RENUSAGAR POWER CO. LTD. ETC. v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. ETC.

RENUSAGARPOWERLTD. v. ELECTRICCO.(AGRAWAL,J.] 103

hearing of such a suit, before passing the decree, the court should call upon the plaintiff to prove the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of the judgment or on 'the date nearest or most nearly preceding the date of the judgment. If necessary, after delivering judgment on all other issues, the court may stand over the rest of the judgment and the passing of the decr~e and adjpurn the matter to enable the plaintiff to prove such rate of exchange. The decree to be passed by the court should be one which orders the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the foreign cu~ ncy sum adjudged by the court subject to the requisite permi ion of the concerned authorities under the Foreign Exchange egulation Act, 1973, being granted, and in the event of the Foreign change authorities not granting the requisite permission or the deferldant not wanting to make payment in foreign currency even though such permission has been granted or the defendant not making payment in foreign currency or in Indian rupees, whether such permission has been granted or not, the equivalent of such foreign currency sum con- verted into Indian rupees at the rate of exchange proved before the court as aforesaid. In the event of the decree being challenged in appeal or other proceedings and such appeal or other proceed- ings being decided in whole in part in favour of the plaintiff, the appeallate court or the court hearing the application in the other proceedings challenging the decree should follow the same proce- E dure as the trial court for the purpose of ascertaining the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of its appellate decree on of its order· on such application or on the date nearest or most nearly preceding the date of such decree or order. If such rate of ex- change is different from the rate in the decree which has been challenged, the court should make the necessar}r modification with respect to the rate of exchange by its appellate decree or final order. In all .such cases, execution can only issue for the rupee equivalent specified in the decree, appellate decree or final order, as the case may be. These questions, of course, would not arise if pending appeal or other proceedings adopted by the defendant the decree has been executed or the money thereunder received by the plaintiff." (pp.587-589) ····'·\·

Referring to arbitration, this Court has held that, on principle, there can be and should be no difference between an award made by arbitrators H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A or an umpire and a decree of a court and has observed:

"In the types of cases we are concerned with here just as the courts have power to make a decree for a sum of money expressed in a foreign currency subject to the limitations and conditions we have set out above, the arbitrators or umpire have the power to make B an award for a sum of money expressed in a foreign currency. The arbitrators or umpire should, however, provide in the award for the rate of exchange at which the sum awarded in a foreign currency should be converted in the events mentioned above. This may be done by the arbitrators or umpire taking either the rate of c exchange prevailing on the date of the award or the date nearest or most nearly preceding the date of the award or by directing that the rate of exchange at which conversion is to be made would be the date when the court pronounces judgment according to the award and-passes the decree in terms thereof or the date nearest or most nearly preceding the ·date of the judgment as the court may determine. If the arbitrators or umpire omit to provide for the rate of conversion, this would not by itself be sufficient to invalidate the award. The court may either remit the award under section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for the purpose of fixing the date of conversion or may do so itself taking the date of conversion as the date of its judgment or the date nearest or most nearly preceding it, following the procedure outlined above for the purpose of proof of the rate of exchange prevailing on such date. If however, the person liable under such an award desires to make payment of the sum in foreign currency awarded by the arbitrators or umpire without the award being made a rule of the court, he would be at liberty to do so after obtaining the requisite permission of the concerned authorities under the FERA." (pp.589-590)

While passing the decision in terms of U.S. dollars the leraned Single Judge has not considered the matter of conversion of US dollars into G Indian currency. The Division Bench has, however, adverted to this aspect and applying the law laid down in Forasol case (supra) the decree has been passed in terms of US dollars as well as Indian rupees on the basis of the rupee-dollar exchange rate prevailing on the date of the decree passed by the learned single judge. The said date was applied for the reason, that H according to the Division Bench the Letter Patent Appeal filed by .

RENU SAGAR POWER LTD. v. ELECTRIC CO. [AGRAWAL, J.] 105

Renusagar was not maintainable. A It appears that both the parties are not satisfied with said view of the Division Bench of the High Court in applying the decision in Forasol case (supra) to the present case.

