MOHAN KUMAR SINGHANIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC

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A decide from what sources the admission will be made. That essentially is a question of policy and depends inter alia on an overall assessment and survey of the requirements of residents of particular territories and other categories of persons for whom it is necessary to provide facilities for medical educa- tion. If the sources are properly classified whether on ter- B ritorial, geographical or other reasonable basis it is not for the Courts to interfere with the manner and method of making the classification." ---< In the above case, the Court has distinguished the decision in Rajendran's case (referred to above). c Y.V. Chandrachud, J as he then was speaking for the Constitution Bench in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors., (1974] 1 SCR 771 in which it was contended on behalf of the State that is always open to the Government to classify its employees so long as the classifica- tion is reasonable and has nexus with the object thereto, stated as follows: D "Thus, it is no part of the appellants' burden to justify the classification or to establish its constitutionality. Formal educa~ tion may not always produce excellence but a classification founded on variant educational qualifications is for purposes of promotion to the post of an Executive Engineer, to say the least, not unjust on the fact of it and the onus therefore cannot shift from where it originally lay .............................................................................................. .

Classification is primarily for the legislature or for the statutory authority charged with the duty of framing the terms and con- ditions of service, and if, looked at from the standpoint of the authority making it, the classification is found to rest on a reasonable basis, it has to be upheld .......................................... .

Discrimination is the essence of classification and does violence to the constitutional guarantee of equality only it rests on an unreasonable basis ............................................................ . G ············································································································· - _._ Equality is for equals. That is to say that those who are similar- ' ly circumstanced are entitled to an equal treatment

Judicial scrutiny can therefore extend only to the consideration whether the classification rests on a reasonabl~ basis whether it H bears nexus \Vith the object in view. It cannot extend to em-

MOHAN KUMAR v. U. 0. I. [PANDIAN, J.} 101

barking upon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the basis· of A . classification, for were such an inquiry permissible it would be open to the courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature or the rule-making authority on the need to classify or the desirability of achieving a particular object." P.N. Bhagwati, J and Krishna Iyer, J have concurred with the view .expressed by chandrachud, J though they have added some more concur- B ring observations of their own.

--y- It will be apposite to recall an observation of this Court in A.S. Sangwan v. Union of India, [1980) Supp. SCC 559 at 561 reading as follows: "A policy once formulated is not good for ever; it is perfectly within the competence of the Union of India to change it, c rechange it, adjust it and readjust it according to the compul- sions of circumstances and the imperatives of national con- siderations. We cannot, as Court, give directives as to how the .. Defence Ministry should function except to State that the obligation not to act arbitrarily and to treat employees equally is binding on the Union of India because if functions under the D Constitution and not ove.r it. ................................................. -~ ············································································································· It is entirely within the reasonable discretion of the Union of India. It may stick to the earlier policy or give it up. But one imperative of the Constitution implicit in Article 14 is that if it does change its policy, it must do so fairly and should not give E the impression that it is acting by any ulterior criteria or ar- bitrarily." See also Aklzil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway)'s case --..<' (already referred to).

In Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, [1989) 2 SCC 145 M.M. Dutt, J F speaking for the Court has held thus:

-- "In order to consider the question as to the reasonableness of the classification, it is necessary to take into account the objec- tive for such classification. If the objective be illogical, unfair and unjust, necessarily the classification will have to be held as ~ unreasonable. Surrounding ('.ircumstances may be taken into G ~ consideration in support of the constitutionality of a law which is otherwise hostile or discriminatory in nature. But the cir- cumstances must be such as to justify the discriminatory treat- ment or the classification subserving the object sought to be ' achieved. A classification by the identification of a source must ......;. H -~

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A not be arbitrary, but should be on a reasonable basis having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the rules for such admission. A classification need not be made with mathe- matical precision but, if there be little or no difference between the person or things which have been grouped together and those left out of the group, the classification cannot be said to be a reasonable one ......................................................................

It is true that a classification need not be made with mathe- matical precision but, if there be little or no difference between the persons or things which have been grouped together and those left out of the group, in that case, the classification can- c not be said to be a reasonable one ................................ :......

