STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. AND ORS. ETC. ETC. v. NATIONAL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS AND ORS, ETC. ETC.

A work of an establishment and employment of contract labour is prohibited either because the Industrial adjudicator/Court ordered abolition of contract labour or because the appropriate Government issued notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, no automatic absorption of the contract labour working in the establishment was ordered; (ii) where the contract was found to be sham and nominal rather a camouflage in which case the contract labour working in the establishment of the principal employer was held, in fact and in reality, the employees of the principal employer himself. Indeed, such cases do not relate to abolition of contract labour but present instances wherein the Court pierced the veil and declared the correct position as a fact at the stage after employment of contract labour stood prohibited; (iii) where in discharge of a statutory obligation of maintaining canteen in an establishment the principal employer availed the services of a contractor and the courts have held that the contract labour would indeed be the employees of the principal employer.

The next issue that remains to be dealt with is: D B. Whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal employer) and the contract labour emerges. E Mr. Shanti Bhushan alone has taken this extreme stand that by virtue of engagement of contract labour by the contractor in any work of or in connection with the work of an establishment, the relationship of master and servant is created between the principal employer and the contract labour. We are afraid, we are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel. F A careful survey of the cases relied upon by him shows that they do not support his proposition.

In The Maharashtra Sugar Mil/s's case (supra), the question that fell for consideration of this court was whether the contract labour was covered by the definition of ·employee' under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, G 1946 and, therefore, should be treated as employees of the appellant-sugar mills. There contractors were engaged by the appellant for carrying on certain operations in its establishment. The contractors were to employ contract labour (workers) for carrying out the work undertaken but they should have the approval of the appellant, although it was the obligation of the contractors to pay wages to the workers. However, the contract labour engaged by the

STEEL AUTHORITY OF !NOIA LTD. '· NATIONAL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS [QUADRI, J ] 407

contractors got the same amenities from the appellant as were available to its muster roll workers. An industrial dispute arose in respect of the payment of wages to the contract labour engaged by the contractors which, along with other disputes, was referred to the Industrial Court by the Government. The reference was contested, as being not maintainable, by the appellant on the plea that the contractors' workers were not 'employees' within the meaning . B of the said Act. The term 'employee' is defined in the said Act to mean 'any person employed to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward in any industry and includes a person employed by a contractor to do any work for him in execution of a contract with an employer within the meaning of sub-clause (3) of clause 14'. It was on the basis of the definitions of the tenns "the employer" and "the employee'', the contract labour engaged C by the contractors was held to be employees of the appellant. The decision in that case cannot be read as holding that when a contractor engages contract labour in connection with the work of the principal employer, the relationship of master and servant is created between the principal employer and the contract labour. D In Shivnandan Shanna's case (supra), the respondent-Bank entrusted its cash department under a contract to the treasurers who appointed cashiers, including the appellant - the head cashier. The question before the three- Judge Bench of this Court was: was the appellant an employee of the Bank? On the construction of the agreement entered into between the Bank and the E treasurers, it was held that the treasurers were under the employment of the Bank on a monthly basis for an indefinite term as they were under the complete control and direction of the Bank through its manager or other functionaries and, therefore, the appointees including the appellant (nominees) of the treasurers, were also the employees of the Bank. This Court laid down, F "if a master employs a servant and authorises him to employ a number of persons to do a particular job and to guarantee their fidelity and efficiency for a cash consideration, the employees thus appointed by the servant would be equally with the employer, servants of the master''. G We do not think that the principle, quoted above, supports the proposition canvassed by the learned counsel.

The decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Basti Sugar Mills' case (supra) was given in the context of reference of an industrial. 'H

408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A dispute under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appellant- Sugar Mills entrusted the work of removal of press mud to a contractor who engaged the respondents therein (contract labour) in connection with that work. The services of the respondents were terminated by the contractor and they claimed that they should be re-instated in the service of the appellant. B The Constitution Bench held,

"The words of the definition of workmen in Section 2(z) to mean "any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express c or implied" are by themselves sufficiently wide to bring in persons doing work in an industry whether the employment was by the management or by the contractor of the management. Unless however the definition of the word "employer" included the management of the industry even when the employment was by the contractor the workmen employed by the contractor could not get the benefit of the D Act since a dispute between them and the management would not be an industrial dispute between "employer" and workmen. It was with a view to remove this difficulty in the way of workmen employed by contractors that the definition of employer has been extended by sub- clause (iv) of Section 2(i). The position thus is: (a) that the respondents E are workmen within the meaning of Section 2(z), being persons employed in the industry to do manual work for reward, and (b) they were employed by a contractor with whom the appellant company had contracted in the course of conducting the industry for the execution by the said contractor of the work of removal of press-mud which is ordinarily a part of the industry. It follows therefore from F Section 2(z) read with sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(i) of the Act that they are workmen of the appellant company and the appellant company is their employer."

