PuNJAB STATE ELECTRICilY BOARO v. DARBARA SINGH

The Judgment of the Court was delivered

ARIJIT PASA ~AT, J. The Punjab State Electricity Board (in short the 'Board') questions legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court holding that the respondent had rendered service in excess of 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding his retrenchment and, therefore, provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 (in short the 'Act') were required to be followed. The High Court upheld the judgment of the Labour Court, Amritsar which had directed respondent's reinstatement with 25% back wages from the date of demand raised by the respondent.

The factual position in a nutshell is as under:

On 4.2.1988 the Board appointed r~spondent as Peon on daily wage basis from 8.1.1988 to 29.2.1988. It was indicated that if the work of the daily wager was not found satisfactory or if a regular employee joins, his services -would be deemed to be terminated without any notice. It was also indicated therein that the daily wager was appointed against vacant post which was temporary in character. On 7.3.1988 the period indicated was extended on the same terms. There were similar extensions on 30.6.1988, 10.11.1988 and 7.4.1989. E On 12.5.1989 one Surat Singh was appointed on a pennanent basis. In tenns of the orders of the engagement, the respondent's services were dispensed with in the month of June 1989 in terms of the terms and conditions of the contractual appointment. After about 8 years on 1.4.1997 the respondent sent a demand notice questioning the order of disengagement. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court passed an award on 14.1.2003 holding that disengagement F of respondent was illegal and he was entitled to reinstatement. However, taking note of the delayed demand, the wages were restricted. The writ petition filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court as noted above was dismissed.

G Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appointment was for a fixed period and, therefore, the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) were clearly applicable. It was also submitted that the abnonnal delay in raising the demand making a stale claim has been lightly brushed aside by the Labour Court and the High Court.

H In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there

p. 277 Copy page pinpoint

was no definite material to show that the appointment was for a fixed period. A On the contrary the respondent was permitted to work for several periods. As the respondent was representing to the authorities, it cannot be said that there was any delay. The plea in this regard has been accepted by the Labour Court. In fact, an appeal was filed on 7th September, 1989 and the appellant h?S failed to prove that the same was disposed of. B The position of law relating to fixed appointments and the scope and ambit of Section 2(00)(bb) and Section 25-F were examined by this Court in several cases.

In view of the findings in the background of the legal position, we do not consider it necessary to go into the question as to whether the demand C raised after a long lapse of time is to be considered fatal.

We find that the High Court's judgment is unsustainable on more than one count. In Morinda Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd v. Ram K~shan and Ors., (1995] 5 sec 653 it was observed as follows: D "4. It .would thus· be clear that the respondents were not working throughout the season. They worked during crushing seasons only. The respondents were taken· into work for the season and consequent to closure of the season, they ceased to work.

5. The question is whether such a cessation would amount to retrenchment. Since it is only a seasonal work, the respondents cannot be said to have been retrenched in view of what is stated in clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Labour Court and the High Court is illegal. However, the appellant is directed to maintain a register for all workmen engaged during the seasons enumerated hereinbefore and when the new season starts the appellant should make a publication in neighbouring places in which the respondents normally live and if they would report for duty, the appellant would engage them in accordance with seniority and exigency of work." G The position was re-iterated by a three-Judge Bench of this Court Court in Anil Bapurao Kanase v. Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd and Anr., (1997] 10 SCC 599. lt was noted as follows:

"The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the judgment of the High Court of Bombay relied on in the impugned order dated H

278 .... SUPREME C:Ol)RT REPORTS· [200S]SUPP. 5 S.C~R.

A 28.3.1995 in. Writ Petition No~488 c,>fl 994 is p~rhaps not applicable: Since ihe appellant has wd~k.effor more than f so days, he ·is to .be treated as retrertched. employee and. if th.e proc;:edur~. conternpJated under Sec.tion 25-Fofthe"fndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 is applied, his retrenchment is illegal. We firid n,o ,force .in *is, <;ontentio~. In Marinda Foop.Sug<;zr Mills ~lfi..,y;; Ra'!'. {(j.s.~an, in, ~~r~ ~~- t~is C9,~rt- h.as: d.e~lt B with enga~em·ent of th'e ~eason11I workman. in sug~rcane ~ru~hi_ng;. in . para: 4 it is' stated· that it wa,s nof/ case ·?f ~~trenc~-~ert. of t~e· workman, but of c!osute of th~ fa~t~ry l\fter tile crushipg se_aso~ ~:8& over. Accordingly, in .para ·5; it was. hel_d that it Is· not 'retrenchment' · within the m~a:ning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. As a con5eq~erice the c appella~t is. not erititled' to retrenchment 8$. per chmse (bb) ·of Section 2(oo) of. the Act. .Since the present. w'otk is seasonal busiiiess, the . .principles of the.. Act .have. no· 8,pplication . .. .However; . this· Coµrt has ~ ' ' ) '