B Shri Venugopal has urged that in Forasol case (supra) this Court was dealing with the enforcement of an award governed by the Indian Arbitra- tion Act and that the principles laid down in the said decision cannot be applied to the present case arising out of a foreign award which is not governed by the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act but is governed by the provisions of the Foreign Awards Act. It is no doubt true that in the C Forasol case (supra) this Court was dealing with an award governed by Indian Arbitration Act but that does not affect the applicability of the said decision to proceedings for enforcement of a foreign award in Indian courts because the matter of conversion of foreign currency into Indian currency at the stage of enforcement of an award is governed by the same D principle irrespective of the fact whether the award is governed by the Indian Arbitration Act or a foreign award governed by the Foreign Awards Act. Moreover the position has been made clear bys. 4(1) of the Foreign Awards Act which lays down that a foreign award shall subject to the provisions of this Act be enforceable in India as if it were an award made on a matter referred to arbitration in India. The said provision equates a E foreign award to an Indian award for the purpose of enforcement with the exception that such enforcement will be subject to the provisions of the Foreign Awards Act. There is nothing in the provisions of the Foreign Awards Act which excludes the applicability of the principles laid down in Forasol case (supra) with regard to enforcement of foreign awards. In our opinion, therefore, the enforcement of the award in the instant case is governed by the law laid down in Forasol case (supra).

Shri Venugopal has further urged that i:he matter· of conversion of foreign currency and the rate of exchange for such conversion is not a matter of procedure but is a matter of substance and it is governed by the proper law and that since the contract as well as performance of the contract are both governed by the New Y.;)rk law, the breach-date rule which was applicable in the State of New York at the relevant time, should be applied for the purpose of ascertaining the exchange rate for conversion of U.S. dollars into Indian rupees and that the rule· in Forasol case can H

106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 3.C.R.

A have no application to the present case. Shri Venugopal has in this regard placed reliance on certain observations in Legal Aspect of Money by F.A. Mann, 5th Edn at p. 326-327 and The Conflict of Laws by Dicey & Morris, 11th Edn., Vol. II, p. 1454. We are unable to agree with this submission of Shri Venugopal. The manner in which the court should pass the decree in a case where a foreign award is sought to be enforced is matter of B procedure and not of substance and is governed by lex Jori, i.e., the law of the forum. The rule laid down in Miliangos case (supra) has been described as a rule of procedure. (See : Owners of Eleftheratria v. Despina R, the Despina R (supra), at p. 704; Cheshire & North's Private International Law, 12th Edn., p. 100). For the same reasons the principles laid down inForasol C case (supra) must be held to be rule of procedural law and would be applicable to the proceedings for enforcement of a foreign award under the Foreign Award Act.

The passage from Legal Aspects of Money by FA.Mann, on which D reliance has been placed by Shri Venugopal reads thus :

"This situation involves two distinct questions: which is the legal system that determines whether there exists a right or a duty to convert the money of account into the (local) money of payment? which is the legal system that governs the mechanics of the con- E version (the type of the rate of exchange to be employed, the date and the place with reference to which the rate is to be ascer- tained)?

As regards the first point it is necessary to repeat that, except in unusual circumstances, the creditor suffers no prejudice from · payment in the moneta loci solutions. It is suggested, therefore, that in generai i.e., where no problem of construction arises, the question of the right or duty of conversion may be treated as one relating to the mode of performance and consequently, subject to the lex loci solutions. The decision on the second point, however; is. liable to encroach severely upon the substance of the obligation: whether the creditor who is entitled to be paid 1,000 Spanish pesetas in Gibraltar must accept the pound equivalent calculated at the rate of peseta notes or of cable transfers to Madrid, or calculated with reference to the rate prevailing at the date of maturity or payment, or calculated at the Gibraltar of Madrid rate