It is evident that the decision in that case also turned on the wide G language of statutory definitions of the terms "workmen·' and "employer'·. So it does not advance the case pleaded by the learned counsel.

In The Saraspur Mills' case (supra), the question was whether the respondents engaged for working in the canteen run by the co-operative society for the appellant-company were the employees of the appellant-Mills. H The respondents initiated proceedings under Section 79 of the Bombay

STEEL AUTHORITY OF !NOIA LTD. '· NATIONAL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS [QUADRI, J.j 409

Industrial Relations Act, 1946 for payment of D.A. in terms of the award of A the Industrial Court. The appellant contested the claim on the ground that the respondents were emp'loyees of the co-operative society and not of the appellant. A two-Judge Bench of this Court approached the question from the point of view of statutory liability of the appellant to run the canteen in the factory and having construed the language employed in the definitions of "employee" and "employer" in sub-sections (13) and (14), respectively, of B Section 3 of the Act, and the definition of "worker" contained in Section 2(i) of the Factories Act and having referred to the Basti Sugar Mills' case (supra), held that even though in pursuance of a statutory liability the appellant was to run the canteen in the factory, it was run by the co-operative society as such the workers in the canteen (the respondents) would be the employees of the appellant. This case falls in class (iii) mentioned above.

In a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hussainbhai's case (supra), the petitioner who was manufacturing ropes entrusted the work to the contractors who engaged their own workers. When, after some time, the workers were not engaged, they raised an industrial dispute· that they were denied employment. On reference of that dispute by the State Government, they succeeded in obtaining an award against the petitioner who unsuccessfully challenged the same in the High Court and then in the Supreme Court. On examining various factors and applying the effective control test, this court held that though there was no direct relationship between the petitioner and the respondent yet on lifting the veil and looking at the conspectus of factors governing employment, the naked truth, though draped in different perfect paper arrangement, was that the real employer was the management not the immediate contractor. Speaking for the Court, Justice Krishna Iyer observed thus :- F "Myriad devices, half-hidden in fold after fold of legal form depending on the degree of concealment needed, the type of industry, the local conditions and the like may be resorted to wheil labour legislation casts welfare obligations on the real employer, based on Articles 38, 39, 42, 43, and 43-A of the Constitution. The court must be astute to avoid the mischief and achieve the purpose of the law and not be G misled by the maya of legal appearances ............ .

Of course, if there is total dissociation in fact between the disowning Management and the aggrieved workmen, the employment is, in substance and in real-life terms, by another. The Management's adventitious connections cannot ripen into real employment." H

410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A This case falls in class (ii) mentioned above.

The above discussion amply justifies rejection of the contentions of Mr. Shanti Bhushan by us.

We find no substance in the next submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan B that a combined reading of the definition of the terms 'contract labour', 'establishment' and 'workman' would show that a legal relationship between a person employed in an industry and the owner of the industry is created irrespective of the fact as to who has brought about such relationship.

C We have quoted the definitions of these terms above and elucidated their import. The word 'workman' is defined in wide terms. It is a generic term of which contract labour is a species. It is true that a combined reading of the terms 'establishment' and 'workman' shows that a workman engaged in an establishment would have direct relationship with the principal employer as a servant of master. But what is true of a workman could not be correct of contract labour. The circumstances under which contract labour could be treated as direct workman of the principal employer have already been pointed out above.

We are not persuaded to accede to the contention that a workman, who is not an out-worker, must be treated as a regular employee of the principal employer. It has been noticed above that an out-worker falls within the exclusionary clause of the definition of 'workman'. The word 'out worker' connotes a person who carries out the type of work, mentioned in sub-clause (C) of clause (i) of Section 2, of the principal employer with the materials supplied to him by such employer either (i) at his home or (ii) in some other premises not under the control and management of the principal employer. A person who is not an out worker but satisfies the requirement of the first limb of the definition of 'workman' would, by the very definition, fall within the meaning of the term 'workman'. Even so, if such a w0rkman is within the ambit of the contract labour, unless he falls within the afore-mentioned classes, he cannot be treated as a regular employee of the principal employer.

