NEYCER (INDIA) LTD. v. GMB CERAMICS LTD.

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2026 INSC 1251 · Not reported in the Supreme Court Reports
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2026 INSC 1251 · Not reported in the Supreme Court Reports

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Judgment

2026 INSC 1251 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5937-5938 OF 2021

NEYCER (INDIA) LTD. … APPELLANT

GMB CERAMICS LTD. … RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. These civil appeals, by special leave granted on 21 st September, 2021,

stem from a common judgment and order dated 24 th September, 20181

passed by a Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta 2. In exercise of

its intra-court appellate jurisdiction, the Division Bench allowed the

appeal3 preferred by the respondent, GMB Ceramics Ltd.4, and dismissed

the cross-appeal5 preferred by the appellant, Neycer (India) Ltd.6

[formerly Neiveli Ceramics and Refractories Limited (NCRL)].

Signature Not Verified

1 impugned judgment Digitally signed by MANIK KUMAR Date: 2026.11.19 19:25:40 IST Reason: 2 High Court 3 APO No. 34 of 2016 4 GMB 5 APOT No. 42 of 2016 6 Neycer

Page 1 of 19

2. In the process, the impugned judgment reversed the judgment and

order dated 14th October, 2015 passed by a Single Judge of the High

Court on Neycer’s application7 under Sections 30 and 33 of the

Arbitration Act, 19408—which had restricted the arbitral award dated

23rd June, 19999 passed by the Umpire to a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/-

(Rupees two crore)—and restored the Umpire’s award in its entirety, i.e.,

Rs.11,69,62,910/- (Rupees eleven crore sixty-nine lakh sixty-two

thousand nine hundred and ten) together with interest @ 15% per

annum.

3. Learned senior counsel Mr. Amit Sibal and Mr. Sanjiv Sen appearing for

Neycer in the two appeals, while assailing the impugned judgment as

well as the award, addressed us at considerable length, setting out the

facts of the case and placing reliance upon several precedents relevant

to the issues arising in these appeals. Per contra, Mr. Siddharth

Bhatnagar, learned senior counsel appearing for GMB, too, advanced

detailed arguments in support of the award of the Umpire, since upheld

by the impugned judgment.

4. Facts leading to the arbitration culminating in the award of the Umpire

have been adequately and lucidly referred to in the judgment of the

Single Judge as well as the impugned judgment; hence, to avoid

prolixity, it is considered unnecessary to reiterate them here.

7 G.A. No. 4026 of 2000 in Award Case No. 32 of 2000 8 the Act 9 award

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5. Having bestowed our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival

submissions and on perusal of the materials on record, we find that the

controversy in these appeals rests upon four principal issues:

a. Whether the Division Bench erred in reversing the Single Judge’s

finding that GMB’s claims10 in the arbitral reference were restricted

to Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) and that the Umpire

exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding sums beyond that limit?

b. Whether the Division Bench erred in reversing the Single Judge’s

setting aside of the award under Schedule ‘C’ of GMB’s claims on

merits?

c. Whether the Umpire’s interpretation of Clause 20 of the Agreement

dated 29th November, 1986 (later amended on 26th June, 1987)11

warranted the award to be set aside in part by the Single Judge?

d. Whether sustaining of the award to the extent of Rs.2,00,00,000/-

(Rupees two crore) (comprising Schedules ‘A’, ‘D’, and part of ‘E’ of

GMB’s claims) by the Single Judge warrants any interference under

Section 30 of the Act or on account of subsequent developments?

6. The parameters of judicial review under Section 30 of the Act are well

settled. A court hearing objections to an arbitral award does not sit in

appeal over the findings of the arbitrator or umpire on the merits, nor

does it re-appraise the evidence. However, a clear and vital distinction

10 Statement of Claim dated 16th April, 1990, claiming a sum of Rs.8,82,73,000/- (Rupees eight crore eighty-two lakh seventy-three thousand), subsequently amended, ultimately aggregating to Rs.17,16,57,000/- (Rupees seventeen crore sixteen lakh fifty-seven thousand) under six Schedules. 11 the Agreement

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exists in law between an error within jurisdiction and an error in excess

of jurisdiction. As exposited by this Court in Sudarsan Trading Co. v.

