MAHARAO SAHIB SRI BHIM SINGHJI ETC. ETC v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

wealth (urban vacant land) in the hands of a family having major sons in it as compared to the family having minor children. In the illustration given above a family of a father with four major sons is allowed to retain with itself 2,500 sq. metres of vacant land while a family of a father mother and three minor sons is permitted to retain only 500 sq. metres. The position becomes more glaring if I take the illustration of a Joint Hindu Family consisting of five brothers, each having five major sons, as, in such a case the said Joint Hindu Family will be entitled to retain 15,000 sq. metres of vocant land as against 500 sq. metres permitted to be retained by the artificial family. It cannot be said that large joint Hindu familis are unknown in urban agglomerations in various cities and towns of the country and instances more glaring than the preceding c illustration could be multiplied. In other words, by adopting the artificial defintion of 'family' and double standard for fixing the ceiling area the Act enables unwarranted and unjustified concentration of wealth in the hands of few rather than preventing the same and this certainly would be in teeth of and not in furtherance of the directive principle of Art. 39(c); in fact, it is a negation of that principle. It is not possible to take the view that the Parliament out of inadvertance ignored joint Hindu Family or forgot the possible concentration of vacant land in the hands of major members of large joint Hindu families, because in another context the concept of Joint Hindu Family was present to the mind of the draftsman as is clear from s. 4(7) of the Act. In my view, therefore, the adoption of the artificial definition of 'family' and double standard for fixing ceiling area one for a family with minor cbildern and another for a family with major children and completely ignoring the concept of Joint Hindu Family in relation to prescrip- F tion of ceiling area clearly lead to results which run counter to the directive principle contained in Art. 39(c) of the Constition. The Act which contains such provision being in teeth of that directive principle must fall outside the pale of protective umbrella of Art. 31C. G Re : s.23 relating to disposal of excess vacant land acquired under the Act.

Jt may be stated that under s.6 every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act is required to file within the period prescribed a statement before the QOmpetent ~uthority havin11 jurisdiction ~ivin~ full particulars thereof

900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPPL. s.c.R.

and also specifying the vacant land within the ceiling limit which he A • desires to retain. Sections 8 and 9 provide for preparation of draft statement as regards vacant land held in excess of the ceiling limit, holding of an inquiry in that behalf and preparation of final state· ment and service thereof on the concerned person by the competent authority, Section I 0 provides for acquisition of excess vacant land by the concerned State Government and determination of claims of 8 all persons interested in such excess vacant-land and under sub·s.(3) it is provided that upon the publication of a notification in that behalf such excess vacant land as may be specified therein shall be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and the same shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all c encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the notification. Then comes s.23 which deals with disposal of such excess vacant land acquired by the State Government under the Act. It runs as follows:

"23. (1) It shall be competent for the State Govern- D ment to allot, by order, in excess of the ceiling limit, any vacant land, which is deemed to have been acquired by the State Government under this act or is acquired by the State Government under any other law, to any person for any purpose relating to, or in connection with, any E industry or for providing residential accommodation of such type as may be approved by the State Government to the employees of any industry and it shall he lawful for such person to hold such land in excess of the ceiling limit. F Explanalion,.-For the purposes of this section,-

(a) Where any land with a building has been acquired by the State Government under any other law and such building bas been subsequently demolished by G State Government, then, such land shall be deemed to be vacant land acquired under such other law;

(b) "industry" means any business, profession, trade, undertaking or m rnufacture. H (c) In making an order of allotment under wb-section (I), \be S\ate Government may impose such cQtJditions

Mss BlllM SINOll Ii. UNION (Tulzapurkur, J.) 901

as may be specified therein including a condition as to the period within which the industry shall be put in operation or, as the case may be, the residential accommodation shall be provided for :

Provided that if, on a representation made in this behalf by the allottee, the State Government is B satisfied that the allottee could not put the industry in operation, or provide the residential accommoda- tion, within the period specified in the order of allotment, for any good and sufficient reason, the State Government may extend such period to such further period or periods as it may deem fit. c (3) Where any condition imposed in an order of allotment is not complied with by the allottee, the State Government shall, after giving an opportunity to the allottee to be heard in the matter, cancel the allotment D with effect from the date of the non-compliance of such condition and the land allotted shall revest in the State Government free from all encumbrances.

(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (I), (2) E and (3), all vacant lands deemed to have been acquired by the State Government under this Act shall bo disposed of by the State Government to subserve the common good on such terms and conditions as the State Govern- ment may deem fit to impose. F (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub· sections (I) to (4), where the State Government is satisfied that it is neces>ary to retain or reserve any vacant land, deemed to have been acquired by that Government under this Act, for the benefit of the public, it shall be competent for the State Government to retain or reserve such land for the same."

Five or six aspocts or peculiar features emerge clearly from the provisions contained ins. 23 in the context of the entire Act. In the first place unlike agrarian ceiling which deals with land as means of production, urban ceiling under the impugned Act deals with vacant

902 StlPRBMi! CoURT REPORTS (i98S) SUPPL. s.c.i. land in urban agglomerations not as a means of production but as a A part of the holder's wealth or capital asset. Secondly, unlike agrarian ceiling which has the objective of distributing surplus agri- cultural land straightway among landless persons, under the impugned Act excess vacant land in urban agglomerations is acquired by and vests in the State to be disposed of as indicated in the section; B clearly a legislation in exercise of the State's power of eminent domain (i.e. power of compulsory acquisition of private property). Thirdly, such excess vacant land thus acquired is to be disposed of by the State Government "for any purpose relating to or connected with industry or for providing residential accommodation to the employees of any Industry". Fourthly, under cl. (b) of the Explanation, c 'industry' bas been very widely defined for the purposes of this section to mean any business, profession, trade, undertaking or manufacture; the word 'any' clearly suggests that business, profession, trade, undertaking or manufacture even in private sector is included. Fithly. sub-s. (I) confers absolute power and discretion on the State D Government to allot any amount of such excess vacant land to any person for any industry. Reading the fourth and fifth aspects together, it is clear that it is open to the State Government to allot any extent of such excess vacant land to any professional person, say a lawyer a medical practioner or even an astrologer for the purpose of carrying on his private profession. Sixthly, the section contemp- E lates utilisation of such excess vacant land by the Stele Government in three ways: (a) allotment for industry (b) allotment to subserve the common good and (c) retention or reservation for the benefit of the public, but, the priorities in the matter of disposal or distrbution of such excess vacant land have boen peculiarly fixed in the section these priorities, as indicated in sub·SS. (1) and (4), are:=(i) allotment for the purpose of an industry, namely any business, profession, under- t king trade or manufacture, (ii) allotment for the purpose of construction of houses for the employees of an industry specified in item (i) above and (iii) disposal to subserve the common good which would include allotment of vacant land for governmental purpose or local authorities or for institutions etc. In other words, it is after the disposal of such excess vacant land for items (i) and (ii) above that the balance thereof can be disposed of "to subserve the common good" which means private purposes have precedence over public purposes, and this is clear from the fact that disposal under sub-s. (4) H is "subject to" the prior disposal under sub-s. (I) for purposes of industry. In fact, disposal of excess vacant land for subserving the common good is last in the priorities Sub. s (5) undoubtedly has an

MSS BRIM SINGH v. UNION (Tu/zapurkar, J.) 903

overriding effect over sub·ss. (I) to (4) but that provision deals not with disposal or distribution of excess vacant land but with retention and reservation of such vacant land by State Government for the benefit of the public like social housing and provision for basic arenities etc.

Article 31 of tlic Constitution has more than one facet, it undoubtedly confers upon individuals (including non-citizens) and

904 SUPREME touin REPORTS (198$j SUPPL. s,t.R.

corporate bodies a fundamental right to property but because of conflict of views in Keshavanada Bharati's case (supra) it may be debatable whether that right forms part of basic structure or not, but that apart, Art. 31 incorporates in our Constitution the concept of State's power of eminent domain i. e. power of compulsory acquisition of private property and prescribes two conditions precedent to the exercise of the power, namely, (i) such acquisition cannot be except for a public purpose and (ii) it must be on payment of compensation (now termed 'amount') to the claimant having interest in the propaty. In Kameshwar Sing h's(') case this position has been clarifie where Mahajan, J., after referring to some authoritative books has summed up the definition of the concept in one sentence thus· c "Authority is universal in support of the amplified definition of 'eminent domain' as the power of the sovereign to take property for public use without the owner's consent upon making just compensa- tion," The requirement of just compensation under the latter condition is diluted to payment of non-illusory amount under the D 25th Amendment of the Constitution and subsequent decisions of this Court. But it is well settled that these two conditions precedent are sine qua non for the exercise of the State's power of eminent domain' and, in my view, represent those aspects of the right to property under Art. 31 which constitute the essential or basic features of our Constitution and for that matter these would be so of any E democratic constitutiQn and, therefore, any law authorising expropria- tion of private property in breach of any one of 1hose condit10ns would damage or destroy the basic structure of our constitution.