RENU SAGAR POWER LTD. v. ELECTRIC CO. [AGRAWAL, J.) 107

- these are substantial matters on-which the quantum eventually received by the creditor depends, if payment is not made in actual pesetas. These aspects, therefore, cannot be described as relating merely to the mode of performance, but ought to be subject to the proper law of the contract". (pp.326-327)

We find that in the said passage which falls in Chapter XI relating to "The Payment of Foreign Money Obligation" the learned author is dealing with the conversion of the money of account to the money of payment and he has not considered the matter of converability of the foreign currency at the stage of enforcement of a judgment or award. We have already inuicated that converability of the money of account into the money of payment involves determination of the liability and is a matter of substance governed by the proper laws of contract. This question arises prior to the stage of the judgment or award. Here we are dealing with a case where the award has already been made and is sought to be enforced in India and the question is about the conversion of the foreign currency in which the award has been made into Indian currency. This question has been dealt with by Dr.F.A.Mann in Chapter XII relating to "The Institution of Legal Proceedings and its effect upon Foreign Money Obligation" and the learned author has stated :

"It is now clear that English law does not require any foreign money obligation to be converted into sterling for the purpose of institut- ing proceedings or of the judgment; on the contrary, where the plaintiff claims a sum of foreign money, he is both entitled and bound to apply for judgment in terms of such foreign money and it is only at the stage of payment or enforcement that conversion into sterling at the rate of exchange then prevailing takes place. This is so whether the claim is for payment of a specific sum contractually due or for damages for breach of contract or tort or for a just sum due in respect of unjustified enrichment or for restitution. Nor does it matter whether the contract sued upon is governed by English or by foreign law. Nor is it necessary to ask for specific performance rather than payment: in either case the defendant will be ordered to pay foreign money. Moreover an award in an English arbitration may be expressed and enforced in foreign currency and a foreign award or judgment so expressed may be enforced like the English award or judgment." (p.352) H

108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The entire position has been thus summed up by Dr. Mann:

"As regards the date with reference to which the rate of exchange is to be ascertained, the law is to a large extent settled. In connec- tion with conversion for the purpose of proceedings the payment- date rule is firmly established. Outside proceedings the date B depends on the construction of the contract, but there exists a strong tendency to apply the payment-date rule". (p.436)

Same is the position with regard to the passage at p.1454 of The Conflict of Laws by Dicey & Morris, llfth Edn., Vol.II, which reads thus-

c "The quantum or'money tokens to be tendered is, however, always a matter of substance and not a question of the manner of perfor- mance. Hence it should always be governed by the proper law, irrespective of the place of payment". (p.1454)

D The said passage falls under Rule 210 relating to discharge of foreign currency obligations which is in following terms :

· "Rule 210 - Irrespective of the currency in which a debt is expressed or damages are calculated (money of account), the currency in which the debt or liability can and must be discharged (money of E payment) is determined by the law of the country in whi.ch such debt or liability is payable, but (semble) the rate of exchange at which the money of account must be converted into the money of payment is determined by the proper law of the contract or other law governing the liability.

F a If a sum of money expressed in foreign currency is payable in England, it may be paid either in units of the money of account or in sterling at the rate of exchange at which units of the foreign legal tender can, on the day when the money is paid, be bought in London in a recognised and accessible market, irrespective of any official rate of exchange between that currency and sterling. G Quaere, whether this rate of exchange also applies if English law is not the proper law of the contract".

At the beginning of the comment on the said rule, it has been stated: • ~

"This Rule deals with th~ question whether a debtor has,,.by making a H payment in a given currency discharged the debt. The effect of proceedings

RENUSAGARPOWERLTD. v. ELECTRICCO.[AGRAWAL,J.] 109

in English court on a foreign currency obligation is not considered in this A rule but in Rule 211". (p. 1453-54). This would indicate that the observa- tions relied upon (at p. 1454) which follow this statement have no bearing to the proceedings in a court on foreign currency obligations and have to be confined to payments by a debtor in discharge of the debt.

