STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. SHRI PIRTHI CHAND AND ANR.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

We have heard the counsel on both sides. On March 24, 1986, on receipt of a secret information that a contraband, viz., Charas was being dealt with at the bus stand, head Constable Rattan Singh alongwith other police officials was present at bus stand, Amb. They secured the presence of one Pradhan Subhas Chand and on Gurdas Ram and raided the house of the first respondent. On search, they found 1 kilo 15 grams of Charas. The took sample and divided the same into three parts. One was given to the accused, another was sent to the court and third one was sent to the chemical examiner for analysis. On analysis, it was found that it was Charas. Accordingly, charge-sheet was filed to prosecute him under Section 20 of the Narcotic Durgs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, "the Act"). After considering the charge-sheet, the learned Sessions Judge by his order dated July 6, 1987 discharged the respondent from the offence under Section 20. On revision, the High Court by the impugned order dated June 4, 1992 made in Criminal Revision No. 118/87 confirmed the same. Thus this appeal by special leave.

The question is whether the learned Sessions Judge was justified, at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence, in discharging the accused, even before the trial was conducted on merits, on the ground that the provisions of Section 50 of the act had not been complied with. This Court

... in State of Punjab v. Ba/bir Singh, [1994] 3 SCC 299 has considered the provisions of the Act. Section 50 has been held to be mandatory. In H

34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 6 S.C.R. • A paragraph 16, this Court has held that it is obligatory on the part of the empowered or the authorised officer to inform the suspect that, if so required, he would be produced before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and search would be conducted in his presence. It was imperative on the part of the officer to inform the person of the above right and if he failed to do the same, it amounted to violation of the requirement of Section 50 B of the Act. It was held that when the person was searched he must have been aware of his right and that if could be done only if the authorised or empowered officer informed him of the same. Accordingly, this Court by implication read the obligation on the part of authorised officer to inform the person to be searched, of his right to information that he could be c searched in the presence of the Gazetted officer or the Magistrate. In Sa(vad Mohd. Saiyaad Umar Saiyad & Ors. v. nie State of Gujarat, JT [1995] 3 SC 489 a three-Judge Bench of this Conrt had reiterated the above view and held that having regard to the grave consequences that might entail the possession of illicit articles under the Act, viz., the shifting of the D onus to the accused and the serve punishment to which he became liable, the legislature bad enacted safeguards contained in Section 50. Com- pliance of the safeguards in Section 50 is mandatory obliging the officer concerned in inform the person to be searched of his right to demand that search could be condin:ted in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. The possession of illicit articles has to be satisfactorily estab- E lished before the Court. The officer who conducts search must state in his evidence that he had informed the accused of his right to demand, while he is searched, in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and that the accused had not chosen to so demand. If no evidence to that effect is given, the Court must presume that the person searched was not p informed of the protection the law gives him and must find that possession of illicit articles was not established. The presumption under Section 114 illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, that the official duty was properly performed, therefore, does not apply. It is the duty of the court to carefully scrutinise the evidence and satisfy that the accused had been informed, by the concerned officer, that he had a right to be searched before a Gazetted G Officer or a Magistrale and that the person had not chosen to so demand.

It is to be seen whether the accused has been afforded such a right and whether the authorised officer has violated the mandatory require- ment, as a question of fact, has to be proved at the trial. In Pooran Mal v. H Director of Inspection, [1974] 1 SCC 345, Constitution Bench of this Court

STATE v. PIRTIU CHAND 35

had held that power of search and seizure, is, in any system of jurisprudence, an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. A search by itself is not a restriction on the right to hold and enjoy property, though seizure is a temporary restriction to the right of possession and enjoyment of the property seized. However, the seizure will be only temporary and limited for the purpose of the investigation. The power of search and seizure is an accepted norm in our criminal law envisaged in Sections 96 to 103 and 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, "the Code"). The Evidence Act permits relevancy as the only test 'of admissibility of evidence. The evidence obtained under an illegal search and seizure does not exclude relevant evidence on that ground. It is wrong to invoke the sprit of Constitution to exclude such evidence. The decisions of the American . Supreme Court spelling out certain Constitutional protections in regard to search and seizure are not applicable to exclude the evidence obtained on an illegal search. Courts in India refuse to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search and seizure. When the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law, evidence obtained as result of illegal search and seizure, is not liable to be shut out. Search and Seizure are not a new weapon in the armoury of those whose duty it is to maintain social security in its broadest sense. If the safeguards are generally on the lines adopted by the Code, they would be regarded as adequate and render the restrictions imposed as reasonable measures.

