K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS

p. 446 Copy page pinpoint

A given a right to' require the Collector to refer the matter for the determina- tion of the Court, and such application is to be deemed to be an application for reference under Section 18 of the Act. ) )

4Copy pinpoint4. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to bear in mind that the determination of the amount of compensation under Section 11 as well as B by the Court on a reference under Section 18, are both regarded by the . Act as an "Award" as distinguished from "Order" or "Decree" of the appellate courts such as High Court and the Supreme Court in appeal against such award. This is clear from the language of sections 11 to 12, 13A, 15A, 16-18, 23, 25 to 28-A and 54, among others. While under Section C 26, the award made by the reference Court is deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment withiri the meaning of Section 2, clause (2) and Section 2 clause (9), respectively of .the Civil Procedure Code, under Section 54, the order passed by the High Court is per se decree and it is appealable as such to the Supreme Court under the Civil Procedure Code. But for Section 54 of the Act, the award of the reference court would not have been appealable. What is further, Section 30 (2) of the Amending Act clearly and specifically brings out the distinction between "award" made by the Collector and by the reference Court on the one hand and the "order" passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal on the other. It is an error to dismiss this vital distinction made in the principal and amending Acts between "award" and "order" by characterising the use of the word "award" as a verb and not noun. The distinction between the two has a significant relevance for the correct interpretation of the provisions in question. According to us, the fogislature has not used the two words causally or unintentionally.

F It is further necessary to bear in mind that the amending Act has added, among others, the provisions of Section 23(1A) and 28-A and has amended the provisions of Section 23(2). It ha_s also made independent transitional provision in its Section 30. The relevant provisions of Section 30 read as follows : G

30. Transitional provision.- (1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act,"as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, anc,i shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to,

H (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land uncler the

KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA(SAWANT,J.] 447

principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date :

(b) Every proceedings for the acquisition of any land under the

.. principal Act commenced after that date, whether 01 not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act.

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 23 and section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and C Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th· day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) D Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commence- ment of this Act.

The date of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act is 30.4.1982 and the date of its commencement is 24.9.1984. E

5Copy pinpoint5. Against the background of the aforesaid relevant provisions of the principal and the amending Act, we have to interpret the provisions of Section.23(1-A) of the principal Act. Section 23(1) speaks of the factor which the reference Court has to take into consideration while determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the acquired land. The F compensation so determined is to be the market value of the land in question on the date of the publication of the n~tification under Section 4(1). of the principal Act. The legislature had originally provided for a further sum in every case to be paid in addition to the market value of the land in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. That sum G was 15 per centum on the market value. This additional sum known as 'solotium' was provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 23. By the amend- ing Act, it has been increased to 30 per centum of the market value. The solotium was thus a part of the compensation from the very inception of the principal Act and all that was done by the amending Act, was to increase its amount. H

p. 448 Copy page pinpoint

·A It was, however, found that there was a considerable time lag1be- tween the date of the publication of the notification under section 4(1) and the date of the awar.d of the Collector. The market value of the land acquired was however frozen to the date of the notification under Section 4(1). In order to relieve the hardship of the persons interested in the land (hereinafter compendiously termed as 'land-owners' for the sake of con- B venience), the legislature for the first time introduced sub-section (1-A) in

.... Section 23. of the principal Act by the amending Act. This sub-section enjoins the grant, in every case, of a further amount in addition to the market value. The amount is to be calculated at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on the market value for a specific period, namely the period c commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) and ending with the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. The Explanation to the said sub-section .(1-A), states that in computing the period for which the said amount is to be granted, any period or periods D during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land, were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court, shall be excluded. This provision like the one for solatium in sub-section (i) of Section 23, is a substantive one. Unless therefore, there is a statutory mandate, neither this provision nor the provisions }or--tlfe-increased solatium can be given retrospective effect. It is here that the role of Section E 30 of the amending Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Section 30') which makes provisions for the transitional period, viz. the period between the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act and the commencement of the said Act, comes into play. It is the interpretation of the said Section 30 and its bearing on the provisions of Section 23 which has become a matter F of controversy and a subject of conflicting,decisions of this Court as stated at the outset.

The relevant provisions of Section 30 have already been reproduced. An analysis of the Section shows that it deals separately with the two different benefits w_hich the amending Act has conferred on the land- G owners. Sub-section (1) thereof deals exclusively with the provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the provisions Act while sub-section (2) thereof deals exclusively with the provisions of the sub-section (2) of Section 23, and section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by the amend- ing Act. In the present proceedings, we are concerned with the applicability H of the newly inserted sub-section (1-A) of Se.ction 23 of the principal Act

KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERAlA(SAWANT,J.] 449

and not with the amended Sections 23(2) and 28 of the principal Act. A However, since some decisions of this Court have tried to project and rely upon sub-section (2) of Section 30 for the interpretation of sub-section (1) thereof and also for the interpretation of Section 23 of the principal Act, ., it will be necessary to refer to the provisions of section 30(2) also in the course of the discussion that follows. B Sub-section (1) of Section 30 in its turn deals separately with two classes of cases. By clause (a) thereof it makes the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act applicable also to and in relation to every acquisitions proceeding pending on the 30th April, 1982 i.e., the date of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act, in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date. By its clause (b), it makes the provisions of the said Section 23(1-A) applicable also to and in relation to every acquisition proceeding commenced after 30th April, 1982 whether the Collector has or has not made an award before the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e., 24th September, 1984. It is further clear that sub-section (1) of Section 30, deals exclusively with the power and the jurisdiction of the Collector in the proceedings before him. It does not deal with or refer to the power either of the reference Court under Section 23 of the principal Act or of the appellate Court such as the High Court and the Supreme Court. With respect, it is the failure to appreciate the sine qua non of the provisions of Section 30(1) which is responsible for misinterpretation of, and wrong conclusions with regard to the applicability of Section 23(1-A). These transitional provisions with regard to the proceedings pending before the. Collectqr were necessary, for without them it would not have been permissible for the Collector to give benefit of Section 23(1-A) to the concerned land-owners. The legislature not only wanted the reference Court under Section 23, but also the Collector under Section 11 of the principal Act, to give the benefit of Section 23(1-A)- in the proceedings pending before them. This is as it should be, for Section 15 of the principal Act requires the Collector to take into consideration the provisions contained in Sections 23 and 24 while determining the amount of compensation to be awarded. To get his due compensation, every landowner need not be obliged to ask for a reference under Section 18 nor is every land-owner in a financial position to do so. It is common knowledge that many a land acquisition proceedings come to an end at the stage of the Collector, and only some cases travel to the reference Court and thereafter to the appellate Courts. Secondly, Section 30(1) while giving H

