AIR INDIA STATUTORY CORPORATION v. UNITED LABOUR UNION AND ORS.

A system, they are entitled, per force, to be absorbed on regular basis transposing their erstwhile contractual status into that of an employer- employee relationship so as to continue to take out their livelihood by working under the employer and be entitled to receive salary prescribed to that post. Thereby they became entitled to be absorbed without any hiatus with effect from the date of abolition. If any action is needed to be taken thereafter against the employee, it should be only in accordance with either the statutory rules or the ID Act, if applicable. In either event, the right to absorption assures to the workmen the right to livelihood as economic empowerment, right to social justice and right to dignity of person which are the concomitants of social democracy. These facets of constitutional rights guaranteed to the workmen as their Fundamental Rights should be kept in view in interpreting the expression "appropriate Government" and the duty of the appropriate Government enjoined under Section 10(1) of the Act a!ld other regulatory provisions in relation to the employment of the workmen. Therefore, the view in Dena Nath's case is not correct in law and requires to be overruled.

There is no hiatus in the operation of the Act on abolition of the Contract labour system under Section 10. The object and pureose of the Act are two-fold. As long as the work in an industry is not perennial, the E Act regulates the conditions of the workmen employed through the con- tractor registered under the Act. The services of the workmen are chan- nelised through the contractor. The principal employer is required to submit the number of workmen needed for employment in its establishment who are supplied by the contractor, an intermediary; but the primary responsibility lies upon the principal employer to abide by law; the violation F thereof visits With penal consequences. The Act regulates systematic opera- tion. Wages to the contract labour should be paid under the direct super- vision of the principal employer. The principal employer is enjoined to compel the contractor to pay over the wages and on his failure, the principal employer should pay and recover it from the contractor/inter- G medkry. The principal employer alone is required to provide safety, health and other amenities to ensure health and safe working conditions in the establishment of the principal employer. This would clearly indicate the pervasive control the principal employer has over the contract labour employed through intermediary and regulation of the work by the workmen during the period of service. On advice by the Board that the work is of

AIRINDIASfATITTORYCORPN.•. UNION LABOUR t:NION (KRAMASWAM\,J.) 603

perennial nature etc. and on being satisfied of the conditions specified under Section 10(2), the appropriate Government takes a decision to abolish the contract labour and have the decision published by a notifica- tion. It results in abolition of the contract labour. Consequently, the linkage of intermediary/contractor is removed from the operational structure under the Act. It creates direct connection between the principal employer and the workmen. There is no escape route for the principal employer to avoid workmen because it needs their services and the workmen are not meant to be kept in the lurch. The words "principal employer" do indicate that the intermediary/contractor is merely a supplier of labour to the principal employer. On effacement of the contractor by abolition of the contract labour system, a direct relationship between the principal employer and the workmen stands knitted. Thereby the workman becomes an employee of the principal employer and it relates back to the date of engagement as a contract labour. The details of the workmen, requirement of the work force, duration of the work etc. are regulated under the Act and the Rules. D The Act, Rules and statutory forms do furnish internal and unimpeachable evidence obviating the need to have industrial adjudication; much less there arises any dispute. There is no machinery for workmen under the ID Act to seek industrial adjudication. If any industrial adjudication is to be sought, it would be only by a recognised union in the establishment of the appellants who are unlikely to espouse their dispute. Therefore, the methodology suggested in Gujarat Electricity Board's case, by another Bench of two Judges apart from being unworkable and incongruous, is not correct in law. On abolition of the contract labour, the principal employer is left with no right but duty to enforce the notification, absorb the workmen working in the establishment on contract basis transposing them as its regular employees with all consequential rights and duties attached to a post on which the workman working directly under the appellant was entitled or liable. The Act gave no option to pick and choose the employees at the whim of the principal employer. The view of the High Court, therefore, is correct to the extent that the notification should be enforced with effect from the date of abolition, namely, December 9, 1976. The subsequent amendment with effect from January 28, 1986 is only a recog- nition of and superimposition of pre-existing legal responsibility of the Central Government as the appropriate Government. It does not come into being only from the date the amendment came into force. Consequently, H

604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R/ A the workmen, namely, the memberlV'f the respondent· Union must be. declared to be the employees with effect from the respective dates on which they were discharging their duties in the respective services of the appellant's establishments either as Sweeper, Duster, Cleaner, Watchman etc. The view, therefore, of ti)e High Court to the extent that they should B be absorbed with effect from the date of the judgment of the learned single Judge, is not correct in law. Therefore, to do complete justice, direction may be given to absorb the workmen with effect from the date of abolition, i.e., December 9, 1976 under Article 142 of the Constitution.

The respective contentions would give rise to the following ques- C lion~:

1Copy pinpoint1. What is meaning of the word "appropriate Government under Section 2(1)(a) of the Act?

2Copy pinpoint2. Whether the view taken in Heavy Engi.neering case is correct in law?

3Copy pinpoint3. Whether on abolition the contract labour are entitled to be ab- sorbed; if so, from what date?

4Copy pinpoint4. Whether the High Court µnder Article 226 has power to direct their absorption; if so, from what da(e?

5Copy pinpoint5. Whether it is necessary to make a reference under Section 10 of the ID Act for adjudication of dispute qua absorption of the contract labour?

6Copy pinpoint6. Whether the view taken by this Court in Dena Nath and Gujarat F State Electricity Board's case is correct in law.?

7Copy pinpoint7. Whether the workmen have got a right for absorption and, if so, what is the remedy for enforcement?

Section 2(1)(a) of the Act defines "appropriate Government" to G mean·

""(i) in relation to an establishment in respect of which the ap- propriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act 14 of 1947), is the Central Government, the Central Government;

H (ii) in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the

AIR !NDIASTATIJTORY CORPN.>. UNION !ABDUR UNION (K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 605

State in which that other establishment is situated" A

Prior to Amendment Act 14 of 1986, the definition was as under :

"2(1)(a) "Appropriate Government" means-

(1) in relation to - B (i) any establishment pertaining to any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, or pertaining to any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government, or c (ii) any establishment of any railway, Cantonment Board, major port, mine or oil-field, or

(iii) any establishment of a banking or insurance company,

the Central Government, D

(2) in relation to any other establishment the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situate."

Section 2(a)(i) of the ID Act defines "appropriate Government" thus; Unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, "ap- E propriate Government" means, iµ relation to any Ind trial Disputes con- cerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a railway company for concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government ...." and Indian Airlines and Air India Corporation established under Section F 3 of the Air Corporation Act 1953 are enumerated industries under Amendment Act 46 of 1982 which came into force with effect from 21.8.1984.

In Heavy Engineering case (supra), industrial dispute was referred under Section 10 of the ID Act by the State Government of Bihar to the G Industrial Tribunal for its .adjudication. The competency of the State Government was questioned by the Mazdoor Union contending that the appropriate Government to refer the dispute was the Central Government. The High Court negatived the contention and had upheld the validity of reference. On appeal, a Bench of two Judges had held that the wqrds H

606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A "under authority of' means pursuant to the authority, such as an agent or a servant's acts under or pursuant to the authority of its principal or master. The Heavy Engineering Company cannot be said to be carrying on its business pursuant to the authority of the Central Government. Placing reliance on common law interpretation, the Bench was of the opinion that the Company derived its powers and functions from its Memorandum and Articles of Association. Though the entire share capital was contributed by the Central Government and all the shares were held by the President and officers of the Central Government were in-charge of the management, it did not make any difference. The company and the share-holders are distinct entities. The fact that the President of India and certain officers hold all its shares did not make the company an agent either of the President or of the Central Government. The power to decide how the company should function; the power to appoint Directors and the power to determine the wages and salaries payable by the company to its employees, were all derived from the Memorandum of Company and D Articles of Association of the .Company and not by the reason of the Company being agent of the Central Government. The learned Judges came to that conclusion on the ba~is of concession and on private law of principal and agent and as regards a company registered under the Com- panies Act, on the basis of the power of internal management. In Hindustan E Aeronautics Ltd case (supra), learned Judges merely followed the ratio of " Heavy Engineering case. It further concluded that the enumeration of certain statutory Corporations in the definition would indicate that those enumerated Corporations would come within the definition of the "ap- propriate Government" without any further discussion. In Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh's case, a Bench of three Judges, while interpreting Section F 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act, considered the purpose of the expres- sion "unrler the authority of any department of the Central Government for purpose of payment of bonus". The meaning and scope of the expression "industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government", was examined and it was held that the industrial undertaking retains its identity, personality, and status unchanged though in its management, the Central Government exercised the power to give a direction under Section 16 and the management is subjected to regulatory control. It is seen that the above decision was reached in the context in which the payment of bonus was to be determined and paid to the employees by the department. In Food Corporation of In,dia's case (supra),

AIRINDIASfATlITORYCORPN.>. UNIONIABOURUNION[KRAMASWAMY,J.) 607

a Bench of two Judges was to consider whether regional office of the Food A Corporation of India and the warehouses etc. were an "establishment" within the meaning of Section 2(i)(e) of the Act and whether FCI is an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. Following the aforesaid three decisions, it was held that a bare reading of the definition would indicate that the "establishment" defined under the Act B means inter alia any place, any industry, trade, business, manufacture warehouse, godown or the place set up by the Corporation where its business is carried on. Though for the purpose of industrial disputes the Central Government is an appropriate Government in relation to Food Corporation of India, its establishments at various places is not under the control of the Government of India. Therefore, appropriate Government c under the Industrial Disputes Act is the State Government. In that behalf, the learned Judges, undoubtedly, relied upon Heavy Engineering case. It would thus be seen that the construction adopted on the phrase "ap- propriate Government" under the ID Act was considered with reference to its functional efficacy. The Heavy Enginee1ing case, as held earlier, had D proceeded on common law principles and the concession by the counsel.

