K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS

The following Judgments of the Court were delivered by

S.C. AGRAWAL, J. By order dated December 17, 1991, these matters have been referred to a larger bench to consider the correctness of the decision in Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 673 D (decided by a bench of three Judges). In Zora Singh's case (supra), this Court has held that the payment of additional amount payable @ 12% per

. annum on the market value under sub-section (1-A) inserted in Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the principal Act') by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as 'the amending Act') is to be ordered in every case where the reference was pending before the reference cotirt on the date of commen- cement of the amending Act even though ihe award of the Collector was made prior to April 13, 1992.

In all these matters preliminary notification under Section 3(1) of Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 was published on f'4arch 21, 1979 and the notification under Section 6 of the said Act was published on May 15,

1979. The Land Acquisition Officer made the award on December 30,

1980. The reference under Section 18 was decided by Ilnd Additional Subordinate Judge, Trivandrum on December 28, 1985, after the commen- cement of the amending Act. The amending Act also repealed the Kerala G Land Acquisition Act, 1961 and extended the principal Act as amended to Kerala with effect from September 24, 1984. The civil court enhanced the compensation and awarded interest @12% per annum from March 11, 1981 till the deposit of the excess amount of compensation awarded by it. The High Court rejected the claim for additional amount at the rate of 12% per annum payable under Section 23(1-A) on the view ~hat the said H

p. 420 Copy page pinpoint

A provision was not attracted in view of Section 30(1) of the amending Act. The said view is assailed by the petitioners on the basis of the decision in Zora Singh (supra). Therefore, this reference.

The question which is required to be examined by this Bench is : · whether the additional amount payable @ 12% per annum oti the market B value under Section 23 (1-A) is restricted to matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 30 of the amending Act or is to be awarded in every case where the reference was pending before the

C reference court on September 24, 1984 (the date of the commencement of the amending Act) irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. .... Section 23 of the principal Act prescribes, in sub-section (1), the matters which are required to be considered in determining compensation by the Court on a reference under Section 18. Sub-section (2) of Section D 23 makes provision for award of a sum, commonly known as 'solatium' in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. Prior to the amending Act, 15% of the market value of the land was required to be paid as solatium. In Section 28 of the principal Act provision has been made for payment of interest on the amount which has been awarded as compensation in excess of the sum awarded by the Collector. Prior to the E amending Act the said interest was payable at the rate of 6% per annum. Similarly in Section 34 of the principal Act provision is made for payment of interest on the amount of compensation when the said amount is not paid or deposited before taking possession of the land. Prior to the amending Act the said interest was payable at the rate of 6% per annum. Having regard to the recommendations of the Law Commission and the F Land Acquisition Review Committee, a Bill (Bill No.67 of 1982) for amending the various provisions of the principal Act was introduced in the Lok Sabha on April 30, 1982. while the said bill was pending consideration before Parliament various other proposals for amendment, in the principal Act were received and after considering these proposals in consultation · ... G with the State Governments and other agencies the said Bill was withdrawn and another Bill (Bill No. 63 of 1984) was introduced and the same was enacted as the amending Act which came into force on September 24, 1984. The amending Act introduced amendments in various provisions of the principal Act. The amendments relevant for the purpose of the present controversy are those introduced in Section 23 of the Act. Sub-section H (1-A) inserted after sub-section (1) in Section 23 reads as under :

K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERA!..A[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 421

"(1-A) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.

Explanation. - In computing the period referred to in this sub-sec- tion, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded." C In sub-section (2) of Section 23 solatium was enhanced from 15% to 30%. The rate of interest prescribed in Sections 28 and 34 was enhanced from 6% to 9%.

Section 30 of the amending Act contains the following transitional D provisions:

"30. Transitiohal provisions. -

(1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, E shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, -

(a) every proceeding for the ~cquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of the April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) F Bill, 1982, in the House of the People), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date :

(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not G an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act.

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed H

p. 422 Copy page pinpoint

A to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commence- B ment of this Act.