It is extremely doubtful whether a bald, indefinite and unspeci- f fied objective like 'industry' simpliciter without any attempt at dovetailing it by having a proper scheme for industrial development will constitute a valid public purpose for the exercise of the power of 'eminent domain'. It is because of the absence of any definite scheme for industrial development with plans or blue prints with set G specifications or standarads for any of the urban agglomerations that wide power has been conferred on the State Government under sub-s. (1) in vague terms to allot any extent of such excess vacant land to any person for any industry. I am conscious that in Kameshwar Singh's case (supra) this Court speaking through M1hajan, J,, observed that "the phrase 'public purpose' has to be H

(I) [1952]3 SCR 889

Mss BIHM SINGH v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 905

construed according to the spirit of times in which the particular legislation is enacted" and held that so construed, acquisition of A estates for the purpose of preventing the concentration of huge blocks of land in the hands of a few individuals and to do away with intermediaries was for a public purpose. But that case dealt with three statutes (the Bihar Land Reforns Act, 1950, the M. P. Aboli· tion of proprietary Rights Act, 1950 and the U. P. Zamindari B Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950), the common aim of which, generally speaking, was to abolish zamindaries and other proprietary estates and tenures in the three States, so as to eliminate the inter· mediaries by means of compulsory acquisition of their rights and interests and to bring the raiyats and other occupants of lands in those areas into direct relation with the Government and therefore, c that case is distinguishable and its ratio would not apply to the instant case where the purpose of acquistition of excess vacant (urban) land is a bald objective like 'industry· simpliciter, surely different considerations would apply. In my view it is extremely doubtful whether compulsory acquisition of all the excess vacant land in all 0 urban agglomerations throughout the country for a bald, indefinite and unspecified objective like 'industry' simpliciter would be a valid exercise of the power of 'eminent domain'. ·However, it is not necessary for me to decide this larger question inasmuch as in my view the alternative submission of counsel for the petitioners clinches the issue in this case. Assuming that a bald objective of 'industry' E simpliciter partakes of the character of a public purpose, what Parlia· ment intended by the said objective bas been expressly clarified by cl. (b) of the Explanation where 'industry' has been very widely defined so as to include any business, trade or profession in private sector which makes a mockery of such public purpose. Whatever be the merits or demerits of a wide definition of 'industry' for the purposes of industrial-cum-labour relations, adoption of such wide definition of the concept in the context of eminent domain is clearly suicidal. By adopting such definition for the purposes of s. 23 the State Government has been empowered under sub·s. (I) to allot any extent of such excess vacant land to any businessman, trader or professional man like a lawyer, doctor and astrologer to enable him to carry on his private business, trade or profession. In other words, acquisition of excess vacant land in urban agglomeration would clearly be for private purposes and what is worse is that under the priorities laid down such private purposes are to be catered to first and then comes the disposal or distribution thereof to subserve common good. This clearly smacks of depriving peter of his property to give it to Paul

9()6 SUPRiiMB cOURT REPORTS [19s5j SUPPL. s.c.a. and, therefore, clearly amounts to an invalid exercise of State's power of 'eminent domain'. Section 23, which thus authorises compulsory acquisitions of property for private purposes flagrantly violates those aspects of Art. 31 which constitute the essential or basic features of the Constitution and is, therefore, ultra vires and unconstitutional. Further, indisputeably it is the most vital, integral and non-severable part of the entire scheme of urban ceiling as without it the scheme will merely remain a scheme for unjust and illegal enrichment of the State and, therefore, the whole of Chapter III, in which it occurs, must fall with it.

c Apart from the unconstitutionality of s.23 as indicated above, it is clear that the wide definition of 'industry' and the priorities for disposal or distribution of excess vacant land laid down therein have adverse impact on the directive principle contained in Art.39(b'. In the first place instead of confining the objective of industrialisa- tion to public sector or cooperative sector and the like where benefit to community or public at large would be the sole consideration, the concept is widely defined to include any business, trade or profession in private sector which enables the disposal or distribution of excess vacant land for private purposes and sub-s.( I) authorises the State Government to allot any extent of such land to individuals or bodies for private purposes. Secondly, the priorities in the matter of disposal or distribution of the excess vacant land under sub-sections (!) and (4) are as indicated above, which show that disposal or distribution of excess vacant land for subserving the common good comes last in the priorities. I have already indicated that the postu- late underlying the directive principle of Art. 39(b) is that diffusion of ownership and control of the meterial resources of the community is always in the public interest and, therefore, the State is directed to ensure such distribution (equitable) thereof as best to subserve the common good but the priorities prescribed in sub-ss. (!)and (4) of s.23 in regard to distribution of material resource produce contrary results or results in the opposite direction inasmuch as private pur- poses receive precedence over common good. The enactment which contains such provisions that produce contra resultes cannot be said to be in furtherance of the directive principle of Art.39(b) and cannot receive the benefit of the protective umre!la of Art. 31C. H Counsel for the respondents, however, relied upon three aspects to counter-act the aforesaid. result flowing from the priorities

MSS BH!M SINGH v. UNION (Tuizapurkar, i.) 907 given in s. 23(1) and (4). It was urged that the disposal of excess vacant land acquired by the State under the Act will be guided by the Preamble which says that enactment was put on the Statute Book with a view to bringing abou! the equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. In the first place, it is well settled that it is only when there is some ambiguity in test of any provision in the enactment that the preamble could be looked at and here there is no ambiguity whatsoever in s 23, I) and (4). Secondly, far from there being any ambiguity there is express provision in s.23(1) and (4) indicating the priorities in the matter of disposal or distribution of excess vacant land, in face of which, the preamble cannot control, guide or direct the disposal or distribution in any other manner. Next, reliance was placed on c s. 46( I) which empowers the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the prosisions of the Act and the disposal or distribution of excess vacant land could be prescribed by rules. It may, however be stated that no rules under s.46 have so far been framed by the Central Government and, in any event, no rules framed thereunder can over-ride the express provisions of s.23. Lastly, reliance was D placed on certain guidelines issued by the Central Government in its Ministry of Works and Housing under the Act and at page 83 of the "Compendium of Guidelines" (a Govt. of India publication dated February 22, 1917) a note containing guidelines on utilization of excess vacant land acquired under the Act is published. Paragraphs E 3 and 4 of the said Note deal with the topic of priorities. In para 3 the disposal or distribution of excess vacant land as per the prio- rities ins. 23 bas been set out (which are the same as given above) while para 4 sets out the priorities in accordance with the recomme- ndations m1de by the 9th Conference of State Ministers of Housing and Urban D'velopment held at Calcutta on the 17th, 18th and F 19th December, 1976, which considered the matter and the priorities indicated are: (i) Retention.lreservation for the 'benefit of the Public' like social housing, provision of basic amenities, etc. (ii) Disposal 'to subserve common good' which may include allotment of vacant land for Government purposes, local authorities, institu- G tions' etc. (iii) Allotment fot the purpose of construction of houses for the employees of industries specified in item (iv) A below (v) Allotment for the purpose of industry, viz., any business, profession trade, undertaking of non-polluting manufacture; cottage and small scale and wherever possible ancillary industry; manufacture. It will appear clear that the recommendations made by the 9th Conference of H State Ministers of Housing and Urban Douelopment seek to furnish

908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] SUPPL. s.c.1\.

improved guidelines but in the process reverse the priorities given A in the section in the matter of disposal or distribution of excess vacant land. It is obvious that the priorities given in s. 23 and as have been summarised in para 3 of the Note must prevail over the priorities indicated in the guidelines contained in para 4 of the Note and the latter are of no avail. It is thus clear that the priori· n ties as given ins. 23(1l and (4) in the matter of disposal or distributi· on of excess vacant land acquired under the Act run counter to and in a sense operate to negate the directive principle of Art. 39(b).

It was then faintly argued by counsel for the respondents that c the law in order to receive the protection of Art. 31C need not fulfil the objectives of both Art. 39(b) and (c) and even if it fulfils the objective under Art.39;c) and not under Art. 39(b) it will be protect· ed by Art. 31 C. But here s. 23 by no stretch deals with the objective of Art. 39(c) at all but only deals with the objective underlying the directive principle of Art. 39(b) and its provisions as discussed above D clearly run counter to that objective and as such the enactment which contains such provisions must forfeit the benefit of the protective umbrella of Art. 31C.