As noted, the appellant, to start with, was a statutory authority 'Jut pending appeal in this Court, due to change in law and in order to be in tune with open economy, it became a company registered under the E Companies Act. To consider its sweep on the effect of Heavy Engineering case on the interpretation of the phrase 'appropriate Government', it would be necessary to recapitulate the Preamble, Fundamental Rights (Part Ill) and Directive Principle (Part IV) - trinity setting out the conscience of the Constitution deriving from the source "We, the people", a charter to establish an egalitarian social order in which social and economic justice with dignity of person and equality of status and opportunity, are assured to every citizen in a socialist democratic Bharat Republic. The Constitu- tion, the Supreme law heralds to achieve the above goals under the rule of law. Life of law is not logic but is one of experience. Constitution provides an enduring instrument, designed to meet the changing needs of each succeeding generation altering and adjusting the unequal conditions to · pave way for social and economic democracy within the spirit drawn from the Constitution. So too, the legal redressal within the said parameters. The words in the Constitution or in an Act are but a framework of the concept which may change more than the words themselves consistent with the H

608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A march of law. Constitutional issues require interpretation broadly not by play of words or without the acceptance of the line of their growth. · Preamble of the Constitution, as its integral part, is designed to realise socio economic justice to all people including workmen, harmoniously blending the details enumerated in the Fundamental Rights and the Direc- B tive Principles. The Act is a social welfare measure to further the general interest of the community of workmen as opposed to the particular interest of the ind.ividual entrepreneur. It seeks to achieve a public purpose, i.e., regulated conditions of contract labour and to abolish it when it is found to be of perennial nature etc. The individual interest can, therefore, no C longer stem the forward flowing tide and must, of necessity, give way to the broader public purpose of establishing social and economic democracy in which every workman realises socio-economic justice assured in the Preamble, Articles 14, 15 and 21 and the Directive Principles of the Constitution.

D The founding fathers of the Constitution, cognizant of the reality of life wisely engrafted the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles in Chapters III and IV for a democratic way of life to every one in Bharat Republic, the State under Article 38 is enjoined strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice, social, economic and political shall inform all the institutions of the national life and tu minimise the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations. Article 39(a) provides that the State shall direct its policies towards securing the citizens, men and women equally, the right to an adequate means of livelihood; clause (d) provides for equal pay for equal work for both men and women; clause (e) provides to secure the health and strength of workers. Article 41 provides that within the limits of its economic capacity and development, the State shall make effective provision to secure the right to work as fundamental with just and humane conditions of work by suitable legislation of economic organisation or in any other way in which the worker shall be assured of living wages, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities to the workmen. The poor, the workman and the common man can secure and realise economic and social freedom only through the right to work and right to adequate means of livelihood, to just and humane H

AIR INDIA STATUTORY CORPN. '· UNION LABOcR UNION (K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 609

conditions of work, to a living wage, a decent standard of life, education and leisure. To them, these are fundamental facets of life. Article 43A, brought by 42nd Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1976 enjoins upon the State to secure by suitable legislation or in any other way, the participation of workers in the management of undertakings, establishments or other organisations engaged in any industry. Article 46 gives a positive mandate to promote economic and educational interest of the weaker sections of the people. Correspondingly, Article 51A imposes fundamental duties on every citizen to develop the scientific temper, humanism and to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity, so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achieve- ment. To make these rights meaningful to workmen and meaningful right to life a reality to workmen, shift of judicial orientation from private law c principles to public law interpretation harmoniously fusing the interest of the individual enterprenuer and the paramount interest of the community. Article 39A furnishes beacon light that justice be done on the basis of equal opportunity and no one be denied justice by reason of economic or other disabilities. Courts are sentinal in the qui vive of the rights of the people, D in particular, the poor. The judicial function of a Court, therefore, in interpreting the Constitution and the provisions of the Act, requires to build up continuity of socio-economic empowerment to the poor to sustain equality of opportunity and status and the law should constantly meet the needs and aspiration oi the society in establishing the egalitarian social order. Therefore, the concepts engrafted in the statute require interpreta- E tion from that perspectives, without doing violence to the language. Such an interpretation would elongate the spirit and purpose of the Constitution and make the aforesaid rights to the workmen a reality lest establishment of an egalitarian social order would be frustrated and Constitutional goal defeated. F Keeping this broad spectrum in view, let us consider whether the interpretation given in Heavy Engineering case is consistent with the scheme and spirit of the Constitution. In Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal & Ors., [1967] 3 SCR 377, a Constitution Bench, composing the learned Judges who formed the Bench in Heavy Engineering case, G considered the issue of interpretation and Bhargava, J. speaking on behalf of the majority, had held that "other authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution need not necessarily be an authority to perform governmental functions. The expression 'other authority' is wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute on which H

610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A powers are conferred to carry out governmental functions or the "functions under the control of the Goverrunent". It is not necessary that some of the powers conferred be Governmental sovereign functions to carry on com- mercial activities. Since the State is empowered under Articles 19(1)(g) and 298 to carry on any trade or business, it was held that Rajasthan State B Electricity Board was "other authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution. The significance of the observation is that an authority under the control of the State need not carry on Governmental functions. It can carry on commercial activities. At this juncture, it is relevant to keep at the back of our mind, which was not brought to the attention of the Bench which decided Heavy Engineering case, that Article 19(2) of the Constitution C grants to the· State, by clause (ii) thereof, monopoly to carry on, by the State or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, any trade, business, industry or service whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. The narrow interpretation strips the State of its monopolistic power to exclude citizens from the field of any activity, to carry on any trade, business, industry or service, total or partial. A reverse trend which would deflect the constitutional perspective was set in motion by the same Bench in Fraga Tools Corporation v. C. V. !manual, [1969] 3 SCR 773 decided on February 19, 1969, 24 days prior to the date of decision in Heavy Engineering case; in which it was held in main that writ under Article 226 would not lie against a company incorporated under Companies Act and the declaration that dismissal of the workmen was illegal, given by the High Court was set aside. But the operation of the above ratio was put to stop by the Constitution Bench decision in Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagat Ram & Anr., [1975] 2 SCR 619. In that behalf, the interpretation given by Mathew, J. in a separate but concurrent judgment is of vital significance taken away the State action from the clutches of moribund common law jurisprudence; it set on foot forward march under public law interpretation. Mathew, J. had held that the concept of State had undergone drastic change. It cannot be conceived of simply as a cohesive machinery yielding the thunderbolt of authority. The State is a G service Corporation. It acts only through its instrumentalities or agencies of natural and juridical person. There is a distinction between State action and private action. There is nothing strange in the notion of the State acting through a Corporation and making it an agency or instrumentality of the State with an event of the welfare State. The framework of the civil service H administration became increasingly insufficient for handling new tasks

AlRINDIASTATIJTORYCORPN.,. UN!ONIABOURUNION(K.RAMASWAMY,J.j 611 , which were often of a specialised and highly technical character. Develop- A ment of policy of public administration, through separate Corporations which would operate largely according to business principles and separate- ly accountable though under the Memorandum of Association or Articles of Association become the arm of the Government. Though their employees are not civil servants, it being a public authority and State B { Corporation, therefore, is subject to control of the Government. The public corporation, being a corporation of the State, is subject to the constitution- al limitation as the State itself. The governing power, wherever located, must be subject to the fundamental constitutional limitations. The Court, therefore, had laid the test to see whether the Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the Government to carry on business for the benefit of C the public. Thus, the ratio in Praga Tools case, no writ would lie against the Corporation is no longer a good law. Though Corporation is not a statutory body, as it is not a authority, it is an instrumentality of the State.