(3) The provision of Section 34 of the principal Act, as amended by Section 20 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied also to, in relation to. - c (a) every case in which possession of any land acquired under the principal Act had been taken before the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People), and the amount of compensation for such acquisition had not been paid or deposited under Section 31 of the principal Act until such date, with effect on and from the. date; and

(b) every case in which such possession has been taken on or after that date but before the commencement of this Act without the amount of compensation having been paid or deposited under the said Section 31, with effect on and from the date of taking such possession."

Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amend- ing Act are interrelated and have to be read together. Similarly section F 23(2) of the principal Act, as amended, as Section 30(2) of the amending Act have to be read together. Though sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 of the amending Act are differently worded, the construction that is placed on one set of provisions has a bearing on the construction of the other set. Since the provisions of Section 23(2) of the principal Act and Section 30(2) of the amending Act came up for consideration before this G Court earlier than the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act, we will briefly refer to the decisions wherein Section 23(2) of the principal Act as amended and Section 30(2) of the amending Act have been construed before we come to the decisions on Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending. H Act.

K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.) 423

In K Kamla Jammanniav(l!U (Dead) by Lrs. v. The Special Land A Acquisition Officer,[1985) 2 SCR 914, a two-Judge Bench of this Court rejected the contention that the amendment in the provisions of Section 23(2) regarding enhanced solatium at the rate of 30% was applicable to all proceedings · in regard to compensation which had not become final whether they be pending before the Collector, court, High Court or B Supreme Court and held that the amended provisions of Section 23(2) would apply to awards made after the commencement of the amending Act and in view of sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Amending Act the said amended provisions would also apply to awards made by the Collector or Court before April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 and to orders made by High Court or by Supreme Court in appeals against such awards. C Chinnappa Reddy, J., speaking for the Court, has observed:

"Parliament did not intend and could not have intended that whatever be the date of the award, however ancient it may be; solatium would stand enhanced to 'thirty per centum' if an appeal happened by chance or accident to be pending on April 30, 1982. Surely it was not the intention of parliament to reward those who kept alive the litigation even after several years. If it was the intention of Parliament to make the amended section 23(2) ap- plicable to all proceedings relating to compensation wherever they be pending, the words "after the 30th day of April 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 in the House of the people) and before the commencement of this Act" is section 30(2) and would become meaningless. It is clear that Parliament wanted the amended section 23(2) to have very limited° retrospectivity. It made the provision applicable to awards made after April 30, 1982 and before September 24, 1984 also and further to appeals to the High Court as the Supreme Court arising from such awards." (p.917)

(Emphasis supplied) G

A three Judge Bench of this Court in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, [1985) Suppl. 2 SCR 949, disapproved the view taken in Kamala Jammanniavarn (supra) and held that under sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the amending Act the provisions of the amended Section 23(2) and Section 28 are made applicable to all proceedings relating to H

p. 424 Copy page pinpoint

E "The answer can only be that the High Court would have to apply the provisions in the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28. The appeal against the award would be a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 and when the High Court hears the appeal, it would be in effect and substance be hearing the reference and while determining the amount of compensation, it would have to give effect to Sections 23 and 28 as it finds them at the date of decision of the appeal. When Section 23 sub-section (1) provides that in determining the amount of compensation the court shall take into consideration matters specified in the various s:ub-clauses of that sub-section and sub-section (2) of Section 23 directs that in addition to the market value of the land the court shall in every case award a sum of 15 per centum of such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition, the mandate of these two sub-sections must apply equally whether the court is hearing a reference or the High Court is hearing an appeal

p. 425 Copy page pinpoint

against an award made by the Court. The amended provisions in A Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would therefore have to be applied by the High Court in determining the amount of compensation. The same position would obtain where an appeal against an award has been decided by the High Court prior, to the commencement of the amending Act and an appeal against the order of the High Court is pending before the Supreme Court at the date of commencement of the amending Act or is filed after such date." (pp.858-59)

Thereafter the Court examined sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the amending Act and observed that by virtue of the said provision the amended provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 were made applicable also where the proceedings were pending on April 30, 1982, the date when the original Bill (which ultimately became the amend- ing Act) was introduced in Parliament, but were commenced after that date even though they might have finally come to an end before the enactment of the amending Act. The expression "such award" in section 30(2) was construed to mean only the award made by the Collector or by the Court and it was held that it does not import the time element which finds place only at the end of the sentence and not immediately followed by the words "any award made by the Collector or Court". It was, therefore, held that under Section 30(2) the provisions of amended Section 23(2) and Section E 28 are applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on April 30, 1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, even though they have finally terminated before the enactment of the Amendment Act. F