RECONSIDERATION OF FORASOL CASE B

Shri Shanti Bhushan also does not wish to go by the principles laid down in Forasol case and has submitted that the exchange rate for conver- sion of foreign currency to Indian currency should be that prevailing on the date of actual payment and that the law laid down Forasol case that the conversion should be on the basis of exchange rate prevailing on the date of judgment does not lay down the correct law and that it needs reconsideration. In this regard Shri Shanti Bhushan has urged that the purpose of the rule relating to conversion of foreign currency into Indian rupees at the stage of enforcement of a foreign award should be to ensure that the amount that has been awarded under the award in foreign currency is available in full to the creditor and this can be achieved only if the exchange rate for the purpose of such conversion is that prevailing on the date of payment as held by the House of Lords in Miliangos case (supra). According to Shri Shanti Bhuc;han the practical and procedural difficulties pointed out by this Court for rejecting the date of payment rule are not of such significance so as to render the said rule inapplicable. Shri Shanti Bhushan has also relied on the following passage from The Conflict of Laws by Dicey & Morris :

"If a debt of other liability expressed in a foreign c~rrency is payable in England, the debtor may tender pounds in discharge. F This is "primarily a rule of construction" which was "understandable at a time when foreign exchange was freely obtainable". Where this is not the case, the rule may defeat the intention of the parties, and it may therefore "require reconsideration". Despite a number of dicta to the contrary, the debtor may also discharge his liability G of tendering the foreign currency in specie, but the creditor_ cannot compel him to do so. The rate of exchange to be applied is that of the day when the debt is paid." (11th Edn., Vol.II p.1454).

These observation have been made in comment under Rule 210 and, so point out earlier, the said rule relates to payment made by debtor in H

110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A discharge of the debt and does not deal with proceedings in courts for enforcement of foreign currency obligations which have been dealt with .in Rule 211, which is in following terms :

"Rule 211 - (1) An English court can give judgment for an amount expressed in foreign currency. B (2) For procedural reasons the amount of the judgment must be converted into sterling before execution can be levied. The date for conversion will be the date of payment, i.e., the date when the court authorises enforcement of the judgment, unless some other date is prescribed by statute." c As regards the submissions of Shri Shanti Bhushan assailing the correctness of the decision in Forasol case (supra) it may be stated that even Miliangos case (supra) does not provide for conversion on the basis of the exchange rate prevailing on the date of actual payment and it D postulates conversion on the basis of the date when the court authorises enforcement of the judgment. The rule in Miliangos case (supra) has not been adopted in Section 27 of the Judiciary Act of New York, as amended in 1987 and it provides that a judgment or decree in foreign currency shall be converted into currency of the United States at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of entry of the judgment or decree. "The E Legislature's concern of how this couple be effected by a sheriff" appears to be the recison for not adopting the date of a execution of the judgment in the amended provision. The practical and procedural difficulties pointed out by this Court in Forasol case against adopting the date of payment cannot, therefore, be ignored. As at present advised, we are not satisfied F that the decision in Forasol case calls for reconsideration. Since this is the only question raised in C.A. No. 379/92 filed by General Electric, the said appeal must fail.

VIII : INTEREST PENDENTE LITE AND FUTURE INTEREST

G In an international commercial arbitration, like any domestic arbitra- tion, the award of interest would fall under the following periods :

(i) period prior to the date of reference to arbitration:

(ii) period during which the arbitration proceedings were pending H before the arbitrators;

RENU SAGAR POWER LID. v. ELECTRIC CO. [AGRAWAL, J.] 111

(iii) period from the date of award till the date of institution of· A proceedings in a court for enforcement of the award;

(iv) period from the date of institution of proceedings in a court till the passing of the decree; and B (v) period subsequent to the decree till payment.