In R.D. Shetty v. International Aiport Authority of India & Ors., [1979] D 3 SCR 1.014, this Court had held that due to expansion of welfare and social service functions, the State increasingly controls material and economical resources in the society involving large scale industrial and commercial activities with their executive functions affecting the lives of the people. It regulates aJld dispenses special services and provides large number of benefits. When the Government deals with the public, it cannot act ar· E bitrarily. Where a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it would be subject to the same constitutional or public law limitation as the Government. The limitations of the action by the Govern- ment must apply equally when such actions are dealt with by Corporation having instrumentality element with public and they cannot act arbitrarily. F Such a functioning cannot enter into relationship with any person it likes ·at its sweet will. Its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Therefore, the distinction between a statutory corporation and the company incorporated under the Com- panies Act was obliterated. G In Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Copn. v. V.N. Vajpayee, [1980] 2 SCR 773, Chinnappa Reddy, J. in his separate but concurrent judgment laid down the relevant principles. The Government establishes and manages large number of industries and institutions which have be- come biggest employer and there is no good reason why the Government H

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9S.C.R.

A should not be bound to observe the equality clause of the Constitution in a matter of employment and its dealings with its employees; why the Corporation set up or owned by the Government should not equally be bound and why instead such Corporation would become citadels of patronage and arbitrary action. Such a distinction perhaps would mock at B the Constitution and the people; some element of public employment is all that is necessary to take the employee beyond the reach of rule which denies him the protection of Articles 14 and 16. Independence and integrity of the- e!fiployees in the public sector should be secured as much as the independence and integrity of the civil servants. It was, therefore, held that a writ would lie against the warehousing corporation. c Jn Ajay Hasia Etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. Etc., [1981] 2 SCR 79, a Constitution Bench was to consider whether a Society registered under the J & K Societies Registration Act would be a State under Article 12 of the Constitution amenable to the reach of the writ jurisdiction. The D Constitution Bench laid the following test to determine whether the entity is an instrumentality or agency of the State; (1) if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by the Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency or Government; (2) where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental char- acter; (3) it must also be relevant factor whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected; (4) existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corp9ration is a State agency or instrumentality; (5) if the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government; (6) specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of the inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. In Delhi Transport C01poration v. D. T.C. Mazdoor Corpn., AIR (1991) SC 101, it was held that the State has a deep and pervasive control over the functioning of the society and, therefore, is an agency of the State. In Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 2 SCR 111, it was held that the settled position in law is that any authority under the control of the Government of India comes within the definition of a State. Burmashell Oil Co. was held to be an instrumentality of the State

AIR INDIA STATUTORY CORPN. '· UNION LABOUR UNION [K.RAMA,WAMY,J.) 613

thou&h it was a Government company. The authority in administrative law is a body having jurisdiction in certain matters of public nature. Therefore, the ability conferred upon a person by law is to alter his case by his own will directed to that end. The rights, duties and liabilities or other legal relation, either of himself or other persons must be present to make a person an authority. When the person is an agent or functions on behalf of the State, as an instrumentality, the exercise of the power is public. Sometimes, the test is formulated by asking whether corporation was formed by or under the statute. The true test is not how it is founded in legal personality but when it is created, apart from discharging public functions or doing business as the proxy of the State, whether there is an element of ability in it to effect the relations by virtue of power vested in it by law. In that case, it was held that the above tests were satisfied and the company was directed to pay full pension.

In Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commissioner, Union Tenito1y of Chan- digarh & 01~., [1984) Supp. sec 540, it was held that JD educational institution receiving 95% of the grant- in-aid from the Government is "other authority'' under Article 12 of the Constitution. It was, therefore, held that the termination of the service without enquiry was without jurisdiction. Dismissal from service without enquiry was declared illegal under Article

226. In P.K Ramachandra Iyer & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1984) 2 SCC 141, !CAR, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, .E was held and adjunct of the Government of India. It was financed by the Government of India. Its budget was voted as part of the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture. It was held that it was the State under Article 12 and was amenable to jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India which is a subsidiary owned by State Trading Corporation was held by this Court inA.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corpn. of India Ltd., [1984) 3 SCC 316, to be an agency of the Government within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. & AllT. v. Brojonath Ganguly & Anr., [1986) 3 SCC 156, a Government company incorporated under Companies Act was held to be an instrumentality or agency. In this case, this Court construed the Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 to 17, the Directive Principles under Articles 38, 41 and 42, the Preamble of the Constitution and held that the River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. was carrying on the same business as the corporation was doing. A scheme of arrangement was entered into between the corporation and the company. H

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A They were managed by the Board of Directors appointed and removable by the Central Government. It was, therefore, held that it was an agency or instrumentality of the State under Article 12. In that behalf this Court pointed out that the trade or business activity of the State constitutes public enterprise; the structural forms in which the Government operates in the field of public enterprise are many and varied. They may consist of governmental department, statutory body, statutory corporation or Govern- ment companies etc.; immunities and privileges possessed by bodies so set up by the Government under Article 298 are subject to Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles to further the State policy. For the purpose of Article 12, the Court must see necessarily through corporate veil to ascertain behind the veil the face of instrumentality or agency of the State. If the instrumentality or agency of the State has assumed the garb of a governmental company, as defined in Section 3(7) of the Companies Act, it does not follow thereby that it ceases to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. Applying the above test, it was held that Inland Water D Transport Corporation was State.

When its correctness was doubted and its reference to the Constitu- tion Bench was made in Delhi Transpott Corpn. case (supra), while holding that Delhi Road Transport Authority was an instrumentality of the State, it was held that employment is not a bounty from the State nor can its E; survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of any Fundamental Rights. Work is the sole source of income. The right to work become as much fundamental as right to life. Law as a social machinery requires to remove the existing imbalances and to further the progress serving the needs of the Socialist Democratic Republic under the rule of law. Prevail- ing social conditions and actualities of the life are to be taken into account to adjudge the dispute and to see whether the interpretation would sub- serve the purpose of the Society.

In Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K Gupta, [1994] 1 SCC 243, the question was whether a Government Authority is amenable to the regulation of Consumer Protection Act. It was held in paragraph 5 and 6 that a Government or a semi-Government body or local authority are amenable to the Act as much as any other private body rendering similar service. This is a service to the society and they are amenable to public accountability for health and growth of society, housing construction or building activities, by private or statutory body rendering service within the meaning of Section 2(0) of the said Act. In Star Enterprises & Ors. v.

AIRINDIASTATIITORYCORPN.,. UNIONIABOURUNION(K.RAMASWAMY,J.J 615

C.l.D.C. of Maharashtra Ltd., [1990] 3 SCC 280, it was held that the State A or its instrumentality entering into commercial filed must act in consonance with the rule of law. In paragraph 10, it was held that judicial review of administrative action has bec_ome expensive and its scope is becoming , wider day by day. The traditional limitations have been vanishing and the sphere of judicial scrutiny is being expanded. State activity too is becoming fast perversive as the State has descended into the conunercial field and B joint public sector undertaking has grown up. The State action must be justified by judicial review, by opening up of the public law interpretation. Accordingly, it was held that the action of company registered under the Companies Act was amenable to judicial review.

In LIC of India & Anr. v. Consumer Education & Research Centre & c Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 482, it was held that in the contractual field of State action, the State must act justly, fairly and reasonably in the public interest commensurate with the constitutional conscience and socio-economic jus- tice; insurance policies of LIC, terms and conditions prescribed therein involve public element. It was, therefore, held in para 23 at page 498 that D every action of the public authority or the person acting in public interest or any act that gives rise to public element, should be guided by public interest. It is the exercise of the public power or action hedged with public element that becomes open to challenge. If it is shown that the exercise of the power is arbitrary, unjust and unfair, it should be n" answer for the E State, its instrumentality, public authority or person whose acts have the insignia of public element, to say that their actions are in the field of private law and they are free to prescribe any conditions or limitations in their actions. They must be based on some rational and relevant principles. It must not be guided by irrational or irrelevant considerations. Every ad- ministrative decision must be hedged by reasons. At page 501 in para 28 it was held that though the dispute may fall within the domain of contractual obligation, if would not relieve the State etc. of its obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Article 14. To this extent, the obligation is of public character, invariably in every case, irrespective of there being any other right or obligation. An additional contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee under Article 14 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of the State etc. in any of its actions.

In G.B. Mahajan & Ors. v. Jalgaon Municipal Council & Ors., [1991] 3 sec 91 at 109, para 38, it was held that in interpretation of the test of reasonableness in Administrative Law, the words 11 void11 and "voidable 11 H

616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A found in private law are amenable to public law situations and "carry over with them meanings that may be in apposite in the changed context. Some - '

such thing has happened to the words 'reasonable' or reasonableness etc." In Shrisht Dhawan (Smt.) v. M/s. Shaw Brothers, [1992] 1 SCC 534 at 553, para 20 the private law principle of fraud and collusion in Section 17 of B the Contract Act was applied to public law remedy and it was held "that fraud in public law is not the same as fraud in private law. Nor can the ingredient, which has established fraud and commercial transaction be of assistance in determining fraud in administrative law. It has been aptly observed in Khwaja v. Secreta1y of State for the Home Department & Ors., C (1983) 1 ALL. E.R. 765 that it is dangerous to introduce maxims of common law as to the effect of fraud while determining fraud in relation to the statutory law." In Khwaja's case (supra), it was held "despite the wealth of authority on the subject, there is nowhere to be found in the relevant judgments (perhaps because none was thought necessary) a defini- tive exposition of the reasons why a person who has obtained leave to enter by fraud is an illegal entrant. To say that the fraud 'vitiates' the leave or that the leave is not 'in accordance with the Act' is, with respect, to state a conclusion without explaining the steps by which it is reached. Since we are here concerned with purely statutory law, I think there are dangers in introducing maxims of the common law as to the effect of fraud on common law transactions and still greater dangers in seeking to apply the concepts of 'void' and 'voidable'. In a number of recent cases in your Lordships' House, it has been pointed out that these transplants from the field of contract do not readily take root in the field of public law. This is well illustrated in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the instant case of F Khwaja (1982) 1 WLR 625 at 630; of (1982) 2 ALL ER 523, .at 527, where Donaldson LJ spoke of the appellant's leave to enter as being 'voidable ab initio', which I fmd, with respect, an impossible difficult legal category to comprehend". Thus, the limitations in private law were lifted and public law interpretation of fraud was enlarged.

