M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi & Ors.

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the death of respondent’s wife. It was brought to the notice of the Court that the 1994 amendment to the MV Act, replaced “medium goods vehicle” and “heavy goods vehicle”, with “transport vehicle.” The 2-judge bench observed as under: “19. “Light motor vehicle” is defined in Section 2(21) and, therefore, in view of the provision, as then existed, it included a light transport vehicle. xx

20. From what has been noticed hereinbefore, it is evident that “transport vehicle” has now been substituted for “medium goods vehicle” and “heavy goods vehicle”. The light motor vehicle continued, at the relevant point of time to cover both “light passenger carriage vehicle” and “light goods carriage vehicle”. A driver who had a valid licence to drive a light motor vehicle, therefore, was authorised to drive a light goods vehicle as well.” [emphasis supplied] 44.1. In the pertinent judgment, this Court held that the amendments carried out in 1994 had a prospective operation and at the time of the accident (pre-amendment), a driver holding a valid license to drive a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ was also authorised to drive a ‘light goods vehicle’. However, post-amendment, a separate endorsement would be necessary. Thus, the insurance company was held liable to remit the compensation since the accident occurred before the change in law. 44.2. The above interpretation on prospective application in the context of the 1994 amendment, however does not seem to be correct since the mention of the term ‘Transport Vehicle’, does not exclude transport vehicles that are already classified as ‘LMV’, under Section 10. If this interpretation were accepted, it would imply that medium or heavy vehicles would no longer require ‘specific’ endorsements, as those classes were removed by the amendment. This would lead to impractical outcomes. 44.3. The contention that since Light Motor Vehicles and Transport Vehicles are mentioned separately, those Transport Vehicles which (weighing less than 7,500 kg) fall within the class of LMV would require the driver to have a separate driving license or

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an endorsement does not appeal well to our understanding. This would be contrary to the legislative intent. The classes mentioned therein do not appear like watertight compartments and some degree of overlap is discernible. An LMV license which typically covers two-wheelers may also be used for commercial activities like small-scale deliveries and the driver may not be required to obtain a separate endorsement for the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class. It is difficult to accept the argument that a driving license issued for a particular class is limited and the intention of the legislature was to exclude the Transport Vehicles falling within the LMV class. According to our understanding, the correct way to view the legal implication would be that ‘transport vehicles’ mentioned in Section 10 would cover only those vehicles whose gross vehicle weight is above 7,500 kgs. Such an interpretation aligns with the broader purpose of the amendments and ensures that the licensing regime remains efficient and practical for vehicle owners and drivers. We therefore partially overrule the decision in Annappa Irappa Nesaria (supra) for the view taken w.r.t the post-1994 amendment position.

45Copy pinpoint45. Significantly, Section 10(2) states that a driving license ‘shall also be expressed as entitling the holder to drive a motor vehicle of one or more of the following classes’. Therefore, the driver of a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ is not per se disentitled to acquire a license for a ‘Transport Vehicle’ class, for driving vehicles above the weight of 7,500 kgs or those classes which do not fall in the definition of Light Motor Vehicle under Section 2(21). As rightly noted in Mukund Dewangan (supra), Section 10 has to be read with Section 2(21) which defines a Light Motor Vehicle. III. Whether the interpretation in Mukund Devangan(2017) would render most provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules otiose?

46Copy pinpoint46. For the Insurance Companies, it was argued with much emphasis that sole reliance on Section 2(21) r/w Section 10 as held in Mukund Dewangan (2017) would render otiose, many provisions of the MV Act and this can have far-reaching implications. To appreciate this contention, a careful examination of the identified provisions is necessary. Is it correct to say that in order to drive a transport

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vehicle, an LMV license holder will require by law, an additional endorsement because the scheme of the Act provides a clear distinction between ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ and ‘Transport Vehicle’? The following table marking the distinction was placed before the Court for consideration:

Sr. Differentiating Provision Light Motor Transport Vehicle No. Factor Under M.V. Vehicle License License Act / Rules Age / Time Requirement (i) Age limit For Sec. 4 18 years and 20 years and above Driving above [S.4(1)] [S.4(2)] (ii) Restriction Sec. 7(1) No minimum Must hold a Driving on grant of requirement to License for a Light Learner’s obtain License Motor Vehicle for at License for Light Motor least 1 year, to obtain Vehicle. Learner’s License for Transport Vehicle. [S. 7(1)] (iii) Training Rule 31 Not less than 21 Not less than 30 days Period for days [Rule 31(2)] [Rule 31(3)] Obtaining (+) (+) License Actual Hours of Actual Hours of Driving shall not be Driving shall not be less than 10 hours. less than 15 hours. [Rule 31(4)] [Rule 31(4)] Medical Certificates (iv) Requirement Sec. 8(3) No requirement of Application for Grant of Medical Medical Certificate of Learner’s License for Certificate must be accompanied Learner’s by a Medical License Certificate [S.8(3)] (v.) Requirement Sec. 15 No requirement of Application Shall be Of Medical Medical Certificate accompanied by a Certificate For prior to attaining Medical Certificate Renewal Of the age of 40 [Second Proviso to Licenses years. [Second S.15(1)] Proviso to S.15(1)]

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(vi) Self- Rule 5 Requirement of Requirement Of Declaration Self Declaration as Medical Certificate by Of Fitness to Physical Fitness. a Registered Medical Or Medical [Rule 5(1)] Practitioner. [Rule Certificate For 5(1)] License

Driving Certificates

(vii) Requirement Sec. 9(4) No requirement of Application for grant Of Obtaining obtaining Driving of License Must be Driving Certificate from a accompanied by a Certificate Driving School. Driving Certificate from a Driving Issued By a School or School for Establishment referred Obtaining to in S.12 of M.V. Act. Driving [S.9(4)] License

(viii) Addition Rule 17(1) No such Application for to Driving (b) requirement Addition of Transport License to Vehicle shall be be supported accompanied by a by Driving Driving Certificate in Certificate Form 5 of the Rules. [Rule 17(1)(b)]

Separate Vehicle / Separate License

(ix) Necessity for Sec. 66 No requirement of Permit from the Permits a Permit. Regional, or State Transport Authority is required to use a vehicle as Transport Vehicle.

(x) Necessity Sec. 3 Effective License Driving License must for Driving holder may drive. specifically entitle the License Driver to drive the Transport Vehicle.

(xi) Separate Sec.10(2) Section 10(2) Section 10(2)(e) – Class of (d) – Light Motor Transport Vehicle. Vehicles Vehicle.

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Validity of Driving License (xii) Validity Sec. 14 Valid for – [S.14(2) Valid for 5 years of Driving (b)] [S.14(2)(a)] License. (i) Who has not attained 30 years of age on the date of issue / renewal – Valid till such person attains 40 years of age; (ii) Who has attained 30 years, but not attained 50 yrs. of age – Valid for 10 years; (iii) Who has attained 50 years, but not attained 55 yrs. of age – Valid till such person attains 60 years of age; (iv)Who has attained 55 years – Valid for 5 years. Other Differentiating Factors (xiii) Requirement Sec. 28 No such State Govt. may make of Uniform and requirement Rules prescribing Badges Badges and Uniform to be worn by Drivers of Transport Vehicles. [S.28(2)(d)] (xiv) Duties, Sec. 28 No such State Govt. may make Functions and requirement Rules prescribing Conduct Duties and Conduct of such persons to whom license is issued to drive Transport Vehicles. [S.28(2)(h)] (xv) Syllabus for Rule 31 Syllabus Part A, Syllabus Part E, F, G, obtaining B, C, F, G and K H, I, J and K [Rule License [Rule 31(2)] 31(3)]

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47Copy pinpoint47. Analysis of the above provisions is now apposite. Chapter II addresses ‘Licensing of Drivers of Motor Vehicles’. We have already noticed Section 3 earlier that covers the ‘Necessity for Driving License’ and specifically mentions ‘Transport Vehicle’. Section 4, in sequence, is titled ‘Age limit in connection with driving of motor vehicles’. Section 18 referred to in Section 4(2) concerns ‘Driving Licenses to drive motor vehicles, belonging to the Central Government’. Section 4(2) in its current form reads as under: “(1) No person under the age of eighteen years shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place: Provided that [a motor cycle with engine capacity not exceeding 50cc] may be driven in a public place by a person after attaining the age of sixteen years. (2) Subject to the provisions of section 18, no person under the age of twenty years shall drive a transport vehicle in any public place. (3) No learners licence or driving licence shall be issued to any person to drive a vehicle of the class to which he has made an application unless he is eligible to drive that class of vehicle under this section.” [emphasis supplied]

48Copy pinpoint48. Section 5 deals with the ‘Responsibility of owners of motor vehicles for contravention of Section 3 and 4’ and declares that: “No owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle shall cause or permit any person who does not satisfy the provisions of section 3 or section 4 to drive the vehicle.”

49Copy pinpoint49. At this stage, we must also note the penal provisions i.e. Section 180 and Section 181 of Chapter XIII which deals with ‘Offences, Penalties and Procedure’: “180. Allowing unauthorised persons to drive vehicles.— Whenever, being the owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle, causes, or permits, any other person who does not satisfy the provisions of section 3 or section 4 to drive the vehicle shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”

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“181. Driving vehicles in contravention of section 3 or section 4.—Whoever, drives a motor vehicle in contravention of section 3 or section 4 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.”