p. 450 Copy page pinpoint

A the power to the· Collector to grant the benefit of section 23(1-A), also places a restriction on the said power. The Collector is empowered to grant . the said benefit only in those proceedings which are pending before him on 30th April, 1982 and in which no award has been made by him before that date. That is understandable since the proceedings would be pending before him on 30th April, 1982 even after he has made his award, either B for making a reference or for payment and distribution of the compensa- tion. In such cases, he is not empowered to give the said benefit by reopening the award. If the reference in such proceedings is ultimately made under section 18 of the principal Act, the reference Court under Section 23 will have authority to give the benefit. If it is not made, the c proceedings will stand closed without the said benefit. On the other hand, if the proceedings are pending before him on the 30th April, 1982 in which no award is made, he is empowered to give the said benefit in such proceedings since, as pointed out earlier, under section 15 of the principal Act he is to be guided by the provisions of Section 23 and 24 of that Act D while determining the compensation. This is the substance of clause (a) of Section 30(1). )

Clause (b) of Section 30(1) takes care of another situation where the· Collector is given power to give the benefit of section 23(1-A). That situation is where the proceedings for acquisition have been started after E 30th April, 1982 whether an award has been m~de or not by the Collector before 24th September, 1984, which is the date of the commencement of the amending Act. In other words, the Collector has been given power to give benefit of Section 23(1~A) in ·an acquisition proceedings started after 30th April, 1982. This provision was also necessary, since but for the said provision, the Collector would have been powerless to give the said benefit in the acquisition proceedings started after 30th April, 1982 in which he has made his award before 24th September, 1984. The clause (b) empowers the Collector to reopen such award whether the proceedings are pending before him or not. Secondly, the said clause empowered the Collector to give the said benefit also in all acquisition proceedings started after that date in which he has not made award till 24 th.e September. 1984.

6Copy pinpoint6. Thus, the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 30 are in conformity with the object of the amending Act, namely, to give benefit to the land-owner.s who were denied the benefit of compensation for a long time and were put to an avoidable loss. There is no reason why if the reference Court under Section 23 of the principal Act can give the benefit

p. 451 Copy page pinpoint

of Section 23(1-A) in the proceedings pending before it on the date of the A commencement of the amending Act, the Collector should not have power to give the said benefit in the proceedings before him. The only restriction that the legislature has placed on the said power of the Collector is that it

- has prevented him from reopening the awards which he had already made before 30th April, 1982 in proceedings pending before him on that day. B This was, as stated above, for the reason that those of the awards made by him in such proceedings which were the subject matter of reference under Section 18 could be taken care of by the reference Court under Section 23. On the other hand, those of such awards which were not questioned and, therefore, had become final, should not be reopened. c What is, therefore, necessary to note is that Section 30(1) deals exclusively with the powers of the Collector and it has no bearing on the powers of the Reference Court under Section 23. What is more, clause (a) of the said Section 30(1) is not retrospective in operation. It speaks of power of the Collector in the proceedings pending before him on 30th D April, 1982 in which he has yet to make the award. It is only clause (b) of the said Section which gives a limited retrospectivity to the power of the Collector when it enables him to reopen the award made by him before the commencement of the amending Act, viz., 24th September, 1984 in proceedings started after 30th April, 1982. E The reference Court in its turn in the matters pending before it on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. viz., 24 September, 1984 is enjoined upon to give the benefit of section 23 (1-A) in awards made by it on and after the date of the commencement of the Act. For granting the said benefit, Section 23 of the principal Act nowhere makes F any distinction between the acquisition proceedings commenced prior to and after 30th April, 1982 or inhibits the power of the Reference Court, unlike the provisions of Section 30 (1) which deal with the powers of the Collector. When the reference Court does so, it gives prospective effect to the provisions of Section 23(1-A). It does not give retrospective effect to the said provisions. To import the concept of retrospectivity in Section G 23 merely because the reference Court gives the benefit of Section 23(1-A) in the proceedings pending before it on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, is neither interpretatively correct nor in· conformity with the provisions of Section 23. It is wrong to say that merely because the ·acquisition proceedings were commenced prior to 30.4.1982, i.e., the date H

p. 452 Copy page pinpoint

A of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act, the grant of the said benefit has a retrospective effect, although the benefit is given by the reference Court in the proceedings pending before it. In the first instance, the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) is to be calculated till the date of the award or the date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier. Secondly, when the legislature does not use any expression to B indicate that the law made by it shall apply only to causes of action or incidents taking place after the coming into force of the amending Act, the law has to be applied to all matters pending before the Court even if those matters had arisen before coming into force of the Act.

C "A statute is not retrospective merely because it affect existing rights; nor it is retfbspective merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing". (Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. IV para 221). In The Queen v. The Inhabitants of St. Mary, Whitechapel, [1848) 12 Q.B. 120 at page 127), the law intended to secure ,. that a widow residing in a parish with her husband shall not be removed for twelve months after his death. The benefit of the·1aw was extended even when the husband had died before coming into force of the Act and it was observed.

"It was said that the operation of the statute was confined to persons who had become widows after the Act was passed, and that the presumption against a retrospective statute being intended supported this construction; but we have shown before that t~e statute is in its direct operation prospective, as it relates to future removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing. In this case the words 'shall be removed' were thus found appropriate to cover all cases of future removals irrespective of whether the husband had dies prior to the Act but they were not found wide enough to nullify completed removals prior to the Act, even if the widow was removed within twelve months of her husband's death."

