MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, JODHPUR v. PAREKH AUTOMOBILES LTD. AND ORS.

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Supreme Court of India (SC) · decided (year only) · SABYASA CHI MUKHARJI, M.H. KANIA and S. RANGANATHAN · judgment

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[1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 49

The result of the above discussion is that the present case is governed by the terms of rule 13 and the IOC is entitled to go on G paying octroi duty on the basis of the goods brought by it within the Municipality less the goods transported outside the Municipality even where the transport outside the Municipality may be in pursuance of a sale within the Municipality so long as such sale is in pursuance of an intention that the goods should be consumed or used outside the Munici- pal limits. As we have already said, in cases where rule 13 applies, rule H 9 is excluded and, therefore, the High Court rightly held that the octroi charged on the IOC in respect of the impugned sales was not justified.

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. PAREKH AUTOMOBILES [RANGANATiiAN, J.I 81

Before concluding I wish to refer to three aspects. The first is as to whether even assuming that rule 9 was applicable to a case where the current account facility has been provided, the terms of tliat rule can be read in such a manner as to militate against the very concept of octroi duty as explained in the Burmah Shell case. A questio11 may arisE whether the terms of rule 9(2) so interpreted would be intr4 vires the rule making power of the legislature. I express no opinion on this issue as I have already expressed my view that rule 9 has no applic~tion to the presel)t case. The second aspect, which I wish to touch upon, is a point sought to be raised on behalf of the appellant in the course oUhe present hearing that the current account facility granted to the IOC had been revoked. My learned brother has referred to the pleadings in this regard at great length and, as pointed out by him, the factual c position is by no means clear. I do not think that the appellant should be permitted to raise at this stage a new plea when all along, in the earlier proceedings in the High Court, the case has proceeded on the footing that the IOC had been having and continues to have current account facilities. The third aspect to which I would like to make a reference is that we have principally based out decision only on the facts in regard to the sales to Parekh Automobiles Ltd. We are told that there are a number of suits, other than those before us today, which are pending at various stages in which various pleas have been raised. I would only like to make it clear that we express no opinion regarding the factual position in those cases and those cases will have to be disposed off in the light of the legal position set out in our judgment. Except for the above clarifications I have nothing to add to what my learned brother Mukharji, J. has said and I respectfully agree with his conclusion that the appeals must fail and are dismissed.

R.S.S. Appeals dismissed.

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