.. The interest in respect of the period covered by item (i), namely, prior to the date of reference to arbitration would be governed by the proper law of the contract and the interest covered by items (ii) and (iii), i.e., during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings and subsequent to the award till the date of institution of the proceedings in the court for the enforcement of the .award would be governed by the law governing the arbitral proceedings. These are matters which have to be dealt with by the arbitrators in the award and the award in relation to these matters cannot be questioned at the stage of enforcement of the award. At that stage the court is only required to deal with interest covered by items (iv) and (v). The award of interest in respect of these period would be governed by lex f ori, i.e., the law C'f the forum where the award is sought to be enforced. According to Allen Redfern and Martin Hunter "once an arbitral award is enforced in a particular country as a judgment of a court, the arbitral post-award interest rate may by overtaken by the rate applicable to civil judgments." (See : Redfern & Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd Edn., p. 406).

Moreover, section 4(1) of the Foreign Awards Act lays down that the foreign award shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be enforceable in F India as if it were an award made on a matter referred to arbitration in India. The provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 would, therefore, apply in the matter of enforcement of awards subject to the provisions of the Foreign Awards Act. With regard to interest, the following provisions, is made in Section 29 of the Indian Arbitration Act : G "INTEREST OF AWRADS - Where and in so far as award is for the payment of money the Court may in the decree order interest, form the date of the decree at such rate as the Court deems reasonable, to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree." H

112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Unlike Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereunder the Court can award interest for the period of pendency of the suit as well as for the period subsequent to the decree till realisation, Section 29 of the Arbitration Act empowers the court to award interest from the date of decree only. It has, however, been held that while passing a decree in terms of the award, the Court can award interest for the period during which the B proceedings were pending in the court, i.e., the period from the date of institution of proceedings for the enforcement of the award in the court till the passing of the decree in case arising after the Interest Act, 1978. (See : Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. & Anr., [1989) 1 SCR at p.328). , c In the instant case, the Arbitral Tribunal has awarded interest by way of compensatory damages in respect of the period prior to the date of reference as well as for the period covered by the arbitral proceedings upto March 31, 1986. In respect of the period subsequent to March 31, 1986, the Arbitral Tribunal has awarded interest only on item No. 1 (regular D interest), item No. 3 (delinquent interest) and item No. 5 (costs of spare parts) until the payment. No direction with regard to the payment of interest pendente lite, i.e., for the period the proceedings were pending in the Bombay High Court till the date of decree as well as for the period _subsequent to the decree, has been given either by the learned Single Judge E or by the Division Bench of the High Court. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interefere with that part of judgment of the High Court and to award interest for the period the. proceedings for enforcement of the award were pending in the Bombay High Court .and in this Court.

F Shri Shanti Bhushan has, however, placed reliance on the interim order passed by this Court on February 21, 1990 whereby this Court stayed the operation of decree and order under appeal subject to Renusagar depositing the sum equivalent to one half of the decretal amount calculated as on date and furnishing security to the satisfaction of the High Court in G respect of the balance of the decretal amount and further directed that interest in respect of the rest of the one half of the decretal amount which wan not recoverable by General Electric by virtue of the said order would be @ 10% per annum calculated from this day on the entirety of the balance irrespective of the terms as to the rate and mode of calculation of interest granted in or permitted by the decree under appeal. Shri Shanti H Bhushan has urged that in view of the said order passed by this Court on

RENUSAGARPOWERLTD. v. ELECfRICCO.[AGRAWAL,J.) 113

February 21, 1990, General Electric is entitled to award of interest @ 10% A per annum on the decretal amount after deducting the amount deposited by Renusagar in pursuance to the orders dated February 21, 1990 and November 6, 1990. The order dated February 21, 1990 was, in our opinion, in the nature of an interlocutory order and the directions contained therein were also interlocut0ry in nature which are subject to the final orders that are passed in the appeals. We ought, here, to take notice of developments B in the international monetary exchange system insofar as lndo-American currencies are concerned. The effect of these changes in the exchange rates made a land-slide change in the size of the financial obligations of Renusagar under the Award. The liability thereunder in terms of Indian rupees virtually became double. It is, however, true that so far General C Electric is concerned, it secures no more than what the Award gave it in terms of U .S.Dollars. This judgment assures to General El~ctric that quantum of U.S. Currency. But the area of the discretion of the court is in the interlocutory dispensation. We are, therefore, not inclined to award interest pendente lite, i.e., during the pendency of the proceedings for enforcement of the award in High Court as well as this Court and we D hereby recall the directions contained in the order dated February 21, 1990 as regards payment of interest on the balance of the decretal amount. The award of interest for the period subsequent to the date of passing of the award till the passing of this judgment in these appeals is, therefore, confined to the period till the date of institution of the proceedings for enforcement of the Arbitration Award in the Bombay High Court i.e., upto E October 15, 1986.