50Copy pinpoint50. Section 6 deals with ‘Restrictions on the holding of driving licenses’ and imposes, inter alia, general restrictions to prevent individuals from allowing others to use their driving license. Section 7(1) is important and provides that a Learner’s license for a transport vehicle can only be issued to a person who has held a driving license for a Light Motor Vehicle for atleast one year. The amended section reads as under: “7. Restrictions on the granting of learner’s licences for certain vehicles.— [(1) No person shall be granted a learner’s licence to drive a transport vehicle unless he has held a driving licence to drive a light motor vehicle for at least one year:] [Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to an e-cart or e-rickshaw.] (2) No person under the age of eighteen years shall be granted a learner’s licence to drive a motor cycle without gear except with the consent in writing of the person having the care of the person desiring the learner’s licence.” [emphasis supplied]

51Copy pinpoint51. Section 8 deals with the ‘Grant of Learner’s license’. The requirement of medical certificate is contained in Section 8(3), Section 15 and Rule 5 of the MV Rules. Sub-section (3) of Section 8 as amended mandates that an application for a Learner’s License for a Transport Vehicle must be accompanied by a Medical Certificate by a registered medical practitioner. However, the unamended Section 8 did not mention ‘Transport Vehicle’: “—8(1) Any person who is not disqualified under section 4 for driving a motor vehicle and who is not for the time being disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence may, subject to the provisions of section 7, apply to the licensing authority having jurisdiction in the area—

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(i) in which he ordinarily resides or carries on business, or (ii) in which the school or establishment referred to in section 12 from where he intends to receive instruction in driving a motor vehicle is situate, for the issue to him of a learner’s licence. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and shall be accompanied by such documents and with such fee as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a medical certificate in such form as may be prescribed by the Central Government and signed by such registered medical practitioner, as the State Government or any person authorised in this behalf by the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint for this purpose: XX]”

52Copy pinpoint52. The amended 8(3) reads as under: (3) Every application [to drive a transport vehicle made] under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a medical certificate in such form as may be prescribed by the Central Government and signed by such registered medical practitioner, as the State Government or any person authorised in this behalf by the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint for this purpose:” [emphasis supplied]

53Copy pinpoint53. Rule 5(1) of the amended MV Rules titled ‘Medical Certificate’ reiterates such a requirement. While for other vehicles, there is a requirement of a self-declaration of fitness, a Medical certificate by a registered Medical practitioner is necessary for driving a ‘Transport Vehicle’. The unamended Rule 5 which does not mention ‘Transport Vehicle’ reads as under: “5. “Medical Certificate- Every application for the issue of a learner’s licence or a driving licence or for making addition of another class or description of motor vehicle to a driving licence or for renewal of learner license or a driving license,

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shall be accompanied by a medical certificate in Form 1 issued by a registered medical practitioner referred to in sub-section (3) of section 8””

54Copy pinpoint54. The amended Rule 5 is also extracted below: “5. Medical Certificate- Every application for the issue of a learner’s licence or a driving licence or for making addition of another class or description of a motor vehicle to a driving licence or for renewal of a driving licence to drive a vehicle other than a transport vehicle shall be accompanied by a self-declaration as to the physical fitness as in Form 1 and every such application for a licence to drive a transport vehicle shall be accompanied by a medical certificate in Form 1-A issued by a registered medical practitioner referred to in sub-section (3) of section 8” [emphasis supplied]

55Copy pinpoint55. Section 15 titled ‘Renewal of driving licenses’, outlines the requirements for renewal within the time period provided therein. The second proviso to Section 15(1), mandates the requirement of a medical certificate for ‘Transport Vehicle’ and for those who are above the age of 40 years. The second proviso therein reads as under: “Provided further that where the application is for the renewal of a licence to drive a transport vehicle or where in any other case the applicant has attained the age of forty years, the same shall be accompanied by a medical certificate in the same form and in the same manner as is referred to in sub-section (3) of section 8, and the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 8 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to every such case as they apply in relation to a learner’s licence.” [emphasis supplied]

56Copy pinpoint56. Section 9 titled ‘Grant of driving license’ provides a comprehensive procedure for granting driving licenses. Section 9(1) addresses the jurisdiction involved in the licensing process. Under Section 9(2), anyone not disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving license may apply, using a form prescribed by the Central Government.

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The applicant must also pass a test as specified in Section 9(3). Additionally, for those seeking a Transport Vehicle license, Section 9(4) mandates a minimum educational qualification set by the Central Government. Section 9(5) pertains to the requirement for re-taking the test after 7 days. Meanwhile, 9(6) states that the test of competence to drive must be carried out in a vehicle of the type to which the application refers. Section 9(7) deals with disqualification and Section 9(8) provides, inter alia, that the licensing authority may refuse to issue a licence to a habitual criminal or a habitual drunkard or who is habitually addicted to any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or whose license had been revoked earlier. Section 9(4) which is relevant for our purpose is extracted below: “(4) Where the application is for a licence to drive a transport vehicle, no such authorisation shall be granted to any applicant unless he possesses such minimum educational qualification as may be prescribed by the Central Government and a driving certificate issued by a school or establishment referred to in section 12.” [emphasis supplied]

57Copy pinpoint57. Rule 17(1)(b) of the MV Rules stipulates that any application for adding a class of “Transport Vehicle” to a Driving License must be accompanied by a Driving Certificate: “17. Addition to driving licence.—(1) An application for the addition of another class or description of motor vehicle to the driving licence shall be made in [Form 2] to the licensing authority and shall be accompanied by— (a) an effective learner’s licence and driving licence held by the applicant; (b) the driving certificate in Form 5, in the case of an application for addition of a transport vehicle, excluding E-rickshaw or E-cart.” [emphasis supplied]

58Copy pinpoint58. Section 14 of the Motor Vehicles Act outlines the validity period of driving licenses, distinguishing between those for ‘transport vehicles’ and ‘transport vehicles carrying goods,’ while also considering the age of the license holder. According to the amended section, individuals

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under 30 years of age will have their license valid until they reach 40 years, while those aged 30 to 49 will enjoy a 10-year validity period. For individuals aged 50 to 54, the license remains valid until they turn 60, and for those aged 55 and older, the validity is set at 5 years. This framework reflects the understanding that driving capabilities and experience may vary with age. The relevant part of Section 14 is extracted below: “14. Currency of licences to drive motor vehicles.— (1) A learner’s licence issued under this Act shall, subject to the other provisions of this Act, be effective for a period of six months from the date of issue of the licence. (2) A driving licence issued or renewed under this Act shall,— (a) in the case of a licence to drive a transport vehicle, be effective for a period of three years: 1 *** 2 [Provided that in the case of licence to drive a transport vehicle carrying goods of dangerous or hazardous nature be effective for a period of one year and renewal thereof shall be subject to the condition that the driver undergoes one day refresher course of the prescribed syllabus; and;] xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx” [emphasis supplied]

59Copy pinpoint59. Rule 10 is titled ‘Application for Learner’s license’. The unamended Rule 10 stated as under: “10. Application for learner’s licence.— An application for the grant of a learner’s licence shall be made in Form 2 and shall be accompanied by,— (a) save as otherwise provided in rule 6, a medical certificate in [Form 1-A]. (b) three copies of the applicant’s recent 28 [passport size photograph], (c) appropriate fee as specified in rule 32, [(d) in the case of an application for medium goods vehicle, a medium passenger motor vehicle, a heavy

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goods vehicle or a heavy passenger vehicle, the driving license held by the applicant.” [emphasis supplied]

60Copy pinpoint60. The amended Rule 10 replaces these highlighted terms with the single term ‘Transport Vehicle’:

10. Application for learner’s licence.— An application for the grant of a learner’s licence shall be made in Form 2 and shall be accompanied by,— (a) save as otherwise provided in rule 6, a medical certificate in [Form 1-A]. (b) three copies of the applicant’s recent 28 [passport size photograph], (c) appropriate fee as specified in rule 32, [(d) in the case of an application for transport vehicle excluding E-rickshaw or E-Cart, the driving licence held by the applicant] [(e) proof of residence (f) proof of age” [emphasis supplied]

61Copy pinpoint61. Section 27 concerns the power of Central Government to make Rules. Section 28 which deals with the power of the State Government to make rules provides specifically w.r.t. transport vehicles in sub-section 2(d) and 2(h) the following :- “(d) the badges and uniform to be worn by drivers of transport vehicles and the fees to be paid in respect of badges” (h) the duties, functions and conduct of such persons to whom licences to drive transport vehicles are issued [emphasis supplied]

62Copy pinpoint62. Rule 31(2) and (3) which deal with the syllabus provides as under:

31. Syllabus for imparting instructions, in driving of motor vehicles.—

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(1) The syllabus for imparting instructions in driving of motor vehicles of the schools or establishments shall be as follows (see tables below): [(2) The lessons for training drivers of non-transport vehicles shall cover Parts A, B, C, F, G and K of the syllabus referred to in sub-rule (1) and the training period shall not be less than twenty-one days: Provided that in case of motorcycles, it shall be sufficient compliance of the provisions, if portion of Part C of syllabus as applicable to such vehicles are covered. (3) The lessons for training drivers of transport vehicles shall cover Parts E, F, G, H, I, J and K of the syllabus referred to in sub-rule (1) and the training period shall not be less than thirty days” [emphasis supplied]

63Copy pinpoint63. Chapter V of the MV Act specifically deals with ‘Control of Transport Vehicles’. Section 66 deals with ‘Necessity for Permits’ and prohibits an owner of a motor vehicle to use or to permit the use of the motor vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place save in accordance with the conditions of permit, granted by an appropriate authority: “66. Necessity for permits.—(1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether or not such vehicle is actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority authorising him the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used:…” [emphasis supplied]

64Copy pinpoint64. The necessity for a permit and the need for driving license are two different requirements and the distinctions thereof must be borne in mind.