E Faced with the situation that the constitutional invalidity of s. 23 was likely to have advarse reprccussion not only on Chapter III in which it occurs but also on the entire Act, counsel for the respon- dents made a valiant effort to salvage the said section by indulging in interpretative acrobatics with a view to relieve it from the two vices attaching to it, namely, (ii the adoption of the wide definition of 'industry' in cl. (b) of the Explanation which makes a mockery of the Public purpose indicated by the bald objective like 'industry' simpliciter and (ii I the priorities mentioned therein governing the disposal or distribution of excess vacant land acquired under the Act. It was suggested that the definition of 'industry' should be read down by the court so as to confine the same to industries in public sector or co-operative sector or the like where benefit to community or public at large would be the sole consideration, so that allotment of excess vacant land acquired under the Act to private ent erpreneurs for private purposes which runs counter to the doctrine of eminent domain would be completely eschewed. It is impossible to read down the difinition in the manner suggested because parliament has for the purposes of the section (i.e. for purposes of disposal or distribution

MSS BHIM SINGH '· UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 909

of such excess vacant land) deliberately and in express terms adopted a vary wide definition which includes within its scope not merely trading or manufacturing activity but also any business or profession in private sector and reading down the definition as suggested would be doing violence to the Parliament's intention stated in express terms. It was then submitted that sub·s. ( 1) of s. 23 should be construed as an enabling provision which merely permits the State Government B to allot exces; vacant land for the purposes of industry, while the real obligation in th, matter of disposal of excess vacant land arises under sub-s. (4) which speaks of disposal of such land "to subserve the common good"; in other words, the disposal under sub-s. (4) should over-ride the disposal under sub-s. (I); at any rate the "common good" spoken of in sub-s. (4) should permeate the c disposal under sub-s. (!). It is impossible to read sub-s. (I) of s.23 as containing merely an enabling provision; the scheme of sub-ss. (I) and (4) read together clearly shows that the disposal of the excess vacant land is first to be done under sub-s.(I) and disposal under sub-s.(4) comes thereafter. The opening words of sub·s.(4) "subject to sub-ss.( I), (2) and (3)" cannot be read aHonstituting D a non obstante clause giving an over-riding effect to sub·s. (4) nor can sub-s.(4) be read as if the opening words were absent. By indulging in such interpretative acrobatics the Court cannot reach the opposite result than is warranted by the plain text of the provision. Further, to say that every disposal of excess vacant land under sub-s.(1) must E be for "common good" is to read into that sub-section something which is not there; it amounts to re-writing that sub-section, which cannot be done. the Preamble notwithstanding. ft is the conferal of such unrestricted power (not its oblique exercise) that is being attacked and hence the submission to read into sub·s.(I) this kind of limita· tion. These submissions require the re-structuring of the entire section F a function legitimately falling within the domain of the Legislature. Moreover, sub-ss.(1), (2). (3) and (4) of s.23 are integral parts of one whole scheme dealing with disposal of excess vacant land acquired -l. under the Act and as such cannot be severed from one another. The attempt to salvage s.23, either wholly or in part, by seeking to free it from the two vices must, therefore, fail.

The next provision challenged by the petitioners as being viol~tive of !.heir fundamental rights is s. 11 (6) which puts the maximum hm1t of Rs. two lakhs on compensation (called 'amount') payable to the holder of excess vacant land irrespective of the extent of such excess vac&nt Jan<!. f'or the purpose of determining the

910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) SUPPL. s.c.R.

F "II (6)- Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (I) or sub·section (5) the amount payble under either of the said sub-sections shall, in no case, exceed two lakhs of rupees."

MSS BHlM SINGH v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 911

is of the value of Rs. two crores are treated alike, that is to say, both will get compensation (termed 'amount') of Rs. two lakhs only and is this sense prescribing a limit of maximum of Rs. two lakhs is clearly arbitrary And violates Art. 14. Similarly, for a person who holds excess vacant land which even at the prescribed rates it of the value of Rs. two crores a payment of Rs. two lakhs only (i.e. 1/IOOth of the value at the prescribed rates) must, by any standard, be regarded as illusory and, therefore, the fixation of maximum limit at Rs. two lakhs under s. 11(6) irrespective of the extent of excess vacant land held by a person violates Art. 31(2) of the Contitution. I find considerable force in both the submissions of counsel for the petitioners. In fact, in my view, this provision which puts the maximum limit of Rs. two lakhs on the amount payable to a holder c of excess vacant land acquired under the Act irrespective of the extent of such excess vacant land held by him is not merely violative of Arts. 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution in the manner indicated above, but would be a piece of confiscatory legislation, because vacant land in excess of that portion which at the prescribed rates is worth Rs. two lakhs stands confiscated to the State without any payment whatsoever. I do not suggest that a provision putting a maximun limit upon compensation payable to the owner or holder irrespective of the extent of the property acquired whenever or wherever is found in any enactment has to be regarded as a confisca· tory provision. I am aware that in enactments involving large schemes of social engineering like abolition of Zamindaris, agrarian reforms, nationalisation of undertakings and businesses and the like, such a pcovision might be justifiably made. In State of Kera/a v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. Ltd., (') this Court upheld the validity of Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 wbere- under private forest lands held on janman right were acquired without payment of any compensation on the ground that such acquisition was for implementing a scheme of agrarian reform by assigning lands on registry or by way of lease to poorer sections of the rural agricultural population, the enactment being protected under Art. 31A (I) of the Constitution. Again the Coal Mines (Nationalisa- G tion Act, 1973 whereunder the right, title and interest of the owneres in relation to their coal mines specified in the schedule to the Act stood tranrferred to and became vested absolutely in the Central Govt. free from encumbrances in exchange of payment of fixed amounts specified in that schedule was upheld by this Court. H

(l) [1974) I S.<;,lt, 671,

912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) SUPPL. S.C.R.

A But such cases involving large schemes of social engineering where avowedly the benefit of the community or public at large is the sole , . consideration are distinguishable from the instant case, where 'industry' has been expressly defined to include business, trade or profession in private sector and where power has been conferred upon the State Government to allot properties acquired under the B enactment to individual businessman, trader or professional to enable him to carry on his private business, trade or profession, that is to say, where the legislation is a fraud on State's power of eminent domain, such a provisjon of putting a maximum limit on compensa- tion payable in respect of the acquired property irrespective of its extent will have to be regarded as confhcatory in nature. c An instance in point is available on the record of these writ petitions. In writ petition No. 350 of 1977 the petitioner who happens to be the ex-Ruler of the fonmr Kota State has averred in ' . paragraphs 17 and 20 of the petition that the urban vacant land owned and possessed by him in the city of K"t1 admeasures 918. 26 acres and that the A;sistant Director, Lands and Buildings Tax, Kola in his assessment order d1ted 20.12. 1976 had valued the same at market rate of Rs. 15.12 per sq. metre at Rs 3,98,05021.84 (say about Rs. four crores) and inclusive of other items of properties the total value was put down at Rs. 4.12 crores and these averments are substantially admitted in the counter-affidavit fikd by S. Mahadeva Iyer on behalf of the Union of India where in para 9 he has stated thus:

"In reply to para 20 of the writ petition I submit tha< F the total assessment of the entire property comes to Rs. 4.56 crores."

In other words, in the case of this petitiorer the fact that he owns -A- G urban vacant land of the value of about Rs. four crores in the city of Kota stands admitted. Now, under s. 11(6) for all this urban vacant land worth nearly Rs. four crores the petitioner will get only rupees two lakhs, it works out to a princely sum of eight annas for property worth Rs. 100, which would clearly be an illusory payment. In fact, all his vacant land. in excess of that portion which is wroth Rs. two lakhs at the prescribed rates, shall stand conficated without any pay- ment whatsoever. Such a glaring instance, availabk on the record of these petitions, brings out in bold relief how 6agrantly s, I 1(6)

MSS BH!M SINGH v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 913

violates Arts. 14 and. 31 (2) of the Constitution; it hightlights the , '. aspect that such acquisition takes place in breach of the other condition precedent attaching to the power of eminent domain namely, payment of non·illusory compensation. However, s. 11(6) is clearly a severable provision, and that alone is liable to be struck down a' being ultra vires and unconstitutional. B The next provision challenged by the petitioners is s. 27 occurring in Chapter IV to the extent to which it imposes restriction on transfer of an urban land with building or a flat therein though unconcerned or unconnected with the excess vacant land as unconst· tutional being beyond the legislative authorisation as also violative of petitioners' fundamental rights under Arts 14 and 19(1) (f). C Section 27, as its marginal note indicates, deals with the subject of prohibition of transfer of urban property and sub-s. (I) thereof runs thus :

"27. (I) Notwithstanding any thing contained in any D other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 5 and sub-section (4) of section 10, no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years, or otherwise, any urban or urbanisable land with a build· E ing (whether constr11cted before or after the commence- ment of this Act) or a portion only of such building for a period of ten years of such commencement or from the date on which the building is constructed, whichever is later, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority."