We have also perused all the Rules and Forms prescribed thereunder. It is clear that at various stages there is involvement of the principal employer. On exhaustive consideration of the provisions of the CLRA Act we have held above that neither they contemplate creation of direct relationship of master and servant between the principal employer and the contract labour nor can

STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD.•. NATIONAL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS (QUADRI, l.J 4JJ

such relationship be implied from the provisions of the Act on issuing notification under Section 10( I) of the CLRA Act, a fortiorari much less can such a relationship be found to exist from the Rules and the Forms made thereunder.

The leftover contention of Ms. Indira Jaisingh may be dealt with here. The contention of Ms. Indira Jaisingh that the principles of contract law sticto senso do not apply to the labour and management is too broad to merit acceptance.

In Rai Bahadur's case (supra), the industrial dispute referred to the Industrial Tribunal was: whether all the employees of the appellant should be allowed 30 days' earned leave with full wages for every 11 months' service without discrimination. The appellant framed the rules on July I, 1956 providing that every workman employed on or before that date would be entitled to 30 days' earned leave with full wages for every 11 months' service. The contention of the employer was that those who were employed after that date were not entitled to the same period of leave. It was contended that the appellant was entitled to fix the terms of employment on which it would employ the workmen and it was open for the workman to accept or not to accept those terms so the Tribunal was not justified in interfering with such matter. A three-Judge Bench of this Court, by majority, held that the Tribunal was justified in directing the appellant to provide the same uniform rules as to earned leave for all its employees that the doctrine of absolute freedom of contract had to yield to the higher claims for social justice and had to be so regulated. After referring to Western India's case (supra) and The Bharat Bank's case (supra), Justice P.B. Gaiendragadkar speaking for the majority observed: F "in order that industrial adjudication should be free from the tyranny of dogmas or the sub-conscious pressure of pre-conceived notions, it is important that the temptation to lay down broad principles should be avoided. Accordingly, it is not necessary to decide the broad contention whether industrial adjudication can interfere with the contract between the employers and the employees." G It is apparent that the case was decided on the ground that there could be no discrimination of the employees in regard to their entitlement for earned leave on the basis of a fixed date and that no general principle was laid down that the contract laws are inapplicable to labour-management relation. H

412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A In the case of Uptron India (supra), the controversy related to the tennination of the services of the workmen for unauthorised absence. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 provided that a workman is liable to automatic termination on the ground of unauthorised absence. It is in that context that this Court has observed that the general principles of the Contract Act, 1872 applicable to an agreement between two persons B having capacity to contract, are also applicable to a contract of industrial employment but relationship so created is partly contractual and partly non- contractual as the States have already, by legislation, prescribed positive obligations for the employer towards his workmen, as for example, tenns, conditions and obligations prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act, 1936; C Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 etc. In our view, the iaw has been correctly laid down therein. The judgment in that case cannot be read as laying down a principle of law that the provisions of the Contract Act are not applicable to relation between the labour and the management. D The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:

(I) (a) Before January 28, 1986, the determimttion of the question whether Central Government or the State Government, is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in view of the definition of the expression "appropriate Government" as stood in the CLRA Act, on the answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry; or the establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government, G (b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act; if (i) the concerned Central Government company/undertaking or any - undertaking is included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the Central Government,

STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD.'· NATIONAL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS [QUADRI, !.] 413

or (b) by railway company; or (c) by specified controlled industry, then the Central Government will be the appropriate Government otherwise in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the appropriate Government.

(2) (a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the appropriate Government :

(I) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State C Advisory Board, as the case may be, and;

(2) having regard to

(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the establishment in question; and D

(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub- section (2) of Section 1O;

(b) inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central E Government on December 9, 1976 does not satisfy the afore-said requirements of Section I 0, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this jtidgment no order passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.

(3) Neither Section I 0 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by appropriate Government under sub-section (I) of Section I 0, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working in the concerned establishment; H

414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP.·2 S.C.R.