State of Kerala12, Associated Engineering Co. v. Govt. of A.P.13,

and Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Annapurna Construction 14, an

arbitrator or umpire is a creature of the contract and the reference; he

has no power, apart from what the parties have conferred upon him. If

he commits an error in the construction of the contract while remaining

within its parameters, it is an error within his jurisdiction and cannot be

interfered with unless it is erroneous and apparent on the face of the

award. Conversely, if he wanders outside the contract or enlarges the

scope of the reference to decide matters not submitted to him, he

commits a jurisdictional error going to the root of his authority. As Lord

Parmoor observed in Attorney-General for Manitoba v. Kelly 15

[quoted with approval in Associated Engineering Co. (supra)]:

It would be impossible to allow an umpire to arrogate to himself jurisdiction over a question which, on the true construction of the submission, was not referred to him. An umpire cannot widen the area of his jurisdiction by holding, contrary to the fact, that the matter which he affects to decide is within the submission of the parties. (emphasis ours)

7. A dispute as to the jurisdiction of the umpire or the scope of the

submission is a matter that lies outside the award and must be

determined by the Court on an objective examination of the documents

constituting the reference.

12 (1989) 2 SCC 38 13 (1991) 4 SCC 93 14 (2003) 8 SCC 154 15 (1922) 1 A.C. 268

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8. In the impugned judgment, the Division Bench erred in equating the

jurisdictional question of the scope of the reference with a mere matter

of “plausible reading” of documents on merits, and in declining to

interfere on the ground that the Umpire’s construction of the pre-

reference correspondence was a “plausible” one. Umpire, it is settled

law, cannot confer jurisdiction upon himself by misconstruing the terms

of the reference.

9. When the pre-reference correspondence exchanged between the parties

is examined, the scope of GMB’s reference to arbitration is

unambiguous:

a. Before the invocation of arbitration, GMB had, following its letter

dated 9th August, 198916 complaining of project overrun, repeatedly

quantified its project cost overrun at Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two

crore) in its messages through telex dated 28 th August, 198917, 4th

September, 198918, and 11th September, 198919.

b. After Neycer invoked the arbitration clause by its letter dated 19 th

September, 198920 in respect of its own claims and called upon GMB

to nominate its arbitrator and desist from using Neycer’s logo/brand

name, GMB responded by a telex dated 6th October, 198921 that it

Footnotes

16 Ext. G-54
17 Ext. G-57
18 Ext. G-63
19 Ext. G-66
20 Ext. G-67
21 Ext. G-68

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would henceforth not put Neycer’s brand name on its wares to

minimise complications, and categorically stated:

NOW THE MATTER BOILS DOWN TO OUR CLAIM FOR OVERRUN AMOUNT ONLY FOR WHICH WE WILL DECIDE ABOUT THE NAME OF ARBITRATOR AND LET U (sic, YOU) KNOW IN DUE COURSE.

c. This was followed by GMB’s telex dated 19th October, 198922, the

foundational document whereby GMB nominated its arbitrator,

specifically defining the reference as:

FOR ADJUDICATION OF OUR CLAIM FOR OVER RS. 2 CRORES (RS. TWO CRORES) IN RESPECT OF ALL OUR LOSSES SUSTAINED AND IS BEING SUSTAINED BY US DUE TO VARIOUS BREACHES COMMITTED AND STILL BEING COMMITTED BY YR (sic, YOU) UNDER THE SAID AGREEMENT.

d. In its subsequent letter dated 24th October, 198923 (which was sent

five days after nomination of its arbitrator, thereby constituting the

arbitral tribunal), GMB reiterated that it was claiming the project

overrun of over Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) from Neycer,

while stating in respect of marketing assistance and non-use of the

brand name that it “reserves” its rights to claim losses and damages.

10. As rightly held by the Single Judge, reading these communications

together and separately leaves no scope for doubt that GMB nominated

its arbitrator for the adjudication of a quantified claim of

Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) in respect of all losses sustained

by it. Once the reference was crystallised by the appointment of GMB’s

arbitrator per Ext. G-71 for a claim of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two

crore), GMB could not unilaterally enlarge the scope of the reference by

Footnotes

22 Ext. G-71
23 Ext. G-72

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a subsequent letter, i.e., Ext. G-72. Moreover, on facts, a mere

“reservation of rights” to claim damages in the future did not constitute

a reference of an existing dispute to arbitration.