Inter alia, the aforesaid provision is clearly applicable to a building v' or a portion of such building which would include a flat therein standing on any urban or urbanisable land falling within the per- missible ceiling area which a holder of a vacant land is entitled to retain with himself and under thi, provision any transfer of such property by way of sale, mortage, gift or lease for ten years or other· wise, is prohibited for the period of ten years from the commencment of the Act except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority. Under sub-s. (2) if the holder of such property falling within the permissible ceiling area is desirous of effecting a transfer of the type indicated above has to apply in writing for per· mission from the competent authority and under sub•s, (3) the

914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] SUPPL. s.c.R.

competent autority bas been authorised after making such inquiry as it deems fit to grant the permission or refuse the same, but a refusal "'f -...

bas to be accompained by written reasons, copy whereof is to be furnished to the holder. Sub-s. (4) provides that if within sixty days of ihe receipt of the application refusal is not communicated, the permission shall be deemed to have been granted by the competent authority.

Counsel for the petitioners made two submissions in regard to aforesaid restriction as made applicable to transfers of built-up properties that fall within the limits of ceiling area permitted to be retained by a holder. Firstly, such restriction would be outside the c legislative authorisation conferred upon the Parliament as well as beyond the ambit and scope of the Act which bas assiduously kept built-up properties outside the pale of imposition of ceiling. Secondly, such restrictiou requiring permission from the competent authority is arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 in as much as the power to grant ' D the permission or to refuse it is unguided and untrammelled which is bound to produce arbitrary results. In my view both the submissions have substance in them.

It cannot be disputed that though the authorisation was for imposition of cdling on urban immovabfo property Parliament deliberately kept out built-up properties from the purview of the Act and the Act seeks to impose ceiling only on vacant land in urban agglomerations; that being so any restriction on transfer of built-up properties or parts thereof (including flats therein) standing on urban land falling within the permissible ceiling area would be outside the purview of the Act. It was urged for the respondents that such a provision would be incidental or ancilliary to the ceiling contemplated by the Act and would fall within the phrase "for matters connected therewith" occurring in the Preamble and the long title of the Act. v

If is not possible to accept the contention, for, the words "matters connected therewith" occurring in the concerned phrase must be co-related to what precedes that phrase, namely, "an Act to provide for ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land" (emphasis supplied) and, therefore, the words "matters connected thaewith" must mean matters in relation to the ceiling imposed by the Act. A reference to objective under Art. 39(b) and (c) (for the achievement of which the enactment is (lllegedly taken in hand) in the Pre11mble or lonll title cannot enlarge

MSS BHIM SINGH v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 915

the ambit or scope of the Act. Any restriction imposed on built-up •• properties falling within the permissible ceiling area left with the bolder would, therefore, be outside the ambit and scope of the Act.

The next question is whether the restriction which requires the holder of such property to seek permission of the competent authority B before effecting any transfer thereof by way of sale, mortgage or gift, etc. is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The contention is that the requirement in the absence of any guidelines governing the exercise of the power on the part of the competent authority in the m1tter of granting or refusing to grant the permission is highly arbitrary, productive of discriminatory results and, therefore, violates c the equality ·clause of Art. 14. Counsel for the respondents fairly conceded that the section itself does not contain any guidelines but urged that the objectives of "preventing concentration, speculation and profiteering in urban land" recited in the Preamble would aford the requisite guidance for the exercise of the power to grant the permission sought or to refuse the same. Firstly, which of the three objectives mentioned in the Preamble should guide the exercise of power by the competent authority in any given case is not clear and in any case no standard bas been laid down for achieving the objectives of preventing concentration, speculation, and profiteering in urban land or urban property and in the absence of any standard being laid down by the Legislature-a purely legislative function, it will be difficult to hold that these broad objectives recited in the Pre- amble could effectively or adequately guide the exercise of power by the competent authority in the matter of granting or refusing to grant the permission and in the absence of guidelines the exercise of the power is bound to produce arbitrary or discriminatory results. It was also said that against the order passed by the competent authority under s. 27 an appeal to the Appellate Authority has been provided for under s. 33 and revision lies to the State Government under s. 34 and in view of such provision for appeal and revision the exercise of the power or discretion vested in the competent authority cannot be regarded as unfettered or arbitrary. Here again I feel that in the absence of any guidelines for the exercise of the power and in the absence of any standards having been laid down by the Legislature for achieving the objectives of prevention of concentra- H tion, speculation and profiteering in urban land and urban property, the provision for appeal and revision would not be r1f much avail to preventin~ arbitrariness in the 1Datter of ~ranting or refusin$ to

916 SUPREME COUkT REPORTS [1985] SUPPL. S.C.R.

grant the permission. Section 27 which does not adequately contro1 A the arbitrary exerci'e of the power to grant or refuse the permission sought, is clearly violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and as such the requirement of permission contained therein will have to be struck down as being ultra vires and unconstitution.

B In the result, in view of the aforesaid disucssion. I would like to indicate my conclusions thus :

(1). The impugned Act, though purporting to do so, does not, in fact, further the directive principles in Art. 39 (b) and (c). Section 2(f) in relation to prescription of ceiling area, as shown above, per- c mits unwarranted and unjustified concentration of wealth instead of preventing the same and is in teeth of the objective under Art. 39(c); similarly, s. 23, as discussed above, produces results contrary to the objective under Art. 39(b). Therefore, the impugned A~t is outside the pale of the protective umbrella of Art. 31 C,

D (2) Section 2(f) which contains the artificial definition of 'family' in relation to the prescription of ceiling area, s. 23 which deals with disposal or distribution of excess vacant land acquired under the Act as per priorities laid down therein and s. 11(6) which puts a maximum limit on the quantum of the amount payable in respect of excess Vacant land acquired from a holder irre:;pective of the extent of area held by him these three provisions flagrantly violate t110se aspects of Arts. 14 and 31 which constitute the essential and basic features of onr Constitution and hence the protective umbrealla of Art. 3!B is not available to the impugned Act inasmuch as the 40th Constitution Amendment Act 1976 to the extrnt to which it inserts the impugued Act in the Ninth Schedule is beyond the constituent power of the Parliament as the said Aemending Act has the effect of damaging or destroying the basic structure of ithe Constitution.

(3). The artificial definition of 'family' given in s. 2(f) in relation to prescription of ceiling area under s. 4(1) is clearly violative of Art. 14 and as such is ultra vires and unconstitutional. Similarly, s. 23 which authories compulsory acquisition of property for private purposes is in breach of the doctrine of eminent domain and since it flagrantly violates Art. 31 (2) i' ultra >'ires and unconstitutional. H (4), Since s. 2!f) together with adoption of double standard for fixing ceiling area runs through and forms ba>is of the whole. Chapter Ill ari<l Sir1ce s, 23 is a vital, lntel!ral and qoq·s~verable part

MSS Bii1M SIN'Gll v. UNION (tulzapurkar, J.) !H 1

of the entire scheme of urban ceiling en visaged by the Chapter III, the whole of Chapter Ill has to fall along with those two provisions and A •• as such that Chapter is also declared to be u/lra vires and unconstitutional. Further, it cannot be disputed that Chapter III comprises the substratum of the entire scheme of urban ceiling contemplated by the enactment incorporating its main provisions while the other Chapters deal with arcillary or incidental matters B which from the decorative frills of the main fabric. Tf the substra- tum is found to be diseased, invalid and bad in law the entire Act has to go and is accordingly struck down as void and unconstitu· ti on al.

(5). Section 11(6), a severable prov1S1on, being violative of c petitioners' fundamental right under Art. 31 is declared to be ultra vires and unconstitutional.

(6). Section 27, being severable, is also declared ultra vires and unconstitutional to the exent indicated above as being beyond the ambit of the Act and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

Before parting with the matter I would like to refer to the manner in which this important and complicated measure came to be enacted. It cannot be doubted that the 11 sponsoring State · Legislatures passed their resolutions under Art. 252( 1) with a laud· able object, namely to clothe the Parliament with legislative competence to enact a law for the imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property for the country as a whole Though initially a model bill based on the recommendations made by the Working F Group in its Report dated July 25, 1970 had been prepared where ceiling was proposed to be imposed on urban prope[ly on the basis of monetary value, Parliament later on realised that the implementa- tion of that proposal was beset with several practical difficulties indicated in the Approach Paper prepared by a Study Group, and, therefore, it was though that ceiling in respect of built-up properties G should be brought about through some fiscal and other measures and ceiling on vacant land in urban aqglomerations on the lines of the impugned Act should be undertaken. In other words, State·wise deep consideration and consultation for over five years had preceded the preparation of the draft Bill and this Court in V.B. Chowdhari's(') II

(I) [1979] 3 SCR 808

9i8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985} SUPPL. S.C.R.

