UNION OF INDIA v. PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS. AND ORS.

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Although the question is to be considered by the High Court afresh, we .. may point that in the event it is found that the unamended provision of Section 25 of the Act is held to be applicable, the High Court could not have awarded compensation <it the rate of Rs. 98 per sq. yard whereas the claim was made only for Rs. 25 or Rs. 50 per sq. yard by the claimants.

B At this juncture, it would also be relevant to note that before the Reference Court the Respondents made their claim only on the basis of certain awards/judgments made by the Reference Court/High Court. Before the Reference Court in relation to the notification dated 24.10.1961 it was contended that the compensation at the rate of Rs. 12,000 per bigha should C have been awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. It is true that a faint argument was advanced before the Reference Court that the lands under acquisition were superior to those situated in Munirka and Ber Sarai. Even for the purpose of determination as regard superior quality of land under acquisition vis-a-vis the lands situated in the villages which were the subject matter of the other acquisition cases, it was obligatory on the part of the High D Court to consider the contra plea raised by the Appellants herein. Furthermore, it was also obligatory on the part of the High Court to consider the question that a pati of the lands consisted of hills and furthermore pits have been dug up while extracting minerals; the same may not be equated with the land, which had potential for building purposes. The High Court in its impugned judgment has not adverted to this aspect of the matter at all.

It is relevant to notice the following observati9ns of the Reference Court:

"But even if we take that the land in dispute is superior to the land acquired in village Ber Sarai because of the factors pointed out above by the Id. Counsel for the claimants, the claimants cannot be given compensation at a rate higher than Rs. 12,000 per bigha because the claimants have not been able to produce any evidence on record with regard to higher compensation having been given in respect of any other superior land in village Munirka or Ber Sarai nor is there any measure to increase the compensation over and above Rs. 12,000 per bigha because of the superiority of this land over the land in village Munirka and Ber Sarai."

Nothing has been shown before the High Court that the said findings of the Reference Court were unfounded. The High Court in its judgment has proceeded computing the amount of compensation on the basis of the circle

U.0.1. v. PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 103 rates without considering this aspect of the matter. A AMENDMENT OF REFERENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE :

It has not been disputed before us that the claimant Smt. Pramod Gupta purchased I/4th share of the land in question by a deed dated 14.4.1960. The Appellants filed an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil B Procedure for bringing xerox copy of the said sale deed on records but the same was rejected inter a/ia on the ground that prior thereto no effort was made to rely upon the said sale deed.

It is now well-settled that if an owner himself has purchased the land, the same would be the best evidence for· determining the amount of C compensation. [See Shakuntalabai, (supra)]

The High Court furthermore committed a serious error in coming to the conclusion that the said deed was executed prior to the date of acquisition inasmuch as the notification under Section 4 was issued on 24.10.1961. D It further appears that Shri Rajiv Gupta purchased I/8th share of the amount of compensation payable to his predecessors-in-interest for a sum of Rs. 30,000 by a deed of sale dated 23.1.1980, a copy whereof has been annexed with I.A. 8 of 2005.

We have noticed hereinbefore that before the Land Acquisition Collector E the Respondents had claimed only a sum of Rs. 12,000 per bigha. Despite the same the Respondents filed an application purported to be under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for amendment of Memo of Appeal and the Reference claiming higher compensation. The Respondents appear to have further filed applications under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code F for adduction of additional evidence in support of their amended claim. The High Court while rejecting the claim application filed by the Appellants allowed the application for amendment as also the application for adduction of additional evidence filed by the Respondents.

Mr. Salve submitted that the bar under Section 25 of the Act must be G considered having regard to Section 53 thereof which provides for applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel urged that the Respondents had already filed an application for amendment of Memo of Appeal in terms of Order 41, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which having been allowed, would amount to amendment of the claim application H

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A in the reference case itself. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Harcharan v. State of Haryana, [1982] 3 SCC 408 and Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Anoop Singh and Anr., [2003] 2 SCC 484.

We do not agree. The pleadings before the Trial Court are the basis for adduction of evidence either before the Trial Court or before the Appellate B Court. By amending the memo of appeal the original pleadings cannot be amended. The claimants - Respondents made their claim before the Reference Court claiming compensation for the lands acquired under two different references at a certain rate. They are bound by the said pleadings. Section 53 merely provides for applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil C Procedure including the one containing Order 6, Rule 17 thereof. Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. Before an amendment can be carried out in terms of Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure the court is required to apply its mind on several factors including, viz., whether by reason of such amendment the claimant intends to resile from an express admission made by D him. In such an event the application for amendment may not be allowed. [See. Mis. Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Mis. Lad.ha Ram & Co. AIR (1977) SC 680, Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal and Ors., [1998] I SCC 278] and Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad and Ors. v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (Dead) thr. LRs. and Ors., JT (2005) l SC 581].