65Copy pinpoint65. The aforenoted provisions are pressed into service to contend that the legislature has placed LMVs and Transport Vehicles under separate classes. For each class of vehicle, varying degrees of scrutiny are

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provided and the argument on behalf of Insurance Companies is that the holder of a LMV license is disentitled to drive a Transport Vehicle and a separate endorsement would be necessary for driving a vehicle of the other class.

66Copy pinpoint66. Reading the various provisions as noticed above appears to pull the reader into two distinct spheres and this might make the legal implications unworkable. The principle of harmonious constructions of statutes should guide us to unravel this vexed question. (a) Harmonious Construction

67Copy pinpoint67. In Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain,32 this Court examined the relevant precedents of this Court and articulated the following principles on harmonious construction of statutes: "a. It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the Act and to construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner as to harmonise them; b. The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other provisions unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect reconciliation between them; c. When there are two conflicting provisions in an Act, which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is the essence of the rule of harmonious construction; d. The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions to a “dead letter” or “useless lumber” is not harmonious construction; and e. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose.” [emphasis supplied]

32 [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 707 : (1997) 1 SCC 373

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68Copy pinpoint68. Keeping the above principles in mind, let us proceed further. The relevant provisions of the MV Act and the MV Rules would show that the term ‘Transport Vehicle’ is frequently referenced in various Sections and Rules. Most of these provisions were not noticed in Mukund Dewangan (2017). It is true that the legislature has imposed additional requirements for ‘Transport Vehicles’. But should it be enough to say that a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ license holder is legally incapable of driving a transport vehicle although its gross vehicle weight is below 7500 kg, as is suggested by the counsel for the insurance companies? In our view, such a manner of interpretation would render superfluous and otiose the precise and compact definition of LMV given in Section 2(21) which so significantly uses the expression ‘means’. When questions on the relevance of Section 2(21) was raised, the following points were made:- (a) Section 2(21) which includes Transport Vehicles is for a different regime, set under Section 113 which places limitation both on weight and usage of the vehicle. Section 115 empowers the authority to restrict the driving of any vehicle of a specified class or description. These sections are contained in Chapter VII which is titled ‘Control of Traffic’ and pertain to ‘limits of weight and limitations on use’ and ‘power to restrict the use of vehicles’. Vehicles of specific weight may be prohibited from certain roads or areas making weight a relevant factor. Under the said definition of LMV, ‘weight’ has been kept as a factor for demarcation between ‘LMV’ and ‘Transport’ vehicles primarily for the purposes of determining the ‘road tax’. (b) Section 41(4) outlines the necessity of specifying the exact type of vehicle—including its design, construction, and intended use—during the registration process. It was contended that this is where weight becomes a critical factor. (c) Weight is considered in Section 44(ae) of the Income Tax Act 1961, which concerns incomes derived from transport vehicles.

69Copy pinpoint69. The above submissions which mention the weight of the vehicle are in different context and can’t be used to render section 2(21) i.e. the definition, a dead letter. If the definition clause was worded differently, one might possibly argue that a distinction could be made between Transport Vehicles and LMVs. But the use of the word

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‘means’, points towards the categorical intent of the legislature. When a Court is faced with two interpretations, one of which would have the effect of rendering a provision a ‘dead letter’, the interpretation that allows for such violence to the key words in the statute must be avoided. An attempt at harmonization would therefore be in order. Let us analyse the issue further by considering the following overlapping diagram:

70Copy pinpoint70. The above illustration indicates that all Transport Vehicles are not Light Motor Vehicles but some may fall within the class of LMVs which is represented by the overlapping section. The inference therefore is that if the transport vehicle falls under the definition of Light Motor Vehicle in Section 2(21), the additional requirements as outlined in the provisions noticed above, need not be satisfied by a person holding a driving licence for a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ class. Consequently, a separate endorsement of a Transport Vehicle is not necessary as the LMV license would suffice for vehicles below 7500 kg weight. Such an interpretation would harmonize the statutory provisions by requiring the additional factors only for those Transport vehicles whose gross weight exceeds 7500 kg.

71Copy pinpoint71. It was additionally argued that the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant would apply in this case. Section 2(21) is a general provision defining a Light Motor Vehicle which includes a ‘Transport Vehicle,’ whereas Section 3 is a specific provision that prohibits driving a ‘transport vehicle’ without a separate license endorsement. According to Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Section 3 should take precedence, requiring a separate endorsement under the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class.

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72Copy pinpoint72. To address the argument, let us consider the following passage by Lord Herschell LC in Institute of Patent Agents & Ors. v. Joseph Lockwood33 : “Well, there is a conflict sometimes between two sections to be found in the same Act. You have to try and reconcile them as best you may. If you cannot, you have to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other.”

73Copy pinpoint73. The important thing to note is that one provision must give way to the other only when reconciliation is not possible. However, when it is possible to harmonize the two, the Court need not determine which is the leading provision. As regards the argument of rendering second part of Section 3(1) otiose, let us again notice Section 3: “3. Necessity for driving licence.—(1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds an effective driving licence issued to him authorising him to drive the vehicle; and no person shall so drive a transport vehicle (other than a motor cab or motorcycle hired for his own use or rented under any scheme made under sub-section (2) of Section 75) unless his driving licence specifically entitles him so to do.” [emphasis supplied]

74Copy pinpoint74. Section 3 refers to ‘Transport Vehicles’, like many other provisions in the MV Act and the MV Rules. Section 3 cannot however be construed as a special provision that would override the strict and emphatic definition of LMV, given in Section 2(21) and the separate class of ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ provided in Section 10. Section 2(21) uses the term ‘means’ as earlier emphasized and there is an affirmation of certainty in the wordings of the definition and it is to be recognized sensu stricto in a technical sense and must not be understood loosely. To say that Section 3 would disentitle the LMV license holders to drive transport vehicles of the permissible weight category, would be incompatible and would render the strict definition clause, sterile and a ‘dead letter’. A harmonious construction of

33 1894 A.C. 347 at 360

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both sections can however reach us to a conclusion that for LMV licence holders, a separate endorsement under ‘Transport Vehicle’ class would be unnecessary for driving LMV class of vehicles. In our interpretation and understanding, it would be logical to hold that the additional licensing requirements will have no application for the LMV class of vehicles but will be needed only for such ‘Transport Vehicles’, which by virtue of their gross weight fall in the Medium and Heavy category. Such a construction would also fulfill the legislative purpose which is to ensure road safety by requiring only those individuals who intend to operate medium and heavy vehicles, to satisfy the additional licensing criteria. In our view, the age restrictions outlined in Section 4, the requirement of a medical certificate, and the criteria under Section 7 should reasonably apply only for the medium and heavy transport vehicles whose gross weight will be above 7500 Kg. Such an interpretation would fulfill the objective of the MV Act to provide compensation to victims of road accidents while maintaining a commensurate licensing regime for drivers.

75Copy pinpoint75. At this stage, it needs to be borne in mind that the genesis of the present reference arises from compensation claims. A reference to the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh34 may therefore be apposite. A 3-judge bench of this Court noted that the liability of the insurance company in relation to the owner depends on several factors. The issue of lack of valid driving license was discussed as under: “7. If a person has been given a licence for a particular type of vehicle as specified therein, he cannot be said to have no licence for driving another type of vehicle which is of the same category but of different type. As for example, when a person is granted a licence for driving a light motor vehicle, he can drive either a car or a jeep and it is not necessary that he must have driving licence both for car and jeep separately.

89. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver to hold an effective driving licence for the type of vehicle

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which he intends to drive. Section 10 of the Act enables the Central Government to prescribe forms of driving licences for various categories of vehicles mentioned in sub-section (2) of the said section. The various types of vehicles described for which a driver may obtain a licence for one or more of them are: (a) motorcycle without gear, (b) motorcycle with gear, (c) invalid carriage, (d) light motor vehicle, (e) transport vehicle, (f) road roller, and (g) motor vehicle of other specified description. The definition clause in Section 2 of the Act defines various categories of vehicles which are covered in broad types mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10. They are “goods carriage”, “heavy goods vehicle”, “heavy passenger motor vehicle”, “invalid carriage”, “light motor vehicle”, “maxi-cab”, “medium goods vehicle”, “medium passenger motor vehicle”, “motor-cab”, “motorcycle”, “omnibus”, “private service vehicle”, “semi-trailer”, “tourist vehicle”, “tractor”, “trailer” and “transport vehicle”. In claims for compensation for accidents, various kinds of breaches with regard to the conditions of driving licences arise for consideration before the Tribunal as a person possessing a driving licence for “motorcycle without gear”, [sic may be driving a vehicle] for which he has no licence. Cases may also arise where a holder of driving licence for “light motor vehicle” is found to be driving a “maxi-cab”, “motor-cab” or “omnibus” for which he has no licence. In each case, on evidence led before the Tribunal, a decision has to be taken whether the fact of the driver possessing licence for one type of vehicle but found driving another type of vehicle, was the main or contributory cause of accident. If on facts, it is found that the accident was caused solely because of some other unforeseen or intervening causes like mechanical failures and similar other causes having no nexus with the driver not possessing requisite type of licence, the insurer will not be allowed to avoid its liability merely for technical breach of conditions concerning driving licence.