11. The decisions in Juggilal Kamlapat v. N.V. Internationale Crediet-

En-Handels Vereeninging ‘Rotterdam’24 and State of Orissa v.

Asis Ranjan Mohanty25, relied upon by GMB and the Division Bench,

are clearly distinguishable. In Juggilal Kamlapat (supra), the reference

was a general submission of a dispute regarding breach of contract and

a consequential difference in price, without any pecuniary cap. In Asis

Ranjan Mohanty (supra), this Court expressly noted that the

memorandum of reference and the order of the Subordinate Judge

therein did not confine the reference only to the amount initially

mentioned in the contractor’s letter. In the present case, GMB itself

defined and limited the pecuniary ambit of its reference to

Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rs. two crore), as per Exts. G-68 and G-71.

12. Equally unacceptable are the two subsidiary reasons assigned by the

Division Bench: first, that Neycer’s invocation letter dated 19 th

September, 1989 per Ext. G-67 kept the scope of reference wide open

by referring to “the said disputes and any other dispute that may be

raised between the parties”; and second, that Neycer could not object

to the scope of reference having contested all of GMB’s claims on merits.

24 AIR 1955 Cal 65 25 (1999) 9 SCC 249

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13. Neycer’s invocation letter was a notice under the arbitration clause

calling upon GMB to nominate its arbitrator to decide Neycer’s disputes

and any counter-disputes GMB might raise; in answer thereto, GMB itself

specified and restricted the dispute raised by it to Rs.2,00,00,000/-

(Rupees two crore). Further, Neycer had from the very inception—in

paragraph 25 of its Rebuttal Statement and paragraph 2(f) of its

Additional Counter Statement—expressly objected that GMB’s claims

beyond Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) were outside the scope of

the reference. Contesting claims on merits without prejudice to a

pleaded jurisdictional objection does not amount to waiver or confer

jurisdiction by acquiescence.

14. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the Single Judge that the

Umpire acted in excess of his jurisdiction in entertaining claims beyond

Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore). Consequently, the first issue is

decided against GMB.

15. Turning to the second issue: under Schedule ‘C’, GMB claimed

Rs.3,50,00,000/- (Rupees three crore fifty lakh) as damages for being

prevented from using the logo/brand name “GMB-NEYCER”, asserting

that it would require Rs.70,00,000/- (Rupees seventy lakh) per annum

for five years in advertising expenditure to build its own brand image.

Relying solely upon an estimate dated 3 rd April, 1990 prepared by an

advertising agency, Sista’s Pvt. Ltd.26, the Umpire assessed the required

expenditure at Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees fifty lakh) per annum for five

26 Ext. G-99

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years, i.e., Rs.2,50,00,000/- (Rupees two crore fifty lakh) and, after

deducting Rs.46,57,000/- (Rupees forty-six lakh fifty-seven thousand)

towards 2% royalty payable to Neycer under Clause 15 on projected net

sales, awarded Rs.2,03,43,000/- (Rupees two crore three lakh forty-

three thousand) to GMB.

16. Quite apart from the fact that this claim fell outside the reference limit

of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) and that GMB had in Ext. G-68

agreed not to use the brand name and in Ext. G-72 merely reserved its

right to claim damages, the Single Judge rightly set aside the award

under Schedule ‘C’ on the merits as wholly speculative, perverse and

based on no evidence.

17. When the Umpire made his award in June 1999, the five-year period

from the commencement of commercial production (December 1989 to

December 1994) had long expired. As demonstrated by GMB’s own

audited balance sheets and annual reports on record (i.e., Exts. N-94,

N-74, G-110, and G-115), GMB’s actual expenditure on advertisement,

publicity, and film expenses across the entire five-year period from

1988-89 to 1992-93 aggregated to only Rs.35,31,794/- (Rupees thirty-

five lakh thirty-one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four) while

GMB’s plant, in fact, remained closed from October 1991 to August 1993.