It is submitted that in making the classification the surrounding circumstances may be taken into account ............... . ......................................................................................................... It ( follows from the observation that surrounding circumstances may be taken into consideration in support of the con- D stitutionality of a law which is otherwise hostile or dis- criminatory in nature. But the circumstances must be such as to justify the discriminatory treatment or the classification sub- + serving the object sought to be achieved. In the instant case, the circumstances which have been relied on by the respon- dents, namely, the possibility of production by them of bogus certificates and insecurity of their services are not, in our opinion, such circumstances as will justify the exclusion of the employees of private establishments from the evening classes." What falls instantly for determination is whether. the differentia on which the classification is sought to be made has a rational relation with the object to be achieved. We have already discussed this question in detail when we have separately examined the question as to whether the second proviso is related to the purposes stated therein.

Whereas Mr. Kapil Sibal has urged that it is always open to the ...... Government to classify its employees as long as the classification is reasonable and has nexus to the object thereto, the rival contention is that there is no nexus between the classification and the object to be achieved thereby, that in fact the classification defeated that object, that if chances of sitting for examination are denied to a few with equals; there is inherent - vice attached to such classification and that in such circumstances, the unreasonableness of the classification becomes patent. It is further urged

MOHAN KUMAR v. U. O. I. [PMTIIAN, J.) 103

J-- on behalf of the appellants that this classification foments frustration amongst the selectees of group 'A' services and produces inefficiency by placing men of lower efficiency in a very advantageous position. Mr. P.P. Rao would urge that if there is a vertical movement in group 'A' services as stated by Mr. Kapil Sibal, how can candidates in group 'B' services be permitted to sit for examination of IAS, IFS and IPS by passing the meritorious candidates under group ~A' and therefore the classification is per se irrational, unjust and discriminatory and as such ultra-vires Article 14. -'y We shall now bestow out judicious thought over this matter and carefully examine the rival contentions of the rival parties in the light of the guiding principles, lucidly laid down by this Court in a series of decisions, a few of which we have already referred to hereinbefore. The selections for c IAS, IFS and !PS group 'A' services and group 'B' service are made by a combined competitive examination and viva voce test. There cannot be any dispute that each service is a distinct and separate cadre, having its separate field of operation, with different status, prospects, pay scales, the nature of duties, the responsibilities to the post and conditions of service 't etc. Therefore, once a candidate is selected and appointed to a particular cadre, he cannot be allowed to say that he is at par with the others on the ground that ail of them appeared and were selected by a combined com- petitive examination and viva voce test and that the qualifications prescribed are comparable. In our considered view, the classification of the present case is not based on artificial inequalities but is hedged within the salient features and truly founded on substantial differences. Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible to accept the submission that -< the classification rests on an unreal and unreasonable basis and that it is arbitrary or absurd.

In this connection, it may be noted that in fact the civil services in foreign countries too, such as United States of America, Great Britain, France and Canada grew up by degrees from time to time in tune with the concept of new ideas under the pressure of some necessity or influence of particular theories linked with the changing political ideology and social conditions and with a view to trimming the civil service scheme and this -j:-~ process of development is by way of evolution rather than revolution. G We may again hark-pack to the case of the appellants and examine whether this classification offends Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 declares that the State shall not deny to any person H

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A equality before the law or the equal protection of the law within the ter- -,l, ritory of India. The cherished principle underlying the above Article is that there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject matter of the legislation, their position is the same. Vide Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, [1950] 1 SCR 869 or in other words its action must not be arbitrary, but must be based on some valid principle, which in itself must not be irrational or discriminatory (Vide Kasturi v. State of J & K (albeit). As ruled by this Court inAmeeroonissa v.Mahboob, [1953] SCR 405 and Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administratio11, AIR 1959 SC 609 -~ that differential treatment does not per se constitute violation of Article 14 and it denies equal protection only when there is no rational or reasonable basis for the differentiation. Thus Article 14 condemns discrimination and forbids class legislation but permits classification founded on intelligible differentia having a rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act/Rule/Regulation in question. The Government is legitimately empowered to frame rules of classification for securing the requisite standard of efficiency in services and the classification need not scientifically be perfect or logically complete. As observed by this Court + more than once, every classification is likely in some degree to produce some inequality.

The provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have come up for discussion before this Court in a number of cases but we feel that in the present case, it is not necessary to go in for any lengthy discussion as to the origin, meaning and the gradual development of the concept of principles· and enlargement of the scope and effect of this Article. Suffice to mention a few decisions of this court relating to the issue under consideration, namely- Chiranjit Lal Clwwdlmry v. The Unio11 of India; Budhan Clwudluy and Others v. The State of Bihar; R.K Dalmia v. Justice Ten- F dolkar (all cited above); E.P. Royappe v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1974] 2 SCR 348; Ma11eka Ga11dhi v. U11ion of India, [1978] 1 SCC 248; Ramona v. r International Airport Authority of I11dia, AIR 1979 SC 1928; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, [1985] 3 SCC 398; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. U11ion of India, [1981] 2 SCR 533; and Ce11tral Inland Water Transport C01poration v. Brojo Nath, AIR 1986 SC 1971. G In Devadasan v. Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680 wherein Subba Rao, J as he then was, has dissented from the majority an.d pointed out that the expression "equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws" means equality among equals and that Article 14 does not provide for an absolute equality of treatment to all persons in utter disregard in every. H conceivable circumstance of the differences.

MOHANKUMAR v. U. 0. I. (PANDIAN, J.) 105

_J_ In Birendra Kumar Nigam and Others v. Union of lndia,Writ Petition A Nos. 220-222 of 1963 decided on 13.3.1964, three writ petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution raising a common question regarding the constitutional validity of certain rules framed by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and certain directions issued by it relative to the appearance of Assistants employed in the Central Secretariat Service in the competi- tive examination held by the Union Public Service Commission for recruit- B ment to certain All India Services. In each of the above three petitions, ~ grounds of challenge was same viz., that the impugned rules and directions were violative of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution.

The facts in relation to the three petitions were slightly different. Therefore, by way of illustration we will tersely state the facts in Writ C Petiti~n No. 220 of 1963.

The petitioner in that case was appointed to the post of an Assistant in the Central Secretariat Service from 1956 and he joined the same on 29.8.56. But in March of that year, he had already submitted his application to be included as a candidate for competing in the combined examination D for the several All India Services - IAS, IFS, IPS and the several categories of the All India Central Services, the Examination for which was held in September 1956 but before that date he received an informa- \ tion from the Home Ministry that he could not appear for that examination because he was still on probation. prior to the date on which he completed his probation and was confirmed as an Assistant, the Ministry of Home E Affairs issued the impugned notification on 14.3.1957 pointing out that there was an acute shortage of Grade IV Assistants in the Secretariat -~ Service and that the Assistants would not be permitted to compete at the examination to be held in 1957 and that those who were desirous of com- peting their candidature would be restricted to an appointment to Grade III of the Central Secretariat alone. F We are not giving the facts of other two writ petitions since the common question di!cided was the same.

Rajagopala Ayyangar, J while speaking for the Constitution Bench in that case has held: G "If, as must must be, it is conceded that the existencies, con- venience, or necessity or a particular department might justify the imposition of a total ban on the employees in that depart- ment, from seeking employment in other departments, a par- tial ban which permits them to seek only certain posts in the H

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A s_ame department cannot be characterised as illegal as being discriminatory. The mere fact therefore that under the rules officers in certain other departments are permitted to compete for a Class I post is no ground by itself for considering such a variation as an unreasonable discrimination, violative of AI- ticles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution as not based on a clas- B sification having a rational and reasonable rela:tion to the object to be attained. Of course, no rule imposes a· ban on these employees resigning their posts and competing for posts in the open competition along with 'open market 'Candidates." As we have repeatedly held that each of the civil services, namely IAS, IFS, IPS, Group 'A' Services and Group 'B' Services is a separate and determinate service forming a distinct ~dre and that each of the services is founded on intelligible differentia which on rational grounds distinguishes persons grouped together from those left out and that the differences are real and substantial having a rational and reasonable nexus to the objects sought to be achieved and that there is no question of unfairness or ar- bitrariness in the ex~cutive action in adding the second proviso to the substantive rule 4 of CSE Rules. When the submission of the learned coun- + sel for the appellants is carefully examined in the backdrop of the legal principles and the factual position, we are in full agreement with con- clusion arrived at by the Tribu~al that the impugned second proviso to Rule 4 is not violative of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India.