90. We have construed and determined the scope of sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act.

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Minor breaches of licence conditions, such as want of medical fitness certificate, requirement about age of the driver and the like not found to have been the direct cause of the accident, would be treated as minor breaches of inconsequential deviation in the matter of use of vehicles. Such minor and inconsequential deviations with regard to licensing conditions would not constitute sufficient ground to deny the benefit of coverage of insurance to the third parties.” [emphasis supplied]

76Copy pinpoint76. The upshot of the above is that compensation must not be denied for minor technical breaches of the licensing conditions. It was submitted before this Court that the decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is per incuriam for not considering Para 89 of the judgment. It is true that the Court pertinently notes therein that “Cases may also arise where a holder of driving licence for “light motor vehicle” is found to be driving a “maxi-cab”, “motor-cab” or “omnibus” for which he has no licence.” However, such an observation cannot be considered a conclusive determination by the Court to hold that a separate license for each of these vehicles would be necessary. Therefore, we are disinclined to accept such an argument. b) Interpretation must not result in impractical outcomes

77Copy pinpoint77. It is well-settled that a statute should be interpreted in a manner that avoids leading to unworkable or impractical outcomes.35 If a statutory interpretation results in confusion, impracticability or creates burden that the legislature could not have intended, such an interpretation should be avoided. Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Learned Senior Counsel, placed reliance on Section 9(6) of MV Act and Rule 15(2) of MV Rules to argue that if one wants an endorsement of a ‘transport vehicle’ class, the person has to be tested on a ‘transport vehicle’ and not a ‘Maruti-800 car’. Let us test this argument by again taking the hypothetical example of Sri who holds an LMV license and is desirous of operating an auto for commercial purposes and as such applies separately for a license of a ‘Transport Vehicle’ class.

35 Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand (1989) 1 SCC 264

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Crucially, Section 9 dealing with ‘Grant of driving license’ provides in sub-section (6) as under: “(6) The test of competence to drive shall be carried out in a vehicle of the type to which the application refers:”

78Copy pinpoint78. Sub-section (2) of Rule 15 of MV Rules titled ‘Driving Test’ read thus: “(2) The test of competence to drive referred to in sub- section (3) of section 9 shall be conducted by the licensing authority or such other person as may be authorised in this behalf by the State Government in a vehicle of the type to which the application relates.”

79Copy pinpoint79. The type of the vehicle referred above, under the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class could therefore either be a three-wheeler weighing less than 7,500 kgs or a heavy passenger vehicle of more than 12,000 kgs, if the class for which Sri applied is broadly taken as a ‘transport Vehicle’, with no distinction between heavy, medium or light category. Then our hypothetical driver Sri, although will be tested to drive an ‘auto’, could end up driving a heavy passenger vehicle using the ‘Transport Vehicle’ license. Such a conclusion on valid authority would be incompatible in the context.

80Copy pinpoint80. Let us also look at the syllabus that would be prescribed for Sri for his application to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle’. As noted earlier, for ‘Transport Vehicles’, the syllabus as per Rule 31 is contained in Part E, F, G, H, I, J and K: Part A: Driving Theory-I Part B: Traffic Education-I Part C: Light Vehicles Driving Practice Part D: Vehicle Mechanism and Repairs Part E: Medium and Heavy Vehicle Driving: Driving Theory-II Part F: Traffic Education—II Part G. Public Relations For Drivers Part H. Heavy Vehicle Driving Practice Part I. Fire Hazards

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Part J. Vehicle Maintenance Part K. First Aid the syllabus is contained in Part E, F, G, H, I, J and K:

81Copy pinpoint81. Our hypothetical Sri, who wants to drive an auto would then be imparted training for the syllabus outlined in Parts E, F, G, H, I, J & K. These parts primarily pertain to ‘Medium and Heavy Vehicle Driving’. The extensive syllabus covers topics such as fire hazards, heavy vehicle maintenance, cross-country practice and hill driving but those would hardly be germane for Sri who is desirous of driving only an auto rickshaw falling within the Light Motor Vehicle class. The legislature in its wisdom had stipulated such a wide-ranging syllabus to augment the safety measures as considered apposite for operating medium and heavy motor vehicles. To apply this extensive level of learning for the auto driver Sri, would defy logic although auto is a ‘transport vehicle’ but of a light weight class. To avoid such an illogical outcome, the argument of Mr. Bhushan has to be rejected. It would therefore be appropriate to interpret the provision to declare that the additional requirements outlined in the MV Act for ‘Transport Vehicle’, would not cover the LMV class but would be applicable only for the heavy and medium class vehicles. Such an interpretation would align with our harmonious interpretation, as explained earlier. If the alternate interpretation as suggested by the counsel for the insurance companies is accepted, it would mean that Sri’s driving skills may be tested on an autorickshaw but he would also be legally entitled to drive a heavy multi axle truck because of the broad class of ‘Transport Vehicle’. Such an absurd result should not be permitted.

82Copy pinpoint82. The requirement of uniforms and badges for ‘transport vehicle’ and the duties and conduct of such persons under Section 28(2)(d) and 28(2)(h) are not directly related to the licensing regime. Similarly misplaced here is the reliance on necessity for Permit under Section 66 as also Rule 62 dealing with the ‘Certificate of Fitness’ of the vehicle. Rule 62 is extracted:- “62. Validity of certificate of fitness.—(1) A certificate of fitness in respect of a transport vehicle granted under section 56 shall be in Form 38 and such certificate

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when granted or renewed shall be valid for the period as indicated below:—

(a) new transport vehicle Two years (b) renewal of certificate of One year fitness in respect of vehicles mentioned in {a) above [(ba) renewal of certificate of Three years fitness in respect of E-rickshaw and E-cart renewal of certificate of fitness One year in respect of vehicles covered under rule 82 of these rules d ) f r e s h r e g i s t r a t i o n o f same period as in the case important vehicles of vehicles manufactured in India having regard to the date of manufacture: [emphasis supplied]

83Copy pinpoint83. The apprehension about a person with a license of a light motor vehicle class being able to drive an e-rickshaw, e-cart, a vehicle carrying hazardous goods or even a road roller is also misplaced. This is for the reason that legislature has carved out exceptions for these special kinds of vehicles in the MV Act and the MV Rules which is discernible from the following:. (i) Section 28 deals with the power of State Government to make Rules. Clause (h) provides for “the exemption of drivers of road rollers from all or any of the provisions of this Chapter or of the rules made thereunder” (ii) An exception is carved out in Section 7, 9 and 27 of MV Act for e-cart or e-rickshaw. For instance, the proviso to Section 7 states that “Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to an e-cart or e-rickshaw”. (iii) Similarly, Rule 8A provides for minimum training for driving E-rickshaw or E-cart. Rule 9 provides for educational qualifications for drivers of goods carriage carrying dangerous or hazardous goods.

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Therefore, the present interpretation will not have any impact for such vehicles.

84Copy pinpoint84. It was also argued that the form of the driving license provides for the validity period for ‘Transport’ and ‘Non Transport Vehicle’. On this contention, we can benefit by the following words of Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy in Life Insurance Corporation v. Escorts,36 where for a similar insistence on form, the Judge opined as under:- “Surely, the Form cannot control the Act, the Rules or the directions. As one learned Judge of the Madras High Court was fond of saying it is the dog that wags the tail and not the tail that wags the dog. We may add what this Court had occasion to say in Vasudev Ramchandra Shelat v. Pranlal Jayanand Thakar [(1975) 1 S.C.R. 534 : AIR 1974 SC 1728 : 1974 (2) SCC 323 : 1975 (45) Com. Cas. 43.] : “The subservience of substance of a transaction to some rigidly prescribed form required to be meticulously observed, sevours of archaic and outmoded jurisprudence.”

85Copy pinpoint85. A harmonious interpretation of various sections would lead us to conclude that a person holding a LMV license is equally competent to drive a Transport Vehicle, provided of course the vehicle’s gross weight does not exceed 7,500 kgs. The reference to ‘transport vehicle’ in Section 3(1) and other sections of the Act and Rules should therefore be understood as applying to only those vehicles which fall beyond the scope of the sensu stricto definition, under Section 2(21). This interpretation would ensure that no provision or word is rendered otiose and the licensing regime remains coherent with the legislative intent. Such an interpretation would also avoid illogical outcomes as discussed above. V. Discussion on the 8 Conflicting decisions

86Copy pinpoint86. The legal landscape surrounding the issue of whether a driver holding a license for a ‘Light motor vehicle’ can operate a ‘Transport Vehicle’ without obtaining a specific endorsement has been marked by a myriad of conflicting judgments. The genesis of the present reference stems from eight conflicting decisions which were thereafter

36 [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 909 : (1986) 2 SCC 264

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referred to a 3-judge bench in Mukund Dewangan (2017). On the issue of Transport Vehicles of the LMV class being driven by a driver with a LMV License, in the event of an accident involving an insured vehicle, some opinions have held the insurance company liable to pay compensation while few others have noted that the driver did not have a valid license for a ‘transport vehicle’ although he was possessing a LMV license. On a few occasions, this Court had exercised its power under Article 142 to grant compensation despite noting that the driver did not possess a valid ‘transport vehicle’ license. Before proceeding any further, a short discussion of these decisions in chronological order would be appropriate for aiding clarity to the discussion.