G In must be remembered that the Constitution adopted mixed economy and control over the industry in its establishment, working and production of goods and services. After recent liberalised free economy private and multi-national entrepreneurship has gained ascendancy and entrenched into wider commercial production and services, domestic con- H sumption goods and large scale industrial productions. Even some of the public

AIRINDJASTATIITORYCORPN.>. UNIONJ.A1!0URUNION(K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 617

Corporations are thrown open to the private national and multi-national investments. It is axiomatic, whether or not industry is controlled by Government or public Corporations by statutory form or administrative clutch or private agents, juristic persons, Corporation whole or Corpora- , tion sole, their constitution, control and working would also be subject to the same constitutional limitations in tlie trinity, viz., Preamble, the Fun- damental Rights and the Directive Principles. They throw open an element of the public interest in its working. They share the burden and shoulder constitutional obligations to provide facilities and opportunities enjoined in the Directive Principles, the Preamble and the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The word 'control', therefore, requires to be interpreted in the changing commercial scenario broadly in keeping with the aforesaid constitutional goals and perspectives. c From the above discussion, the following principles would emerge :

(1) The constitution of the Corporation or instrumentality or agency or Corporatirn aggregate or Corporation sole is not of sole material relevant to decide whether it is by or under the control of the appropriate Government under the Act. • (2) If it is a statutory Corporation, it is an instrumentality or agency of the State. If it is a company owned wholly or partially by a share capital, floated from public exchequer, it gives indicia that it is controlled by or under the authority of the appropriate Government.

(3) In commercial activities carried on by a Corporation estab- lished by or under control of the appropriate Government having protection under Articles 14 and 19(2), it is an in- F strumentality or agency of the State.

(4) The State is a service Corporation. It acts through its in- strumentalities, agencies or persons - natural or juridical. G (5) The governing power, wherever located, must be subject to the fundamental constitutional limitations and abide by the principles laid in the Directive Principles.

(6) The framework of service regulations made in the appropriate rules or regulations should be consistent with and subject to H

618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A the same public law principles and limitations.

(7) Though the instrumentality, agency or person conducts com- mercial activities according to business principles and are separately accountable under their appropriate bye-laws or Memorandum of Association, they become the arm of the B Government.

(8) The existence of deep pervasive State control depends upon the facts and circumstances in a given situation and in the altered situation it is not the sole criterion to decide whether the agency or instrumentality or persons is by or under the c control of the appropriate Government.

(9) Functions of an instrumentality, agency or person are of public importance following public interest element.

(10) The instrumentality, agency or person must have an element of authority or ability to effect the relations with its employees or public by virtue of power vested in it by.law, memorandum of association or bye-laws or articles of association.

(11) The instrumentality, agency or person renders an element of public service and is accountable to health and strength of the workers, men and women, adequate means of livelihood, the security for payment of living wages, reasonable condi- tions of work, decent standard of life and opportunity to enjoy full leisure and social and cultural activities to the workmen.

F (12) Every action of the public authority, agency or instrumentality or the person acting in public interest or any act that gives rise to public element should be guided by public interest in exercise of public power or action hedged with public element and is open to challenge. It must meet the test of reasonable- ness, fairness and justness. G (13) If the exercise of the power is arbitrary, unjust and unfair, the public authority, instrumentality, agency or the person acting in public interest, though in the field of private law, is not free to prescribe any unconstitutional conditions or limita- H tions in their actions.

AIR INDIA SfATIITOR Y CORPN. '· UNION LABOUR UNION (K.RAMASWAMY. J.) 619

__. It must be based on some rational and relevant principles. It must A not be guided by irrational or irrelevant considerations and all their actions would satisfy the basic law requirement' of Article 14. The public law interpretation is the basic tool of interpretation in that behalf relegating common law principles to purely private law field. B From this perspective and on deeper consideration, we are of the considered view that the two-Judge Bench is Heavy E11gi11eeri11g case nar- rowly interpreted the words "appropriate Government" on the common law principles which no longer bear any relevance when it is tested on the anvil of Article 14. It is true that in Hindustan Machi11e Tool's R.D. Shetty's and Food Corporatiol! of India cases the ratio of Heavy Ellginee>illg case formed c the foundation. In Hindustan machi11e Tool's case, there was no inde- pendent consideration except repetition and approval of the ratio in Heavy E11ginee1i11g case. It is to reiterate that Heavy Engineering case is based on conce5'ion. In R.B. Shetty's case, the need to dwelve in-depth into this aspect did not arise but reference was made to the premise of private law D interpretation which was relegated to and had given place to constitutional perspectives of Artie!~ 14 which is consistent with the view we have stated above. In Food Corpor~tion of India's case, the Bench proceeded primarily on the premise that warehouses of the Corporation are situated within the jurisdiction of different State Governments which led it to conclude that the appropriate Government would be the State Government. E

In the light of the above principles and discussions, we have no hesitation to hold that the appropriate Government is the Central Govern- ment from the inception of the Act. The notification published under Section 10 on December 9, 1976, therefore, was in exercise of its power as F appropriate Government. So it is valid in law. The learned Solicitor General is not right in contending that the relevant factors for abolition of the contract labour system in the establishment of the appellant was not before the Central Advisory Board before its recommendation to abolish the contract labour system in the establishment of the appellant. The G learned Attorney General has placed before us the minutes of the Board which do show the unmistakable material furnished do indicate that the work in all the establishments including those of the appellants, is of perennial nature satisfying all the tests engrafted in Section 10(2) of the Act. Accordingly, on finding the work to be of perennial nature, it had recommended and the Central Government had considered and accepted H

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A the recommendation to abolish the contract labour system in the aforesaid services. Having abolished it, the Central Government was denuded of its power under Section 10(1) to again appoint insofar as the above services of the Mobile Committee to go once over into the self-same question and the recommendations of the latter not to abolish the contract labour system in the above services and the acceptance thereof by the Central Govern- B ment are without any legal base and, therefore, non est.

The next crucial question for consideration is : whether the High Court was right in directing enforcement of the notification dated Decem- ber 9, 1976 issued by the Central Government? Before adverting to that C aspect, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act.

The constitutionality of the Act was challenged in Mis. Gammon India Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1974] 1 SCC 596 on the touchstone of the Fundamental Rights given by Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) D and of Article 265. The Constitution Bench elaborately considered the provisions of the Act and had held that the Act in Section 10 empowers the Government to prohibit employment of contract labour. The Govern- ment, under that Section, has to apply its mind to various factors, before publishing the notification in the official Gazette prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any estab- E lishment. The words "other work in any establishment" were held to be important. The work in the establishment will be apparent from Section 10(2) of the Act as incidental or necessary to the industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation that is carried on in the e;tablishment. The Government before notifying prohibition of contract labour work which is F carried on in the establishment, will consider whether the work is of a perennial nature in that establishment or work is done ordinarily through regular workmen in that establishment. The words "work of an estab- lishment" which are used in defining workmen as contract labour being employed in or connected with the work of an establishment indicate that the work of the establishment there is the same as work in the estab- G lishmer.t contemplated by Section 10 of the Act. The contractor undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment through contract labour. He supplies contract labour for any work of the establishment. The entire site is the establishment and belongs to the principal employer who has a right of supervision and control; he is the owner of the premises and the end product and from whom the contract labour receives its payment either

AIR INDIASTATlITORY CORPN. '· UNION LABOUR UNION [KRAMASWAMY.J.J 621

directly or through a contractor. It is the place where the establishment intends to carry on its business, trade, industry, manufacture, occupation after the construction is complete. Accordingly, the constitutionality of the Act was upheld.

