter was taken up for hearing, the Union of India sought to withdraw its appeal against the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court.16 This Court is competent to hear the present case even if the Union of India was permitted to withdraw its appeal because the other appellants continue to press their case.

C. Submissions

1818. The petitioners broadly contend that the decision in Azeez Basha (supra) is not correct, and that AMU is a minority institution. The submissions of the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners and the intervenors are summarized below.

1919. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel made the following submissions: a. The Union of India’s recent attempt to withdraw its appeal against the minority status of AMU contradicts its consistent position since 1981; b. Azeez Basha (supra) is no longer good law because: i. It failed to recognize that the words ‘establish’ and ‘administer’ are not preconditions to define a minority but the consequential rights that flow from such a recognition; ii. The assumption that universities lose their minority status when recognized by a statute conflicts with the right of minorities to establish educational institutions; iii. It recognized the role of the Muslim community in the establishment of AMU but held that its origins and administration were rooted in legislation. This interpretation could restrict the recognition of minority institutions under Article 30; iv. Its restrictive interpretation of the word ‘establish’ in Article 30(1) is contrary to the expansive view adopted by subsequent judgments; and

16 Civil Appeal No. 2318 of 2006, Supreme Court of India

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v. This decision has been superseded by subsequent decisions like TMA Pai (supra), which emphasized that the religious character of an institution cannot be stripped down by government interventions. c. Upholding Azeez Basha (supra) could jeopardize the minority status of several educational institutions, including recognized minority institutions like St. Stephen’s College and Christian Medical College; d. Minority rights were acknowledged by the State before the adoption of the Constitution through various legislative enactments like the Indian Councils Act of 1909, and the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, which provided reservations to Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians in the legislature; e. The formation of AMU was characterized as a “movement” rather than a “surrender” by the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College. Provisions in the AMU Act, including the transfer of assets, liabilities, and special provisions for Muslim students, underscore the continuation of minority rights with the establishment of AMU; f. Entry 63 in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution deals with the competence of the Union to make laws regarding AMU and BHU but does not determine who established or administers the universities. Article 30, which guarantees minority rights, cannot be negated merely because the institution is of national importance in terms of Entry 63; g. The evolution of the AMU Act can be broken down into four phases: pre-1951 with Muslim administration, the 1951 Amendment aligning with the Constitution, the 1965 Amendment diluting minority status, and attempts to restore minority status in 1972 and 1981; h. While the 1951 amendment aligned the Act with the Constitution by removing compulsory religious education, the 1965 amendment diluted minority administration by reducing “the Court” to an advisory role, shifting the supreme governing authority to the “Visitor” and the President of India; and i. Amendments in 1972 and 1981 aimed to restore AMU to minorities. The 1981 amendment explicitly stated that AMU was “established by the Muslims of India” and aimed to

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promote Muslim educational and cultural advancement. The 1981 amendment accommodated a democratic setup, focusing on the institution’s original purpose rather than numerical representation.

2020. Mr Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel made the following submissions: a. The enactment of the Act of 1920 marked the formal recognition of the MAO “College” as the Aligarh Muslim University, reflecting a crucial legislative step in its evolution into a full-fledged University; b. Compliance with regulatory requirements, constitutionally grounded in Article 19(6), is crucial for university status. However, adherence to these regulations does not diminish the right guaranteed by Article 30 to minorities to establish institutions of their choice; c. Article 30 grants religious and linguistic minorities the autonomy to establish and administer institutions of their “choice”. Institutions covered by Article 30 have the flexibility to choose their administrative set-up, even if it includes individuals outside the minority community. This choice is solely vested in the institution; d. Assessing the numerical composition within the administration is inadequate to determine its minority status. Minority institutions have the prerogative to include non-minorities in their administration while maintaining their minority status. St. Stephen’s College, Delhi, despite having a Christian representation of less than 5 per cent, maintains its classification as a minority institution; e. The crucial factor for recognizing an educational institution as a Minority educational institution lies in its genesis, focusing on three key aspects: i. the purpose for which it was founded (educational advancement of the minority community); ii. the identity of the founders and major fund providers (being substantially from the concerned minority); and iii. the concept’s initiation by a member of the minority,