87Copy pinpoint87. The earliest decision on the issue was in 1999, in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.37 (for short “Ashok Gangadhar Maratha”). The definition of LMV at that time stipulated a weight limit of 6000 kgs. The facts in that case was that the appellant who was the holder of a LMV license, owned a Swaraj Mazda truck weighing 5,920 kgs, which got damaged in an accident on 26.11.1991. When the insurer refuted the claim, questioning the validity of the LMV driving license, the appellant filed a complaint before the Consumer Forum. The case traveled to the Supreme Court where a two-judge bench of this Court pertinently observed that a holder of a LMV license can drive a ‘transport vehicle’, without a specific endorsement and accordingly, compensation was granted to the claimants. The Supreme Court, inter alia, gave an important interpretation to Section 2(21) of the MV Act as well as Rule 2(e) of the MV Rules which defines a “non-transport vehicle”. In Para 10, the Court pertinently observed as under: “10. The definition of “light motor vehicle” as given in clause (21) of Section 2 of the Act can apply only to a “light goods vehicle” or a “light transport vehicle”. A “light motor vehicle” otherwise has to be covered by the definition of “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” as given in clause (28) of Section 2 of the Act. A light motor vehicle cannot always mean a light goods carriage. Light motor vehicle can be a non-transport vehicle as well.”

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88Copy pinpoint88. The Court supplemented its reasoning in Para 11 as under: “11. To reiterate, since a vehicle cannot be used as a transport vehicle on a public road unless there is a permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority for that purpose and since in the instant case there is neither a pleading to that effect by any party nor is there any permit on record, the vehicle in question would remain a light motor vehicle. The respondent also does not say that any permit was granted to the appellant for plying the vehicle as a transport vehicle under Section 66 of the Act. Moreover, on the date of the accident, the vehicle was not carrying any goods and though it could be said to have been designed to be used as a transport vehicle or a goods carrier, it cannot be so held on account of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 66 of the Act.”

89Copy pinpoint89. The Court additionally noted that if one accepts the contention of the insurer, “there can never be any light motor vehicle and there can never be any driving licence for driving a light motor vehicle. We cannot put such a construction on clause (21) of Section 2 of the Act so as to exclude a light motor vehicle from the Act altogether.” 89.1. Looking at the scheme of the MV Act, the above conclusion was the correct one declaring that an LMV would include a ‘light good vehicle’ or a ‘light transport vehicle’. While the Court supplemented its reasoning by stating that a vehicle cannot be used as a transport vehicle on a public road unless there is a permit, we must understand that a ‘license’ is different from a ‘permit’. The observations of the Court on the legal issue of a driving license, aligns with our own interpretation.

90Copy pinpoint90. In Nagashetty v. United India Insurance Co,38 the vehicle involved was a tractor with a trailer attached, filled with stones. The case revolved around an accident that occurred on 4.12.1995, when a tractor driven by the driver lost control and hit two pedestrians, resulting in the death of one person. The LRs of the deceased filed a compensation claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), which ruled in their favor and awarded compensation of ₹2,07,000 making the Insurance company liable for the insured

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tractor. The Insurance Company appealed before the High Court, contending that the driver only had a licence to operate a tractor and not a ‘goods vehicle’, as a trailer filled with stones was attached to the tractor, classifying it as a ‘transport vehicle’. Deciding in favour of the Insurance Company, the High Court held that the licence was invalid for driving a ‘transport vehicle’, and therefore, the Insurance Company was not liable to pay the compensation to the claimants. 90.1. Setting aside the decision of the High Court, the Supreme Court held that a person having a valid driving license to drive a particular category of vehicle, does not become unauthorised to drive that category of vehicle, merely because a trailer is attached to it. Interpreting the terms of the Insurance Policy, it was held that if the submission of the Insurance Co. is accepted, then every time, an owner of a private car, who has a license to drive an LMV, attaches a roof carrier to his car, and carries goods thereon, the LMV would become a Transport Vehicle, and the owner would then be deemed to have no valid license, to drive that vehicle. 90.2. It was rightly held in the above decision and as noted in Mukund Dewangan (2017), that a vehicle cannot be readily classified as a ‘transport vehicle’ requiring a separate endorsement in the driving license. Although the Court supported its reasoning by referencing the insurance policy terms, the legal position remains that the term ‘transport vehicle’ overlaps with other vehicle classes.

91Copy pinpoint91. Before this Court, reliance was placed on the judgment in New India Assurance Company v. Prabhu Lal39(for short “Prabhu Lal”). The decision would now require our careful consideration. In this case, the accident which occurred on 17.4.1998 involved a Roadways bus (weighing 4,100 kgs) which was being driven by one M. This was however disputed by the insurance company who claimed that the vehicle was driven by the complainant’s own brother, who held a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ license but not a ‘transport vehicle’ license. The District Forum held that a “goods carrier” weighing 4,100 kgs defined under Section 2(14) of the MV Act was driven by an individual with a LMV license and hence this was a Transport Vehicle under

39 [2007] 12 SCR 724 : (2008) 1 SCC 696

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Section 2(47) of the MV Act for which, a separate endorsement was necessary. The State Commission however held that the principle laid down in the 1999 decision in Ashok Gangadhar (supra) would apply and since the gross weight of the vehicle was only 6,800 kgs, it did not exceed the permissible limits for LMV category vehicles. Accordingly, the Insurance company was held liable. The National Commission upheld the said decision of the State Commission, favouring the claimants. 91.1. Reversing the concurrent decisions of the State and National Commissions, the Supreme Court however restored the decision of the District Forum which held that at the time of the accident, complainant’s brother was driving the insured vehicle. On the validity of the LMV driving license holder driving the bus weighing 4100 kg, this Court held that a separate endorsement was necessary to drive the Transport Vehicle. It was observed as under: “33. In our considered view, the State Commission was wrong in reversing the finding recorded by the District Forum. So far as Ashok Gangadhar [(1999) 6 SCC 620 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1170] is concerned, we will deal with the said decision little later but from the documentary evidence on record and particularly, from the permit issued by the Transport Authority, it is amply clear that the vehicle was a “goods carrier” [Section 2(14)]. If it is so, obviously, it was a “transport vehicle” falling under Clause (47) of Section 2 of the Act. The District Forum was, therefore, right in considering the question of liability of the Insurance Company on the basis that Tata 709 which met with an accident was “transport vehicle”. 91.2. The Court in Para 40 and Para 41 also distinguished the 1999 judgement in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra) with the following discussion: “40. It is no doubt true that in Ashok Gangadhar [(1999) 6 SCC 620 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1170] in spite of the fact that the driver was holding valid driving licence to ply light motor vehicle (LMV), this Court upheld the claim and ordered the Insurance Company

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to pay compensation. But, in our considered opinion, the learned counsel for the Insurance Company is right in submitting that it was because of the fact that there was neither pleading nor proof as regards the permit issued by the Transport Authority. In absence of pleading and proof, this Court held that, it could not be said that the driver had no valid licence to ply the vehicle which met with an accident and he could not be deprived of the compensation. This is clear if one reads para 11 of the judgment, which reads thus: (SCC p. 626) “11. To reiterate, since a vehicle cannot be used as a transport vehicle on a public road unless there is a permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority for that purpose and since in the instant case there is neither a pleading to that effect by any party nor is there any permit on record, the vehicle in question would remain a light motor vehicle. The respondent also does not say that any permit was granted to the appellant for plying the vehicle as a transport vehicle under Section 66 of the Act. Moreover, on the date of the accident, the vehicle was not carrying any goods and though it could be said to have been designed to be used as a transport vehicle or a goods carrier, it cannot be so held on account of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 66 of the Act.”

41. In our judgment, Ashok Gangadhar [(1999) 6 SCC 620 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1170] did not lay down that the driver holding licence to drive a light motor vehicle need not have an endorsement to drive transport vehicle and yet he can drive such vehicle. It was on the peculiar facts of the case, as the Insurance Company neither pleaded nor proved that the vehicle was transport vehicle by placing on record the permit issued by the Transport Authority that the Insurance Company was held liable.”

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91.3. In Prabhu Lal (supra), this Court correctly noted that the vehicle was a ‘goods carrier’ under Section 2(14) and fell within the definition of ‘transport vehicle’. But then it strikingly overlooked that a ‘transport vehicle’ below 7500 kg unladen weight, would also be covered within the definition of LMV, under Section 2(21). This vital aspect was not discussed and the definition of Section 2(21) was also not adverted to in the judgment. The relevant portion of Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra) where it was held that the definition of ‘light motor vehicle’ can apply to ‘light goods vehicle’ as well as a ‘light transport vehicle’, was also overlooked. Instead the Court distinguished the judgment in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra) on the basis of evidence and pleadings in that case. We have already noted earlier that the reasoning in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra) w.r.t evidence and pleadings was only an additional observation. We must not confuse ‘permit’ with a ‘driving license’ to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle’. The Supreme Court in Prabhu Lal (supra) should have followed the decision in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra) which clearly stated the legal position that a ‘light motor vehicle’ would include a ‘light goods vehicle’.

92Copy pinpoint92. The issue in Annappa Irappa Nesaria (supra), as we have already discussed in Part III of the judgment, was whether a driver of a Matador van weighing 3,500 kgs, with a “goods carriage” permit, could drive a “transport vehicle” with just a LMV license. The van met with an accident before the 1994 amendments to the MV Act, when there was no separate class for “transport vehicle.” The Court ruled that since the accident occurred before the amendment, the driver’s LMV license was valid for the transport vehicle, and the insurance company was liable to pay compensation. However, the Court held that post-amendment, a separate endorsement for driving transport vehicles is required. We are disinclined to accept such a view as we have already discussed in our judgment earlier that both before and after the 1994 amendment, the enhanced requirements for ‘Transport Vehicles’ applied primarily for medium and heavy vehicles, particularly following the 1994 amendment. We have also discussed the unworkability of the broad class of ‘Transport Vehicles’ and the inconsistency this creates with the other provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules, if such an interpretation is adopted.