This principle was approved by our Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 394 at 398 and in T.K Lakshmana Iyer and Ors. v. State of Madras and Ors., [1968) 3 SCR

H 842. In Trimbak Damodhar Rajpurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil & Ors.,

KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFY.ERAIA(SAWANT,J.] 453

AIR 1966 SC 1758, it was observed by the Constitution Bench. A "where a statute operates in future it cannot be said to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights are included."

In Bishun Narain Misra v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR B (1965) SC 1567 a rule made by the State Governnient providing that the age of retirement would be 55 years came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench. It was argued that since the rule could not apply retrospectively, a Government servant who was recruited and appointed earlier to the date when the rule was made by the Government, could not C be retired in exercise of power under this rule retrospectively. The submis- sion was repelled and it was held that the rule could not be struck down on the ground that it was retrospective in operation as all that it provided was that from the date it came into force the age of retirement became 55 years. D The fact that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 30 are confined to the powers of the Collector and have no relation to or bearing on the power of the reference Court under Section 23 of the principal Act or of the appellate Courts, becomes dbundantly clear when we contrast the said provisions with the provisions of sub-section (2) of the said Section E

30. That sub-Section extends the benefit of the amended Section 23 (2) and Section 28 of the principal Act also to and in relation to not only the award made by the Collector but also to that made by the reference Court and · further to the orders passed by the High Court and the Supreme Court in appeals against any such award made by the Collector or the reference Court after 30.4.1982 and before 24.9.1984. In other words, sub-section (2) F of Section 30 empowers all the tribunals, viz., the Collector, the reference Court and the appellate Courts to grant the benefits of the amended Section 23(2) and Section 28 in contradiction to its sub-section(!) which only speaks of the Collector and the award made by him.

7Copy pinpoint7. In the face of these clear indications given by Section 30(1) and G (2), it is incorrect to read in Section 23, the limitations of section 30(1) and circumscribe the powers of the reference Court under Section 23. The reference Court acting under Section 23 is not inhibited in any manner as the Collector under Section 30(1), from giving benefit of Section 23 (1-A) in the proceedings pending before it on 24.9.1984, whether the said H

p. 454 Copy page pinpoint

A proceedings were started prior to or after 30.4.1982. In fact the plain language of Section 23 enjoins upon the reference court to grant the said benefit in all-proceedings pending before it on the date of the commence- ment of the amending Act. For the same ·reason, neither the reference Court nor the appellate Court like the High Court and the Supreme Court can give the benefit of Section 23(1-A) in proceedings which were closed B before the reference Court before 24.9.1984. This is so, because unlike sub-section (2) Section 30 which extends the benefit of the amended section 23 (2) and Section 28 of the principle Act .to the awards made by the reference Court after 30.4.1982 and before 24.9.1984 or to any order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against such c award, sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not extend the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to such award of the reference Court and to the orders of High Courts and the Supreme Court in appeal against such award.

8Copy pinpoint8. The above interpretation is also in conformity with t~e object of the legislation. It must be remembered in this connection that according to the Agricultural Census of 1985-86, [All-India Report on Agricultural Census, 1985-86 (1992)] the small holders of agricultural land, i.e., those who hold land between 1 to 2 hectares, constitute 18.4 per cent of the agriculturists whereas marginal holders, i.e., those who possess less than one hectare constitute 57.8 per cent of the agriculturists. Thus, together, the small and the marginal holder constitute 76.2 per cent of the agricul- turists. The average small holding is 1.43 hectare whereas the average marginal holding is 0.39 hectares. Out of the total holdings, only 27.1 per cent are wholly irrigated whereas 17.8 per cent are partly irrigated and remaining 55.1 per cent are wholly unirrigated. The vast majority of the land holders in this country, thus, are sub,&istence farmers. It is also a notorious fact that agriculture in this countfy has never been a profitable occupation. The vagaries of nature, the spiralling prices of inputs and the basic necessities of life, uneconomic prices fixed for the agricultural products, the exploitation of farmers by the middlemen and market forces, the growing burden of dependents on the limited holdings are rendering even the so-called large holdings, the area of which ranges be~een 10 hectares to 50 hectares on average unremuner.ative. When the acquisition takes away either wholly or partly the lands from the farmers, they are deprived of their only means of livelihood or the already slender means are still further slimmed, depending upon the area of the land acquired and the person from whom it is acquired.

K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERAIA(SAWANT,J.] 455

9Copy pinpoint9. The right to receive compensation under the priilcipal Act accrues to the owner when the possession is taken by the Collector. Section 16 vests the land in the State absolutely free from all encumbrances when the Collector takes possession of the land after making the award in non-urgent circumstances, the urgent cases being covered by Section 17 of the prin- cipal Act. But as stated above between the date of notification under B Section 4 and the date of award and of taking possession of the land, vecy often than not a long delay occurred which affected the land-owners materially as the market value of the land is to be determined under Section 23 of the principal Act with reference to the date of the notification issued under Section 4(1). The delays became more pronounced and their consequences to the land-owners more and more adverse with the passage of time on account of the spiralling of the prices. To remedy the situation, the Law Commission as early as in 1958 observed as follows :

"...... .It is noteworthy, however, that the State Governments them- selves admit that the delay is largely due to the tardy manner in which the machinery of the government moves in the matter. They also admit that, if the land acquisition officers are made to work methodically and expeditiously, the pace can be quickened. Any proposal for the reform of the ·1aw should, therefore, aim at overcoming these evils. Most of the delay occurs in the initial stages of the proceedings between the date of the notification under E Section 4 and the declaration under section 6. Further delay arise in the making of the award by the Collector, with the result that as under the existing law, the Government cannot obtain posses- sion until the award is made and the taking of possession is indefinitely delayed." F

The report submitted in 1970 which suggested a time-frame for completion of the acquisition proceedings, particularly to relieve the poor land holders whose only means livelihood was taken away, recommended as follows: · G "The Land Acquisition Act is over 75 years old. When enacted it was not faced with the requirements of the Constitution of India. It is remarkable that broadly speaking it fulfilled the needs of the community for such a length of time. Even today the Act is not so much vulnerable on its provisions as on the way_ the executive H

p. 456 Copy page pinpoint

A authority tried to implement them. From one end of the country to the other the same story has been repeated again and again (with provincial variations) that it has been used as an engine of oppression by the administrative authorities and the weaker poorer sections of the community have suffered the most. The complaint (not without substance) is that only an illusory compensation was B awarded in an appreciable number of cases and that too was not paid for years. Emergent acquisition was the order of the day without the existence of any emergency. The law was ignored and the exception was made the Jaw perhaps on the ground that observance of law would have meant delay. The executive mind c considered the delay in acquiring possession as a matter of great importance but the delay in payment of compensation to poor land-owners as of no consequence. This callous indifference was manifested again and again. Many of the sufferers lost their hereditary occupation also which alone provided them with some sort of economic security. As a result quite an appreciable number D of citizens were completely uprooted and turned into refugees in their own land of birth."