case has upheld the legislative competence of Parliament to enact A such a measure as a first step towards eventual imposition of ceiling on immovable properties of every other description. However, after the introduction of the Bill on the floor of the house on January 28, 1976, the enactment as drafted in its present form seems to have been rushed through the attenuated Parliament during the Emer- B gency in less than seven hours on February 2, 1976. The Lok Sabha debates dearly show: (al that the Bill was moved and taken up for consideration at 11.17 hours on that day, (b) that a motion moved by a member that the Bill be circulated for the purpose of eliciting opinion thereon by May IS, 1976 was negatived, (c) that another motion supported by quite a few members that the Bill be referred to c a Select Committee with a view to improve the same by 1removing defects, deficiencies and omissions therein with instructions to the Select Committee to 1eport by April I, 1976, was also negatived, (d) that though over 150 amendments had been moved (some of which were received by the members on the very day as speeches were in progress), an earuest request to postpone the second reading of the Bill to the following day to enable the members to consider those amendments (many of which were neither formal nor clarificatory but of substance) was also turned down, and (e) that the original time schedule of six hours fixed by the Speaker for the Bill was adhered to and the entire process (including general discussion, clause by clause reading, consideration of the several amendments and the third reading) was completed in undue haste by 18.0l hours. In Rajya Sabha also a request to refer the Bill to a Select Committee went unheaded and the entire process was completed in one day, February 5, 1976. The result is tbat it has, in the absence of ade- quate study or discussion about the implications of various provisions thereof, turned out to be an ill-conceived and ill-drafted measure. The measure was, undoubtedly, taken in hand with a view to achieve the unexceptional objectives underlying Art. 39,b) and (c), but as shown above, the enacted provisions misfire and produce the opposite results and also damage or destroy the essential features or basic structure of the Constitution and hence duty-bound I am constrained to strike down this impugned piece of purported socio-economic legislation. The legislative competence of the Parliament being still there a ;well ·drafted enactment within the constitutoinal limitations on the subject would be the proper remedy. ... ' H I would, therefore, allow the petitions and direct issuance of the appropriate writs sought.

MSS BHIM SJNOH v. UNION (Sen, J.) 919

SEN J. These writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution seek to challenge the constitutional validity of the Urban Land A (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 on various grounds. The Act has been placed as item NJ. 132 in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 197r,. Questions involved are of far-reaching importance affecting the national interest. B The history of the legislation is well-known. The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legisla· tures of the States of A11dhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform Jegblation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on c urban property in the country as a whole and in compliance with clau&e (I} of Article 252 of the Constitution passed a resolution to that effect. Parliament accordingly enacted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. In the fir,t instance, the Act, came into force on the date of its introduction in the Lok Sabha, D that is, January 28, 1976 and covered Union Territories and the eleven States which had already passed the requisite Resolution under Article 252(1) of the Constitution. Subsequently, the Act was adopted, after passing resolutions under Article 252(1) of the Constitution by the State of Assam on March 25, 1976, and those of Bihar on April l, 1976, Madhya Pradesh on September 9, 1976, I Manipur on March 12, 1976, Meghalaya on April 7, 1976 and Rajasthan on March 9, 1976.Thus, the Act is in force in seventeen States and all the Union Territories in the cou~try.

The legislative competence of Parliament to enact the F Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 having been upheld by this Court in Union of India etc. v. Va//uri Basavaiah Chaudhary,(') there remains the question of its constitutional validity. G > Sechedule I to the Act lists out all States, irrespective of whether or not they have passed a resolution under Art. 252(1) authorizing the Parliament to enact a law imposing a ceiling on urban immovable property, and the urban agglomerations in them having a population of two lacs or more. The ceiling limit of vacant H

(I) [1979] 3 SCR 802.

9~0 SUPREME COURT RBPORTs [1985) SUPPL. s.c.ll.

land of metropolitan areas of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras A having a population exceeding ten lacs falling under category 'A' is 500sq. metres; urban agglomerations with a population .of ten lacs and above, excluding the four metropolitan areas falling under category 'B' is 1000 sq. metres; agglomerations with a population between three lacs and ten lacs falling under category 'C' is 1500 sq. metres and urban agglomerations with a population between two lacs and B three lacs falling under category 'D' is 2000 sq. metres. The schedule does not mention the urban agglomertations having a popu- lation of one lac and above; but if a particular state which passed a resolution under Art. 252(1), or if a State which subsequently adopts the Act, wants to extend the Act to such areas, it could do so by a c notification under s.2(n) (B) or s.2 (n) (A) (ii), as the case may be, after obtaining the previous approval of the Central Government.

The primary object and the purpose of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, 'the Act' as the long title and the pream- D ble show, is to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and with a view to bringing E about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to sub serve the common good, in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy under Art. 39(b) and (c).

The Statement, of objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill F reads as follows :

"There has been a demand for imposing a ceiling on urban property also, especially after the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural lands by the State Governments. G • With the growth of population and increasing urbanisa• tion, a need for orderly development of urban areas has also been felt. It is, therefore, considered necessary to take measures for exercising social control over the scarce resource of urban land with a view to ensuring its equitable distribution amongst the various sections of society and also avoiding speculative transactions relating to land in urban agglomerations. With a view to ensuring

MSS BHIM SIN Gil v. UNION (Sen, J.) 921

uniformity in approach Government of India addressed the State Governments in this regard, eleven States have so far passed resolutions under Art. 252(1) of the Consti· tution empowering Parliament to undertake legislation in this behalf."

The Act consists of five Chapters. Chapter I contains the short title and the extant clause and Chapter II contains section 2, which is the definition section. Chapter III deals with 'Ceiling on vacant Land Chapter IV deals with 'Regulation of transfer and use of urban land' and Chapter V contains miscellaneous provisions.

There can be no doubt that the legislative intent and object of c the impugned Act was to secure the socialisation of vacant land in urban agglomerations with a view to preventing the concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons, speculation and profiteer· ing therein, and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribu· tion of land in urban agglomerations to subserve to common good, D in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy under Art. 39 (b) and (c). The Act mainly provides for the following:

(i) imposition of a ceiling on both ownership and posses· sion of vacant land in urban agglomerations unders.3, E the ceiling being on a graded basis according to the classification of the urban agglomerations under s.4;

(ii) acquistion of the excess vacant land by the State Government under s.10(3), with powers to dispose of the vacant land with the object to subserve the F common good under s.23;

(iii) payment of an amount for the acquisition of the excess land in cash and in bonds under s.14(2), > according to the principles laid down in s.11 (I) G subject to the maximum specified in s.11(6);

(iv) granting exemptions in respect of vacant land m certain cases under ss.20 and 21; H

(v) regulating the transfer of vacant land within the ceiling limits under s.26;

922 StiPREME COURT REPORTS (!985) SUPPL. a.c.R.

(vi) regulating the transfer of urban or urbanisable land A with any building (whether constructed before or after the commencement of the Act, for a period of ten years from the commencement of the Act or the construction of the building whichever is later under - s.27; B (vii) restricting the plinth area for the construction of future resdential buildings under s.29; and

(viii) other procedural and miscellaneous matters.

c The Act is thus intended to achieve the following objectives: (I) to prevent the concencration of urban property in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein; (2) to bring about socialisation of urban land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good to ensure its equitable distribution, (3) to discourage coastruction of luxury housing leading to conspicuous consumption of scarce building materials. and (4) to secure orderly urbanisation. Thus the dominant object and purpose of the legislation is to bring about socialisation of urban land.

In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions : Section 3 which is all important for the purpose of these writ petitions, provides :

"3. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-section (2) of section !."

Section 4 divides the urban agglomerations into four broad categories, categories A, B, C and D, and fixes the ceiling limits varying from five hundred sq. metres in Category A to two thousand sq. metres in Category D thereof. The word 'person' is defined in s.2(i} as :

H "2(i) "person" includes an individual, a family, a firm, a company, or an association or body of indivi· duals, whether incorporated or not."

M!S BRIM SINGH '· UNION (Sen, I.)

The definition of the word 'family' in s.2(f) is In the following ,. terms: A

"2(f) "family" in relation to a person, means the individual, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such individual and their unmarried minor chiidren." B In order that the burden of compensation, that is, the amount payable for such excess vacant lands by the Government, may not be high, the Act incorporates a specific provision, namely, sub-section (ll of s.11 which fixes the amount broadly on the following basis: (I) eight and one-third of the annual net income from the land during the last five years or where such annual income is not being derived, at c rates not exceeding Rs. 10 per sq. metre or Rs. 5 per sq. metre in Categories A and B, and and urban agglomerations resp~ctively, classifying the area into different zones There is also a ceiling on the maximum amount payable in any single case placed by sub- section (6) of s.11. Sub-section (I) s.27 provides for the freezing of all transfers of urban land with or without a building or portion of D a building in all agglomerations for a poriod of ten years from the date of the commencement of the Act or from the date ou which the building is constructed.

The constitutional validity of the Act which has been placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Fortieth Amendment, is challenged principally on the g'ound that, firstly. it is violative of the funda- mental rights guaranteed under Arts 14, (19(.) (f) and 31(2), since it seeks to alter the "basic structure" of the Constitution as formu- lated by this Court in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala(I) and; therefore, has not the protective umbrella of Art.31B, F and secondly that it is a law in negation of, and in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy under Art.39(b) and (c) and is, therefore, not protected under Art.31C.