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93Copy pinpoint93. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir40 (for short “Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir), the case involved an autorickshaw, classified as a three-wheeled transport vehicle, used for goods delivery. In this case, insurance company resisted the accident claim and argued that the driver did not have a valid driving licence for a ‘transport vehicle’. The Supreme Court however reversed the decision of the Gujarat High Court and the MACT and noted that under Section 14(2)(a) of the MV Act, the renewal period for Transport Vehicle licences is three years, compared to twenty years for other vehicle categories. Based on this reasoning, the Court held that the driver was not authorised to drive the autorickshaw as he lacked the appropriate endorsement on his LMV License. 93.1. The above faulty conclusion was reached primarily because the Court failed to take into account Section 2(21), which defines a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV). Since an autorickshaw falls within the weight limit of an LMV, the driver’s LMV licence should have been deemed sufficient. The presumption on account of the validity of license for 20 years could be relevant only for such vehicles which are covered within Medium or Heavy categories.

94Copy pinpoint94. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Angad Kol41(for short “Angad Kol”), the legal heirs of the deceased victim filed claim before the MACT, alleging that the deceased was fatally injured by a mini door auto (a goods carriage vehicle) on 31.10.2004 while she was standing at a location known as ‘Hardi Turning’. The Insurance Company resisted the claim by contending that the driver did not possess a valid and effective licence to operate the vehicle. The Tribunal allowed the claim and directed the payment of Rs. 1,83,000/- holding that the driver’s Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) licence was sufficient. This view was upheld by the High Court. 94.1. Setting aside the above decisions favouring the claim, a two-judge bench of this Court held that the holder of a LMV license must also obtain a separate endorsement for a transport vehicle. It noted that the definition of LMV under Section 2(21) of MV Act would bring within its umbrage a Transport Vehicle but a distinction exists between the two as per Section 3 which

40 [2008] 8 SCR 328 : (2008) 8 SCC 253 41 [2009] 2 SCR 695 : (2009) 11 SCC 356

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deals with the necessity of a driving license. It was thus noted in Para 15 and 16 of the judgment: “15. Section 9 provides for “grant of driving licence”. Section 10 prescribes the form and contents of licences to drive which is to the following effect: “10. Form and contents of licences to drive.— (1) Every learner’s licence and driving licence, except a driving licence issued under Section 18, shall be in such form and shall contain such information as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (2) A learner’s licence or, as the case may be, driving licence shall also be expressed as entitling the holder to drive a motor vehicle of one or more of the following classes, namely: (a)-(c)*** (d) light motor vehicle; (e) transport vehicle; [ Substituted for clauses (e) to (h) by Act 54 of 1994, Section 8 (w.e.f. 14-11-1994).] (i) road roller; (j) motor vehicle of a specified description.” The distinction between a “light motor vehicle” and a “transport vehicle” is, therefore, evident. A transport vehicle may be a light motor vehicle but for the purpose of driving the same, a distinct licence is required to be obtained.

16. The distinction between a “transport vehicle” and a “passenger vehicle” can also be noticed from Section 14 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 provides for duration of a period of three years in case of an effective licence to drive a “transport vehicle” whereas in case of any other licence, it may remain effective for a period of 20 years.” [emphasis supplied]

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94.2. Relying on the judgment in Prabhu Lal (supra) which distinguished Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra), the Court in Angad KoI held that a driver of the mini goods carriage auto holding a LMV license, need not have a license for a Transport Vehicle. The Court also referred to Annappa Irappa Nesaria (supra) to note that the amendment (applicable prospectively) specifically introduced the term ‘Transport Vehicle’ in Section 10. Following this amendment, a specific endorsement for driving a Transport Vehicle would be necessary. It was also noted that since the license was granted for 20 years, a presumption arose that it was for a vehicle other than a transport vehicle. It was ultimately held that the driver did not have a valid driving license, for driving a ‘goods vehicle’ and breach of conditions of the insurance policy was found apparent on the face of record. However, exercising its power under Article 142, this Court directed the Insurance Company to deposit the compensation amount before the Tribunal with liberty to the claimants to withdraw the same providing the right of recovery to the Insurance Company to recover the deposited sum from the owner and the driver of the vehicle. 94.3. Before this Court, the Counsel for the Insurance Companies placed reliance on the above decision in Angad Kol (supra) to argue that there is a clear distinction between ‘transport vehicle’ and ‘light motor vehicle’. Let us examine if such argument deserves our endorsement. 94.4. The decision in Angad Kol (supra) was rendered when Prabhu Lal (supra) and Annapa Irappa Nesaria (supra) held the field. However, as we have noticed earlier, Prabhu Lal (supra) conspicuously failed to notice the definition of LMV in Section 2(21) even though it considered the definition of Transport Vehicle. It also wrongly distinguished Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra), where the legal position was clearly stated as under: “10. The definition of “light motor vehicle” as given in clause (21) of Section 2 of the Act can apply only to a “light goods vehicle” or a “light transport vehicle”. A “light motor vehicle” otherwise has to be covered by the definition of “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” as

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given in clause (28) of Section 2 of the Act. A light motor vehicle cannot always mean a light goods carriage. Light motor vehicle can be a non-transport vehicle as well.” 94.5. The Court in Angad Kol (supra) overlooked the crucial legal analysis in Para 9 and 10 and instead distinguished Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra) by relying on Para 11 where the Court only provided additional reasoning on the requirement of a ‘permit’. A ‘driving license’ is different from a ‘permit’. The conflation of the two terms led to the confusion. While a driving license relates to a driver’s qualification, a ‘permit’ relates to the vehicle’s operational classification. 94.6. The Court in Angad Kol (supra) also relied on Annapa Irappa Nesaria (supra), which held that the introduction of Transport Vehicles post-amendment would imply that a specific endorsement would be needed for Transport Vehicles. At the cost of repetition, even otherwise, a comprehensive reading of the MV Act and Rules shows that the specific mention of the term Transport Vehicle in different places of the Act and Rules for the purpose of driving license would reasonably be applicable only for those Transport Vehicles, that fall above the weight limit prescribed in Section 2(21) for LMVs.

95Copy pinpoint95. In S. Iyyapan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,42 the 2-judge bench relied on inter alia, Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra) and Annappa Irappa Nesaria (supra). The case stemmed from an accident involving a Mahindra Maxi Cab (a light motor vehicle) that led to the death of one person. The deceased’s wife filed a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 2,42,000/- in compensation and held that a person holding a LMV License was entitled to drive a Mahindra Maxi Cab. The High Court, however reversed this decision noting that the vehicle was used as a taxi and hence it was a commercial vehicle. It held that a separate license is necessary for driving a commercial vehicle. The Supreme court however restored the decision of MACT stating that the driver with a LMV license was legally competent to drive the Max Cab, used as a taxi. The Court additionally considered Sections 146, 147, and 149 of

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the MV Act and noted that under certain circumstances, insurers could limit their liability, but they were still bound to pay compensation to third parties. The right of third parties to compensation was protected by law, and the insurer could later recover the amount from the insured if any policy violation occurred. The Supreme Court categorically held that since the driver had a valid LMV licence, and the Mahindra Maxi Cab was classified as an LMV, the insurance company was liable to pay the compensation. The following was the relevant discussion for what appears to be the correct conclusion in S Iyyappan (supra):- “18. In the instant case, admittedly the driver was holding a valid driving licence to drive light motor vehicle. There is no dispute that the motor vehicle in question, by which accident took place, was Mahindra Maxi Cab. Merely because the driver did not get any endorsement in the driving licence to drive Mahindra Maxi Cab, which is a light motor vehicle, the High Court has committed grave error of law in holding that the insurer is not liable to pay compensation because the driver was not holding the licence to drive the commercial vehicle. The impugned judgment [ Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1016 of 2002, order dated 31-10-2008 (Mad)] is, therefore, liable to be set aside.”

96Copy pinpoint96. Similarly, in Kulwant Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd,43 the question for consideration was whether the Insurance Company had recovery rights for breach of conditions of insurance policy when the driver possesses a valid driving licence for driving light vehicle but fails to obtain endorsement for driving goods vehicle? In that case, the L/Rs of the deceased had filed a claim before the MACT following a road accident death on 8.10.2005. The deceased was driving a tempo which was hit by a Tata-407 Tempo. The tribunal held that the claimants were entitled to compensation. The High Court, however, held that there was a breach of policy conditions and the insurance company was entitled to recover the compensation amount from the owner of the vehicle. 96.1. The 2-judge bench of the Supreme Court opined that the issue stands covered by the judgment in S. Iyyapan (supra). It therefore held that the insurance company could not

43 (2015) 2 SCC 186

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avoid liability merely because, the driver did not have an endorsmement to drive a commercial vehicle. 96.2. In view of the reasons assigned by us and as rightly noted in Mukund Dewangan (2017), the decisions in S. Iyyapan (supra) and Kulwant Singh (supra) were decided correctly. However, as regards the reliance on Annappa Irappa Nesaria (supra), post-amendment in Section 10 also, the law continues to be the same for vehicles falling within the LMV category. 96.3. Therefore, the judgments where the Court has held that a separate endorsement for a ‘transport vehicle’ may not be necessary i.e. in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra), Nagashetty (supra), S. Iyyapan (supra) and Kulwant Singh (supra) are found to align with our reasoning and interpretation and they are therefore upheld. In consequence, the three judgments which concluded otherwise i.e. Prabhu Lal (supra), Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir (supra) and Angad Kol (supra) are overruled based on the reasoning provided by us in this judgment. The decision in Annappa Irappa Nesaria (supra) is partially overruled to the extent that the position even post-amendment would remain the same. VI. Is Mukund Dewangan (2017) per incuriam?