Nobody from Sista’s Pvt. Ltd. was examined to prove the estimate dated

3rd April, 1990. Once the five-year period had elapsed and actual figures

of expenditure were available on record in GMB’s own audited accounts,

damages could not be awarded based on a hypothetical estimate made

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in 1990. We may, in this behalf, profitably refer to the decisions of this

Court in ONGC v. Off-Shore Enterprises Inc. 27 and Unibros v. All

India Radio28. Notably, while disallowing GMB’s claim under Schedule

‘B’ (i.e., Research & Technology Development Expenditure), the Umpire

himself accepted Neycer’s contention that mere anticipated

expenditures unsupported by evidence of actual expenditure could not

be awarded; yet, the Umpire adopted a diametrically opposite yardstick

for Schedule ‘C’. Since GMB’s actual expenditure of Rs.35,31,794/-

(Rupees thirty-five lakh thirty-one thousand seven hundred and ninety-

four) was less than the 2% royalty of Rs.46,57,000/- (Rupees forty-six

lakh fifty-seven thousand) deductible in favour of Neycer, GMB suffered

no net loss under this head. The Division Bench was clearly in error in

reversing the Single Judge’s well-reasoned interference with Schedule

‘C’ of GMB’s claims.

18. Adverting now to the third issue concerning Clause 20 of the Agreement,

Mr. Sibal particularly emphasised the Umpire’s mis-reading of the said

clause. He contended that the manner in which the contractual

stipulations were construed amounted to rewriting the contract at the

hands of the Umpire. He painstakingly took us through the award in

which Clause 20 was interpreted. Since much turns on Clause 20, we

deem it appropriate to reproduce the same herein:

20. TIME SCHEDULE Subject to the delivery of the equipment, the consultants shall endeavour to commission the plant within 18 calendar months

27 (2011) 14 SCC 147 28 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1366

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from the date of sanction of the term loan by financial institutions.

19. Mr. Sibal contended that a plain reading of Clause 20 makes it clear that

the time schedule envisaged for Neycer was contingent upon the

delivery of equipment by GMB, which was delayed; and that by using

the expression “shall endeavour”, the parties intended that Neycer was

only required to make an earnest effort rather than undertake an

absolute obligation to commission the plant within a rigid timeframe. He

further submitted that under the Agreement—for which Neycer was to

receive a know-how and technical services fee of Rs.20,00,000 (Rupees

twenty lakh), out of which Rs.18,00,000/- (Rupees eighteen lakh) was

to be reinvested in GMB’s equity share capital, leaving a net cash

consideration of only Rs.2,00,000 (Rupees two lakh)—Neycer’s role was

to impart technical know-how and to “advise”, “assist”, and “help” GMB

in establishing its plant. Contrary thereto, the Umpire treated the project

as a “joint venture” and stretched Neycer’s obligations so far as to foist

upon Neycer open-ended liabilities for five years of projected profits

under Schedule ‘E’ [Rs.3,46,45,000/- (Rupees three crore forty-six lakh

forty-five thousand)] and five years of normal, penal, and compound

interest on GMB’s term loans from December 1989 to March 1994 under

Schedule ‘F’ [Rs.4,56,99,000/- (Rupees four crore fifty-six lakh ninety-

nine thousand)].

20. We find substantial force in the contentions advanced by Mr. Sibal to the

extent that the Umpire could not have construed Clause 20 and the

Page 11 of 19

Agreement as a turnkey guarantee or an insurance policy underwriting

GMB’s entire business profitability and debt servicing for five years after

the commencement of commercial production. Even on the Umpire’s

own finding, the delay in commissioning the plant was seven months

(from the extended date of 31st January, 1989 to August 1989). While

the expression “shall endeavour” in Clause 20, read with Clause 18,

required Neycer to make earnest and timely efforts to assist in

commissioning the plant, Neycer’s contractual role could not be

stretched to treat it as a joint-venture partner underwriting five years of

projected profits under Schedule ‘E’ and five years of compounding loan

interest up to March 1994 under Schedule ‘F’, even covering a period

such as October 1991 to August 1993 when GMB’s plant remained closed

due to labour problems and disconnection of electric power by the Orissa

State Electricity Board, as recorded in the Board for Industrial and

Financial Reconstruction (BIFR)’s Draft Rehabilitation Scheme 29.

Conscious of the limited role of courts in re-appreciating evidence under

Section 30 of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that the Single

Judge rightly set aside the award in part, to the extent it travelled

beyond the permissible ambit of the reference and the contract.

21. Lastly, turning to the fourth issue and Neycer’s grievance that the

Division Bench failed to consider its cross-appeal independently and that

the Single Judge ought to have set aside the entire award even to the

extent of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore), we have independently

29 Ext. N-32

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examined Neycer’s challenges on the remaining issues within the settled

contours of Section 30 of the Act instead of remanding the matter after

nearly four decades of litigation. Having done so, we find no ground to

interfere with the Single Judge’s conclusions sustaining the award up to

Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore).