In Woman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India Ors.( 2 ) this Court by its order, in the context of the decision in Kesavananda Bharati's case, G has laid down.

"Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the 9th schedule to the Constitu- tion was amended from time to time by the inclusion o lJ

(1) [1973) Supp. SCR I. (2J (1980J 3 sec 587

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [11)85] SUPPL, S.c.J!..

various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to A challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parlia- . ment since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent amend- B ments except to say that if any Act or Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a constitutional amendment made after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 3 l.C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the c 9th Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure as rellected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose.

D Article 31-C of the Constitution, as it stood prior to its amendment by Section 4 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its constitutionality was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati. Article 31-C, as it stood prior to the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act does not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure."

(I) c19so1 s. sec 578.

MSS BHIM SINGH '· UNION (Sen, J.)

he Act freezing all transfers by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years or otherwise, of any urban or urbanisa- A ble land with a building (whether constructed before or after the com- mencement of the Act), or a portion of such building, for a period of ten years from such commencement or from the date on which the building is constructed, whichever is later, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, even though such B vacant land in an urban agglomeration is within the ceiling limits, is an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to property guaranteed under Art. 19 (I); and (4) the 'priorities' laid down in s.23 of the impugned Act are not in keeping with part IV of the Consti- tution and, therefore, liable to be struck down. It is urged upon these grounds that the impugned Act is flagrantly violative of those c aspects of the petitioners' fundamental rignts under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 as constitute the basic structure or framework of the Constitution, and therefore, it is not protected under Art. 31B or 31C.

Land in urban areas is a vital physical recourse capable of D generating and sustaining economic and social activities. It should be properly utilised by the community for social good. But the attraction of urban areas has led to profiteering and recketeering in land in these areas. There is also mis-application of this scarce resource of urban land for undesirable purposes. Therefore, a E comprehensive policy of effective control of land covering its use, distribution amongst the V'lrious sections of the society and indi- viduals and for different social purposes, and its disposal by owneri; subject to their sharing the profits witn the community at large, has been evolved. The Act has been designed to benefit the weaker sections of the community. It also grant~ exemptions in favour of public institutions and co-operative housing. The imposition of ceil- ing on land and plinth area of future dwelling units, and regulation of transfer of urban property under the Act, seeks to achieve the objective of social control over the physical resources of land. A , unique feature of the Act is that it covers seventeen States and aJI the Union Territories and provides for aggregation of holdings in urban agglomerations in the differen~ States where the law is applicable for purposes of ceiling limits. In other words, persons holding vacant lands or vacant and other built-up property with dwelling units therein in different urban agglomerations throughout the country will have to make a choice of retaining only one piece of vacant land within the ceiling limit a11d S\lrren4er excess vaqant lands else-where,

926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198SJ SUPPL. S.C.R.

Since the Act applies to firms, companies, and undertakings, future construction of industrial or commercial premises requiring large areas cannot take place in the notified urban agglomerations without obtaining the requisite land from the Government. This enables Government to regulate and canalise the location of industries and thus serve the broad policy approach in dispersal of economic activity. Hoarding of land by industrialists based on prospects for expansion in the distrnt future, is thus sought to be avoided.

The fundamental issue is: Whether s. 23 of the impugned Act impairs the basic structure or framework of the Constitution being c violative of Art. 39 (b) and (c) and Art, and is, therefore, not protected under Arts. 31 (2) of the Constitution 31-B and 31-C.

The impugned Act is designed as a law for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit to regulate the construction D of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons, and speculation and profiteering therein, and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good, in furtherance of the E Directive Principles under Art. 39 (b) and (c'. The constitutional validity of s. 23 of the Act depends on whether in truth and substance these objectives have been translated into action. Section 23 of the Act reads:

F "23. (I) It shall be competent for the State Govern- ment to allot, by order, in excess of the ceiling limit any vacant land which is deemed to have been acquired by the State Government under this Act or is acquired by the state Government under any other law, to any person 1 for any purpose relating to, or in connection with, any industry or for providing residential accommodation of such type as may be approved by the State Government to the employees of any industry and it shall be lawful for such person to hold such land in excess of the ceiling limit.

Explanation.-For the purpose of this section,-

MSS BHIM SINGH'· UNION (Sen, J.) 927

(a) where any land with a building has been acquired by the State Government under any other law and such building has been subsequently demolished by the State Government, then, such land shall be deemed to be vacant land acquired under such other law;

B (b) "industry" means any business, profession, trade, undertaking or manufacture.

(2) In making an order of allotment under sub-section ( 1), the State Government may impose such conditions as may be sqecified therein including a condition as to the c period within which the industry shall be put in opera· tion or, as the case mly be the residential accommodation shall be provided for:

D Provided that if, on a representation made in this behalf by the allottee, the State Government is satisfied that the allottee could not put the industry in operation, or provide the residential accommodation, within the period specified in the order of allotment, for any good and sufficient reason, the State Government may extend E .' such period to such further period or periods as it may deem fit.

(3) Where any condition imposed in an order of allotment is not complied with by the allottee, the State F Government shall, after giving an opportunity to the allottee to be heard in the matter, cancel the allotment with effect from the date of the non-compliance of such condition and the land allotted shall revest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. G

Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (I), (2) and (3), all vacant lands deemed to have been acquired by the State Government under this Act shall be disposed of by •J H the State Government to subserve the common good on such terms and conditiol\s as the $tate Governmenl may ~eem fit to imp<>se.

928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985J SUPPL, S.C.R,

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec- A tions (I) to (4), where the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary to retain or reserve any vacant land, deemed to have been acquired by that Government under this Act, for the benefit of the publlo, it shall be compe- tent for the State Government to retain or reserve such land for the same."

The submission is that though the impugned Act is designed as a law for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, to subserve the common good, in furtherance of c the Directive principles under Art. 39 (b) and (c), the dominant object of the impugned Act for the acquisition of vacant land in urban agglomerations under s. 23 of the Act, was to facilitate the setting up of industries in the private sector and, therefore, the Act was not in furtherance of part IV of the Constitution and void being violative of Art. 31 (2). It was urged that s. 23 of the impugned D Act must, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional, it being not in keeping with part IV of the Constitution was not protected under Art. 31C and that it cannot also have the protective umbrella of Art. 3!B as it seeks to alter the basic structure of the Constitution.

E Although the impugned Act is enacted with a laudable object, to subserve the common good, in furtherance of the Directive Princi- ( ples of state policy under Art, 39 (b) and (c), it appears froni the terms of sub-ss. (I), (2) and (3) of!. 23 that it would be permissible to acquire vacant land in urban agglomerations and divert it for private purpose. The whole emphasis is on industrialisaton. The F opening words ins. 33 (4) "subject to the provisions of sub-sections (!), (2) and (3)" make the provisions of s. 23 ( 4) subservient to s. 23 (1) which enables the Government to allot vacant land in an urban agglomeration to any person for any purpose relating to, or in connection with, any industry or for providing residential accom- modation of such type as m•y be approved by the state Government G to the employees of any industry. It further makes it lawful for the allottee that is, the industrialist, to hold such land in excess of the ceiling limit. The definition of the word 'industry' in Explanation (b) to s. 23 (I) is wiJe enough to include any business, profession, trade, undertaking or manufactue, and necessarily includes the private sector. The proviso to s. 23 (2) fortifies that construction of mine. It is incomprehensible that vacant lands in all urban agg• lomerations throughout the country should be acquired for the

MSS BHIM SINGH v. UNION (Sen, J.) 929

purpose of setting up industries. More so, that it should permissible to allow setting up of indu1tries for private gain. There is no material placed before us showing that the Government has prepared any blue print for industrialisation of all the urban agglomerations in India in the public sector.