A (4) We over-rule the judgment of this court in Air India's case (supra) prospectively and declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including High Court, for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India's case (supra), shall hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.

(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance of various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of the contract labour in the concerned establishment subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder. E (6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section I0( I) of the CLRA Act in respect of the concerned establishment has been issued by the appropriate Government, prohibiting employment of contract l~bour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workmen he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical qualifications.

We have used the expression "industrial adjudicator" by design as determination of the questions afore-mentioned requires inquiry into disputed questions of facts which cannot conveniently be made by High Courts in

STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. o. NATIONAL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS [QUADRI, J.] 4 J5

exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, in such cases the appropriate authority to go into those issues will be industrial tribunal/court whose determination will be agienable to judicial review.

In the resu It :

CA.Nos.6009-601012001 @S.L.P. (C) Nos. 12657-58198 B The order of the High Court at Calcutta, under challenge, insofar as it relates to holding that the West Bengal Government is the appropriate Government within the meaning of the CLRA Act, is confirmed but the direction that the contract labour shall be absorbed and treated on par with C the regular employees of the appellants, is set aside. The appeals are accordingly allowed in part.

CA.No.601112001@ SLP(C)No.20926198

In the impugned order of the High Court of Judicature, Madhya Pradesh, D Bench at Jabalpur in C.P. 14.3 of 1998 dated October 14,1998, 'it was held that no contempt of the High Court was committed. In view of this finding, no interference of this Court is warranted. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

T.CNo. 112000 E W.A.No. 80/J 998 on the file of the High Court of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh was transferred to this Court and numbered as TC. 1/2000. The writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing W.P.No.29865/1998 on 13. 11.J 997. The petitioner questioned the competence of the State Government to make reference of the industrial dispute to the Labour Court at Visakhapatnam. It will be open to the Labour Court to F Q decide the question whether the reference was made by the appropriate Government on the basis of the main judgment. Transferred Case No. 112000 ( W.A.80/1998) is dismissed accordingly.

T.C Nos.5-712000 G Civil Writ Petition Nos.1329/97, 655/97 and 1453/97 on the file of the High Court of Delhi were transferred to this Court and numbered as TC. 51 2000, TC. 612000 and TC. 7/2000 respectively. The petitioners therein prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to absorb them as regular employees in the establishment in which they were working at the relevant H

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R

A time. Their claim is based on the impugned notification dated December 9, 1976 issued by the Central Government. In view of the finding recorded by us that the notification is illegal and it is not issued by the appropriate Government.under the CLRA Act in relation to the establishment in question, the petitioners in writ petitions cannot get any relief. However, we leave it B open to the appropriate Government to issue the notification under Section I 0(1) of the CLRA Act in respect of the concerned establishment of the petitioners. Subject to the above observation the transferred cases are dismissed.

T.C.Nos. 1712000 and 1812000

C L.P.A. Nos. 326/97 and 18/98 on the file of the High Court of Judicature, Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Jabalpur were transferred and numbered as TC.Nos. 17/2000 and 18/2000. The Letter Patent Appeals were directed against the order of a learned Single Judge allowing the writ petitions and directing absorption of the members of the respondent-union. The claim of the petitioners was based on a notification issued by the Central Government on 17.3.1993 D prohibiting; with effect from the date of publication of the notification the employment of contract labour in the limestone and dolomite mines in the country, in the works specified in the Schedule to the notification. The points that arise in these cases are: (i) the validity of the notification and (ii) the consequential orders that may be passed on issue of the abolition notification. E Having regard to the facts of these cases, we consider it appropriate to direct that the cases be transferred back to the High Court to be decided by the High Court in the light of the main judgment. Transferred cases are disposed of accordingly.

C.A.No.60121200/@SLP(C) No. 956812000 F This appeal arises from the order of the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur in LPA No.418/1999 dated l.5.2000. The High Court declined to pass any order and dismissed the LPA as this Court had stayed proceedings in the connected LPA Nos. 326/97 and 18/98 on August 17, 1998. Inasmuch we have now transferred back those LPAs, we consider it appropriate to G transfer this case also back to the High Court to be heard and decided along with the said cases. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