22. While Clause 20 did not make Neycer an insurer of GMB’s project for five

years, Neycer’s extreme contention that it had no enforceable obligation

whatsoever under the Agreement, and its challenge regarding the date

of sanction of the term loan, responsibility for the tunnel kiln, and

deputation of a senior technician under Clause 10, essentially invite us

to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute our own interpretation of

the Agreement for that of the Umpire.

23. By Addendum No. 1 dated 26th June, 1987, the parties consciously

substituted the word “Collaborators” for “Consultants” throughout the

Agreement. They incorporated specific assurances regarding the

achievement of guaranteed optimum production in Clause 12 and the

timely fulfilment of obligations in Clause 18. On the question of when

the 18-month period under Clause 20 commenced, the Umpire

construed Clause 20 alongside Clause 14(b) (which referred to a

communication issued by one or the other financial institutions

approving in principle the grant of term loan assistance) and Paragraph

2.15 of the Project Feasibility Report30 (prepared at Neycer’s instance,

which stated that commissioning was expected to be completed within

30 Ext. G-111

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18 months from the date of receiving the Letter of Intent from financial

institutions sanctioning the term loan). On that basis, the Umpire held

that the Letter of Intent dated 19 th May, 198731 issued by Industrial

Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) as the lead institution (which carried

a specific sanctioned code number and set out the term loan allocations

of IFCI, Industrial Development Bank of India, and ICICI Bank)

constituted sanction of the term loan, and that the 18-month period

expired on 19th November, 1988 and stood mutually extended up to 31 st

January, 1989.

24. Similarly, on a detailed appraisal of the oral testimony and documentary

evidence, including the Minutes dated 3 rd and 5th December, 198832, the

report of SPB Projects and Consultancy Ltd. (SPB-PC) 33 (which recorded

that SPB-PC undertook the procurement, coordination, and installation

of the tunnel kiln “on behalf of M/s. NCRL”), and contemporaneous

correspondence, the Umpire found as a fact that GMB had not defaulted

in delivering the equipment, that commissioning of the plant as a whole

occurred only upon trial production in August 1989 resulting in a delay

of seven months from the extended date of 31 st January, 1989, and that

Neycer failed to retain a senior technician of general supervisory level at

the site after the change of management in August 1988 despite

repeated requests (Mr. U. Sarkar, Senior Vice President of Neycer, having

joined GMB as a full-time employee only on 1st January, 1990 after the

Footnotes

31 Ext. G-81
32 Ext. G-28
33 Ext. G-120

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project had already suffered, and GMB having validly objected under

Clause 10 to the suitability of an outside freelancer, Mr. Jagannatha Rao,

belatedly proposed by Neycer in September 1989). As the Single Judge

rightly held, these findings are based on a plausible construction of the

Agreement and appreciation of the evidence on record, and do not

disclose any error apparent on the face of the award.

25. Neycer’s reliance on Clause 13 is equally unavailing. The stipulation in

Clause 13 that Neycer shall not be called upon to provide additional

funds in the event of an overrun merely capped Neycer’s obligation to

contribute capital as a co-promoter at Rs.18,00,000/- (Rupees eighteen

lakh); it did not immunise Neycer from liability for damages resulting

from a breach of its contractual obligations.

26. As regards the 1993 amendments to the Statement of Claim, the Umpire

held, relying on settled legal principles, that the amendments merely

revised and recast the quantification of damages flowing from the same

breaches already pleaded without introducing a new cause of action, a

view which the Single Judge found not to be erroneous on the face of

the record. More importantly, once the total award is restricted to the

original reference limit of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore), the

sustained claims under Schedule ‘A’ [Rs.39,14,910/- (Rupees thirty-nine

lakh fourteen thousand nine hundred ten)], Schedule ‘D’

[Rs.1,23,61,000/- (Rupees one crore twenty-three lakh sixty-one

thousand), which was in fact reduced from the original claim of

Rs.1,99,43,000/- (Rupees one crore ninety-nine lakh forty-three

Page 15 of 19

thousand)], and Schedule ‘E’ [restricted by the Single Judge to

Rs.37,24,090/- (Rupees thirty-seven lakh twenty-four thousand ninety),

well below the original unamended claim of Rs.1,87,22,000/- (Rupees

one crore eighty-seven lakh twenty-two thousand)] fall well within the

original unamended claim figures, rendering Neycer’s grievance

regarding the inflation of claims through the 1993 amendments—as well

as its contention regarding the subsequent waiver of loan interest under

GMB’s One-Time Settlement with its lenders in 2011-12, which pertained

to Schedule ‘F’—academic.