B In fact, faced with this difficulty, the learned Attorney General attempted to justify the provisions contained in s.23 by submitting that the opening words ins 23(4) "subject to the provisions of sub- sections (I), (2) and (3)" must, in the context of the preamble and the Directive Principles under Art 39(b) and (c), be construed to mean "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sub· sections (1), (2) and (3)"' According to him, the "brooding spirit', of the Preamble permeates through the entire section, and, therefore- the provisions of s. 23 of the Act should be read in the light of the preamble. The contention cannot be accepted. When the language of the section is clear and explicit, its meaning cannot be controlled D by the preamble. It is not for the Court to re-structure the section. The re-structuring of a statute is obviously a legislative function. The matter is essentially of political expediency, and as such it is the concern of the statesmen and, therefore, the domain of the legislature and not the judiciary. B It was, however, urged that s.23(1) of the Act is only an enabling provision, and the real power was under s.23(4), and if there is ambiguity in the language of s.23, it was possible to read the section in the light of the preamble and th' Directive Principles under F Art. 39(bl and (c) and as such s.23(1) is subject to s.23(4). The use of the words "subject to the provisions of sub-sections (!), (2) and (3)" in s.23(4) takes away the compulsion on the State Government to adhere to the Directive Principles under Art. 39(b) and (c) in making allotment of the vacant lands in an urban agglomeration acquired under the Act. The words "subject to the provisions of sub· G sections (I), (2) and (3J" in s.23(4}, appearing in the context ofs.23(1) means 'in addition to; if anything is left over after the allotment under s.23(1)'. I cannot. therefore, read the provisions of sub-ss.(1), (2) and (3) s.23 of in the light of the preamble or the Directive Principles under Art. 39(bl and (c). By no rule of construction can the operation of sub·s.( ll of s.23 of the Act be controlled by the H operatio11 of sub·s.( 4),

930 SUPrulME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPPL. s.c.R.

A legislation built on the foundation of Art. 39(b) and (c) • permitting acquisition of private property must be for a public purpose, that is, to subserve the common good. In my view, sub·ss. ' (!), (2) and (3) of s.23 of the Act negate that principle. Furthermore, Art. 31 (2) consists of three pre-requisites namely (i) the property shall be acquired by or under a valid law, (ii) it shall be B acquired only for a public purpose. and (iii) the person whose property has been acquired shall be given an amount in lieu thereof. The definition of 'industry' in Explanation (b) to s. 23(1) ls wide enough to include any busincess, trade or vocation carried on for private gain. There cannot be 'mixed purpose' of public and private to sustain a legislation under Art. 39(b) and (c). The vice lies in c s. 23(1) and the Explanation (b) thereto, which on a combined reading, frustrate the very object of the legislation.

One is left with the feeling that sub-ss. (1), (2) and (3) of s. 23 D of the impugned Act are meant to promote the interests of the business community and further professional interests. While setting up of an industry in the private sector may, at times, be for the public good, there cannot be acquisition of private property for private gain. Acquistion can only be for a 'public purpose'. That is to say, a purpose. an object or aim in which the general interest of • the community aq oppo>ed to the particular interest of the individual, i• directly and vitally concerned. The concept of 'public purpose' necessarily implies that it should be a law for the acquisition or requisition of property in the interest of the general public, and the purpose of such a law directly and vitally subserves public interest. If in reality the object of the acquisition under the Act is to set up F industries in the private sector as is permissible from the provisions of s. 23(1) of the Act, nothing prevents the State from taking recourse to s. 40 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for which there mnst be quid pro quo, that i,, payment of compensation according to the market value. G Our attention was drawn to the Guidelines issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing clarifying the intent and purpose of the provisions of the Act. It may be stated If here that these Guidelines cannot supersede or alter any of the I provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder. The Guidelines jssue4 µ111,i~r s. 23 are in these terms :

MSS BHIM SINGH v, UNION (Sen, J.) 931

"Section 23 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regula- tion) Act, 1976, governs, inter a/ia, disposal of vacant A land acquired under the Act. In brief, this Section enables the State Government to allot any vacant land for the purpose of an industry or to subserve the common good. or to retain or reserve such land for the benefit of the public.

2. For the purpose of the Section 'industry' bas been given a wider meaning so as to cover any business, profession, trade, undertaking or manufacture.

3. The section also enables Government to allot land c for providing residential accommodation of such type as may be approved by the State Government to the employees of any industry. Thus the excess vacant land acquired by the State Government under the Act can be dealt with in the foll owing manner : D

(i) allotted for the purpose of an industry namely, any business, profession, trade, undertaking or manu- facture; E (ii) allotted for the purpose of construction of houses for the employees of an industry specified in item (i) above;

(iii) disposed of to subserve the common good which may include allotment of vacant land for Government purpose, for institutions, etc., and

(iv) retained/reserved for the benefit of the public"

It appears that the Government issued the following guidelines pursuant to the recommendations made at a conference of State Ministers of Housing and Urban Development with a view to imple- ment the policy of socialisation of urban land : H "The 9th Conference of State Ministers of Housing and Urban Development held at Calcutta on the 17th, 18th and 19th December, 1976, considered the matter anc

932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] SUPPL. 1.c.1.

A recommended that, in order to bring about social objectives of the Act more prominently, the utilisation of the excess vacant land should be according to the priori- ties set down below subject to the prescribed land uses: B (i) Retain/reserve for the benefit of the public for social housing, provision of basic amenties, etc. ., (ii) Dispose of to subserve common good which may include allotment of vacant land for Government c purposes, local authorities, institutions, etc.

(iii) Allot for the purpose of construction of houses for the employees of industries specified in item (iv) below.

D (iv) Allot for the purpose of industry, viz., any business, profession, trade, undertaking of non-polluting manufacture; cottage and small scale and wherever possible ancillary industry, manufacture."

It is significant to notice that there was an attempt made in these aforesaid Guidelines to alter the 'priorities' laid down in s. 23. The Guidelines cannot alter the 'priorities' laid down in the section. The Guidelines are nothing but in the nature or Executive Instruc- tions and c1nnot obviously control the plain meaning of the section. Where the language of the Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature.(') The Court cannot be called upon to interpret the provisions of s. 23 of the Act in the light of the Guidelines issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing.

G I am, therefore, constrained to hold that the provmons of sub-ss. (!), (2) and (3) of s. 23 and the opening words "subject to the provisions of sub-sections (I), (2) and (3)" in s. 23(4) wbicb make the setting up of industries tbe dominant object for the acquisition of vacant land in urban agglomerations under the Act, are not in keep- ing with Part IV of the Constitution and, therefore, not protected under Article 31 ·C.

(I) craie$ QP ~tatute Law~ 6th ed., p.6~ 1

Mss BHIM SINGH v. UNION (Sen J.) 933 A legislation which directly runs counter to the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Art. 39(b) and (c) cannot by the mere inclusion in the Ninth Schedu'.e receive immunity under Art. 3!B. The Directive Principles are not mere homilies. Though these Directives are not cognizable by the Courts and if the Govern- ment of the day fails to carry out these objects no Court can make the Government ensure them, yet these principles have been declared to be fundamental to the governance of the country. Granville Austin(') considers these Directives to be aimed at furthering the goals of the social revolution or to foster this revomtion by establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement, He explains: c: "By establishing these positive obligations of the State, the members of the Constituent Assembly made if the responsibility of future Indian governments to find a middle way between individual liberty and the public good, between preserving the property and the privilege of the few and bestowing benefits on the many in order to liberate 'the powers of all men equally for contributions to the common good'."

In short, th~ Directives emphasise, in amplification of the preamble, that the goal of the Indian polity is not laissez faire, but a E welfare State, where the State has a positive duty to ensure to its citizens social and economic justice and dignity of the individual. It would serve as an 'Instrument of Instructions' upon all future governments, irrespective of their party creeds. F Article 38 requires that the Stdte should make an effort to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which jtistice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life. In other words, the promise made by the Constitution to the citizens of India in its Preamble is directly included in one of the Directive G Principles of State Policy. Article 39, cl. (a) requires that all citizens shall have a right to adequate means of livelihood. Article 39(b) enjoins that the State shall enmre that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to H (1) Glanville Austin-The Indian Constitution : Cornerstone of a Nation pp.50-52. '

9~4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (198~] SUPPL, s.d.&.

subserve the commou good. Article 39(c) mandates that the State A shall direct its policy towards securing that the operatiou of the ecouomic system does uot result iu the coucentration of wealth aud meaus of production to the common detriment. Dr. P.B. Gajeudragadkar iu 'Law, Liberty aud Social Justice', observes:

B "These directive priuciples very briefly, but eloqueu- tly, lay down a policy of action for the differeut State Governmeuts aud the Ceutral Goverumeut, aud iu a sense, they embody solemnly and recoguize the validity of the charter of demands which the weaker sections of the citizens suffering from sociol-economic injustice would c present to the respective governments for immediate relief."

Chaudrachud J. (as he theu was) iu Smt. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain(') after observing that the ratio of the majority in D Ktsevananda Bharati's case were merely illustrative of what constitutes the basic structure and are not intended to be exhaustive, observes :

"I consider it beyond the pale of reasonable contro- versy that if there be any unamendable features of the of the Constitution, on the score that they form a part of the basic structure of the Constitution,they are that : (i) India is a Sovereign Democratic Republic; (ii) Equality of status and opportunity shall be secured to all its citizens, (iii) The State shall have no religion of its own aud all persons shall be equally entitled to freedom of couscieuce and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion and that (iv) the Nation shall be governed by a Government of laws, uot of men. These in my opinion, are the pillars of our constitutional philosophy, the pillars therefore of the basic structure of the Constitu- tion." G According to him, the pillars of the Coustitution are Sovereign Democratic Republic, Equality of Status and Opportunity, Secular- ism, Citizen's right to religious worship, and the Rule of Law. With H respect, I would add that the concept of social aud economic justice- to build a Welfare State-is equally a part of the basic structure or

(I) (1976] 2 SCR 347.