E In Summation: The impugned second proviso tci Rule 4 of the CSE Rules intro- duced by Notification No. 13016/4/86- AIS(l) dated 13.12.1986 is legally and constitutionally valid and sustainable in law and the said proviso neither travels beyond the intent of the main rule, namely, Rule 4 of the F CSE Rules nor it is ultra-vires Regulation 4 (iii-a) of Regulations, 1955 that it is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and that there is a dynamic and rational nexus between the impugned second proviso and the object to be achieved. There is no discrimination whatsoever involved on account of the introduction of the second proviso in question and the said proviso is not ultra-vires Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution of India. G Before parting with the judgment, we feel that it has become neces- -sary to give a specific direction to the respondents inclusive of the Union Public Service Commission in pursuance of the earlier directions given in . our order dated 7.12.1990 (vide Annexure 'A') which directions were given in pursuance of various interim orders passed by the Central Administra- H tive Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi and thereafter finaUy in its final

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A In the result for the reasons aforementioned the judgments of the . Tribunal are confirmed subject to the above directions and all the appeals i--. are dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs.

ORDER

We have heard all the learned counsel appearing in their respective B appeals and also the learned Additional Solicitor for respondents for a very considerable length of time. The .main thrust of the argument ad-. vanced on behalf of all the appellants is that the second proviso to Rule 4 of the Civil Services Examination Rules (published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-I Section, dated December 17, 1988) is offending Ar- C tide 14 of the Constitution of India and is contrary to law. As the above question requires a careful examination with regard to the individual cases listed for consideration and as we are informed that the Central Services Examination Commences on 17.12.1990, we are constrained to give the following directions on the 'basis of the conclusions arrived at by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in its judg- D ment dated 20th August 1990. The relevant conclusions as they appear from the concluding portion of the judgment of the Tribunal are as fol- lows:- -+- S(ii). A candidate who has been allocated to the I.P.S. or to a Central Services, Group 'A' May be allowed to sit at the next Civil Service Examination, provided he is withil! the per- missible age limit, without having to resign from the service to which he has been allocated, nor would he lose his original seniority in the service to which he is allocated if he is unable to take training with his own Batch.

6. Those applicants who have teen allocated to the l.P.S. or any Central Services, Group 'A', can have one more attempt in the subsequent Civil Services Examination for the services in- dicated in Rule 17 of the C.S.E. Rules. The Cadre Controlling Authorities can grant one opportunity to such candidates.

7. All these candidates who have been allocated to any of the Central Services, Group 'A', or l.P.S. and who have appeared in Civil Services Main Examination of a subsequent year under i

the interim orders of the Tribunal for the Civil Services Ex- amination in 1988 or 1989 and have succeeded, are to be given benefit of their success subject to the provisions of Rule 17 of the C.S.E. Rules. But this exemption will not be available for any subsequent Civil Services Examination.

MOHAN KUMAR v. U. 0. I. (PANDIAN, J.) 109 It is pertinent to note that the respondent has not challenged the above directions given in the concluding part of the judgment. So far as the conclusions under para Nos. 6 and 7 reproduced above, the learned Additional Solicitor General states that the respondent has no objection to have them sustained. So far as the .directions under para No. 5 (ii) is concerned, the Tribunal has allowed the candidates who have been allo- cated to the l.P.S or the Central Services, Group 'A' to sit at the next Civil B Service Examination subject to the condition that they must be within the permissible age limit and without having to resign from the service to which they have been allocated nor would they lose their original seniority in the service to which they are allocated if they are unable to take training with their own Batch. The Tribunal has used their expression "may be allowed to sit at the next Civil Service Examination but it did not restrict it only with regard to the preliminary examination as now contended by the learned Additional Solicitor, according to whom those candidates are not eligible to sit for the main examination since the Tribunal has upheld the validity of the second proviso to Rule 4 of the CSE Rules.

In order to properly understand and appreciate the conclusions ar- rived at by the Tribunal under para 5(ii), we shall reproduce some interim orders made by the Tribunal during the bearing of the 0.As.