CA.Nos. 719-72012001

H These appeals arise from the judgment and order of a Division Bench

STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD '·NATIONAL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS [QUADRI, J.] 4 J7

of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in MAT Nos. 1704 and 1705 of A 1999 dated August 12, 1999. A learned Single Judge of the High Court directed, inter alia, absorption of contract labour on the ground that the type of work in which the contract labour was engaged was prohibited in view of the notification issued by the Central Government on February 9, 1980 under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act. The appellants filed the application against the notification on the ground that the respondents are not covered by the notification. Be that as it may, the Central Government issued a further notification on 14.10.1999 which appears to cover the respondents herein. The Division Bench maintained the directions under appeals with modification in regard to interim order. In view of the fact that we have over-ruled the judgment of this Court in Air India's case (supra) which covered the field when the order of the High Court was passed, we set aside the order of the High Court under challenge. Appeals are accordingly allowed.

T.C.No. 1412000

M.A.T. No.1592/1997 pending before the Division Bench of the High D Court of Calcutta which was filed against the order of a learned Single Judge dated 9.5.1997 in C.O. No.6545(w) of 1996, holding that having regard to the impugned notification of the Central Government dated December 9, 1976 issued under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour, the appellants are bound to absorb the contra1;t labour as E regular employees of the appellants. In view of the main judgment, the order of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside and the transferred case is allowed.

C.A.Nos. 5798-9911998 F In these appeals, the Food Corporation of India is the appellant. Having regard to the un-amended definition of the appropriate Government which was in force till 28.1.1986, the appropriate Government within the meaning of CLRA Act was the government of the State in which the concerned establishment of FCI was situated. With effect from 28.1.1986, the amended definition of that expression under the CLRA Act came into force. G Consequently, the definition of that expression as given in the Industrial Disputes Act would apply for purposes of the CLRA Act also. FCI is included within the definition of appropriate Government in sub-clause (I) of clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It follows that for any establishment of FCI for the purposes of the CLRA Act, the appropriate H

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Government will be the Central Government.

In these appeals, prohibition notification was issued on March 26, 1991 under Section I0(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in the concerned establishment in the process, operation or work of handling of foodgrains including loading and unloading from any means of B transport, storing and stocking. The respondents claimed absorptitm of contract labour in the concerned establishment of the appellant. A Division Bench of ,,. the High Court of Bombay following the judgment of this Court in Air India's case (supra) directed the appellant to absorb the contract labour engaged in the depots of the appellant in Jalgaon, Srirampur and Ahmednagar C (Khedgaon). Inasmuch we have over-ruled the judgment in Air India's case (supra), the appeals deserve to be allowed. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment of the High Court under challenge and allow these appeals leaving it open to the contract labour to seek appropriate relief in terms of the main judgment. - D C.A.Nos.6013-221200/@SLP(C) Nos. 16122-16131198

These appeals by FCI from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in W.A. Nos. 345-354/97 dated April 17, 1998 confirming the judgment of a learned Single Judge passed in W.P. N0.22485/ E 94 and batch dated 22.11.1996. The learned Single Judge directed absorption of the contract labour with effect from 29.1.1996. Inasmuch as the impugned judgment, under challenge, was passed following the judgment in Air India's case (supra) which has since been over-ruled, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and allow these appeals accordingly, leaving it open to the contract labour to seek appropriate relief in tenns of the main judgment. F CA.Nos. 4188-94198 and 4195198

These appeals arise from a common judgment of the High Court of Karnataka in W.A.Nos. 228-229, 231, 233-236/97 and 1742/97 dated 17.4.98 are filed by union of workmen and workmen of FCI. The Division Bench G confirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge directing absorption of contract labour in the concerned establishment of the appellants w.e.f. 29.1.96. The grievance of the appellants is that they should have been absorbed with effect from the date of the prohibition notification dated November I, 1990. Inasmuch as in the connected civil appeals we have set aside the judgment of Division Bench passed following the judgment of this Court in Air India's

STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. "·NA TI ON AL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS [QUADRI, l.] 4 J9

case (supra) which has since been over-ruled, the appellants are not entitled to any relief in these appeals. Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed.

T.P(C) Nos. 284-30212000 and 308-33712000

In these transfer petitions, the petitioners prayed for transfer of various writ petitions/writ appeals pending in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh B mentioned in para (a) of prayer on the ground that the question involved in those cases is pending consideration of this Constitution Bench in SLP (C) Nos. 12657-58/98. Notice has been ordered in these cases but the cases are not transferred. Inasmuch as we have already pronounced the judgment in the above-mentioned cases, we are not inclined to allow these transfer petitions. C The High Court will now proceed to decide those cases in accordance with the main judgment. Transfer petitions are dismissed accordingly.