It would be seen that the organised traffic in contraband generates deleterious effect on the national economy affecting the vitals of the economic life of the community. It is settled law that illegality committed in investigation do_es not render the evidence obtained during that inves- tigation inadmissible. lnspite of illegal search property seized, on the basis of said search, still would form basis for further investigation and prosecu- tion against the accused. The manner in which the contraband is discovered may affect the factum of discovery but if the factum of discovery is otherwise proved then the manner becomes immaterial.

In Radha Kris/tan v. State of UP., AIR {1963) SC 822, this Court held that the evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure not be rejected but H

36 SVPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A requires to be examined carefully. Jn State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal, AIR (1980) SC 593, even if the search was illegal, it will not affect the validity of the seizure and further investigation of the authorities or the validity of the trial which followed on the complaint by the customs officials. In Shyam Lal v. State of M.P., AIR (1972) SC 886: it was held that even if the search and seizure is illegal being in contravention of Section B 165, that provision does not have any effect in its application to the subsequent steps taken in the investigation. In State of Kera/a v. A/asseny Mohd., AIR 1978 SC 933, this Court had held that failure to comply strictly with the statutory provisions, by the Food Inspector, would not vitiate the trial and conviction of the accused. c It would thus be settled law that every deviation from the details of the procedure prescribed for search, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that search by the police renders the recovery of the articles pursuant to the illegal search, irrelevant evidence nor the discovery of the D fact inadmissible at the trial. Weight to be attached to such evidence depends nn facts and circumstances in each case. The court is required to scan the evidence with care and to act upon it when it is proved and the court would hold that the evidence would be relied upon.

In Sunder Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1956) SC 411 a E three-Judge Bench of this Court held that under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 though respectable inhabitants of the locality were not associated with the search, that circumstance would not invalidate the search. It would only affect the weight of the evidence in support of the search and ihe recovery. At the highest, the irregularity in the search and the recovery would not affect legality of the proceedings. Jn State of Maharashtra v. P.K. Pathak, AIR (1980) SC 1224 it was held that absence of any independent witness from the locality to witness the search does not affect the trial and the conviction uf the accused under the Customs Act. In Matajog Dubey"· H.C. Bahri, AIR (1956) SC 44 it was held that when the salutary provisions have not been complied with, it may, however, affect the weight of the evidence in support of the search or may furnish a reason for disbelieving the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the prosecution properly explains such circumstances which made it impossible for it to comply with these provisions. In Balbir Singh's case (supra) this H Court held that if the provisions of the Act have not been complied with,

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STATE v. PIRTHI CHAND 37

the Court has to consider whether any prejudice has been caused to the accused and also examine the evidence in respect of the search in the light of the fact that the provisions have not been complied with further consider whether weight of evidence is in any manner affected because of the non-compliance. The testimony of witness is not to be doubted or dis- carded merely because he happens to be official. As a rule of caution and depending upon the circumstances of the case the court may look for corroboration from independent evidence. This again depends upon the questi'.m whether the official has deliberately filed to comply with tire provisions or failure was due to lack of time and opportunity to associate some independent witness with the search and strictly comply with the provtstons. c In Rakesh Kumar@ Sachdeva @Deva v. State Delhi Administration- al, (1994] Supp. 3 SCC 729 a two-judge Bench of this Court held that in spite of non-examination of the investigation officer no-inference could be drawn against the prosecution. Non-examination did not in any way affect D the prosecution case nor prejudiced the accused in his defence. The Court has to consider the evidence of the witnesses examined. Failure to join independent witness1 of locality .is also not fatal. Conviction based on e°vidence of policy officers alone is not improper. In that case since wit- nesses were not willing to come and associate with the search under the E TADA Act, this Court upheld the evidence given by the police officers and accepted the finding of the High' Court which relied on the evidence of police officers and the conviction was upheld.