MSS Bll!M SINGH v. UNION (Sen, J.) 935

the foundation upon which the Constitution rests. The provlSlons of sub-ss. (!), (2) and (3) of s. 23 and the opening words "subject to the provisions of sub-sections(!), (2) and (3)" in s. 23(4) are the very antithesis of the idea of a Welfare State based on social and economic justice. Since these provisions permit acquisition of property under the Act for private purposes, they offend against the Directive Principles of State Policy of Art. 39(b) and (c) and are also . violative of Art. 31(2) and therefore, not protected under Art. 3LB. B

• I would, therefore, declare that the provisions of sub-sections (I', (2) and (3) ofs. 23 and the opening words "subject to the pro- visions of sub-sections (I), (2) and (3)" in s. 23( 4) are ultra vires of the Parliament. c With the striking down of the invalid provisions what remains, that is, the remaining provisions of the impugned Act, including s. 23( 4) thereof. being in conformity with Part IV of the Constitution and Article 31(2), are valid and, therefore, tbe impugned Act has the protection of both Article 31-B and Article 31-C.

I find no justification to strike down the whole Act as it would be against the national interest. Unless it becomes clear beyond reasonable doubt that the legislation in question transgresses the limits of the organic law of the Constitution it must be allowed to stand as the true expression of the national will. The provisions of sub-ss. (I), (2) and (3) of s. 23 and the opening words "subject to the provisions of sub-sections(!), (2) and (3)" ins. 23·4), which are, in my view, invalid, cannot effect the validity of the Act as a whole. The test to be applied when an argument like the one addressed in this case is raised, has been summed up by the Privy Council in Attorney-Genera/for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canad,( 1) iu these words :

) "The real question is whether what remains is so inextricably bound up with the part declared invalid that what remains cannot independently survive or, as 1t has sometimes been put, whether on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that .the legislature w _iuid have enacted what survives without enacting the part til•t is ultra vires at all." H

(I) (1947] A.C. 505 at SIS,

936 SUPRl!ME COURT REPORTS {1985) SUPPL, S.C.ll.

It is quite clear that the provisions of sub-ss. (!). (2) and (3) of s. 23 A and the opening words "subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3)" ins. 23(4) struck down by me are not inextricably bound up with the remaining provisions of the Act, and it is difficult to hold that the legislature would not have enacted the Act at all without including that part which is found to be ultra vires. The Act B stiJJ remains the Act as it was passed, i.e., an Act for imposition of ceiling on urban land.

In determining the effect of the law upon the individual's right to property, the Court must take judicial notice of the fact of vast c inequalities in the existing distribution of property in the country. The Court's concern lies not merely with applying the pre-existing sets of theories, concepts, principles and criteria with a view to determining what the Jaw is on a particular point. The proper approach should be to view the principles with the realisation that the ultimate foundation of the Constitution finds its ultimate roots D in the authority of the people. This demands that constitutional questions should not be determined from a doctrinaire approach, but viewed from experience derived from the life and experience or actual working of the community. which takes into account emer- gence of new facts of the community's social and economic life affecting property rights of the individual, whenever, among others, B the validity of a law prescribing preference or discrimination is in question under the "equal protection" guarantee.

It should be remembered that the Directive Princi!Jles cannot F be regarded only as idle dreams or pious wishes merely by reason of the fact that they are not enforceable by a court of law. A rule of law in facts does not cease to be such because there is no regular judicial or quasi-judicial machinery to enforce its commands. An attempt to create a truly social Welfare State also carries with it the idea that in a country like India concentration of wealth in the ( G country must be done away with and its distribution on an equitable basis effected in order to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor. The very purpose of creating such a state is to benefit the weaker and poorer sections of the community to a much greater extent than the rich persons so that the living standards of the people in general may improve. In fact, in such a State, all welfare schemes in their operation generally tend to benefit the poor people to a much greater extent than others. If an equal protection guarantee were enough to invalidate such schemes, improvement in the economic

MSS lllt!M SINGlt v. UNION (Sen, J.) 937

and social conditions of the country would be impossible. One > should not be swayed away by emotions but should be guided by the real needs of the country. Hence a paradoxical situation should be avoided by refusing to perpetuate the existing inequality among the social classes and maintain that gap to the same extent as before by intending to pay to the rich compensation at the same full rates as in the case of the poorer sections of the community. B The impugned Act is meant to remove inequalities with a view to promote 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'. During the last thirty years much has been done to implement the State's policy of socialisation of agricultural land by imposition of a ceiling on agricultural holding. There is much that still remains to be done. c There is noed for prevention of concentration of wealth in a few hands in the urban areas and to provide for equitable distribution of vacant land among others. The grnat disparity between the rich and the poor is more visible in the urban areas particularly in the great cities. A majority of the people in the urban areas are living in abject poverty. They do not even have a roof over their heads. Concentration of wealth in a few hands is not conducive to the national wellbeing.

The challenge to the validity of the artificial definition of 'family' in s.2(f) of the impugned Act must fail. The Court has recently upheld the validity of an identical definition of 'family' appearing in the different State laws relating to imposition of ceiling on agricultural land. Some marginal hardship is inevitable in the working of the legislation. The ultimate object is to reduce inequa- lities in the larger interest. That takes us to the question whether I! the definition of 'family' in s.2(f) of the Act results in the exclusion of a joint Hindu family.

- The definition of 'family' contained in s.2(f) is in the following terms :

"2.(f) "family" in relation to a person, means the G

individual, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such individual and their unmarried minor children." H As a result of the artificial definition of 'family' in s.2(f), there is no denying the fact that a joint Hindu family is excluded from the purview of the Act. Section 3 of the Act provides that no person, on

STJPREMB COURT REPORTS [198SJ SUPPL. S.C.R. and from the commencement of the Act, shall be entitled to ho! A any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which the Act applied. The word 'person' is defined in s.2(i) as :

"2.(i) "person" includes an individual, a family, a firm, a company, or an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not;" B The question is whether the total exclusion of joint Hindu family renders the Act void and unconstitutional as violative of Art.14. I do not think that this is so. Parliament deliberately excluded a joint Hindu family from the purview of s.3 of the c impugned Act. As already pointed out in Vasavaiah Chaudhary's case, Parliament was be;et with difficulties in imposing a ceiling on urban immovable property. While dealing with imposition of ceiling on vacant urban land it was presumably faced with another difficulty, viz., the institution of a joint Hindu family. According to • the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, there is community of interest D and unity of possession. Under the Mitakshara School a copar- cener cannot predicate the extent of his share, while under the Dayabhaga school a member of joint Hindu family takes as a tenant in common. We, therefore, do not find anything wrong in excluding a joint Hindu family. The impugned Act applies to Hindus, E Mohamedans and Christian alike. By the exclusion of a joint Hindu family the members of a joint Hindu family, whether governed by the Mitakshara School or the Dayabhaga School, were brought at par with others. The contention that the impugned Act offends against Art.14 must, therefore. fail. F The contention that the amount fixed by sub-s.(6) of s.11 of the impugned Act is totally arbitrary and illusory since there is no nexus betwen the value of the property and the amount fixed and, therefore, the maximum amount fixed under sub·s.(6) makes the Act G confiscatory in total abrogation of th.e fundamental rigl:tt guaranteed under Art.3 I (2) cannot be accepted. The Constitution (25th Amendment) Act, 1971, which came into force on April 20, 1972, by s.2(a) substituted the word 'amount' for the word 'compensation' in the new Art.31(2), which reads :

H "31(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law whicl:t provides for acquisition or

i.iss llilIM SINGH y, UNION (Sen, J.) 939

requisitioning of the property for an amount which may be fixed by such law or which may be determined in A accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law; and no such law shaJI be called in question in any court on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate or that the whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise 8 than in cash.''

Under the original Art.31(2), no property could be acquired for a public purpose under any law, unless it provided for compensation of, or acquired and either fixed the amount of the compensation, or specified the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation was to be determined and given.

It will be seen that Art.31(2) provides for acquisition or requisitioning of the property for an amount which may be fi <ed by such law, or which may be determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such Jaw. No such law can be called in question on the ground that the amount is not adequate, or that the whole or any part of it is to be given otherwise than in cash. Section 2(b) of the 25th Amendment Act inserted a new clause (2B) to Art.3 l which provides : E

"31.(2BJ Nothing in sub-clause (f) of clause (I) of article 19 shall affect any such law as is referred to in clause (2)." F The substitution of the neutral word 'amount' for the word 'com- pensation' in the new Art.31 (2) still binds the legislature to give to the owner a mm of money in cash or otherwise. The legislature may either lay down the principles for the determination of the amount or may itself fix the amount. The choice open to the legislature is that the amount should be directly fixed by or under the law itself G or alternatively, the law may fix principles in accordance with which the amount will be determined.

Sub·section (I) of s.J I reads : H "11(1) Where any vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by any State Government under sub-section (3)

940 St.IPREMS COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPPL. S.C.R.