The appalling conditions of contract labour who are victims of ex- B ploitation have been engaging the attention of various committees for a long time and in furtherance of the recommendations, the Act was enacted to benefit, as a welfare measure, the contract labour. Various welfare measures, viz., provisions for canteens, rest rooms, facilities for supply of drinking water, latrines, urinals, first aid facilities and amenities for the dignity of human labour, are in larger interests of the community. Legisla- c ture is the best Judge to determine what is needed as the appropriate conditions for employment of comract labour. The legislature is guided by the needs of the general public in determining the reasonableness of such requirements under the Act and the rules made thereunder. Suffice it would, for the purpose of this case, to concentrate on the definition of D "contract labour" under Section 2{b), "contractor" under Section 2(c). "establishment" under Section 2(e), "principal employer" under Section 2(g), "wages" under Section 2{h) and of "workman" under Section 2{i), Under Section 2( c), ''contractor", in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment, other than a supply of goods or articles of manufacture to such estab- E lishment, through contract labour or who supplies contract labour for any

- work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor. "Establishment", under Section 2{e ), means any office or department of the Government or a local authority, or any place where any industry, trade, business, manufac- ture or occupation is carried on. "Principal employer", under Section 2(g), F means, in relation to any office or department of the Government or a local authority, the head of that office or department of such other officer as the Government or local authority, as the case may be, may specify in this behalf; and in a factory, it means the owner or occupier of the factory and where a person has been named as the manager of the factory under the Factories Act, 1948, the person so named; in a mine, it means the owner G or agent of the mine and where a person has been named as manager of the mine, the person so named; and in any other establishment, any person responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment, is the principal employer. 11 Workman 11, under Section 2(i), means any person employed in or in connection with the work of any establishment to do any H

622" SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, but does not include any such person categorised in clauses (a) to (e) which are not relevant for the purpose of this case.

B Every principal employer of an establishment under the Act is en- joined under Section 7 to apply for registration and have it registered thereunder. The registration is subject lo the revocation under Section 8 on fulfilment of certain conditions enumerated therein. The effect of non-registration is enumerated in Section 9 in the mandatory language that no principal employer shall employ contract labour in th.e establishment after the specified period. Section 12 enjoins similar obligation on the contractor for registrations with mandatory language, that from the ap- propriate date, no contractor to whom ~e Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work through contract labour except under and in accordance with the licence issued in that behalf by the licencing officers. Licence is granted under Section 13 and revocation, suspension and amendment thereof have been provided in Section 14 with which we are not concerned in this case. The welfare measures mandated in Chapter V be complied with by every establishment. Under Section 21, every principal employer shall nominate his representative to be present at the time of disbursement of wages by the contractor and the contractor should be responsible for payment of wages to every such workman. Representative of the principal employer should ensure and certify that wages was paid in the prescribed manner. In case of default committed by the contractor in paying wages within the prescribed period or for short payment, the principal employer should ensure payment of wages in full or the unpaid balance due, as the case may be, to the contract labour employed by the contractor in his establishment. He is empowered to recover the amount so paid from the contractor either by deduction from any amount payable to the contractor under any contract or as a debt payable by the contractor.

Section 10 prohibits employment of contact labour with a 11011 G obstante clause. The appropriate Government, after consultation with the Central Advisory Board or, as the case may be, State Board, prohibit, by notification published in the official Gazette, employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Before issue of any such notification, the appropriate Government is enjoined to H have regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided for the

AIR INDIASTATIJTORYCORPN. '- UNION lABOUR UNION IKRAMASWAMY,J.] 623

contract labour in the establishment and other relevant factors, such as - A (a) whether the process, operation or other work is incidental to, or necessary for the industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation that is carried on in the establishment; (b) whether it is of perennial nature, that is to say, is of sufficient duration having regard to the nature of industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation carried on in that B establishment; (c) whether it is done ordinarily through regular workmen in that establishment or an establishment similar thereto; and (d) whether it is sufficient to employ considerable number of whole-time workmen. Section 20 makes it mandatory to provide the amenities of welfare and health facilities enjoined in sections 16 to 19. The expenses incurred in that behalf may be recovered, by the principal employer, from the contractor. C The penalty for non-compliance is provided in Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. Offences by companies are dealt with under Section 25. For the prosecution of non-cognisable offences, complaint is to be laid with pre- vious s,anction of the Inspector in writing. Section 27 prescribes limitation for laying prosecution. D

Rules have been prescribed in that behalf for effective enforcement of the Act. Forms and terms and conditions of licence have been prescribed in Rules 21 to 25. Chapter V of the Central Rules deals with welfare and health of the contract labour. Chapter VI deals with payment of wages to the workmen and the manner of payment has also been provided therein. Form III referred to in Rule 18(3) envisages, among others, name and address of the principal employer, type of business etc., total No. of workmen directly employed, name and address of the contrac- tor, nature of work in which contract labour is to be employed on any day, maximum number of contract labour to be employed on any date, probable duration of employment of contract labour etc. The licence issued in Form IV under Rule 21(1) indicates the particulars envisaged in Form III. Form XIII under Rule 75 requires information as to the list of workmen employed by the contractor and also to be specified, the name and surname of the workmen, SI. No., age and sex, father's/husband's name, nature of employment, designation, permanent home address of the workman, date of commencement of employment, signature/thumb impression of workmen, date of termination of employment, reasons for termination. Certificate of completion of the work has been provided in Form XV as per Rule 77. Form XVII,,., per Rule 78(1)(a}(i) is Register of Wages and provides the particulars, apart from other details, number of days worked, H

624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A units of work done, daily-rate of wages/piece rate etc. Register of Wages- cum-Muster Roll is prescribed in Form XVIII referred to in Rule 78(1)(a)(i) and requires details in particular as to daily attendance, units worked, designation/nature of work, total attendance, units of work done, overtime \vages etc.

B It would thus be seen that before the Central or State Advisory Board advises the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) on the issue whether or not to abolish the contract labour system, it has before it all the relevant factual material and the appropriate Government after the receipt and consideration of the recommendations and the material and takes decision.

The pivotal question for consideration is : on abolition of the contract labour by publication of a notification in the Gazette under sub-section (1) of Section 10, what would be the consequences? It is seen that so long as the contract labour system continues, the principal employer is enjoined to ensure payment of wages to the contract labour and to provide all other amenities envisaged under the Act and the Rules including provisions for food, potable water, health and safety and failure thereof visits with penal consequences. {

E The 42nd Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1976, brought explicitly in the Preamble socialist and secular concepts in sovereign democratic of Bharat with effect from January 3, 1977. The Preamble was held as part of the Constitution in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavarn v. State of Kera/a, (1973] Supp. SCR 1. The provisions of the Constitution including Fundamental Rights are alterable b11t the result thereof should F be consistent with the basic foundation and the basic structure of the Constitution. Republican and democratic form of Government, secular chacacter of the Constitution, separation of powers, dignity and freedom to the individual are basic features and foundations easily discernible, not only from the Preamble but the whole scheme of the Constitution. In S.R. G Bommai v. Union of India, (1994] 3 SCC 1, it was held that Preamble of the Constitution is the basic feature. Either prior to 42nd Constitution (Amendment) Act, or thereafter, though the word "socialist" was not expressly brought out separately in the main parts of the Constitution, i.e., in the Chapters on Fundamental Rights or the Directive Principles, its seed-beds are right to participation in public offices, right to seek con- H sideration for appointment to an office or post; right to life and right to

AIR INDIA STATIITORY CORPN. '· UNION LABOUR UNION fK.RAMASWAMY.J.J 625

equality which would amplify the roots of socialism in democratic form of A Government; right to equality of statu' and of opportunity, right to equal access to public places and right to prohibition of discrimination read with right to freedom, protective discrimination, abolition of untouchability, its practices in any form a constitutional offence, as guaranteed in Part III & IV, i.e., Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles which to every citizen are Fundamental Rights. In Mine1va Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & B Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 206 = AIR (1980) SC 1789, the Constitution Bench had held that the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles are two wheels of the chariot in establishing the egalitarian social order. Right to life enshrined in Article 21 means something more than survival of animal existence. It would include the right to live with human dignity vide Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Tenito1y of Ddhi & Ors., AIR c (1981) SC 746 para 3; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR (1986) SC 180; Delhi Transpo1t Corporation v. D. T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR (1991) SC 101para223, 234 and 259 = [1991] Supp. 1SCC600. Right to sustenance allowance during suspension was held in state of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan, AIR (1983) SC 803 para 20 to be a part of right to life. D Right to means of livelihood and the right to dignity, to health, right to potable water, right to pollution free environment and right to education have been held to be part of right to life. Social justice has been held to be fundamental right in Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India, [1995] 3 SCC 42 = (1995) 1 SCALE 354 at 375. The Directive E Principles in our Constitution are fore-runners of the U.N.O. Convention on Right to Development as inalienable human right and every person and all people are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social cultural and political development in which all human rights, fun- damental freedoms would be fully realised. It is the responsibility of the State as well as the individuals, singly and collectively, for the development taking into account the need for fuller responsibility for the human rights, fundamental freedoms as well as the duties to the community which alone can ensure free complete fulfilment of the human being. They promote and protect an appropriate social economic order in democracy for develop- ment. The State should provide facilities and opportunities to ensure development and to eliminate all obstacles to development by appropriate economic and social reforms so as to eradicate all social injustice. These principles are imbibed, as stated earlier, an integral part of our Constitu- tion in the Directive Principles. Therefore, the Directive Principles now stand elevated to inalienable fundamental human rights. Even they are justiciable by themselves. Social and economic democracy is the foundation H