The question then is whether the High Court would be justified in F exercising its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR/charge sheet/complaint.

In State of Ha1yana & Ors.. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., (1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335 a two-Judge Bench of this Court laid down certain broad tests to exercise the inherent power or extraordinary power of the High Court. It G is not necessary to reiterate the guidelines. Suffice it to state that they are only illustrative. The High Court should sparingly and only in exceptional cases, in other words, in rarest of rare cases, and not merely it would be appealable to the learned Judge, be inclined to exercise the power to quash the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint. In that case the Court held that the FIR H

38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A should not be quashed since it disclosed prima facie cognisable offences to proceed further in the investigation. In Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Anr. JT (1995) 7 SC 299 this Court reiterated the above view that held that when the complaint or charge-sheet filed dis- closed prima facie evidence of Court would not weigh at that stage and find B out whether offence could be made out. The order of the High Court exercising the power under Article 226, was accordingly set aside.

It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an exceptional one. Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinise the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint. In decid- e ing whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that FIR is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investiage into cognisable offence. After the investigation is conducted and the charge-sheet is laid the prosecution produces the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code in support of the charge-sheet. At that stage it is not the function of the Court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict compliance of the provisions which are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. It would be done after the trial is concluded. The Court has to prima facie consider from the averments in the charge-sheet and the statement of witnesses on the record in support thereof whether court could take cognizance of the offence, on that evidence and proceed further with the trial. If it reaches a conclusion that no cognigible offence is made out no further act could be done except to quash the charge sheet. But only in exceptional case, i.e. F in rarest of rare cases of ma/a fide initiation of the proceedings to wreak private vengence process of criminal action is availed of in lying a com- plaint or FIR itself does not disclose at all any cognisable offence - the court may embark upon the consideration thereof and exercise the power.

G When the remedy under Section 482 is available, the High Court . would he loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 since efficacious remedy under Section 482 of the Code is available. When the Court exercises its inherent power under Section 482 the prime consideration should only be whether the exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would be an abuse of the process

STATE v. PIRTHI CHAND 39

of the court. When investigating officer spends considerable time to collect the evidence and places the charge-sheet before the Court, further action should not be short-circuited by resorting to exercise inherent power to quasb the charge-sheet. The social stability and order requires to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon exercising inherent power. The accused involved in an economic offence destablises the economy and causes grave incursion on the economic planning of the State. When the legislature entrusts the power to the police officer to prevent organised commission of the offence or offences involving moral turpitude or crimes of grave nature and are entrusted with power to investigate into the crime in intractable terrains c and secrative manner in concert, greater circumspection and care ·and caution should be born in mind by the High Court when it exercises its inherent power. Otherwise, the social order and security would be put in jeopardy and to grave risk. the accused will have field day in destablising the economy of the State regulated under the relevant provisions. D

The evidence collected in a search in violation of law does not become inadmissible in evidence under the Evidence Act. The conse- quence would be that evidence discovered would be to prove unlawful possession of the contraband under the Act. It is founded in Panchnama E to seize the contraband from the possession of the suspect/accused. Though the search may be illegal but the evidence collected, i.e., Panchnama etc., nonetheless would be admissible at the trial. At the stage of filing· charge-sheet it cannot be said that there is no evidence and the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge would be co'llmitting illegality to dis- F charge the accused on the ground that Section 50 or other provisions have not been complied with. At the trial an opportunity would be available to the prosecution to prove that the search was conducted in accordance with law. Even if search is found to be in violation of law, what weight should · be given to the evidence collected is yet another question to be gone into. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in G discharging the accused, after ftling of the charge-sheet holding that man- datory requirements of Section 50 had not been complied with.

The next question is whether at this belated stage, would it be necessary to remit the matter for trial. In view of the fact that more than H

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A ten years have passed and the contraband seized is not of a considerable magnitude, we think that it is not a fit case to remit at this stage for trial but non-remittance on facts of this case should not be used as precedent in future cases.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of. B R.A. Appeal disposed of.