To implement these recommendations and suggestions, the amend- ing Act was enacted. One of the suggestions made in the debate in the E Parliament was that the determination of the value of the land be made with reference to the notification issued under Section 6 of the Principal Act. The Honourable Minister who piloted the Bill expressed his inability to do so due to various difficulties. Instead, he opted for measures includ- ing that provided under Section 23 (1-A) to mitigate the miseries of the land-owners. In this connection, he stated thus : F "It is, therefore, necessary to ensure particularly that the interest of the weak and the poor are not overlooked in our concern for modernisation and industrialisation. Even when acquisition of their land, becomes an inescapable necessity for the larger interest of the community, they ought to be provided with the necessary wherewithals of rehabilitation. In making provision in the amend- ' . ing Bill, we have been animated by our concern of ensuring that the person who loses his property right in land, particularly one how belongs to the weaker sections of the community, is adequately compensated for his loss ........ As it is well known, a number of land

p. 457 Copy page pinpoint

acquisition proceedings have been pending for the award of Col- A lector for years an end. In some cases, the preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) was issued many year ago. Payment of com- pensation to the interested parties on the basis of the market value of the land prevailing on the one of the preliminary notification will be purely unfair. To remedy this unfairness, the Bill provides B for payment, in every proceeding for acquisition of land where the award of the Collector had not been given on the 30th day of April, 1982, an additional payment of 10 per cent annum from the date of the preliminary notification on the date of the payment or deposit of compensation." c

10Copy pinpoint10. It is, therefore, clear that the intention of the legislature in enacting the amending Act and in particular Section 23 (1-A) with which we are concerned, was to give additional amount to the deprived land owners in all the proceedings which were pending before the Collector on the 30th April, 1982 and before the reference Court on the 24th September, D 1984 i.e. the date of the commencement of the .Act. However, the legisla- ture conferred the power on the Collector to give the said benefit only in those proceedings which were pending before him on 30.4.1982, where no award was made by him. This is because, as explained earlier, where he had made his awards in such proceedings, either they had travelled to the reference Court and were pending before it or had been accepted and E become final. The awards which were before the reference Court were left to be dealt with by it under Section 23 while those which had become final. were not to be reopened. However, in proceedings which were started after 30.4.1982, whether the award was or was not made by the Collector before the date of commencement of the Act, the legislature gave the Collector F the power to grant the said benefit even by reopening the award, because the Collector was seized of the proceedings between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984 when the benefits were on the anvil. If he could give the benefit to the awards made by him in such proceedings after 24.9.1984, there is no reason why the awards made by him during the said interregnum should not receive the same treatment. The reference Court proprio vigore was G empowered to give the said benefit in all proceedings which were pending before it on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. If the Collector could give the said benefit in proceedings pending before him on 30.4.1982, although started prior to that date, where he had not made his award, it will be against the scheme of the Act to contend that the reference I I

p. 458 Copy page pinpoint

A Court could not give the same benefit in the proceedings pending before it because the acquisition proceedings had started prior to 30.4.1982.

11Copy pinpoint11. According to me the error in the contrary view springs, firstly, from the fact that the said view fails to notice that section 30(1) of the amending Act is confined to spelling out the powers of the Collector. It B has no reference to and bearing on the powers of the reference or the appellate Court. The dovetailing of the provisions of Section 30(1) into the provisions of Section 23 is, therefore, mainly responsible for the error. Secondly, sections 30(1) and 30(2) deal with different benefits and speak of powers of different tribunals. While Section 30(1) speaks of powers only c of the Collector, Section 30(2) speaks of powers of the Collector, the ·reference Court and also of the appellate Court. An attempt to project the provisions of Section 30(2) into the provisions of Section 30(1) and conse- quently in Section 23(1-A) is no less responsible for the erroneous inter- pretation of the powers of the reference Court under Section 23 to grant the benefit of Section 23(1-A).

12Copy pinpoint12. The. relevant decisions of this Court may now be referred to. There are three decisions directly on Section 23(1-A) viz., Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990] 1 SCC 277, Union of India and Anr. v. Zora Singh .and Ors., (1992] 1 SCC 673, and the referring judgment in KS. Paripooman & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Ors., (1992] 1 SCC 684. The other decisions, viz., Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc., (1989] 2 SCC.754 which is a Constitution Bench decision and K Kamalajammiavaru (Dead) by Lrs. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1985] 1 SCC 582, Bhag Singh and Ors. v. Union p Territory of Chandigarh, (1985] 3 SCC 737 and State of Punjab v. Mohinder . Singh and Anr., (1986] 1 SCC 365 are all on the interpretation of amended Sections 23 (2) and 28 of the principal Act and, therefore on the inter- pretation of Section 30 (2) of the Amending Act.