626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A for stable political democracy. To make them a way of life in the Indian polity, law as a social engineer, has to create just social order, remove the inequalities in social and economic life and socio-economic disabilities due to which people are languishing; and to require positive opportunities and facilities as individuals and groups of persons for development of human personality in our civiliscd,idemocratic set up so that every individual would B strive constantly to rise to higher levels. Dr. Ambedkar, in his closing speech in Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1949, had lucidly s/ucidated the meaning of social and political democracy. He stated that it ineans a way of life which recognises liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life. They are not to be treated as separate items in a trinity. .C They are not to be treated as separate items in a trinity. They form an integral union. One cannot divorce one from the other; otherwise it would defeat the very purpose of democracy. Without equality, liberty would produce supremacy of the few over the many; equality without liberty would kill the initiative to improve the individual's excellence, political equality without socio-economic equality would run the risk of democratic D institutions to suffer a set back. Therefore, for establishment of just social order in which social and economic democracy would be a way of life inequalities in income should be removed and every erdeavour be made to eliminate inequalities in status through the rule •.:· :.w.

E The word "socialism" was brought into the Preamble and its sweep elaborately was considered by this Court in several judgments. It was held that the meaning of the word "socialism" in the Preamble of the Constitu- tion was expressly brought in the Constitution to establish an egalitarian social order through rule of law as its basis structure. In Mbwva Mills Ltd. F case, the Constitution Bench had considered the meaning of the word "socialism 11 to crystalise a socialistic State securing to its people socio- economic justice by interplay of the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles. In D.S. Nakara & Ors v. Union of India, [1983] 2 SCR 165, another Constitution Bench had held that the democratic socialis.n G achieves socio-economic revolution to end poverty, ignorance, disease and inequality of opportunity. The basic framework of socialism was held to provide a decent standard of life to the working people and especially to provide security from cradle to grave. The less equipped person shall be assured a decent minimum standard of life to prevent exploitation in any form, equitable distribution of national cake and to push the disadvantage to the upper ladder of life. It was further held that the Preamble directs

AIR INDIASTATIITORY CORPN. '· UNION JABOUR UNION (KRAMASWAMY,J.] 627

the centers of power, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, to strive to shift up from a wholly feudal exploited slave society to a vibrant, throbbing socialist welfare society is a long march; but daring the journey to the fulfilment of goal, every State action, whenever taken, must be directed and must be so interpreted as to take the society towards that goal, Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao, one of the eminent economists of India in his "Indian B Socialism-retrospect and prospect" has stated that equitable distribution of the income and maximisation of the production is the object of socialism under the Constitution to solve the problems of unemployment, low income and mass poverty and to bring about a significant improvement in the national standard of living. He also stated that to bring about socialism, C deliberate and purposive action on the part of the State, in regard to production as well as distribution and necessary savings, investment, use of human skills and use of science and technology should be brought about. Changes in property relations, taxation, public expenditure, education and the social services are necessary to make a socialist State under the D Constitution, a reality. It must also bring about, apart from distribution of income, full employment as also increase in the production. In State of Kamataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy & Anr., [1978] 1 SCR 641, a Bench of nine judges of this Court, considering the nationalisation of the contract carriages, had held th>.t the aim of socialism is the distribution of the material resources of the community in such a way as to subserve the commonhood. The principle embodied in Article 39(b) of the Constitution is one of the essential directives to bring about the distribution of the material resources. It would give full play to the distributive justice. It fulfils the basic purpose of re-structuring the economic order. Article 39(b), therefore, has a social mission,it embraces the entire material resources of the community. Its task is to distribute such resources. Its goal is to undertake distribution as best to subserve the common good. In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. & Anr., [1983] 1 SCR 1000, another Constitution Bench interpreted the word 11 socialism'1 and Article 39(b) of the Constitution and had held that the broad egalitarian principles of economic justice was implicit in every Directive Principle. The Jaw was designed to promote broader egalitarian social goals to do economic justice for all. The object of nationalisation of mining was to distribute nation's resources. In State of Tamil Nadu Etc. Etc. v. L. Abu Kavur Bai & Ors. Etc., [1984] 1 SCR 725, the same interpretation was given H

628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A by another Constitution Bench upholding nationalisation of State Carriages and Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act. Therefore, all State actions should be such to make socio-economic democracy with liberty, equality and fraternity, a reality to all the people through democratic socialism under the rule of law.

B In Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1995] 3 SCC 42, a Bench of three Judges (to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J., was a member) had to consider whether right to health of workers in the Asbestos industries is a fundamental right and whether the management was bound to provide the same? In that context, con- C sidering right to life under Article 21, its meaning, scope and content, this Court had held that the jurisprudence of personhood or philosophy of the right to life envisaged under Article 21 enlarges its sweep to encompass human personality in its full blossom with invigorated health which is a wealth to the workman to earn his livelihood, to sustain the dignity of D person and to live a life with dignity and equality. The expression "life" assured in Article 21, does not connote mere animal existence or con- tinued drudgery through life. It has a much wider meaning which includes right to livelihood, better standard of living, hygienic conditions in the workplace and leisure. E Right to health and medical care to protect health and vigour, while in service or after retirement, was held a fundamental right to a worker under Article 21, read with Articles 39(e), 41, 43, 48-A and all related constitutional provisions and fundamental human rights to make the life of the workman meaningful and purposeful with dignity of person. The right to health of a worker is an integral facet of meaningful right to life, to have not only a meaningful existence but also robust health and vigour without which the worker would lead a life of misery. Lack of health denudes him of his livelihood. Compelling economic necessity to work in an industry exposed to health hazards, due to indigence for bread-winning for himself and his dependents, should not be at the cost of the health and vigour of the workman.

The Preamble and Article 38 of the Constitution envision social justice as the arch to ensure life to be meaningful and livable with human dignity. Jurisprudence is the eye of law giving an insight into the environ-

AIR INDIASTATIITORYCORPN.» UNION !ABDUR UNION (K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 629 ment of which it is the expression. It relates the Jaw to the spirit of the time and makes it richer. Law is the ultimate aim of every civilised society, as a key system in a given era, to meet the needs and demands of its time. Justice, according to law, comprehends social urge and commitment. The Constitution commands justice, liberty, equality and fraternity as supreme values to usher in the egalitarian social, economic and political democracy. B Social justice, equality and dignity of person are cornerstones of social democracy. The concept of "social justice" which the Constitution of India engrafted, consists of diverse principles essential for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. "Social justice" is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species, Social justice is a dynamic device to c mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, dalits, tribals and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. Social justice is not a simple or single idea of a society but is an essential part of complex social change to relieve the poor etc. from handicaps, penury, to ward off distress and to make their life livable, for greater good of the society at large. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree to social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectation and constitutional goal. Social security, just and humane conditions of work and leisure to workman are part of his meaningful right to life and to achieve self-expression of his personality and to enjoy the life with dignity. The State should provide facility and opportunities to enable them to reach at least minimum stand- ard of health, economic security and civilised living while sharing according to their capacity, social and cultural heritage.

In a delivered development society like ours, steeped with unbridge- F able and ever-widening gaps of inequality in status and of opportunity, law is a catalyst, rubicon to the poor etc. to reach the ladder of social justice. What is due cannot be ascertained by an absolute standard which keeps changing, depending upon the time, place and circumstance. The constitu- tional concern of social justice as an elastic continuous process is to accord G justice to all sections of the society by providing facilities and opportunities to remove handicaps and disabilities with which the poor, the workmen etc. are languishing and to secure dignity of their person. The Constitution, therefore, mandates the State to accord justice to all members of the society in all facets of human activity. The concept of social justice embeds equality to flavour and enliven the practical content of life. Social justice H

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 9 S:C.R. A and equality are complementary to each other so that both should maintain their vitality." Rule of law, therefore, Is a potent instrument of social justice to bring about equality in results. It was accordingly held that right to social justice and right to health are Fundamental Rights. The management was directed to provide health insurance during service and at least 15 years after retirement and periodical tests for protecting the health of the workmen.