As regards future interest, we are inclined to take the view that for the period subsequent to the date of this judgment Renusagar should pay interest @ 18% on the decretal amount that remains due after adjusting the sum of Rs.10,69,26,590 paid by Renusagar to General Electric in F pursuance to the directions given by this Court on February 21, 1990 and November 6, 1990 till the payment of the said balance amount.

IXADJUSTMENT OF THE SUM OF RS.10,69,26,500 DEPOSITED BY RENUSAGAR AGAINST THE DECRETAL AMOUNT: G As indicated earlier, in pursuance to the orders of this Court dated February 21, 1990, Renusagar deposited a sum of Rs. 9,69,26,590 on March 20, 1990 and a further amount of Rs.l,00,00,000 was deposited by Renusagar in pursuance to the order dated November 6, 1990 on Decem- ber 3, 1990. These amounts have been withdrawn by G~neral Electric. The H

114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A question is how and at what rate the said amount should be adjusted against the decretal amount. It is not disputed that on the date whea the said deposite were made by Renusagar and were withdrawn by General Electric, rupee-dollar exchange rate was Rs.17 per dollar. Shri Shanti Bhushan has, however, s'ubmitted that although General Electric had withdrawn has amount deposited by Renusagar, it was not able to use the B same because the Reserve Bank of India did not grant the permission to General Electric to remit the amount by converting the same into U.S. dollars on account of the pendency of these appeals in this Court. In this regard, Shri Shanti Bhushan has placed before us copies of the letters dated April 30, 1990, June 25, 1990, September 10, 1990 and November 29, :c1990 of the Reserve Bank of India. On the basis of the said letters, Shri Shanti Bhushan has submitted that out of a sum of Rs.10.69 crores which was received by General Electric it was permitted by the Reserve Bank of India to utilise only Rs.3.52 crores for meeting administrative and opera- tional expenses of the Liaison Office of General Electric and the rest of the amount would be converted only after the decision in these appeals. D Shri Shanti Bhushan has, therefore, submitted that the amounts deposited by Renusagar should be converted from Indian rupees into U.S. dollat's at the exchange rate prevalent on the date of the judgment of this Court and not on the basis of the rate of exchange prevalent at the time of the said payments by Renusagar. We are unable to agree with this submission. The convertibility into U.S. dollars of money paid by Renusagar in fodian E rupees is not the condition for discharge of the decree and as laid down in Forasol case (supra) the decree can be discharged by payment in Indian rupees and it is for General Electric to obtain the necessary permission from the Reserve Bank of India for such conversion of Indian rupees to U.S. dollars and the transfer thereof to the United States. If General F Electric were finding a difficulty in such transfer on account of the pen- dency of these appeals in this Court they could have moved this Court and obtained necessary clarification in this regard. They did not choose to do so. In these circumstances, the amount of Rs. 10,69,26,590 which has been paid by Renusagar in pursuance to the order dated February 21, 1990 and November 6,' 1990 has to be converted into U.S. dollars on the basis of the rupee-dollar exchange rate of Rs. 17.00 per dollar prevalent at the time of such payment and calculated on that basis the said amount comes to US $ 6,289,800.00. _)

The judgment of the High Court passing a decree in terms of the award is, therefore, affirmed. This would cover the amount awarded by the