The said decision in Bhag Singh (supra) has been reversed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989) 3 SCR 316, wherein the earlier decision in K Kamala Jammanniavaru (supra) has been affirmed. Accepting the contention of the learned Attar- G ney General that if Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced compensation should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have said so in clear language and that on the contrary the terms in which Section 30 is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit, Pathak, CJ. speaking for this Court, has stated: H

p. 426 Copy page pinpoint

A "The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provisions concerned. Since it is necessary to spell out the degree of retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provision itself, close attention must be paid to the provisions of S.30(2) for determining the scope of retrospective relief intended by Parlia- ment in the matter of enhanced solatium." (pp.339-40)

Referring to the principle that an appeal is a continuation. of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18, the learned Chief Justice observed that "the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself." (p.340) While construing the provisiOns of Section 30(2) of the amending Act, it was held that the words "any such award", in the context in which they appear in Section 30(2), are intended to refer to awards niade by the Collector or by the Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984, and they could not have the expanded meaning given to them in Bhag Singh (supra).

The provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section E 30(1) of the amending Act have been construed by the various High Courts in the light of the decision in Bhag Singh (supra). A Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Soma Gopal Gowda, AIR 1986 Karnataka 179, construed Section 23(1-A) of the prin- cipal Act to mean that in all pending cases whether on reference or on F appeal, the Court is required to apply the provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 in determining the compensation payable to claimants. It was held that Section 23(1-A) is not restricted by Section 30(1) of the amending Act which gives a limited retrospectivity to category of cases specified therein. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jaiwant Laxaman P. Sardesai & etc. etc. v. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu & Anr., AIR G (1967) Born. 214, also construed Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act independently of Section 30(1) of the amending Act and held that where on the date of the commencement of the amending Act any proceedings for determination of compensation were pending before the Collector under section 11 or before the Court under referen,ce under Section 18 of H the Act or before the High Court under appeal under Section 54 of the

p. 427 Copy page pinpoint

Act, then the amended Section 23(1-A) would be applicable to such proceedings in absence of Section 30(1). Similarly a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in The Special Deputy Collector v. B. Venkata Seshamma, AIR (1987) Andhra Pradesh 136, took the view that the amended provisions of Section 23(1-A) were applicable to all pending cases, whether pending before the Collector or on reference or appeal on the date of commenceiiient of the amending Act i.e. September 24, 1984, and the operation of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 was not cut down by the transitory provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. A Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana took the same view in Maya Devi v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, [1988] Punj. l.J 189. The Kerala High Court in the judgment under appeal has, however, taken a different view and has held that the retrospectivity of Section 23(1-A) stands regulated by section 30(1) of the amending Act in the same mode as Section 30(2) regulate!! the retrospectivity of Section 23(2) and that in cases where the acquisition proceedings commenced before April 30, 1982 amount would be payable under Section 23(1-A) only if no award was made before April 30, 1982.

The question of applicability of Section 23(1-A) to pending proceed- ings was considered by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 336. In that case, the Land Acquisition Officer declared the award on March 5, 1969, and on reference the Civil Court made the award on May 28, 1985, i.e., after the commen- cement of the amending Act. It was held that the entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) depends upon pendency of ac- quisition proceedings as on April 30, 1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date and if the Collector has made the award before p that date then, additional amount cannot be awarded;. After referring to the provisions of Section 23(1-A), Jagannatha Shetty, J., speaking for the Court, has observed :

"The objective words used in this sub-section are similar to those that are used in Section 23(2). It enjoins a duty on the Court to G award the additional amount at twelve per cent on the market value of the land for the period prescribed thereunder. But this again is a part of the scheme for determining compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act. It also operates on the market value of the land acquired. It is plainly and distinctly prospective in its operation H

p. 428 Copy page pinpoint

A since market value has to be determined as on the date of publi- cation of notification under section 4(1). But the legislature has given new starting point for operation of Section 23(1-A) for certain cases. That will be found from section 30 sub-section 1(a) and (b) of the Transitional Provisions." (p. 345) B Referring to Section 30 of the amending Act the learned Judge has pointed out that the Collector had made the award on March 5, 1969 and on April 30; 1982, no proceeding was pending before the Collector and, therefore, Section 30 sub-section (1) (a) was not attracted to the case and since the proceedings for acquisition commenced before April 30, 1982, C Section 30 sub-section (l)(b) was also not applicable to the case. The learned Judge has taken note of the decisions of Karnataka High Court in Soma Gopal Gowda (supra) and Bombay High Court case in laiwant Laxaman P. Sardesai (supra) and has observed:

"Both the High Courts have focussed attention on the terms and D phraseology used in Section 30 sub-section (1) namely, "........... shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation has also been proceedings for acquisition...... ". The conclusion has also been rested on the mandatory words of Section 23(1-A). It was said that it enjoins a duty on the court to award the amount in every case and that mandate of the legislature could not be - E ignored. The decision of this Court in Bhag Singh appears to be the single motive force guiding the approach and reaching the conclusion. But it may be noted that the aforesaid phraseology used in Section 30 sub-section (1) is quite similar to that used in Section 30 sub-section (2). The scope of those words has already F been examined and no more need to be stated in that regard since Bhag Singh has been overruled in Raghubir Singh. The view taken by the High Courts of Karnataka and Bombay, therefore, could no ionger be considered as. good law and the said decisions are accordingly overruled." (p. 347) G It may be mentioned that the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Soma Gupal Gowda (supra) which was reversed by Jagannath Shetty, J. in Filip Tiago(supra) was also rendered by Shetty, J. in the High Court.

The said view in Filip Tiago (supra) has been reversed by a three- H Judge Bench of this Court in Zora Singh (supra). The Court has held that

p. 429 Copy page pinpoint

Section 23(1-A) confers a substantive right to claim the additional amount A calculated as set out ill the said sub-section in the circumstances set out therein and that under the well-settled rules the said provisions can have only prospective operation unless the language in which the provisions are couched, read in the context, shows that the;: intention of the legislature was to give retrospective effect to them. Laying emphasis on the language of section23(1-A) the Court has observed that a duty has been cast on the B Reference Court to award an additional amount calculated as prescribed . therein and that an unduly restricted meaning given to the provisions of Section 23(1-A) in Filip Tiago (supra) was not warranted. It was held that on the plain language of Section 23(1-A) itself the additional amount is directed to be awarded by the Court, namely, the Reference Court, in all cases which are pending before that Court on September 24, 1984 even if the award of the Collector was made before April 30, 1982. It was so confined to the Reference Court on the ground that the provisions "award", as distinguished from the expression "decree", has been used in Section 23(1-A) and for that reason it was held that Section 23(1-A) would not come into play where award had been made by the Collector as well as by the Reference Court earlier, but on the date of coming into effect of the said sub-section, an appeal from the said award might have been pending in a court. The benefit conferred by Section 30(1)(a) has been limited to only those cases where the Collector as well as the Court have made their respective awards between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. Kania, E J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for the Court, has observed:

"We find that on the plain language of Section 23(1-A) itself, which we have set out earlier, the ducy was cast on the court to award an additional amount calculated as prescribed therein which would mean that it is directed to be awarded by the court, namely, the Reference Court, in all cases which are pending before the Court on September 24, 1984. Sub-section (1) (a) of Section 30 undoub- tedly lays down that the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act are also made applicable to all proceedings for the acquisition of any land under the said Act pending on April 30, 1982, where no award had been made by the Collector before that. At first glance this would appear to suggest that the additional amount referred to in Section 23(1-A) could not be awarded where the Collector had made his award before April 30, 1982. But this provision cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits available to the H

p. 430 Copy page pinpoint

A claimants on a plain reading of Section 23(1-A). This is clear from the use of the word "also" in the opening part of Section 30(1). In our opinion, the view taken by the bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court in that case cannot be accepted as correct as it is too narrow and unduly cuts down the operation of the benefit conferred under the plain language of Section 23(1-A) of the said B Act." (p. 682)

The decision in Raghubir Singh, (supra) was distinguished on the ground that it was mainly concerned with the provisions of Section 30(2) I of the amending Act with which the Court was not directly concerned. c The correctness of the said view in Zora Singh, (supra) has been doubted by a two-Judge Bench in the order of Reference.