97Copy pinpoint97. Shifting gears, we may recall that the decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) was doubted for not noticing certain provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules. These include, inter alia, Section 4(1), 7, 14, the second proviso to Section 15 and Section 180 and 181 of the MV Act. It was therefore argued before this Court that the said decision is per incuriam. To begin with, it is useful to refer to some decisions that have expounded on the principle of per incuriam.

98Copy pinpoint98. The term per incuriam is a Latin term which means ‘by inadvertence’ or ‘lack of care’. English Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. In Halsbury’s Laws of England,44 the concept of per incuriam was explained as under:

44 Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 26: Judgment and Orders: Judicial Decisions as Authorities (pp. 297-98, para 578)

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“A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, in which case it must decide which case to follow;45 or when it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in which case it must follow that decision; or when the decision is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force.46 A decision should not be treated as given per incuriam, however, simply because of a deficiency of parties,47 or because the court had not the benefit of the best argument,48 and, as a general rule, the only cases in which decisions should be held to be given per incuriam are those given in ignorance of some inconsistent statute or binding authority.49 Even if a decision of the Court of Appeal has misinterpreted a previous decision of the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal must follow its previous decision and leave the House of Lords to rectify the mistake.” [emphasis supplied]

99Copy pinpoint99. Lord Evershed in Morelle Ld. V. Wakeling50 (for short “Morelle”) explained the concept as under: “As a general rule the only cases in which decisions should be held to have been given per incuriam are those of decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned; so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found, on that account, to be demonstrably wrong” [emphasis supplied]

45 Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 KB 718 at 729 : (1944) 2 All ER 293 at 300 46 Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. (1941) 1 KB 675 : (1941) 2 All ER 47 Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 1 All ER 708 (CA) 48 Bryers v. Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd. (1957) 1 QB 134 : (1956) 3 All ER 560 (CA) Per Singleton, L.J., affirmed in Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd. v. Bryers1958 AC 485 : (1957) 3 All ER 572.] 49 A. and J. Mucklow Ltd. v. IRC, 1954 Ch 615 : (1954) 2 All ER 508 (CA), Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 1 All ER 708 (CA), see also Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union, 1954 Ch 479 : (1954) 1 All ER 822 (CA) 50 Morelle LD v. Wakeling (1955) 2 QB 379 (Court of Appeal).

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100Copy pinpoint100. A few months after the decision in Morelle (supra), the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar51 adopted the per incuriam principle. It held that while Article 141 states that the Supreme Court’s decisions are “binding on all courts within the territory of India,” this does not extend to binding the Supreme Court itself, which remains free to reconsider its judgments in appropriate cases.

101Copy pinpoint101. In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal,52 reflecting on the principle of per incuriam, this Court speaking through Krishna Iyer J. held thus: “7. Certainty of the law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts — all flowering from the same principle — converge to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases. We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission. No such situation presents itself here and we do not embark on the principle of judgment per incuriam.” [emphasis supplied]

102Copy pinpoint102. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,53 the Constitution Bench of this Court made the following observations: “42. It appears that when this Court gave the aforesaid directions on 16-2-1984, for the disposal of the case against the appellant by the High Court, the directions were given oblivious of the relevant provisions or law and the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar case [State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1952 SC 75 : 1952 Cri LJ 510] . See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 26, p. 297, para 578 and p. 300, the relevant Notes 8, 11 and 15; Dias on Jurisprudence, 5th Edn., pp.

51 AIR 1955 SC 661 52 [1975] 3 SCR 834 : (1975) 2 SCC 232 53 [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602

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128 and 130; Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 KB 718 (CA)] Also see the observations of Lord Goddard in Moore v. Hewitt [Moore v. Hewitt, 1947 KB 831] and Nicholas v. Penny [Nicholas v. Penny (1950) 2 KB 466] . “Per incuriam” are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. See Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling [Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 2 WLR 672 (CA)] . Also see State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. [State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., 1985 Supp SCC 280 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 538] We are of the opinion that in view of the clear provisions of Section 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, these directions were legally wrong.”

103Copy pinpoint103. In MCD v. Gurnam Kaur,54 A 3-Judge bench of this Court held that: “11. ... A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute.”

104Copy pinpoint104. In Punjab Land Development & Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Labour Court, 55 a five-judge bench of this Court said the following in the context of the principle of per incuriam for ignoring statutory provisions :- “43. As regards the judgments of the Supreme Court allegedly rendered in ignorance of a relevant constitutional provision or other statutory provisions on the subjects covered by them, it is true that the Supreme Court may not be said to “declare the law” on those subjects if the relevant provisions were not really present to its mind. But in this case Sections 25-G and 25-H were not directly

54 [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 929 : (1989) 1 SCC 101 55 [1990] 3 SCR 111 : (1990) 3 SCC 682

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attracted and even if they could be said to have been attracted in laying down the major premise, they were to be interpreted consistently with the subject or context. The problem of judgment per incuriam when actually arises, should present no difficulty as this Court can lay down the law afresh, if two or more of its earlier judgments cannot stand together.” [emphasis supplied]

105Copy pinpoint105. In N.Bhargavan Pillai v. State of Kerala,56 a two-judge bench speaking through Arijit Pasayat J. noted that a judgment cannot be treated as a binding precedent, if it fails to notice a specific statutory bar: “14. Coming to the plea relating to benefits under the Probation Act, it is to be noted that Section 18 of the said Act clearly rules out application of the Probation Act to a case covered under Section 5(2) of the Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the accused-appellant’s plea relating to grant of benefit under the Probation Act. The decision in Bore Gowda case [(2000) 10 SCC 260 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1244] does not even indicate that Section 18 of the Probation Act was taken note of. In view of the specific statutory bar the view, if any, expressed without analysing the statutory provision cannot in our view be treated as a binding precedent and at the most is to be considered as having been rendered per incuriam. Looked at from any angle, the appeal is sans merit and deserves dismissal which we direct.”

106Copy pinpoint106. In State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan,57 this Court reiterated: “67. Thus, “per incuriam” are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some statutory provision or authority binding on the W.P.(C)Nos.7785, 7851, court concerned, or a statement of law caused by inadvertence or conclusion that has been arrived at without application of mind or proceeded without any reason so that in such a case some part of the decision or some step in the

56 [2004] Suppl. 1 SCR 444 : (2004) 13 SCC 217 57 [2011] 11 SCR 678 : (2011) 7 SCC 639

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reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong.”

107Copy pinpoint107. Subsequently, in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd.58 this Court observed: “A prior decision of the Supreme Court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points of law in a later case. In exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, the principle of per incuriam may apply. Unless it is a glaring case of obtrusive omission, it is not desirable to depend on the principle of judgment ‘per incuriam’. It has to be shown that some part of the decision was based on a reasoning which was demonstrably wrong, for applying the principle of per incuriam.” [emphasis supplied]

108Copy pinpoint108. In State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer,59 the legal dilemma was noted as under: “10. … Easy course of saying that earlier decision was rendered per incuriam is not permissible and the matter will have to be resolved only in two ways — either to follow the earlier decision or refer the matter to a larger Bench to examine the issue, in case it is felt that earlier decision is not correct on merits.”

109Copy pinpoint109. In Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra,60 the Court expanded the definition of per incuriam in the Indian context and noted that: “A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a Co-equal or Larger Bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the

58 [2001] 3 SCR 479 : (2001) 6 SCC 356 59 (2003) 5 SCC 448 60 [2014] 4 SCR 486 : (2014) 16 SCC 623

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views of this Court. It must immediately be clarified that the per incuriam rule is strictly and correctly applicable to the ratio decidendi and not to obiter dicta.”

110Copy pinpoint110. In a recent decision in Shah Faesal v. Union of India,61 a five judge bench of this Court reiterated that the principle of per incuriam only applies on the ratio of the case.

111Copy pinpoint111. After having examined the above decisions, when dealing with the ignorance of a statutory provision, we may bear in mind the following principles. These may not however be exhaustive: (i) A decision is per incuriam only when the overlooked statutory provision or legal precedent is central to the legal issue in question and might have led to a different outcome if those overlooked provisions were considered. It must be an inconsistent provision and a glaring case of obtrusive omission. (ii) The doctrine of per incuriam applies strictly to the ratio decidendi and does not apply to obiter dicta. (iii) If a court doubts the correctness of a precedent, the appropriate step is to either follow the decision or refer it to a larger Bench for reconsideration. (iv) It has to be shown that some part of the decision was based on a reasoning which was demonstrably wrong, for applying the principle of per incuriam. In exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight, a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, the principle of per incuriam may apply.

112Copy pinpoint112. Applying the above principles to the case at hand, let us now apply our mind to the reference made in the context of the decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017). The following questions were referred: "1. What is the meaning to be given to the definition of “light motor vehicle” as defined in Section 2(21) of the MV Act? Whether transport vehicles are excluded from it?

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2. Whether “transport vehicle” and “omnibus” the “gross vehicle weight” of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg would be a “light motor vehicle” and also motor car or tractor or a roadroller, “unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg and holder of a licence to drive the class of “light motor vehicle” as provided in Section 10(2)(d) would be competent to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the “gross vehicle weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg or a motor car or tractor or roadroller, the “unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg?

3. What is the effect of the amendment made by virtue of Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14-11-1994 while substituting clauses (e) to (h) of Section 10(2) which contained “medium goods vehicle”, “medium passenger motor vehicle”, “heavy goods vehicle” and “heavy passenger motor vehicle” by “transport vehicle”? Whether insertion of expression “transport vehicle” under Section 10(2)(e) is related to said substituted classes only or it also excluded transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class from the purview of Sections 10(2)(d) and 2(41) of the Act?