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f. Provisions within the AMU Act focus on governance structures, academic standards, and prevention of maladministration. These statutory measures primarily relate to the administration of the University and do not alter the constitutional fact of its establishment by a minority; g. “Establish” under Article 30 must be interpreted to mean ‘found’. The word does not cover the conversion process from a college to a university through the AMU Act; h. AMU was established with the objective of providing quality education specifically to Muslims. The exclusivity of such institutions in offering education tailored to the needs of minorities was not adequately considered by Azeez Basha (supra); i. The denial of reservation to institutions like AMU results in fewer degrees and job opportunities, exacerbating socio-economic disparities within minority groups; j. The founders of AMU satisfactorily fulfilled the five-step criteria laid down in TMA Pai (supra) to ascertain the right to administer. The criteria related to admission policies, fee structures, governance, faculty appointments and disciplinary action; k. The objective of establishing AMU was to obtain the status of an independent university and not demonstrate allegiance to colonial authorities; l. A minority institution can accede to some regulations to maintain a particular standard of education. With that, the institution also retains the right to challenge any invasive restrictions imposed on it; and m. The imperial government never interfered with the administration of the University after it was incorporated. MAO College was also supervised by the British government even when it was not a university. MAO College was acknowledged as a minority institution under Azeez Basha (supra).

2121. Mr Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel made the following submissions: a. Adopting a ‘political, moral reading’ of Article 30 would facilitate a broader interpretation of the term ‘established’. Ronald Dworkin’s definition of a ‘political moral reading’ involves invoking moral

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principles about political decency and justice for interpreting constitutional provisions;17 b. Aligarh Tehzeeb represents a distinctive cultural ethos cultivated by the AMU. This unique cultural identity encompasses traditions, values and practices that have evolved within the university; c. The concept of takeover in the context of educational institutions can be categorized into non-consensual and consensual takeovers. In the case of AMU, there was a consensual takeover, where changes and amendments were made to its structure and character through a process that involved the University’s participation and consent; and d. AMU was founded by members of the community. The societies formed for this purpose had a crucial role in the establishment and evolution of the University, contributing resources, support and a collective vision that shaped the identity and character of AMU.

2222. Mr. Shadan Farasat, learned counsel submitted that: a. The purpose of Article 30 rests primarily on two grounds: i. The ability to retain the minority identity; ii. The ability to fully participate in the national mainstream; Azeez Basha (supra) adopts an approach by which the institution could either retain the minority status or integrate into the national mainstream and lose it; b. The Indian secularism model allows state involvement in religious activities without compromising their character; c. In advocating for a broader interpretation of ‘establish’ in Article 30, there is a need to distinguish between ‘establish’ and ‘incorporate’ to better preserve constitutional protection for minority educational institutions. The AMU Act of 1920 only “incorporated” AMU. This is fundamentally different from the establishment of the institution; d. Stripping away the minority character of AMU would diminish its significant place in history since the institution has led to:

17 Reliance was placed on Ronald Dworkin, “The Moral Reading of the Constitution” (March 21, 1996).

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i. The creation of a Muslim-educated middle class; and ii. The education of women. e. The validity of the 1981 amendment should not be considered in this case. The Parliament enacted it to reinstate AMU’s minority status, which is now being contested by the current Union government. Considering the Union’s arguments requires reassessing Parliament’s reasoning behind the law.

2323. Mr MR Shamshad, learned counsel submitted that an inclusive definition of ‘minority educational institutions’ includes universities established and administered by minorities.

2424. The respondents broadly submitted that Azeez Basha (supra) is good law, and that AMU is not a minority institution. They argued that AMU was established by Parliament. The submissions of the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents and the intervenors are summarized below.

2525. Mr R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India appearing for the Union of India, made the following submissions: a. The right guaranteed by Article 30 can only be exercised if there is legislation in place to enable the establishment and administration of minority institutions. This legislation should empower minorities to form institutions under constitutional provisions; and b. While Article 30 guarantees minorities certain rights, they are not exempt from other constitutional requirements, particularly regarding reservation.