.RENUSAGARPOWERLTD. v. ELECfRICCO.[AGRAWAL,J.] 115

Arbitrnl Tribunal in U.S.Dollar and interest on amount· awarded under item nos. 1, 3 and 5 for the period from April 1, 1986 to October 15, 1986, the date of filing of the petition by General Electric for enforcement of the award in the Bombay High Court. The amount paid by Renusagar during the pendency of these appeals will have to be adjusted against the said decretal amount and the present liability of Renusagar under this decision has to be determined accordingly. Calculating on this basis the amount payable by Renusagar under the decree in terms of U.S. dollars is:

Amount awarded by the Arbitral : 12,215,622.14 Tribunal Interest of US $ 2,716,914.72 (the : 117,733.00 c total amount awarded under item nos. 1, 3 and 5) @ 8% per annum from 1.4.86 to 15.10.86 in terms of the award 12,333,355.14 D Less : Amount paid by Renusagar in : 6,289.800.00 pursuance of the order dated 21.2.1990 and 6.11.1990 during the pendency of the appeals in this Court E 6,043,555.14

In accordance with the decision in Forasol case (supra) the said amount has to be converted into Indian rupees on the basis of the rupee- dollar exchange rate prevailing at the time of this judgment. As per F information supplied by the Reserve Bank of India, the Rupee-Dollar Exchange (Selling} Rate as on October 6, 1993 was Rs.31.53 per dollar.

At this stage it may be mentioned that after the arguments were concluded and the judgment had been reserved, an application [I.A.No. G 9/93 in CA.Nos. 71 and 7W90] was filed on behalf of Hindalco Industries Ltd. for amendment of the cause title to substitute the applicant as appel- lant in C.A.No. 71/90 in place of Renusagar. The said application has been moved on the ground that after the filing of the said appeal the :':,ombay High Court, by its order dated April 22, 1993, has sanctioned a scheme of amalgamation of Renusagar with Hindalco Industries Ltd. and the said H

li6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 s.c.R . .. A scheme has also been sanctioned by the Allahbad High Court by its order dated March 26,1993. A true copy of the said scheme of amalgamation has been filed along with the said application. In clause (i) of para 4 of the scheme, it is stated :

"(i) If any suit, appeal of other proceedings or whatever nature B (hereinafter called "the proceedings") by or agfilnst he Transferor Company be pending, the same shall not be abate, be discontinued or be in any way prejudicially affected by reason of the transfer or the undertaking of the Transferor Company or of anything con- tained in this Scheme but the said proceedings may be continued, c prosecuted and enforced by or against the Transferor Company as if this Scheme had not been made."

In view of the aforesaid provision in the scheme, all pending suits, appeals or other proceedings of whatever nature by or against the trans- feror ~ompany, viz., Renusagar shall not abate or be discontinued or in any D way be prejudicially affected by reason of the transfer of the undertaking of Renusagar and that the said proceedings may be continued, presented and enforced by or against Renusagar as if the scheme had not been made. The scheme of amalgamation does not, therefore, in any way affect the continuance of the proceedings in the above appeals in this Court by E Renusagar and in these circumstances, we find no ground for substituting _ the name of Hindalco Industries Ltd. as the appellant in place of Renusagar in C.A.No. 71/90. The said application is, therefore, rejected.

In the result, C.A. Nos. 71 and 71A of 1990 and C.A.NO. 379 of 1992 are dismissed and the decree passed by the High Court is affirmed with the direction that in terms of the award an amount of US$ 12,333,355.14 is payable by Renusagar to General Electric out of which a sum of US $ 6,289,800.00 has already been paid by Renusagar in discharge of the decretal amount and the balance amount payable by Renusagar under the decree is US $ 6,043,555d:4 which amount on conversion in Indian rupees at the rupee-dollar exchange rate of Rs. 31.53 per dollar prevalent at the time of this judgment comes to Rs. -J19,05,53,293.56. Renusagar will be liable to pay future interest @ 18% on this amount of Rs. 19,05,53,293.56 from the date of this judgment till payment. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

SM Appeals dismissed.