4. What is the effect of amendment of Form 4 as to the operation of the provisions contained in Section 10 as amended in the year 1994 and whether the procedure to obtain the driving licence for transport vehicle of the class of “light motor vehicle” has been changed?”

113Copy pinpoint113. The judgment in Mukund Dewangan (2017), shows that the 3 Judge Bench considered Section 2(21), 2(47) read with Section 10 of MV Act. The Court also examined the legislative intent behind the 1994 amendment to Section 10, noting that while the amendment introduced the term “transport vehicle” under Section 10(2)(e), it did not amend the definition of LMVs under Section 2(21). It was further observed that the newly inserted provision of Section 10(2)(e) would only subsume those classes of vehicles that were contained in Sections 10(2)(e) to 10(2)(h) of the un-amended Act i.e. medium goods vehicle, medium passenger vehicle, heavy goods vehicle and

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heavy passenger vehicle, and which now stand deleted by virtue of the amendment of 1994. Since no amendment was carried out in Section 10(2)(d) of the Act which contains the class for ‘Light Motor Vehicles’, the scope of Section 10(2)(d) would remain intact as is contained in Section 2(21) of the Act, which is to say that LMV would include ‘Transport Vehicles’ in cases where the gross weight of such vehicle is less than 7500 Kgs. It further noted that the syllabus does not provide separate training for transport vehicles but includes them under the relevant vehicle class based on the vehicle’s weight. It considered Rule 75 which deals with ‘State Register of motor vehicles’ as provided in Form 41. Form 41 categorizes vehicles on the basis of, inter alia, gross vehicle weight, unladen weight etc. Likewise, the Court observed that Section 41, pertaining to registration, mandates the inclusion of relevant information as specified in Form 20, which outlines details such as the class of vehicle, gross vehicle weight, and unladen weight, among other factors.

114Copy pinpoint114. The court analysed those key provisions of the Act and Rules and reached a conclusion which is aligned with the discussion and opinion in this judgment. It rightly concluded as under: "(i) ‘Light motor vehicle’ as defined in section 2(21) of the Act would include a transport vehicle as per the weight prescribed in section 2(21) read with section 2(15) and 2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded from the definition of the light motor vehicle by virtue of Amendment Act No.54/1994. (ii) A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg. would be a light motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or a road roller, ‘unladen weight’ of which does not exceed 7500 kg. and holder of a driving licence to drive class of “light motor vehicle” as provided in section 10(2)(d) is competent to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg. or a motor car or tractor or road-roller, the “unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg. That is to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light motor

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vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued under section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54/1994 and 28.3.2001 in the form. (iii) The effect of the amendment made by virtue of Act No.54/1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 while substituting clauses (e) to (h) of section 10(2) which contained “medium goods vehicle” in section 10(2)(e), medium passenger motor vehicle in section 10(2)(f), heavy goods vehicle in section 10(2)(g) and “heavy passenger motor vehicle” in section 10(2)(h) with expression ‘transport vehicle’ as substituted in section 10(2)(e) related only to the aforesaid substituted classes only. It does not exclude transport vehicle, from the purview of section 10(2)(d) and section 2(41) of the Act i.e. light motor vehicle. (iv) The effect of amendment of Form 4 by insertion of “transport vehicle” is related only to the categories which were substituted in the year 1994 and the procedure to obtain driving licence for transport vehicle of class of “light motor vehicle” continues to be the same as it was and has not been changed and there is no requirement to obtain separate endorsement to drive transport vehicle, and if a driver is holding licence to drive light motor vehicle, he can drive transport vehicle of such class without any endorsement to that effect.”

115Copy pinpoint115. It is true that Mukund Dewangan (2017) did not analyse the provisions that distinguish transport and non-transport vehicles, as noted in the reference orders. The statutory scheme of MV is more nuanced than the simple weight-based distinction made in the said judgment. Moreover, the Court failed to notice Section 31(2) and 31(3) which specify ‘Transport’ and ‘Non-Transport’ vehicles. However, the judgment gave due consideration to the important statutory provisions. We have carefully looked at the relevant and the wide ranging provisions in our analysis in this decision. A harmonious interpretation, as we have explained earlier, would lead us to the same conclusion but fortified with some additional reasoning based on the consideration of all the relevant provisions. The overlooked

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provisions would not, in our considered opinion, alter the eventual pronouncement. Importantly, we do not notice any glaring error or omission that would alter the outcome of the case. Therefore, the ratio in Mukund Dewangan (2017) should not be disturbed by applying the principles of per incuriam. F. IMPACT ON ROAD SAFETY

116Copy pinpoint116. The counsel for the insurance Companies raised concerns regarding road safety, arguing that if the present law in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is not interfered with, unfit drivers will start plying Transport Vehicles putting at risk the lives of thousands of people. One of the supporting Intervenors placed reliance on Para 57 of the decision of this Court in Savelife Foundation v. Union of India62 where this Court while exercising its public interest litigation jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India held that the Right to life under Article 21 also includes the right to safety of persons travelling on the road. Per contra, in the intervention application filed on behalf of auto drivers, it was argued that the members of the Applicant Intervenor have been permitted to operate taxis and motorcabs while holding an LMV licence for the past almost 6 years. Reconsideration of the same is not merely an issue of insurance coverage, rather it directly pertains to the livelihood of those operating transport vehicles of the LMV class, thereby giving rise to a fair consideration of their rights under Article 19(1)(g). It was submitted that if this Court upsets Mukund Dewangan (2017), which it should not, a transition period of 12-24 months be provided.

117Copy pinpoint117. The above submissions will now require our consideration. It is true that in its PIL jurisdiction, this Court has passed orders in a myriad of cases including elevating the right of road safety to a fundamental right. It has also taken over policy areas63 by appointing Commissioners to gather facts or to take expert advice in the form of reports. However, this Court should be conscious that this is neither a Public Interest Litigation jurisdiction nor is the Court testing the constitutional validity of any of the provisions. Moreover, no empirical

62 (2016) 7 SCC 194 63 See Ashok H Desai and S Muralidhar, ‘Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems’ in B.N Kirpal and others (eds), Supreme but not Infallible – Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India (Oxford University Press 2000)

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data has been produced before us to show that road accidents in India have increased as a direct result of drivers with LMV license, plying a transport vehicle of LMV class of vehicles whose gross weight is within 7500 Kg. Road safety is indeed an important objective of the MV Act but our reasoning must not be founded on unverified assumptions without any empirical data. The dangers of reasoning without empirical data64 and beyond the statutory scheme of the Act must be avoided. While we are mindful of issues of road safety, the task of crafting policy lies within the domain of the legislature. As a constitutional court, it is not our role to dictate policy decisions or rewrite laws. We must be mindful of the institutional limitation to address such concerns.

118Copy pinpoint118. The complexities surrounding the question of whether the Court should examine not only the existing laws and definitions, but also the broader underlying issues of policy have been vividly captured in the following words from Salmond on Jurisprudence65: “Rules, which are originally designed to fit social needs, develop into concepts, which then proceed to take on a life of their own to the detriment of legal development. The resulting “jurisprudence of concepts” produces a slot-machine approach to law whereby new points posing questions of social policy are decided, not by reference to the underlying social situation, but by reference to the meaning and definition of the legal concepts involved. This formalistic a priori approach confines the law in a strait-jacket instead of permitting it to expand to meet the new needs and requirements of changing society. ……In such cases Courts should examine not only the existing laws and legal concepts, but also the broader underlying issues of policy. In fact presently, judges are seen to be paying increasing attention to the possible effects of their decision one way or the other…… Such an approach is to be welcomed, but it also warrants two comments. First, judicial inquiry into the general effects of a proposed decision tends itself to be of a fairly speculative nature.

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Secondly, Too much regard for policy and too little for legal consistency may result in a confusing and illogical complex of contrary decisions; and while it is true that ‘the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience’ and that we should not wish it otherwise, nevertheless we should remember that ‘no system of law can be workable if it has not got logic at the root of it” [emphasis supplied]

119Copy pinpoint119. What follows from the above is that wherever possible, the Court must attempt to be consistent in its approach. The principle of stare decisis, which mandates that courts adhere to established precedents, plays a crucial role in maintaining legal stability and predictability. The finding in Mukund Dewangan (2017) need not be disturbed owing to speculative concerns of road safety that intersect with broader policy issues.

120Copy pinpoint120. We may recall that during the course of the present proceeding, the Central Government was arrayed and the learned Attorney General was requested to obtain instructions on whether the legislative wing would wish to examine and undertake an appropriate amendment on the legal question of whether a person holding a driving license for a light motor vehicle is entitled to legally drive a ‘transport vehicle’ of a specified weight. An order to this effect was passed in light of the possible social impact of the reference, particularly on road safety and the livelihood issue. Pursuant to this, the learned Attorney General submitted a note, inter alia, suggesting multiple amendments including a further classification of LMVs into LMV Class 1 and LMV Class 2, each with different weight thresholds.

121Copy pinpoint121. Had the Parliament acted sooner to amend the MV Act and clearly differentiated between classes, categories and types, much of the uncertainty surrounding driving licenses could have been addressed, reducing the need for frequent litigation and an unclear legal terrain. The confusion and inconsistency in judicial decisions continued to persist for 25 years starting from the 1999 decision in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra).

122Copy pinpoint122. Road safety is a serious public health issue globally. It is crucial to mention that in India, over 1.7 lakh persons66 were killed in road

66 Dipak K Dash, Accidents killed 474 on daily average in 2023 (October 20, 2024) <https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/india/accidents-killed-474-daily-on-average-in-2023/articleshow/114384171.cms>

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