2626. Mr Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India appearing for the Union of India, made the following submissions: a. Azeez Basha (supra) correctly recognized the choices available to AMU in 1920. It had the choice of either affiliating with another university or surrendering its minority status to the imperial government; b. Under the AMU Act, AMU voluntarily surrendered its minority institution status to the imperial government. This is shown by the historical context of the Aligarh Split, where the institution’s leaders chose cooperation with the British government over retaining its Muslim character;

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c. The British government exerted control over AMU, as evidenced by provisions in the 1920 Act. The Lord Rector had significant authority in the administration of the institution. The Act dissolved the previous governing body and transferred property and decision-making authority to secular government authorities; d. The 1920 Act was a substantive statute which dealt with the specifics of the administration of the institution. The administration of the institution predominantly vested with the non-minority; e. The British government mandated that AMU should not be a religious institution and should be controlled by secular authorities; f. Amendments in 1951 made the 1920 Act consistent with constitutional provisions. This affirmed that AMU was established by statute, not by the minority community; g. Justice M.C. Chagla in the course of legislative debates in 1965 stated that AMU was neither established nor administered by minorities. Azeez Basha (supra) correctly held that AMU surrendered its minority status to the British Government; h. The validity of the 1981 amendment is questionable, as it is contrary to previous judicial decisions; i. The 1981 reference sought clarity on the definition of a minority educational institution. The reference did not include the question of whether AMU is a minority educational institution. Legal challenges in 2005 regarding reservations for Muslims in postgraduate programs led to the current reference. This reference also focused on a specific legal question without reopening factual controversies; j. The term “establish” under Article 30 should be interpreted to mean tangible and manifest establishment. The indicia to decide the minority character of an institution contemplated under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, must include the following: i. The institution/university must necessarily be established and administered by the minority community; and ii. The institution/university should be established by the minority, for the minority and as a minority institution.

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k. There are concerns about the potential misuse of minority status without a strict standard of actual establishment. The drafting history of fundamental rights under Articles 29 and 30 consistently uses “establish” and “administer” conjunctively and further expresses apprehensions about an over-expansive interpretation of these Articles; l. The genesis of an institution does not determine its minority status. Legislative enactments are the final authority on the establishment, as seen in legislations where the minority status is explicitly recognised; m. The reliance on St. Stephen’s (supra) is self-defeating since this Court applied the standard of administrative control as an indicia in that case. The involvement of the Government in AMU’s establishment, clear intent and specific provisions indicate the national and non-minority character of the institution; n. The Nation Commission for Minority Educational Institution Act 200418 and its Amendment in 2010 provide that an institution needs to be established and administered by minorities to be a minority educational institution. The said definition is not under challenge; and o. The consequence of recognising AMU as a minority educational institution is that seats cannot be reserved for the other categories of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes/Socially and Educationally Backward Classes.

2727. Mr Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel submitted that: a. For a community to be considered a “minority,” it must fulfil three criteria: i. It must be numerically lesser than the majority; ii. It cannot be the ruling group even if it is numerically smaller; and iii. The group itself should identify as a minority. b. Muslims were not recognized as a minority during British rule, as Hindus and Muslims were considered equals. Syed Ahmed

18 “NCMEI Act”

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Khan, the founder of Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, claimed in a letter that the Muslim community never considered itself as a minority and instead as rulers prior to the British government; c. Judgments of this Court have held that Article 30(1) applies to institutions that were established before the commencement of the Constitution. However, these decisions dealt with colleges and schools and not a University. Article 30(1) does not apply to a University that was established before the commencement of the Constitution because a University before the enactment of the University Grants Commission 1956 could only have been established by the Government and not a person; and d. Azeez Basha (supra) was a standalone and statute-specific judgment. Overruling it would disrupt the Union’s control over AMU, constituting “public mischief”. The precedent set by the case should only be overturned if there is a substantial risk to public interest, which is not the case here.

2828. Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned senior counsel submitted that: a. The correctness or validity of Azeez Basha (supra) was not within the purview of the reference order, which solely aimed to clarify the meaning of “established and administered” under Article 30; b. Parliament cannot deny a fact by creating legal fiction in a subsequent legislation. The 1981 amendment only attempted to change who “established” the University but made no change in the provision related to the administration of the University. It attempted to rewrite history by altering the recognition of the University’s establishment; c. AMU’s inclusion as an institution of national importance under Entry 63 of the Union list gives the Union government sole authority over it. Altering AMU’s status would require a constitutional amendment rather than a legislative amendment; and d. Over the past decades, there has been no demand for minority status for AMU, as evidenced by legislative actions in 1951 and

1965. The demand for minority rights now would conflict with existing reservation rights for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Socially and Economically Backward Classes.