E Delay and !aches on the part of the parties to the proceedings would also be a relevant factor for allowing or disallowing an application for amendment of the pleadings. The High Court neither assigned sufficient or cogent reasons nor applied its mind as regard the relevant factors while allowing the said application for amendment. It has also not been taken into p consideration that the application for amendment of pleading might not have been maintainable in view of statutory interdict contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act, if the same was applicable.

In Anoop Singh, (supra), whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr. Salve, the Division Bench of this Court did not have any occasion to consider that decisions of this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal and Ors., [2000] 7 SCC 756 and B. V. Reddy, (supra), which, it will bear repetition to state, are authorities for the proposition that once it is held that Section 25(2) of the Act would be attracted in a given case, the parties are estopped and precluded from claiming any amount higher than that claimed in their claim petition before the Collector. An observation made to the effect

U.0.1. v. PRAM OD GUPTA (D) BY LRS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] I05 that an application under Order 6, Rule 17 would be maintainable having regard to Section 53 of the Act, with utmost respect, does not constitute a binding precedent. No ratio has been laid down therein and the observations made therein are without any discussion. Furthermore no reason has been assigned in support of the said proposition of law.

In Harcharan (supra) also this Court did not address the question as to whether Order 6, Rule 17 would be applicable in relation to the original claim petition or memo of appeal.

It may be true that not only the memorandum of appeal but also the reference was amended. Mr. Rao pointed out that the necessary amendments have been carried out in the application for reference or memorandum of appeal. In terms of Order VI Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such amendments are required to be carried out in the pleadings by a party who has obtained leave to amend his pleadings within the time granted therefor and if no time was specified then within fourteen days from the date of passing of the order. The consequence of failure to amend the pleadings D { within the period specified therein as laid down in Order VI Rule 18 of the Code is that the party shall not be permitted to amend his pleadings thereafter unless the time is extended by the court. It is not in dispute that such an order extending the time specified in Order VI Rule 18 has not been passed.

Mr. Rao, however, would contend that in any event, three Respondents E claimed compensation @Rs. 50 per sq. yd and one@ Rs. 25 per sq. yd. and in that view of the matter having regard to the cross-objections filed by them, the High Court could have exercised its jurisdiction while allowing the cross- objections to enhance the amount of compensation to the extent of Rs.50 per sq. yd. The said argument was advanced on the premise that the Respondents F had, as noticed hereinbefore, raised a specific contention before the Reference Court that the land situated in Village Masoodpur was better than the land situated at Munirka or Ber Sarai. We are not persuaded. The finding of fact arrived at by the Reference Court to the effect that the Appellants had not been able to show that the land situated at the aforementioned village are not only inferior to the land situated at village Masoodpur and which finding G having not been reversed by the High Court, any consideration other than those which found favour with the Reference Court could not have been entertained. The High Court in its judgment has referred to various decisions showing that the rates specified in the notification issued by the Union of India would be admissible in evidence. There is nothing to show that the said H

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A judgments were brought on record in accordance with law. There is al.so nothing to show that any application under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC was filed and allowed by the High Court permitting the Respondents to bring the said judgment on records. In fact, several reported judgments have been referred to by the High Court not for the purpose of applying the ratio therein as precedent that such notifications are admissible in evidence but for the purpose of computing the amount of compensation on the basis of the rates at which the market price was fixed therein. The High Court had referred to the judgments whereby the market value of the land had been calculated on the basis of the rates specified in such notification in respect ofVasant Vihar, Defence Enclave and several other areas, without arriving at any finding that the said judgments are admissible in evidence or otherwise have relevance for determination of the market value of the land in question. The rights of the parties, it is well-settled, must be determined on the basis of the case pleaded and proved by leading proper evidence and just not on the basis of other reported judgments [See Surendra Kumar Vakil and Ors. v. Chief Executive Officer, MP. and Ors., (2004] 10 SCC 126 and Sanjay Gera v. D Haryana Urban Development Authority and Anr., (2005] 3 SCC 207].

We have noticed hereinbefore that the amendments have not been carried out in the pleadings in terms of Order VI, Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said provision being mandatory, if not complied with the consequences flowing therefrom shall ensue.

The purported amendments of the Memo of Appeal and the Reference applications, therefore, could not have been the basis for allowing adduction of additional evidence as has been done by the High Court.

F The submission of Mr. Rao that all the procedural requirements contained in the Land Acquisition Act were required to be strictly complied with having regard to the fact that at the relevant point of time, the right to property was a fundamental right, is misconceived. We are not, in these appeals, concerned with the action of the State in acquiring the properties but only concerned with determination of the market value thereof. G I.A. NOS. 7-8 OF 2004 :

One of the claimants Shri Rajiv Gupta s/o Shri L.R. Gupta filed an application marked as I.A. Nos. 7-8 of 2004 wherein the following prayers were made: H

U.0.1. v. PRAM OD GUPTA (D) BY LRS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] I 07

"(I). Stay the operation of the judgment and order dated October A 5, 2001 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in RFA Nos. 83/ 87, 84/87, 85/87 and 86/87.