directed th~t the respon~ent man~gem~nt .shpulq jnaintain a' regis~er 'artd(engage ,the \\'Orkmen' When the' season ~ta:rts·•in" the sUccee~lillg 1

.. . • • . . . . ' ,' i. t'~· ' ' ' '. .. l ~

. years in tli~ otdet of:.senforjty.-Uritil 8!1 the ernpll?yees· whose qames, D . appear in the list are, . eng~ged in:a:dd'itiori the empfoyees who .are to already working, the manageme:nt should· not• go fa' for: fr~sh engagement of. ne:W ~<;>rkm~n. ··lt ·would 'be incum.bent upon ~he. respondent' man'agement .to adopt.1:~uch' procedure 'as; is. enumerated . ' above;" '."' E Re~ently ~he questioP. was ·exa~i11~d in.~ata,la do{}keta~ive Sugar Mil(s Ltd v, Sowaran Singh, (2005) (7) Supreme 1':65~ .. '.. . . , . . .· .· ·. · .. ~ Se~~i~n 2(oo)(bb) ': . reads· as fo1J6w/ ::'· '. ' .... ' ' . '.i . . •. ' . "(oo) ''retrenchment1' means the termination, by the employer ofthe F . .

. servic'e of a·, .workman· •

for apy rea~on whatso.ever, I"

otherwise. ~han as· , ' ,• • ,, , •, , ~ •' ' I. l . 1 ·, •• "I . . ,. : · , ~

. ! . , .' ; ., i . , .' . . ,· ' f' I I~ t , ' • • ~· -,. ' ~

· a. punishment inflicted by w~y o• •' r . l ·of • djsc1pl'ina1y : fl~ actipn, , but does 'not , · + • ~ ,'l •'' · . ' , .' o., ,• • ' ' ·", '• •. ' I' I ·• '

in<;1iude - .',.: . · ., . .1. · ,'I,·· ,., (a) ......:-. . ~ =~~ "i· ' ' : i ~ .,.;-.

J ' \ ' ' •· G .Cb> ... "... ··~·: ' '· ,, .. .; ·. ' \ ' ' (bb) terminatiO~ of.the ~ervic~ 'Or th~ wor~man as a resul1t of the non- renewal of the contract of employment ~e~een th.e employer and the. workman conc~med !:>n'.itS-expiry;qr of'i;uch contract·b~irig te~inated , • ., . , . . ·. ' .. ,• • i • ·~ . l 'I ·.. • .' ; f• - • 1

qnder a ~tipulatio~ 'in. that b~halfconta~nea therein", · , H .• •. I> .• •:, ' I

PUNJAB S'.fATE ELECTRICITY BOARD'" DARBARA SINGH [PASA VAT, J.] 279 .The materials. on recotd clearly establish that the engagement of the workman was for specific period and conditional. It was clearly fodicated that on appoii:itment of a regular employee, his engagement was to come to an end.

·hl view of the position as highlighted in Marinda Coop. Sugar Mills. Anil Bap~ti:w and Batala Co-operatives cases (supra); the relief granted to the workman by:the Labour Court and the Hlgh Court cannot be maintained.

Th~refore, t_he orders of the Labour ~c>Urt and the High Court are clearly untenable and are qµashed. Our interference shall not stand on the way of appellant considering .the case of the respondent for eogagem~nt on such terms as is deemed proper by it. If question of any disqualification ~n account of crossing of age limit arises, the appellant shall condone it as a special case in view of.the b,ackgrouhd' facts of.the case.

...The. : appeal ,· . i~ allowed . . . .with no . order as. '. to costs .

'i)£i. ft..ppeal allowed. D