In UC of India & Anr. v. Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 482, considering the Life Insurance Corporation's right to fix the rates of premium, this Court had held that the authorities or private persons or industry are bound by the Directives contained in Part IV and the Fundamental Rights in Part III and the Preamble of the Constitution. The right to carry on trade is subject to the Directives contained in the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European Convention of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights and foe D Convention on Right to Development for Socio Economic Justice. Social security is a facet of socio-economic justice to the people and a means to livelihood. In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde & Anr., (1995] supp 2 SCC 549 (to which two of us, K. Ramaswamy, and B.L. Hansaria JJ., were members), the question arose : whether the alienation of the lands assigned to Scheduled Tribes was valid in law? In that context considering the Preamble, the Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights including the right to life, this Court had held that economic empowerment and social justice are Fundamental Rights to the tribes. The basic aim to the welfare State is the attainment of substantial degree of social, economic and political equalities and to achieve self-expression in his work as a citizen, leisure and social justice. The distinguishing characteristic of the welfare State is the assumption by community acting through the State and as its responsibilities to provide the means, whereby all its members can reach minimum stand- ard of economic security, civilised living, capacity to secure social status and culture to keep good health. The welfare State, therefore, should take positive measure to assist the community at large to act in collective responsibility towards its member and should take positive measure to assist them to achiev~ the above. It was, therefore, held thus :

H "Article 21 of the Constitution assures right to life. To make right

AIR INDIASTATL'TORYCORPN.>. UNION JABOUR UNION [KRAMASWAMY.l.[ 631

to life meaningful and effectiv"1 this Court put up expansive inter- A pretation and brought within itsambit right to education, health, \ speedy trial, equal wages for equal work as fundamental rights. Articles 14, 15. and 16 prohibit discrimination and accord equality. The Preamble to the Constitution as a socialist republic visualises to remove economic inequalities and to provide facilities and opportunities for decent standard of living and to protect the economic interest of the weaker segments of the society, in par- ticular, Scheduled Castes i.e. Dalits and the Scheduled Tribes i.e. Tribes and to protect them from "all forms of exploitations". Many a day have come and gone after 26.1.1950 but no leaf is turned in the lives of the poor and the gap between the rich and the poor is gradually widening on the brillk of being unbridgeable.

Providing adequate means of livelihood for all the citizens and distribution nf the material resources of the community for com- mon welfare, enable the poor, the Dalits and the Tribes, to fulfil the basic needs to bring about a fundamental change in the structure of the. Indian society which was divided by erecting impregnable walls of separation between the people on grounds of caste, sub-caste, creed, religion, race, language and sex. Equality of opportunity and status thereby would become the bedrocks for social integration. Economic empowerment thereby is the founda- tion to make equality of status, dignity of person and equal oppor- tunity a truism. The core of the commitment of the Constitution to the social revolution through rule of law lies in.effectuation of the fundamental rights and directive principles as supplementary and complementary to each other. The Preamble, Fundamental F Rights and Directive Principles - the trinity - are the conscience of the Constitution. Political democracy has to be stable. Socio- \ economic democracy must take strong roots and should become a way of life. The State, therefore, is enjoined to provide adequate means of livelihood to the pocrr, weaker sections of the society, the G Dalits and the Tribes and to distribute material resources of the community to them for common welfare etc. 11

It was accordingly held that right to economic empowerment is a fundamental right. The alienation of assigned land without permission of H

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A competent authority was held void. In R. Chandevarappa and Ors. v. State of Kamataka and Ors., (1995] 6 SCC 309 (to which two of us, K. Ramaswamy and B.L. Hansaria, .JJ., were members) this Court was to consider whether the alienation of Government lands allotted to the Scheduled Castes was in violation of the B Constitutional objectives under Articles 39(b) and 46. It was held that economic empowerment to the Dalits, the Tribes and the poor as a part of distributive justice is a Fundamental Right; assignment of the land to them under Article 39(b) was to provide socio-economic justice to the Scheduled Castes. The alienation of the land, therefore, was held to be in violation of the Constitutional objectives. It was held thus :

"In fact, the cumulative effect of social and economic legislation is to specify the basic structure. Moreover, the social system shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens come to have. It deter- mines in part the sort of persons they want to be as well as the sort of persons they are. Thus an economic system is not only an institutional device for satisfying existing wants and needs but a way of creating and fashioning wants in the future. The economic empowerment, therefore, to the poor, the dalits and the tribes as an integral constitutional scheme of socio-economic democracy is a way of life of political democracy. Economic empowerment is, therefore, basic human right and a fundamental right as part of right to live, equality and of status and dignity to the poor, the weaker sections, the dalits and the tribes.

The prohibition from alienation is to effectuate the constitu- F tional policy of economic empowerment under Articles 14, 21, 38, 29 and 46 read with the Preamble of the Constitution. Accordingly refusal to permit alienation is to effectuate the constitutional policy. The alienation was declared to be void under Sections 23 of the Contract Act being violative of the constitutional scheme of economic empowerment to. accord equality of status, dignity of G 11 persons and economic empowerment.

It was further held that providing adequate means of livelihood for all the citizens and the distribution of the material resources of the com- munity for common welfare, enable the poor, the dalits and the tribes, to fulfil the basic needs to bring about the fundamental change in the struc-

AIR INDIA SfATUTOR YCORPN. '· UNION LABOUR UNION [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 633

ture of the, Indian society. Equality of opportunity and status would thereby become the 'oedr9cks for social integration. Economic empowerment is, therefore, a basic human right and Fundamental Right as a part of right to life to make political democracy stable. Socio-economic democracy must take strong route and beco~e a·way of \ife. The state, therefore, is enj()ined to provide adequate means to livelihood to the poor, the weaker sections of the society, the dalits and the tribes a~cl distribute material resources of the community to then1 for common welfare. Justice is an attribute of human conduct and rule of law is indispensable foundation to establish socio- economic justice. The doctrine of political economy must include .interpretation for the public good which is based on justice that would guide the people when questions of economic and social policy are under consideration. In Peerless Ge11eral Fina11ce a11d Investme11t Co. Ltd. & A11r. v. Reserve Ba11k of India, [1992] 2 SCC 343 at 389 para 55, this Court had held that stability of the political democracy hinges upon socio-economic democracy. Right to development is one of the important facets of basic human rights. Right to self-interest is inherent in right to life. Mahatma D Gandhiji, the Father of Nation said that "every human being has a right to live and, therefore, to find the wherewithal to feed himself and where necessary to cloth and house himself'. In D.K. Yadav v. !.MA. I11dustries Ltd, [1993] 3 sec 259, the question was whether the workman for absence in service for 7 days can be removed without an enquiry. In that context a bench of three judges had held thus : E

"Article 21 clubs life with liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the glorious contents of dignity of person would he reduced to animal eXistence. When right to life inter- preted in the light of the colour and content of procedure estah- F lished by law must be in conformity with the minimum fairness and processual justice, it would relieve legislative callousness despiring opportunity of being heard and fair opportunities of defence. Article 14 has a pervasive processual potency and versatile quality, equalitarian in its soul and allergic to discriminatory dictates. Equality is the antithesis of arbitrariness". G

In Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & 01'. Etc., JT (1996) 4 SC 555, a Bench of three Judges (to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy, .I., was a member) was to consider the constitutionality of Jute Packing Material Act, 1987. The law was made to protect the agricul- H

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.CR

A . turists cultivating jute and jute products. In that context it was held thus :

"the agriculturists have fundamental rights to social justice and economic empowerment. The Preamble of the Constitution is the epitome of the basic structure built in the Constitution guarantee- ing justice - social, economic and political - equality of status and B of opportunity with dignity of person and fraternity. To establish an egalitarian social order, the trinity, the Preamble, the Fun- damental Rights in Part III and Directive Principles of State Policy (for short, 'Directives') in Chapter IV of the Constitution delineated the socio-economic justice. The. word justice envision c in the Preamble is used in broad spectrum to harmonise individual- right with the general welfare of the society. The Constitution is the supreme law. The purpose of law is realisation of justice w~ose content and scope vary depending upon the prevailing social en- vironment. Every social and economic chahge causes change in the law. In a democracy governed by rule of law, it is not possible to change the legal basis of socio-economic life of the community without bringing about corresponding change in lhe law. In inter- pretation of the Constitution and the law, endeavour needs to be made to harmonise the individual interest with the paramount interests of the community keeping pace with the realities of ever changing social and economic life of the community envisaged in the Constitution. Justice in the Preamble implies equality consis- tent with the competing demands between distributive justice with those of cumulative justice. Justice aims to promote the general well-being of the community as well as individual's excellence. The principal end of society is to protect the enjoyment of the rights of the individuals subject to social order, well-being and morality. Establishment of priorities of liberties is a political judgment.

Law is the foundation on which the potential of the society stands. Law is an instrument for social change as also defender for social change.

Social justice is the comprehensive form to remove social imbalances by law harmonising the rival claims or the interests of different groups and/or sections in the social structure or in- H dividuals by means of which alone it would be possible to build up

AIRIND!ASfATlJIDRYCORPN.'- UNIONIABOURUNION[KRAMASWAMY,J.} 635

a welfare State. The idea of economic justice is to make equality of status meaningful and the life worth living at its best removing inequality of opportunity and of status - social, economic and political.