(2) Set aside the judgment and order dated October 5, 2001 and to remand the case back to the High Court of Delhi for fresh disposal. B (3) To stay the payment to L.R. Gupta HUF decree holder in Execution Petitions No. 1I7/2002, I I 9/2002 titled Raj iv Gupta and Ors. v. U.0.1. and Ex. No. I 14/2002 & I 18/2002 entitled Pramod Gupta and Ors. v. U.0.1. before the Court of Shri A.K. Pahak, A.DJ. Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. c (4) To pass any other order which this Hon'ble Court deems just, fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."

The contention of the applicant is that the High Court committed a serious error in issuing a direction to the effect that the amount of compensation deposited by the Appellants should be disbursed in favour of Shri L.R. Gupta D HUF as in relation thereto a lis is pending in a partition suit between the parties in a competent court of civil jurisdiction.

It is not in dispute that the inter se disputes between the parties are pending decision in several first appeals before the High Court in terms of E Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Respondents herein as also the interveners are persons interested but the question as regard their entitlement to the amount of compensation determined by the High Court is yet to be determined. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, despite noticing that the first appeals are pending wherein the inter se dispute/claims ,., between the parties are to be adjudicated upon, without any application made by Shri L.R. Gupta HUF has authorized it to collect the entire amount of compensation directing :

"The amount of compensation has thus to be realized, received and withdrawn only by the Karla of L.R. Gupta HUF, through Shri L.R. Gupta. The amount of compensation, therefore, deserves to be paid to L.R. Gupta, HUF through its Karla Shri L.R. Gupta. Ordered accordingly."

It is interesting to note that the said direction had been passed on an application filed by Shri Raj iv Gupta for deletion of the three names of Shri H Sanjay Gupta, Smt. Sumangli Gupta and Shri L.R. Gupta and for continuing

108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005} SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A with the proceedings in his name and in the name:of Smt. Pramod Gupta, inter alia, on the ground that the bhumidhari rights continued to remain in his name and in the name ofSmt. Pramod Gupta only and not on any application filed by any party to the said proceeding in this behalf. We fail to appreciate as to how the aforementioned directions had been made by the High Court on the B application made by Shri Raj iv Gupta. We may also notice that Shri L.R. Gupta had already withdrawn a sum of money as awarded by the Reference Court, the details whereof are as under : (As shown on next page)

1::JoO.L.11J>R.AM-O&~(DTBY-LRS:{S:B:SINID'i;T.)

I. "Name Compensation Interest Interest upto Deficit Amount Received 3 J.03.91refundable upto 31.03.91 At the rate of 15% p.a. in case of restitution as per terms of order dated 23.03.87 passed by this Hon'ble Court I. Sh. L.R. Gupta 2,87,72,757.60 68,09,404 1,54,66,355 86,55,951

2Copy pinpoint2. Mrs. Pramod I 0,07,04,651.23 2,87,05,730 5,41,28,748 2,54,23,018 Gupta '.> ·-·

3Copy pinpoint3. Sh. Rajiv 5,27,50,055.56 1,25,11,387 2,83,53,153 1,58,41, 766 Gupta

4Copy pinpoint4. Sh. Sanjay 5,27,50,055.56 1, 15,22,534 2,83,53, 153 1,68,30,619 Gupta

5Copy pinpoint5. Ms. Sumangli 5,27,50,055.60 1,47,26,420 2,83,53,153 1,36,26,733 Gupta Total 28,27,27,575.55 7,42,75,475 15,46,53,562 8,03,78,087"

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A The aforementioned direction, as has been rightly submitted by the learned counsel Mr. Bhat, is wholly unjustified and unwarranted. The said direction is, therefore, set aside.

It will also be relevant to noti~e the",third proviso appended to sub- ~ section (2) of Section 31 of the Land' Acquisition Act which reads as under B "Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto." c In view of the aforementioned provision there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that if and when an occasion arises either on the basis of an application filed by the interested parties or otherwise and/or upon disposal of the pending appeals, in the event Shri L.R. Gupta, HUF is found to have no title over the land in question, it would be bound to refund the entire D amount of compensation received by it together with such interest thereon, as may be determined applying the doctrine of 'restitution'.