The learned counsel appearing for the claimants have urged that D Zora Singh (supra) lays down the correct law and that in view of the language used in Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act in every case which was pending before the Reference Court on September 24, 1984 the date of commencement of the amending Act, the Court has to award the additional amount as prescribed in sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 and that this obligation is irrespective of the date on which the award was made by E the Collector. It has been submitted that this construction does not involve giving retrospective effect to the provisions of sub-section (1-A) introduced in Section 23 of the amending Act for the reas'on that a provision cannot be held to be retrospective only because a part of the requisites for its action ·is drawn from events antecedent to its passing. In support of the p said submission reliance has been placed on a number of English decisions, namely, R v. St. Mary Whitechapel, (1848] 12 Q.B. 120, 116 E.R. 811; Master Ladies Tailors Organisation & Anr. v. Minister of Labour & National Service, [1950] 2 All E.R. 525; In re A Solicitor's Clerks, (1957] 1 W.L.R. 1219 and Alexander v. Mercouris, [1979] 3 All E.R. 305; as well as the G decisions of this Court in Sajjan Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1964) 1 SCR 631, Kapur Chand Jain v. B.S. Grewal & Ors., [1965] 2 SCR 36, T.KL. Iyer v. State of Madras, [1968] 3 SCR 542, Lakshminarayan Guin & Ors. v. Niranjan MQdak, [1985] SCR 202 and Darshan Singh v. Ram Pal Singh & Anr., [1992) Suppl. 1 SCC 191. Placing reliance upon the observations of the House of Lords in Warburton v. Loveland, [1832) VI Bligh N.S.1, 5 E.R. H 499, that "no rule of construction can require that where the words of one

p. 431 Copy page pinpoint

part of a statute convey a clear meaning it shall be necessary to introduce another part of a statute for the purpose of controlling or diminishing the efficacy of the first part", it has been urged that the language used in sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act is clear and the scope of that language cannot be limited by reference to Section 30(1) of the amending Act. It has also been submitted that acquisition proceedings do not terminate with the making of the award by the Collector, and in case Reference has been made the proceedings remain pending till the Court decides the Reference and that Collector's award is no more than an offer of compensation made by the government to the claimant whose property is acquired and that if the offer is acquiesced by total acceptance the right to compensation does not survive but if the offer is not accepted or is accepted under protest and reference is sought by the claimant under Section 18, the right to receive compensation must be regarded as having survived and kept alive which the claimant prosecutes in Civil Court. In support of the said submission reference has been made to the decision in Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Etc. v. Assistant Collector of Estate Duty, [1980] D 2 SCR 315. The learned counsel have also placed before us the statements of objects and reasons for the Bills which led to the enactment of the amending Act and the debates in the Lok Sabha to show that the intention of Parliament in enacting Section 23(1-A) was to remove the hardship caused to the affected parties on account of pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods which renders unrealistic the scale of com- E pensation offered to them.

The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for union of India and the other counsel appearing for the State have, on the other hand, urged that since the amendment introduced in Section 23 by inser- tion of Sub-section (1-A) imposes an obligation to pay an additional F amount by way of compensation, it can only apply to proceedings for acquisition which are initiated subsequent to the coming into force of the amending Act and it can only operate prospectively. According to the learned counsel retrospectivity to a limited extent has been given to the said provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act G and except in cases falling within the ambit of sub-section (1) of Section 30, the benefit of additional amount by way of compensation under sub- section (1-A) of Section 23 cannot be granted in acquisition proceedings which had commenced prior to the coming into force of the amending Act.

In view of the submissions that have been advanced the first question H

p. 432 Copy page pinpoint

A which needs to be examined ic; whether sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 has been correctly construed in Zora Singh (supra) to apply on its own force to matters in which acquisition proceedings were initiated prior to the commencement of the amending Act and were pending on the date of said commencement.

B Zora Singh (supra) proceeds on the basis, and rightly so, that Section 23(1-A) deals with substantive rights and it confers a substantive right to claim additional amount calculated as set out in the said sub-section in the circumstances set out therein. The applicability of the said provisions to proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of coming into force of the said provisions has, therefore, to be examined keeping in view c the aforesaid nature of the provisions.