In Vasco De Gama (supra), the facts were that the acquisition G proceedings were commenced with the notification publish~d under Sec- tion 4 (1) of the principal Act on 26.10.1967. The Collector made his award ·on 5.3.1969 and the reference Court made its award on 28.,5.1985. The Court was here called upon to interpret the provisions of sections 23 (2) and 28 of the principal Act and, therefore, of Section 30(2) of the Amend- H ing Act as well as the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) of the princiP,al Act

p. 459 Copy page pinpoint

and of Section 30 (1) of the Am.ending Act. I am in respectful agreement with the observations made in the said judgment that Section 30 (1) of the Amending Act refers to the Collector's award and Section 30 (2) refers to the award of the reference Court as well. To this extent, the view which I have taken above on the point finds support in these observations. The conclusion, drawn in, this case however as far as Section 23 (1-A) is concerned, was, with respect, incorrect inasmuch as it denied the power to the reference Court to give the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) in the proceed- ings in that case, though they were pending before the Court on the commencement of the amending Act. i.e. on 24.9.1984..1This decision, with respect, has committed the error of projecting the provisions of section 30(2) in Section 30(1) and in Sections 23 and 23(1-A) of the principal Act. C

In Zora Singh (supra), notification under Section 4(1) of the principal Act was issued on 10.5.1979. The Collector made his award on 31.3.1981 and the Court made its award in 1985, i.e., after the commencement of the principal Act. Although I agree with the proposition laid down there that D the plain language of Section 23(1-A) shows that a duty is cast on tht< reference Court to award the additional amount in all cases pending before that court on 24.9.1984 even if the award of the Collector was made before April 30, 1982, with respect, I am unable to agree with the following observation underlined by me in paragraph 14 of the judgment: E "..... .. On a correct interpretation of the provisions of section 23(1-A) read with Section 30(1)(a) of the Amendment Act of 1984, an additional amount calculated in the manner indicated in Section 23 (1-A) is also payable in those cases where the Collector had not made his award on or before April 30, 1982, even in cases where p the court might have made its award before September 24, 1984."

The above observation, according to me, ignores that in cases where (a) acquisition proceedings were pending on 30.4.1982 and the award i.s made by the Collector after that date (b) where acquisition proceedings G had started after 30.4.1982 and the Collector made award after that date but before the 'commencement of the amending Act i.e., 24.9.1984, the Collector is given power to reopen the award and give the benefit of .Section 23(1-A). The reference Court under Section 23 has no power to reopen the award made by it before 24.9.1984 to give the benefit of Section 23 (1- A), since the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) have no. retrospective H

p. 460 Copy page pinpoint

A effect. The retrospective effect is given only to the powers of the Collector to reopen the awards made by him before 24.9.1984. For the similar reason, the observations made by the Court to the same effect in paragraph 15, with respect, cannot be accepted.

As regards the referring judgment in KS. Paripoornan (supra), the facts in that case show that notification under section 4 (1) was issued on 21.3.1978. The Collector made his award on 30.12.1980 and the reference Court gave its award on 28.2.1985. I agree with the observation made there that the said case is not covered by Section 30(1). However, I am unable to agree that in that case the benefit of Section 23(1-A) is not available to be granted by the reference Court under Section 23. With respect, the decision confuses the powers of the Collector under Section 30 (1) with the powers of the Court under Section 23. The provisions of Section 30(1) govern only the powers of the Collector under Section 11 and not the powers of the Court under Section 23. Further, there is no retrospectivity given by Section 30(1) to the powers of the Collector except where it enables the Collector to reopen the award made by him before 24.9.1984 in proceedings for acquisition started after 30.4.1982. In all other respects, the powers of the Collector are prospective in nature inasmuch as both clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) grant power to the Collector to give the benefit of section 23 (1-A) in proceedings pending before him on E 30.4.1982 and thereafter. I am also unable to agree that the use of the word "Court" in Section 23 (1-A) is of no significance and that the said expression would include the appellate Courts, i.e., the High Court and the Supreme Court. It is also difficult to agree with the statement made in paragraph 11 of the judgment that even the High Court and Supreme Court can award F the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) if they decide the matter on or after 24.9.1984 irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the reference Court. The said interpretation gives retrospective effect to Sec- tion 23(1-A) inasmuch as it applies the provisions of the said Section also to awards made by the reference Court prior to 24.9.1984.

13Copy pinpoint13. I am further unable to accept the view that the word "award" occurring in Section 23(1-A) is used there not as a noun but as a verb. Although the word "award" is not defined in the Act, as pointed out at the outset, the legislature has used the said word in various provisions of the Act with a specific intention and meaning and hence there cannot be any H mistake that the said word has been used even in Section 23(1-A) as a

K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA[SAWANT,J.) 461

noun. The inconvenient words, expressions and language, when their in- A tendment and meaning are plain, cannot be got over by either mutilating or by attributing to them unnatural and unwarranted role. Such an exercise is against all canons of the interpretation of statutes.

14Copy pinpoint14. Coming now to the decisions of this Court on Section 23(2), I find that on the language of Section 30(2) of the amending Act, this Court B in Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1985) 1 SCC 582, has with respect taken the correct vi~w of the law. In that case, the notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 28.11.1957 and the Collector and the Court made their awards either in 1970 or prior to it. The Court held that the provisions of section 23 (2) read in the light of Section 30(2) c of the amending Act did not apply to the said case. This judgment is also relevant for yet another reason in that it states that it is only the awards made by the Collector under Section 11 and the reference Court under Section 18 which are "awards" proper under the Act. This observation supports the view I have taken. D

15Copy pinpoint15. I am, however, unable to agree with the decision in Bhag Singh, (supra) which was also a decision under Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the principal Act read with Section 30(2). In that case, notification under Section 4(1) of the principal Act was issued on 19.10.1974. The Collector made his award on 9.10.1975 and the Court made its award on 31.7.1979. E This decision ignores the limited prospectivity given by section 30(2) of the Amending Act and makes the amended provisions of Sections 23(2) and 28 of the principal Act applicable also to cases where the award were made by the Collector or the Court prior to'30.4.1982. This decision has relied upon the earlier decision of the Court in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh p and Another, (supra). Unfortunately the latter decision has not given any reasons for coming to the conclusion in question except that S.L.P. against the same decision was already dismissed. For the reasons given above, I am unable to agree with the conclusions in this decision.