I.A. NOS. 17-18 OF 2005:

We have hereinbefore noticed the claim of Shri Madan Gopal Gupta E and Shri Sudhir Jain. The contention of the interveners in the aforementioned application, is that no Bhumidhari right could be granted in favour of Guiab Sundari and in that view of the matter any finding on Issue No. I as framed by the Reference Court and affirmed by the High Court, should be set aside by this Court. In these appeals, this Court is concerned only with the F determ_i!iation of the question raised before us and not the inter se dispute of title between the parties. Such a question as and when adjudicated upon by the competent courts in appropriate proceedings will be binding on the parties thereto inasmuch as only who succeeds in the said proceedings will be entitled to the amount of compensation. Keeping in view the fact that neither the Reference Court nor the High Court had any opportunity to examine the said G questio"ij as has been contended by the applicants herein, we would observe that this Court had not determined the question that the Respondents herein being ·successors of Guiab Sundari were entitled to the Bhumidhari rights by teason oftQ,e:alleg~q dee_<!, ~f sa\e,.exe7uted in their favour, but we only h~ve proceeded-on-the basis-that-assuming-they-are Bhumidhars; in what manner their claim for awarding compensation should be dealt with. Any observation _,.. H

U.0.1. v. PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS. [S.B. SINHA, J.) 111 made herein by us should not be taken to mean that we have determined the A question of entitlement of the Respondents herein as Bhumidhar under the Delhi Land Reforms Act finally or otherwise. Such a finding has to be arrived at by the courts determining the said question in the pending proceedings.

CONNECTED MATTERS:

We may, however, notice that in the appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) CC No. 5724 of2004 an award was made@ Rs. 1.74 per sq. yard, although the claim of Rs. 30 per sq. yard was made and the High Court despite the fact that neither application for amendment nor adduction of additional grounds was filed, blindly followed its decision in other appeals filed by the Union '.(!: of India. No finding therein has also been arrived as to how the judgment and. award of the Reference Court was unsustainable.

CONCLUSION:

It is true that Union oflndia did not question the orders disallowing, the application for amendment filed by the Appellants and allowing the applicatio~ for amendment as also adduction of additional evidence by the Respondents herein but having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of thi~ ~%!! and in particular the fact that a large amount of public money is involveg,:1Yi: are of the opinion that it is a fit case where our jurisdiction of this ·C:.'!Yf.l under Article 142 of the Constitution should be invoked for the purpose of ~E setting aside the said orders with a view to do complete justice between the parties. .(h1::: ·to

i (\ j J In a case where the !is was mishandled by the State and different courts passed different orders, this Court relying upon a decision of this Court in Deb Narayan Shyam and Ors. v. State of W.B. and Ors., [2005] 2 SGC;l!S§ ·:p invoked its inherent jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution stating:

"26 ... Therefore, in order to do complete justice to the parties1 it is a fit case where we need to invoke our inherent power undeP;ArJ;i.cle 142 of the Constitution. Learned Senior Counsel appearing fot·.:tlte r · State of West Bengal has made a categorical submission .,tharalltJJ.e rQJ Am ins irrespective of their qualifications will be entitled to Pay.:Sqile 6 and no money which has been drawn by the Amins in the 36 writ petitions will be recovered from them prior to 1-10-2001 as dlfect'e'd by the Division Bench of the High Court. Therefore, we direct that all the Am ins irrespective of their qualification in the minimum scale H

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A of pay will be given Scale 6 and they will be entitled to promotion as per rules in Scales 7 and 8 as the case may be. Though the Division Bench has directed that no recovery shall be made from the Amins drawing higher pay scale for the period prior to 1-10-2001 but since the law has now been declared by this Court, we extend that period till this date i.e. no recovery shall be effected from all these Amins B in 36 writ petitions and' they shall be properly fixed in the pay scale provided for Amins in the ROPA Rules and their pay should be protected in the respective pay scales. This is being done because of the fact that the State Government is responsible for creating such anomalous situation. Had the State Government contested the matter c and consequently pursued the remedies available under law, then this • anomalous situation would not have been created. Though the Division Bench has given the benefit of the pay scales up to 1-10-200 I, the said cut-off date is extended till this date because we are invoking the inherent jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution."

D CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6825- 6832 OF 2003

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments are set aside and the matters are remitted'to the High Court for fresh consideration, in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No wsts. E Civil Appeal Nos. 950, 2661 of2005, Civil Appeal Nos ..... 5566-5569...... of2005 [!\.rising outof.SLP (Civil) No. 14383 of2004, CC Nos. 5724, 9371, 11751 of2004]

These appeals were disposed of by the High Court on the basis of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Bhooria and Ors. v. Union of India, 95 (2002) DL T 100 (DB).

In view of the fact that in Civil Appeal Nos. 6825-26 of 2003 etc., the impugned judgments are being set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court, the judgments and awards passed in these appeals must also be set .aside on the same lines, The Appeals are dispos.ed of accordingly. No costs.

v.s.s. Appeal disposed of.