A statute dealing with substantive rights differs from a statute which relates to procedure or evidence or is declaratory in nature inasmuch as while a statute dealing with substantive rights is prim a f acie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect, a statute concerned mainly with matters of procedure or evidence or which is declaratory in nature has to be construed as retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not the intention of the legislature. A statute is regarded retrospective if it operates on cases or facts coming into existence before its commencement in the sense that it affects, even if for the future only, the character or consequences of transactions pre- viously entered into or of other past conduct. By virtue of the presunwtion against retrospective applicability of laws dealing with substantive rights transactions are neither invalidated by reason of their failure to comply with formal requirements subsequently imposed, nor open to attack under powers of avoidance subsequently conferred. They are also not rendered valid by subsequent relaxations of the law, whether relating to form or to substance. Similarly, provisions in which a contrary intention does not appear neither impose new liabilities in respect of events taking place before their commencement, nor relieve persons from liabilities then exist- ing, and the view that existing obligations were not intended to be affected has been taken in varying degrees even of provisions expressly prohibiting proceedings. (See: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 44, paras 921, 922, 925 and 926)

These principles are equally applicable to amendatory statutes. H According to crawford :

KS. PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 433 ,

"Amendatory statutes are subject to the general principles relative to retrospective operation. Like original statutes, they will not be given retrospective constructions, unless the language clearly makes such construction necessary. In other words, the amend- ment will usually take effect only from the date of its enactment and will have no application to prior transaction, in the absence of an expressed intent or an intent clearly implied to the contrary. Indeed there is a presumption that an amendment shall operate prospectively."

(S~e : Crawford's Statutory Construction, pp. 622-23) c The dictum of Lord Denman, CJ in The Queen v. St. Mary, Whitechapel, (supra) that a statute which is in its direct operation prospec-

' tive cannot properly be called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing, which has received the approval of this Court, does not mean that a statute which is otherwise retrospective in the sense that it takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past, will not be treated as retrospective. In Alexander v. Mercouris, (supra), Goff, Ll, after referring to the said obser- vation of Lord Denman, CJ has observed that a statute would not be operating prospectively if it creates new rights and duties arising out of past transactions. The question whether a particular statute operates prospectively only or has retrospectiv~ operation ;tlso will have to be determined on the basis of the effect it has on existing rights and obliga- tions, whether it creates new obligations or imposes new duties or levies p new liabilities in relation to past transaction. For that purpose it is neces- sary to ascertain the intention of the legislature as indicated in the statute itself.

In the instant case we are concerned with the application of the provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 as introduced by the amend- G ing Act to acquisition proceedings which were pending on the date of commencement of the amending Act. In relation to pending proceedings, the approach of the courts in England is that the same are unaffected by the changes in the law so far as they relate to the determination of the substantive rights and in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary H

p. 434 Copy page pinpoint

A intention in an amending enactment, the substantive rights of the parties to an action fall to be determined by the law as it existed when the action was commenced and this is so whether the law is changed before the hearing of the case at the first instance or while an appeal is pending. (See : Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 922). Similar is the approach of the courts in India. In United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, [1940] B FCR 110, Sulaiman, J. has observed. :

"Undoubtedly, an Act may in its operation be retrospective, and yet the extent of its retrospective character need not extend so far as to affect pending suits, Court have undoubtedly leaned very c strongly against applying a new Act to a .pending action, when the language of the statute does not compel them to do so". (p.163)

To the same effect are the observations of Varadachariar, J., who has stated:

D "There can be little doubt that there is a well-recognised presump- tion against construing an enactment as governing the rights of the parties to a pending action. .. .... There ~re two recognised prin- ciples, that vested rights should not be presumed to be affected and that the rights of the parties to an action should ordinarily be determined in accordance with the law as it stood at the date of E the commencement of the action. The language used in an enact- ment may be sufficient to rebut the first presumption, but not the second. Where it is intended to make a new law applicable even to pending actions, it is common to find the legislature using language expressly referring to pending actions." (p. 185-186) F In the words of S.R. Das, CJ, "The golden rule of construction is that, . . in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act G was passed." (See : Garikapatti Ve"aya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, [1957] SCR 488, at pp. 515-16). In order that the provisions of a statute dealing with substantive right may apply to pending proceedings the court has insisted that the law must speak in language which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters.' (See : Smt Dayawati & Anr. v. Inderjit & Ors., (1966] 3 SCR 275, and Lakshminarayan Guine's case H (supra)].