Law is the ultimate aim of every civilised society, as a key system in a given era, to meet the needs and demands of its time. Justice, according to law, comprehends social urge and commitment. Jus- tice, liberty, equality and fraternity are supreme consfitutional values to establish the egalitarian social, economic and political democracy. Social justice, equality and dignity of person are cornerstones of social democracy..Social justice consists of diverse principles essential for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. Justice is the generic sense and social justice is its facet, a dynamic devite to mitigate the sufferings of the disadvantaged and to eliminate handicaps so as to elevate them to the level of equality to live life with dignity of person. Social D justice is not a simple or single idea of a society but it an essential part of complex social change to relieve the poor etc. from hand- icaps, penury, to ward them off from distress and to make .their lives livable for greater good of the society at large. Social justice, · therefore, gives substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the C:onstitutional right of every citizen. In para 19, it was further elaborated that social justice is one of the disciplines of justice which relates to the society. What is due cannot be ascertained by absolute standard which keeps changing ·depending upon the. time, place and circumstances. The constitu- tional concern of social _jllstice, as· an 'elastic continuous process, is to transform and accord justice to sections of the society by providing facilities and opportunities to remove .handicaps and disabilities with the poor etc. are languishing. It aims to secure dignity of their persons. It is the duty of the State to accord justice to all members of the society in all facets of human activity. The G concept of social justice embeds equality to flavour and enlivens practical content of life. Social justice and equality are complemen- tary to each other so that both should maintain their vitality. Rule of law, therefore, is a potent instrument of social justice to bring about equality in result. H

636 SUPREMF COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A Social and economic justice in the context of our Indian Con- stitution must, therefore, be understood in a comprehensive sense to remove every inequality and to provide equal opportunity to all citizens in social as well as economic activities and in every part of life. Economic justice means the abolition of those economic conditions which ultimately result in the inequality of economic B values between men. It means to establish a democratic way of life built upon socio-economic structure of the society to make the rule of law dynamic.

The Fundamental Rights and the Directive are, therefore, har- c moniously be interpreted to make the law social engineer to provide flesh blood to the dry bones of law. The Directive would serve the Court as a beacon light to interpretation. Fundamental Rights are rightful means to the end, viz., social and etonomic justice provided in the Directives and Preamble. The Fundamental Rights and the Directives establish the trinity of equality, liberty and fraternity in an egalitarian social order and prevent exploitation.

Social Justice, therefore, forms the basis of progressive stability in the society and human progress. Economic justice means abolishing such economic conditions whicil remove the inequality of economic value between man and man, concentration of wealth and means of production in the hands of a few and are detrimental to the vast Law, therefore, must seek to serve as a flexible instru- ment of socio-economic adjustment to bring about peaceful socio- economic revolution under rule of law. The Constitution, the fundamental supreme lex distributes the sovereign power between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. The Court, there- fore, must strive to give harmonious interpretation to propel for- ward march and progress towards establishing an egalitarian social 11 order.

The validity of the Act was accordingly upheld. G It is already seen that in D.T.C's case (supra), this Court had held that right to life to a workman would include right to continue in per- manent employment which is not a bounty of tb:e employer nor can its survival be at the volition and mercy of the employer. Income is the H foundation to enjoy many Fundamental Rights and when work is the source

AIRINDIASfATlITORYCORPN.>. UNION !ABOUR UNION (KRAMASWAMY,J.( 637

of income, the right to work would become as such a fundamental right. A Fundamental Rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of un- defined premises and uncertain application. In Bandhu Mukti Morcha v. U11io11 of India, [1984] 3 SCC 161, this Court had held that right to life with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and that opportunities and facilities B should be provided to the people. In Olga Tellis's case, this Court had held that the right to livelihood is an important facet of the right to life. Deprivation of the means of livelihood would denude the life itself. In C.E.S.C. Ltd. & Ors. v. S.C. Bose & 01'., [1992] 1SCC441, it was held that the right to social and economic justice is a fundamental right. Right to health of a worker is a fundamental right. The right to live with human c dignity at least with minimum sustenance and shelter and all those rights and aspects of life which go to make a man's life complete and worth living, would form part of the right to life. Enjoyment of life and its attainment - social, cultural and intellectual - without life cannot be meaningful, would embrace the protection and preservation of life guaranteed by Article 21. D In Life /11surance Corporation case, a Bench of two Judges had held that right to economic equality is a fundamental right. In Dalmia Cement Bharat Ltd. case, right to economic justice was held to be a fundamental right. Right to Shelter was held to be a• fundamental right in Olga Tellis's case; P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1995] Supp. 2 SCC 182; Mis. Shantisar Builders v. Narayan Khim/a/ Totame & Ors., [1990] 1 SCC 520; E Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., [1996] 2 SCC 549 etc.

It would, thus, be seen that all essential facilities and opportunities to the poor people are fundamental means to development, to live with minimum comforts, food, shelter, clothing and health. Due to economic constraints, though right to work was not declared as a fundamental right, right to work of workman, lower class, middle class and poor people is means to development and source to earn livelihood. Though, right to employment cannot, as a right, be claimed but after the appointment to a post or an office, be it under the State, its agency instrumentality, juristic person or private enterpreneur it is required to be dealt with as per public element and to act in public interest assuring equality, which is a genus of Article 14 and all other concomitant rights emanating therefrom are species to make their right to life and dignity of person real and meaning- ful. The democracy offers to everyone as a doer, an exerter and developer and enjoyer of his human capacities, rather than merely as a consumer of H

638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A utilities, as stated by Justice K.K. Mathew, in his "The Right to Equality and Property under the Indian Constitution" at page 47-48. These exer- cises of human capacity require assess to the material resources and also continuous and sufficient intake of material means to maintain human energy. Lack of access to the material resources is an impedi- ment to the development of human personality. This impediment, as a B lack of access to means of labour, if we take labour in its broadest sense of human resource, requires removal only under the rule of law. To the workmen, right to employment is the property, source of livelihood and dignity of person and a means to enjoy life, health and leisure. Equality, as a principle of justice, governs the distribution of material resources including right to employment. Private property ownership has always required special justifications and qualifications to reconcile the institu- tion with the public interest. It requires to thrive and, at the same time, be responsive to social weal and welfare. St. Thomas Acquinas, in his "Selected Political Writings" (1948 Edn.) at page 169, has stated that the private rights and public needs are to be balanced to meet the public interest "the common possession of things is to be attributed to natural law, not in the sense that natural law decrees that all things are to be held in common and that there is to be no private possession, but in the sense that there is no distinction of property on the grounds of natural law, but only by human agreement, and this pertains to positive law, as we have already shown. Thus, private property is not opposed to natural law, but is an addition to it, devised by human reason. If, however, there is such urgent and evident necessity that there is clearly an immediate need of necessary sustenance, if, for example, a person is in immediate danger of physical privation, and there is no other way of satisfying his need, then he may take what is necessary from another person's goods, either openly or by stealth. Nor is this strictly speaking fraud or rob- bery." Property is a social institution based upon an economic need in a society organised through division of labour, as propounded by Dean Rosco Pound in his "An Introduction to Philosophy of law" (1954 Edn.) G page 125, at 129. M.R. Cohen in his "Property and Sovereignty" (13 Cornell} Law Quarterly page 8 at 12 had stated that "the principle of freedom of personality certainly cannot justify a legal order wherein a few can, by virtue of their legal monopoly over necessities, compel others io work under degrading and brutalizing condition." If there is H no property or if one does not derive fruits and means of one's labour,

AIR INilIA STATIITOR Y CORPN. '· UNION !ABDUR UNION [KRAMASWAMY. I] 639

no one would have any incentive to labour· in the broader sense. Social A progress receives set back without equality of status, fraternity would not be maximised. Edward Kent in his "Property, Power and Authority", Prof. Herald Laski in his "Congress Socialist" dated April 11, 1936, had stated that "those who know the normal life of the poor will realise enough that without economic security, liberty is not worth living". Brooklyn Law B Review page 541 at 5~7 has stated that "In modern translation, public officers and others who promulgate policies to increase unemployment or to deny or dilninish benefits to the poor are accountable for the conse- quences to free human personality." It would, thus, be clear that in a socialist democracy governed by the rule of law, private property, right of · the citizen for development and his right to employment and his entitle- c ment for employment to the labour, would all harmoncously be blended to serve larger social interest and public purpose.

Mahatma Gandhiji, the Father of the Nation, in his book "Socialism of My Concept", has said thus : D "To a people famishing and idle, the only acceptable form in which God can dare appear is work and promise of food as, wages. God created man to work for his food, and said that those who ate without work were thieves. Eighty per cent of India are compulsory thieves half the year. Is it any wonder if India ha' become one vast 11 E prison?

Again, he stressed :

No one has ever suggested that grinding pauperism can lead to anything else than moral degradation. Every human being has a F right to live and, therefore, to find the wherewithal to feed himself and, where necessary, to clothe and house himself... In a well ordered society the securing of one's livelihood should be, and is found to be the easiest thing in the world. Indeed, the test to orderliness in a country is not the number of millionaires it owns, but the absence of starvation among its masses. G ••• • •• • •• Working for economic equality means abolishing the eternal con- flict between capital and labour. It means the levelling down of the few rich in whose hands is concentrated the bulk of the nation's H