In M.P. No. 1269/90 in OA No. 1074/90 dated 31.5.1990 which has given rise to SLP (Civil) Nos. 13525-38/90, the CA.T., New Delhi has passed the following order: - "We have beard the learned counsel for the parties and con- E sidered the matter. In our opinion, a direction should be issued to the respondents to permit the applicants to appear in the preliminary C.S.E. 1990 without pressing for their resignations from the service and respondents may also grant them neces- sary leave etc. This interim order will be subject to the order in F O.A. 206/1989 and connected cases." Interim order passed on 4.6.1990 in Regn. No. OA/160/90 by CAT, New Delhi which has given rise to Civil Appeal No. 5470/90 reads thus: - ''The learned counsel for the applicant states that the applicant has applied for the 1990 Civil Services Preliminary Examina- tion well in time and has also received Roll Number from the G Union Public Service Commission and that he is not being allowed to appear in the Examination in \iiew of the power conferred by the second proviso to Rule 4 of the Civil Services Examination 1987. The examination is going to be held on 10.6.1990. In view of this, we direct that if it is convenient and administratively possible, the respondents shall allow the ap- H

110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 1 S. C.R.

A plicant provisionally to appear in the said examination. Respondents may also consider granting him necessary leave etc. for the purpose. Issue dasti."

In M.P. No. 1251/90 in O.A. No.944/1989 which has given rise to Civil B Appeal No. 5471/90, CAT, New Delhi has passed the following order:- "We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we think it will be in the interest of justice to allow the prayer for interim order to enable the petitioner to sit in the preliminary. C.S.E.

1990. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner has received the admission card. He is directed to c give the Registration No./Roll No. to the Secretary, UPSC by 4.6.1990. We direct the respondents to permit the pet~tioner to appear in the preliminary C.S.E. 1990 without pressing for his resignation from the service and also grant him necessary leave etc. for appearing in the said examination. This interim order will be subject to the order in OA. 944/1989. The Misc. Petition D is accordingly disposed of.

Order dasti." In OA 913/90 (MP 1133/90) and OA No. 914/90 (MP 1134/90), which have given rise to Civil Appeal Nos. 5506-5525/90 the Tribunal has passed the following order on 17.5.1990:- E "As regards interim relief, the respondents are directed to per- mit the applicants to appear in the Civil Services Examination 1990 and to provide necessary facilities like leave etc. to enable them to appear in the ensuing Civil Services Examination, 1990 subject to the decisions in the Bunch of cases including F O.A.No. 206/89AlokKumar& Ors. v. U.O.I. .

List the matter on 29.5.1990. Orders (Dasti)" It seems no clarification has been sought for from the Tribunal by the respondents as to whether the expression "next Civil Service Examination" is confined only to the preliminary or whether it includes the main examination also. Though some of the interim orders passed by. the Tribunal which we have extracted above show that the said interim orders' were passed per- .milting the candidates to sit for the preliminary Central Service Examina- -uon of 1990 subject to the decisions of the O.As, in the final judgment, no restriction is shown. In other words, the conclusion under.para S(ii) is

MOHAN KUMAR v. U. 0. I. [PANDIAN, J. J 111,

not limited subject to any contingency; but on the other hand, it is absolute. A Therefore, that expression in the absence of any specific restriction, • has to hi.elude both the preliminary as· well as the main examinations. Hence in the absence of any challenge to the directions embodied in the impugned judgment, we hold that all those candidates falling under para No. 5(ii) can sit both for the preliminary as well as the main examinations subject to their eligibility otherwise. The condition incorporated in the later part of the impugned proviso that they should resign from the service to which. they have been allocated would not operate against them for the main examination of 1990 lest that direction would be meaningless.

Hence we permit all those candidates falling under Para . Nos.5(ii), 6 and 7 to, sit for the main examination subject to the condition that each candidate satisfies the Secretary, Union Public Service Commis- sion that he/she falls within these categories and that the concerned can- didates have passed the preliminary examination of 1990 ·and have also applied for the main examination within the due date. This permission is only for the ensuing examination. As we are now permitting those who have passed the preliminary examination of 1990 and have applied for the main examination on the basis of the unquestioned and unchallenged I directions given under paras 5(ii), 6 and 7 of the judgment of the CAT, ·-t Principal Bench, New Delhi, the same benefit is extended to the other appellants also who satisfy those conditions as mentioned under paras 5(ii), 6 and 7. E The Secretary, Union Public Service Commission will make the necessary arrangements enabling the candidates to sit for the main ex- amination of 1990.

We will give the judgment touching on the constitutionality of the second proviso to Rule 4 of CSE Rules later. We would once again like to F state that the above directions are given only on the basis of the unchal- lenged conclusions arrived at by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Prin· cipal Bench, New Delhi. '

T.N.A Appeals dismissed.