16Copy pinpoint16. The last decision on the amended Sections 23(2) and 28 read with G Section 30(2) is of the Constitution Bench in the case of Raghubir Singh (supra). This decision has overruled the decisions in Bhag Singh and Mohinder Singh (supra). With respect, I am in complete agreement with the decision which has taken the correct view of law as taken in the case of K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. The Appellate Court, viz, that under Section H

p. 462 Copy page pinpoint

A 30(2),. the High Court and the Supreme Court have power to give the benefit of the amended Sections 23(2) and 28 retrospectively only in those r proceedings where the awards are made by the Collector, or the reference Court between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. It is further only to such awards of the Collector and the reference Courts that the said provisions apply retrospectively. B

17Copy pinpoint17. The transitional provision is by its very nature an enabling one and has to be interpreted as such. In the present case, it is made to take care of the period between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984, i.e., between the date of the ·introduction of the Bill of the amending Act and the date of the commencement of the Act. Since some awards might have made by the Collector and the reference Court during the said interregnum, the legis- lature did not want to deprive the concerned awardees either of the newly conferred benefit of Section 23(1-A) or of the 'increased benefit under Sections 23(2) and 28. The second object was to enable the Collector and the Court to give the said benefits in the proceedings pending before them where they had not made awards. The only limitation that was placed on the power of the Collector· in this behalf was that he should not reopen the awards already made by him in proceedings which were pending before him on 30.4.1982 to give the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) to such awardees. This was as stated earlier, for two reasons. If the said awards are pending before th~ reference court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act viz., 24.9.1984, the reference Court would be al;>le to give the said benefit to the awardees. On the other hand, if the awardees in question had accepted the awards, the same having become final, should not be teopened. As regards the increased benefit under Sections 23(2) and 28, the intention of the legislature was to extend it not only to the p proceedings pending before the reference Court on 24.9.1984 but also to those where awards were made by the Collector and the reference Courts between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. Hence these awards could not only be reopened but if they were the subject-matter of the.before High Court or the Supreme Court, the appellate orders could also be reopened to extend the said benefits. G The difference made in the transitional provisions of Section 30 between payment of the additional amount under Section "23(1-A) and of the increased solatium and interest under Sections 23(2) and 28 has to be noted. While the former is provided for under Sub-Section (1) of Section · _H 30, the latter are taken care of by sub-Section (2) thereof. Sub-section (1)

p. 463 Copy page pinpoint

gives power to the Collector while sub-section (2) gives power to all the A tribunals - the Collector, the.reference Court and the appellate courts. The Collector's powers under sub-section (1) are confined (a) to the acquisition

' . proceedings pending before him on 30. 4.1982 where he has not made award before that date and (b) to the acquisition proceedings commenced after 30.4.1982 whether he has or has not made award prior to the com- B mencement of the amending Act i.e., 24.9.1984. As against this, the power conferred by sub- section (2) on all the tribunals is confined only to the awards made by the Collector and the reference Court between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. This distinction is necessitated by the difference in the nature of the benefit. While the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) which is for the first time made payable by the amending Act is to ·C compensate for the delay in the making of the award or taking possession of the land, the solatium under Section 23(2) and interest on the excess amount under Section 28 which were always payable were increased to take care of the inflation and the fall in the purchasing power of the rupee in the meanwhile. D But for the provisions of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30, the Collector would not have been able to give the benefit of Section 23(1-A) in the proceedings referred to therein. This would have defeated the object of the Act in those cases which had not travelled or could not travel to the reference Court and had or would become final with the Collector's award. E The legislature, therefore, wanted to give the power to the Collector in · addition to the reference Court to take care of such cases. It was aware that many cannot and did not go to the reference Court to get their due compensation.

18Copy pinpoint18. According to me, any other interpretation will be a distortion of F the plain language, meaning and intendment of the relevant provisions. It will also amount to reading limitation on the powers of the Collector and the Courts where the legislature intended to expand them.

19Copy pinpoint19. I, therefore, hold that : . G -(i) Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act relates only to the powers of the Collector. It has no relation to or bearing on the powers of the reference Court. It is erroneous to read its provisions and the limitations placed by and the distinction made by it between acquisition proceedings com- . H

p. 464 Copy page pinpoint

A menced prior to and after 30th April 1982, into the provisions of Section 23 including of sub-section (1-A) thereof.

(ii) Under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30, ·.the Collector has power to grant benefit of Section 23(1-A) ·-·~· of the principal Act in every proceeding for the acquisition B which is pending before him on 30th April, 1982_ but in which he has made no award before that date. ..,.. (iii) Under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30, the Collector has power to give the benefit under Section 23(1-A) in every proceeding for the acquisition commenced c aft.er 30th April, 1982 whether or not he has made his award in such proceeding before 24th September, 1984. Where he has made his award in such proceeding before that date, he , is empowered to reopen the same and grant the said benefit.

D (iv) Section 23 does not make any distinction in the acquisition proceedings pending before the reference Court on the 24th September, 1984 between those which had commenced prior to 30th April, 1982 and those which had commenced there- after. If the proceedings are pending before the reference Court on the date of the commencement of the Act, viz., 24th E September, 1984, the reference Court is enjoined upon to give the benefit of Selection 23(1-A) in all such proceedings without making any distinction. When the reference Court does so, it gives prospective effect to Section 23(1-A). It does · not give retrospective effect to the said Section merely be- F cause the proceedings in question had started prior to 30th Apri~ 1982. '." (v) It is not permissible to read the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the amending Act into the provisions of sub-section (1) thereof and thereby in Sections 23 and 23(1- G A). The provisions of Section 30(2) are exclusively concerned with Sections 23(2) and 28 and have no relation to the provisions of Section 23(1-A).

(vi) Neither the reference Court under Section 23 nor the appel- H late court, whether High Court or the Supreme Court can

p. 465 Copy page pinpoint

grant the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) in any proceeding in A which the reference Court has made its award prior to 24th September, 1984. The grant of such benefit by the Courts is not warranted by the transitional provisions of Section 30(1). ·c The provisions of Section 30(2) as stated above are not applicable to the benefit under Section 23 (1-A). For the B Courts to grant the said benefit in such proceedings is to give retrospective effect to the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) which is impermissible in law.

20Copy pinpoint20. For the reasons stated above, I agree with the conclusion drawn in Union of Indian & Another v. Zora Singh & Others, [1992] 1 SCC 673, C that in all proceedings pending before the reference court on 24.9.1984, the reference Court has to give benefit of the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to the claimants.