27. Specifically, the awards sustained by the Single Judge under Schedule

‘A’ [Rs. 39,14,910/- (Rupees thirty-nine lakh fourteen thousand nine

hundred ten) towards idle establishment, personnel, and utility

expenses proportionately for the 7-month delay from February to August

1989, the item-wise figures whereof were not disputed before the

Umpire], Schedule ‘D’ [Rs. 1,23,61,000/- (Rupees one crore twenty-

three lakh sixty-one thousand) towards losses suffered on account of

discounts and lower price realisation due to Neycer’s failure to provide

marketing and sales assistance under Clause 16], and Schedule ‘E’ [loss

of profit assessed based on the Project Feasibility Report prepared at

Neycer’s instance, scaled down by the Single Judge from

Rs.3,46,45,000/- (Rupees three crore forty-six lakh forty-five thousand)

to Rs.37,24,090/- (Rupees thirty-seven lakh twenty-four thousand

ninety) so as not to exceed the permissible limit of Rs.2,00,00,000/-

(Rupees two crore)] are supported by evidence on record and do not

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suffer from any infirmity warranting interference under Section 30 of the

Act. As rightly held by the Single Judge, relying upon Upper Ganges

Valley Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. U.P. Electricity Board 34, the

claims under the different Schedules being distinct and severable, the

valid portion of the award up to Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore)

was rightly sustained after severing the invalid excess.

28. To end, Neycer’s reliance on the order of the Appellate Authority for

Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR) dated 11 th February,

2003 and the BIFR’s Modified Rehabilitation Scheme (MS-08) dated 6 th

October, 2008, does not furnish a ground under Section 30 of the Act to

set aside the award. In any event, Paragraph 11.1 of MS-08 treated

GMB’s claim as an uncrystallized contingent liability pending the High

Court proceedings. It required Neycer/its promoters to infuse funds to

meet the same upon crystallisation so that the scheme would not be

derailed. Neycer’s own financial statements placed on record continued

to reflect the arbitral award as a contingent liability even after the repeal

of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. We,

therefore, find no justification to scale down the principal sum of

Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) sustained by the Single Judge.

29. However, we take note of the fact that pursuant to this Court’s interim

orders dated 22nd November, 2018 and 7th January, 2019, Neycer

deposited a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) on account of

the principal amount and a further sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two

34 (1973) 1 SCC 254

Page 17 of 19

crore) by way of interest, and the entire sum of Rs.4,00,00,000/-

(Rupees four crore) was withdrawn by GMB in January 2019. Having

regard to the fact that the dispute between the parties has spanned over

nearly four decades during which both companies underwent industrial

sickness, and considering that the principal sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/-

(Rupees two crore) sustained by the Single Judge along with an equal

sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) towards interest has

already been paid by Neycer and realised by GMB, we deem it just and

proper to direct that the said payment of Rs.4,00,00,000/- (Rupees four

crore) already received by GMB shall be treated as full and final

satisfaction of the award as modified by the Single Judge (both towards

principal and interest), and no further amount shall be recoverable by

either party from the other under the award.

30. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment is set aside and the

judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 14th October, 2015

restricting the award to a principal sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two

crore) is restored. The sum of Rs.4,00,00,000/- (Rupees four crore),

comprising Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) each towards principal

and interest, deposited by the appellant and withdrawn by the

respondent pursuant to the order of this Court dated 22 nd November,

2018, shall stand adjusted in full and final satisfaction of the award as

modified by the Single Judge. The undertaking furnished by the

respondent shall stand discharged.

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31. These civil appeals are, accordingly, disposed of.

32. Connected application(s), if pending, shall stand disposed of.

33. In the circumstances, parties are left to bear their own costs.

………………….………………….J. (DIPANKAR DATTA)

……………….…………………….J. (SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA) NEW DELHI; NOVEMBER 18, 2026.

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