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2929. Mr Guru Krishnakumar, learned senior counsel made the following submissions: a. The “new sovereign,” presumably referring to contemporary legislative and executive authorities, holds the discretion to determine the approach towards minority rights. This implies that decisions regarding minority rights are subject to the interpretation and judgment of current governing bodies; b. H.V. Kamath in the Constituent Assembly advocated for parliamentary legislation on universities to demonstrate their impartial and non-communal nature. Similarly, Naziruddin Ahmed, a member of the Muslim League in the Constituent Assembly, asserted that universities were rightly under the Union’s jurisdiction; and c. A fact established by legislation cannot override a fact recognised by the Court.19

3030. Mr Vijay Navare, learned senior counsel submitted that granting minority status to AMU would undermine Parliament’s authority and interfere with powers vested under Entry 63.

3131. Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, learned senior counsel submitted that AMU was created ‘by the Statute’ (Act 21 of 1920) and not ‘under the Statute’.

3232. Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel submitted that the Rajya Sabha debates related to the amendments of 1981 reveal a misconception that this Court in Azeez Basha (supra) neglected AMU’s history before 1920. The amendment failed to alter the foundational aspect of Azeez Basha (supra), which is centred on the Muslim community’s concessions to the terms of the British Government.

D. Issues

3333. The petitioner and the respondents disagree on whether this Bench must determine if AMU is a minority educational institution. In Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra), the two-Judge Bench referred the question of the essential ingredients of a minority education institution. This was the core issue which was referred to the Constitution

19 Reliance was placed on Indira Sawhney (II) v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 2000 SC 498.

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Bench. The other two questions which were formulated, that is, the meaning of the phrase “establish” and the impact of registration under the Societies Registration Act 1860 after the establishment of the institution are in essence, subsets of the core issue. The question of the indicia for recognising an educational institution as a minority educational institution was reflected in question 3(a) framed in TMA Pai (supra). Thus, neither was Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) nor TMA Pai (supra) concerned with the factual situation in Azeez Basha: that is, whether AMU is a minority education institution.

3434. The 2019 reference order also limits the reference to the legal aspects arising from the decision in Azeez Basha (supra) and not the factual aspects of the decision relating to AMU. This is clear from the passages from the 2019 reference order extracted above, particularly paragraphs 8 and 9. Paragraph 8 states that the correctness of the “question arising from” Azeez Basha (supra) has “remained undetermined”. The paragraph indicates that the 2019 reference order must be read along with the previous references in both Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) and TMA Pai Foundation (supra). Paragraph 9 mentions that the correctness of the view in Azeez Basha (supra) “which has been extracted above” requires an authoritative pronouncement. The paragraph from Azeez Basha (supra) extracted in the 2019 reference order deals with the question of indicia to be considered a minority educational institution. It is evident upon a reading of the reference orders that only the question of the criteria to be fulfilled to qualify as a minority educational institution is referred to this Bench.

3535. From the order in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) referring the judgment in Azeez Basha (supra) to a larger Bench, the question formulated in TMA Pai (supra) and the 2019 Reference order, the question that must be decided by this Bench is what are the ingredients, indicia or criteria for an educational institution to be considered a minority educational institution under Article 30. The following issues must be answered for this purpose: a. Whether an educational institution must be both established and administered by a linguistic or religious minority to secure the guarantee under Article 30; b. What are the criteria to be satisfied for the ‘establishment’ of a minority institution? Whether Article 30(1) envisages an

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institution which is established by a minority with participation from members of other communities; c. Whether a minority educational institution which is registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act 186020 soon after its establishment loses its status as a minority educational institution by virtue of such registration; and d. Whether the decision of this Court in Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh21 and the amendment of National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act 200522 in 2010 have a bearing on the question formulated above and if so, in what manner.

E. Analysis

i. The preliminary objection by the Union of India

3636. The Union of India advanced a preliminary objection to the reference. It argued that the order dated 26 November 1981 in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) by which the matter was referred to a Bench of seven Judges is “wholly bad in law.” It relies on the decision of a Constitution Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra23 to argue that the two- Judge Bench of this Court in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) could not have referred the correctness of the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in Azeez Basha (supra) directly to a Bench of seven Judges. It was suggested that the two-Judge Bench ought to have referred the matter to a Bench of equal strength to the decision the correctness of which is doubted, that is, a Bench of five Judges. The Union of India argued that only a Bench of five Judges could have referred the matter to a Bench of seven Judges.

3737. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra), a Constitution Bench discussed the legal precepts which apply to orders of reference and reiterated the position of law as below:24

20 “Societies Registration Act” 21 [2005] 2 SCR 23 : (2005) 5 SCC 420 22 “NCMEI Act” 23 (2005) 2 SCC 673 24 Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) [12]

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