R.M. SARAI, J. How to construe section 23(1-A) of the Land D Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (for short 'the Amendment Act') a substantive provision added in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') after 90 years, for striking proper balance, 'between the need of acquisition of land for private purpose and the rights of the individual whose land is acquired' is the simple issue but of far reaching consequence both for the State or the acquiring body and the owners who, by process of law are deprived of their land. Should the interpretative process, which in public welfare measures has to be purpose oriented, further the legisla- tive objective by taking recourse even to the debates in the House, if necessary, to find out the mischief the Legislature intended to remedy or it should resort to strained or unduly restrictive construction by adding or substracting words to the otherwise plain and simple language on assump- tions of limited retrospectivity drawn from the transitional provision. Even a decade has not elapsed since the amendment was made yet there are no less than six decisions one of them being constitution bench on scope and applicability of the amending provision when it could not be disputed that the law was amended and the Legislature made the changes to mitigate the rigour of the owners on account of delay by providing for time frame in Section 11-A, additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) enhanced solatium under Section 23(2), and equality of compensation for persons affected by same notification under Section 28-A. But the divergence has arisen not on the purpose of objective, or the benefit the provision intends H

p. 466 Copy page pinpoint

A to confer but on construction arising out of difference in approach of interpreting such a provision. Brother Agrawal has opted for construction which restricts the operation of Section 23(1-A) to the proceedings for acquisition initiated after coming into force of the Amendment Act. This with profound respect to him is not made out either from the language of the provision or from the legislative objective as discerned from the ... Debates in the LokSabha. Therefore, despite deliberations and discussions it has not been possible to share the views expressed by him, that if the provision for additional compensation is extended to the land owner whose reference were or are pending under Section 18 it would amount to operating the provisions retrospectively in respect of past transactions. Nor c it has been possible to reconcile to the view that Section 30(1), the transitional provision, can be reflected into Section 23(1-A) to curtail its ambit and scope and construe it as applicable to notification issued under Section 4(1)'after September, 1984.

D Before entering into the legalistic exercise of analysing Section 23(1- A) and the time or period from which it commences to operate it, it is appropriate to preface it by making an attempt to bring out the purpose .and objective of the amendment. The Land Acquisition Act enacted in 1894 primarily, for acquiring land was more socially inclined towards displacement of the individual by providing for payment of compensation, E from the date the declaration was issued under Section 6 of the Act. But as time passed and acquisition expanded the date of determining compen- sation was pushed back in 1923 to the date notification under section 4 was issued. Effect of it on the right of land owners was economically harsh as at times there was long delay between issuing of notifications under See- p tions 4 and 6 of the Act and compensation due to distance of time between the two notifications, in many cases, became nugatory. Yet it took 34 years, even, from the date the country became independent for the elected representative, most of whom come from rural background, to intervene in favour of that class of persons who not only form bulk of the society and G for whom land is not only property but their bread and butter, their life and soul, to relieve them to the effect of compulsory taking over of their land by restructuring and making the provisions more economically viable. Even though our country is vast, bristling with varied cultures yet the economy, basically, being agricultural right from Kashmir to Kanyakumari, irrespective of the fertility of land, the love and lure for it is the same. An H agriculturist of Tamil Nadu is as much concerned as a cultivator in Uttar

KS. PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAHAI,J.) 467

Pradesh and Bihar. But the development of different State, the potential value of land etc. is vastly different. An acre of land in one State due to irrigation facility and development activity may cost more than in any other State. Therefore,. the high ratio of compensation for land in that State should not be a scare for construing, the beneficient, provision narrowly. If the Legislature in kee~ing with feeling of its elected representative brings out a legislation then the Courts endeavour should be to advance it and the draftsman devil, if any, should not be permitted to act as obstruction in achieving the basic purpose.

Although the amendments touched various aspects but these peti- tions are primarily concerned with construction of Section 23(1-A) of the C Act. To put it precisely whether the provision for additional compensation introduced since 1984 is attracted even in those cases where the awards had been made by the Collector prior to 1982 and their final adjudication was pending in courts either under Section 18 of the Act or in appeal etc. But before adverting to and examining its reach it appears apposite to mention in brief the provisions relating to determin,ation of compensation under the Act prior to 1984, the defects, if any, with which ft suffered, and if the Legislature intended to cure and remedy the mischief.

Relevant sections of the Act which deal directly or indirectly with the right to receive compensation, jurisdiction and power to C;ietermine it and method and manner of its calculation and payment of interest on it are Sections 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18, 23, 24, 28 and 34. They can be conveniently divided in two parts, one, the right and duty of the Collector to make award and take possession and second the jurisdiction and power of the court to determine compensation. In the first part there are three stages, one, from sections 6 to 9 that is the · period during which the .Collector acquires jurisdiction to measure and plan the land, which has been declared to be intended to be used for public purpose, and issue,, 'lotice to persons interested to file objection to the value of the land. The second stage deals with procedure which the Collector is required to follow under section 10 which ultimately ends in making of the award under Section 11 of the Act. G Section 12 make5 the award as conclusive and· binding between the parties subject to provisions of the Act. The third stage is to take possession under Section 16 is after making of the award. The second part deals with determination of compensation by the court on reference made to it under Section 18 in the manner provided by the Act by taking into consideration H

p. 468 Copy page pinpoint

A certain factors in Section 23 and ignoring those in Section 24. Section 28 empowers the Court to award interest on difference in the amount awarded by the Collector and determined by the Court whereas Section 34 entitles Collector to award interest if the amount determined is not paid before taking possession. Nature of the proceedings for determination of the compensation both by the Court and the Collector are statutorily regarded B as award. That is apparent, amongst others, from sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Act.