CA.No. 602912001@SLP(C)No. I 634612000

The order under challenge in this appeal is the judgment of a Division D Bench of the High Court of Bombay in W.P.No. 4050199 dated 2.8.2000. On the ground that the members of respondent union (employees of ONGC) are covered by the notification issued by the Central Government on December 9, 1976, the High Court ordered absorption of the workers employed as contract labour. Inasmuch as the Central Government became the appropriate E Government, for an establishment of ONGC after the amended definition of the appropriate Government came into force under the CLRA Act w.e.f. 28.1.1986 whereunder the definition of the said expression under the Industrial Disputes Act is adopted in the CLRA Act, therefore, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government for ONGC w.e.f. 28.1.1986. It follows that the notification issued on December 9, 1976 would not cover the establishments of the appellant. However, as the High Court directed absorption of the contract labour in the establishments of the appellant following the judgment of this Court in Air India's case (supra) and that judgment has since been over-ruled, both on the question of appropriate Government as well as on the point of automatic absorption, we set aside the order under challenge and accordingly allow this appeal.

C.A.Nos.6030-34/200 l@SLP(C)Nos.13146-150/2000

These appeals are directed against the order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A. Nos. 1652-1655/99 and 1959/99 dated 22.11.99. The Division H

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Bench of the High Court took note of the fact that the order of the learned Single Judge had been given effect to and on the facts declined to condone the delay of 353 days in filing the writ appeals. In our view, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, no interference with the impugned order, is warranted. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.

B CA.Nos. 6024-251200 l@SLP(C)Nos. 8282-8312000

These appeals are from the order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in LP.A.No. I I 8/2000 dated I 9.4.2000 which was directed against the interim order passed by a learned Single Judge. Inasmuch as the C writ petitions are pending before the High Court, we are not inclined to interfere with the orders impugned in the appeals. We leave it open to the High Court to dispose of the writ petitions in terms of the main judgment. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.

TP. (C)No. 16912000 D In this transfer petition, the petitioner seeks transfer of S.C.A.No.5 I92/ 99 pending in the High Court of Gujarat. Notice has been issued but the case is not transferred. In view of the fact that we have pronounced the judgment in the connected cases, we are not inclined to order transfer of the case from the High Court. We leave it open to the High Court to dispose of the said E appeal in accordance with the main judgment of this Court. Transfer petition is dismissed accordingly.

CA.No. 60231200/@SLP(C)No.1939 l/99

F This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated I 9.8.1999 of the High Court of Patn'I, Ranchi Bench, Ranchi, in LP.A.No. 214/99 (R). The Division Bench declined to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.

The case arose out of the award dated October 3, 1996 passed by the G Central Government Indust~ial Tribunal No.1 directing the appellant to absorb the contract labour. The Tribunal, on appreciation of the evidence, found that the contract labourers were not regularised to deprive them from the due wages and other benefits on par with the regular employees under sham paper work by virtue of the sham transaction. It was also pointed out that the H workmen in other coal washery were regularised. The claim of the appellant

STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. "· NATIONAL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS [QUADRI, J.] 421

that the washery was given to the purchaser was not accepted as being a A sham transaction to camouflage the real facts. The learned Single Judge on consideration of the entire material confirmed the award and the Division Bench declined to interfere in the LPA. We find no reason to interfere with the order under challenge. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.

C.A.No. 141/2001 B

This appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay passed in W.P.No. 2616/99 dated 23.12.99. The employment of contract labour in the concerned establishment of the appellant was prohibited by the notification issued by the Central Government under Section I 0( I) of the CLRA Act on 16.11.99. Following the judgment of this Court in Air India's case (supra), the High Court directed the appellant to absorb the contract labour. Inasmuch as we have over-ruled the judgment of this Court in Air India's case (supra), the direction given by the High Court cannot be sustained. We, however, leave it open to the respondent-union to seek appropriate relief in terms of the main judgment. The order, under challenge, is set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

In all these cases except in C.A.6023/200 l@SLP(C)No. 19391/99, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.

T.N.A . Appeals and T.C. dismissed/disposed of/allowed. E