Right to receive compensation accrues to the owners, under the Act, "'· when possession is taken by the Collector. Section 16 vests the land in the C State absolutely free from all encumberances when the Collector takes possession after making the award. But between Sections 4 and 6 notifica- tion and thereafter between Section 6 and 11 there occurred at times much delay. The Act did not provide for any time frame. And this affected the land owners vitally as the market value of the land under Section 2J is to D be determined on the date the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 was issued whereas the award has to be made after declaration under Section 6 and issuing of notice under Section 9. The effect of such delay become more marked as years rolled in after 1950. As far back as 1958 the Law Commission observed :

E "The Finance Ministry has given four instances in which the car- rying ·out of projects has been delayed because they could not obtain possession of the land in time and it has been stated that acquisition proceedings commenced as early as 1948 are still pending. It is noteworthy, however, that the State Governments themselves admit that the delay is largely due to the tardy manner in which the machinery of the Government moves in the matter. They also admit that, if the land acquisition officers are made to · work methodically and expeditiously, the pace can be quickened. Any proposal for the reform of the law should, therefore, aim at overcoming these evils. Most of the delay occurs in the initial stages of the proceedings between the date of the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under section 6. Further delays arise in the making of the award by the Collector, with the result that as under the existing law, the Government cannot obtain posses- H sion until the award is made indefinitely delayed."

p. 469 Copy page pinpoint

The situation deteriorated further and report submitted in 1970 suggested A time frame as delay in acquisition proceedings caused untold sufferings to the land owners and affected the poor adversely.

· "The Land Acquisition Act is over 75 years old. When enacted it was not faced with the requirements of the Constitution of India. B It is remarkable that broadly speaking it fulfilled the needs of the ~ommunity for such a length of time. Even today the Act is not so much vulnerable on its provisions as on the way the executive authority tried to implement them. From one end of the country to the other the same story has been repeated again and again (with provincial variations) that it has been used as an engine of oppression by the administrative authorities and the weaker poorer sections of the community have suffered the most. The complaint (not without substance) is that only an illusory compensation was awarded in an appreciable number of cases and that too was not paid for years. Emergent acquisition was the order of the day without the existence of any emergency. The law was ignored and the exception was made the law perhaps on the ground that observance of law would have meant delay. The executive mind considered the delay in acquiring possession as a matter of great importance but the delay in payment of compensation to poor landowners as of no consequence. This callous indifference was manifested again and again. Many of the sufferers lost their hereditary occupation also which alone provided them with some sort of economic security. As a result quite an appreciable number of citizens were completely uprooted and turned into refugees in their own land of birth." F

(emphasis supplied)

There can thus be no dispute that there existed a lacuna in the Act which did not provide for compensating for the rise in price of land due to delay G rendering the compensation illusory, in many cases. To overcome this and similar defects the Parliament introduced the Bill in 1982. It was withdrawn as it suffered from certain defects. It was reintroduced in 1984. One of the suggestions in the House was that determination of value of the land may again be restored to the date the declaration was published under Section 6 of the Act. But the Hon'ble Minister who piloted the Bill expressed his H

p. 470 Copy page pinpoint

A inability due to various difficulties and opted for measures including Sec- tion 23(1-A) to mitigage misery of the land owners. It was stated thus,

"It is, ·therefore, necessary to ensure particularly that the interest of the weak and the poor are not overlooked in our concern for modernisation and industrialisation. Even when acquisition of B their land, often the only source of their livelihood, becomes an inescapable necessity for the larger interest of the community, they ought to be provided with the necessary wherewithals of rehabilita- tion. In making provision in the amending Bill, we have been animated by our concerned of ensuring that the person who loses his c property right in land, particularly one who belongs to the weaker sections of the community, is adequately compensated for his loss ....... As it is well known, a member of land acquisition proceed- ings have been pending for the_ award of the Collector for years an end. In some cases, the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) was issued many years ago. Payment of compensation to the D interested parties on the basis of the market value of the land prevailing on the one of the preliminary notification will be purely unfair.''

(Emphasis supplied) E Such being the legislative background and purpose of its enactment being to remove the hardship of the affected parties as is clear from the objects and reasons that 'The pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often, caused hardship and to the affected parties and renders umealistic p the scale of compensation offered to them', it becomes the duty of the Court while construing the provisions to construe it in such a manner that the mischief which the Legislature intended to remove may be suppressed and the avowed objective of the legislation be served. The rule in this regard as laid down in numerous decisions rendered by this Court and English Courts is th<i.'t the Court when faced with interpretation of such provisions must ascertain what was the law before making of the Act, what we.re the mischief or defects in such law and how the Parliament intended to resolve or cure it. The prevailing law and its defects have already been noticed. It has been attempted to be remedied by taking recourse to provide not only for future but present and past as welt Future has been taken care of by providing for automatic lapse of acquisition proceedings

K.S.PARIPOORNAN v.STATEOFKERALA[SAHAI,J.] 471

under Section 11-A if the award is not made by the Collector within two years of the publication of notification under Section 6 of the Act. Present is protected by Section 23(1-A) and past by Section 30. It is the under- standing of scope of these two sections and their inter-relation which shall be decisive of fate of these petitions. For this purpose Section 23(1-A) of the Act is extracted below : B "S.23(1-A). - In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possessiop of the land, whichever is earlier.

Explanation. - In computing the period referred "to in this sub-section, any period or periods during 'which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded."

It is added to Section 23 which provides for considerations which may be taken into account for determination of compensation. But it is different in nature. Unlike sub- section (1) it operates on its own as it crates the right of additional compensation, provides for the rate at which it is to be paid and lays down the period for which it is to be calculated. Therefore, from the date it came on the statute book, i.e., September 24, 1984 an owner became entitled to the additional amount and the court became ~tatutorily obliged to award it. The use of the expression 'in every case' F widens the ambit of the Section. True it. is not a procedural law or a declaratory law, therefore it is substantive in nature and is prospective in operation. Yet the question is, as arises in every such provisions, the time or the date from which it commences to operate. The difficulty is greater when there are no express indications and the provision is general in nature and wider in reach. If the legislature does not use any expression to indicate G that the law made by it shall apply to any cause of action or incident taking place only after coming into force of the Act then the law has to be applied in presenti, that is to the matters pending before it even if those matters and arisen before coming into force of th~ Act, as "A (a) statute is not retrospective merely because it affects existing rights; nor it is retrospective H ) i

p. 472 Copy page pinpoint