p. 435 Copy page pinpoint

The provisions of section2J(l-A) have to be construed in the light of the aforementioned principles. If thus construed, it would be evident that under section 23(1-A) an obligation to pay an additional amount by way of compensation has been imposed. Such an obligation did not exist prior the enactment ·of the said provision by the amending Act. If the said provision is applied to the acquisition proceedings which commenced prior to its enactment and an additional obligation in the matter of payment of com- pensati01;1 is imposed for such acquisition the effect would be that the said provision would be operating retrospectively in respect of transactions already past. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view expressed in Zora Singh (supra) that Section 23(1-A) would only operate prospec- tively and will not have retrospective operation if it is construed as applying to proceedings which were pending before the Reference Court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act and in which the Reference Court makes the award after the commencement of the amending Act.

The next question which needs to be considered is whether any indication has been given by Parliament that Section 23(1-A) will have retrospective operation so as to be applicable to acquisition proceedings which were commenced prior to the date of the enactment or the said provision. The learned counsel for the claimants have urged that such an indication has been given by the words "in every case" used in Section 23(1-A). We are, however, of the view that Parliament has given a clear indication of its intention in this regard in Section 30(1) of the amending Act. Since express provision is contained in Section 30(1) of the amending Act indicating the intention of Parliament as to the extent to which the provision of Section 23(1-A) would apply to pending proceedings there is no scope for speculating about the said intention of Parliament by reading p Section 23(1-A) in isolation without reference to Section 30(1) of the amending Act.

Section 30 of the amending Act bears the heading "Transitional provisions". Explaining the role of transitional provisions in a statute, Bennion has stated : G

"Where an Act contains substantive, amending or repealing enact- ments, it commonly also includes transitional provisions which regulate the coming into operation of those enactments and modify their effect during the period of transaction. Where an Act fails H

p. 436 Copy page pinpoint

A to include such provisions expressly, the court is required to draw inferences as to the intended transitional arrangements as, in the light of the interpretative criteria, it considers Parliament to have intended."

[Francis Bennion : Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn. p. 213] B The learned author has further pointed out :

"Transitional provisions in an Act or other. instrument are provisions which spell out precisely when and how the operative parts of the instrument are to take effect. It is important for the c interpreter to realise, and bear constantly in mind, that what appears to be the plain meaning of a substantive enactment is often modified by transitional provisions located elsewhere in the Act." (p.213)

D Similarly Thornton in his treatise on Legislative Drafting has stated:

"The function of a transitional provision is to make special provision for the application of legislation to the circumstances which exist at the time when that legislation comes into force."

E [See : Thornton on Legislative Drafting, 3rd Edn., 1987, p.319 quoted in Britnell v. Secretary of State, [1991] 2 All E.R. 726; at p. 730, Lord Keith]

For the purpose of ascertaining whether and, if so, to what extent the provisions of sub-section (1-A) introduced in Section 23 by the amending F Act are applicable to proceedings that were pending on the date of the .commencement of the amending Act it is necessary to read Section 23(1-A) along with the transitional provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Sec- tion 30 of the amending Act.

In Zora Singh (supra) the Court has laid stress on the word "also" in G Section 30(1) and has held that apart from the retrospectivity flowing from the provisions contained in Section 23(1-A) further retrospectivity is given to these provisions in cases covered by clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) in cases where no proceedings were pending on the date of commencement of the amending Act. This would mean that Parliament has made two H provisions for giving retrospectivity to Section 23(1-A), one in Section

p. 437 Copy page pinpoint

23(1-A) itself and the other in Section 30(1) of the amending Act. We do A not find a sound basis for this construction. The words "in every case" are also found in Section 23(2) and so is the word "also" contained in Section 30(2) of the amending Act. While construing Section 23(1-A) the approach in Zora Singh (supra) is not different from that in Bhag Singh (supra) on the construction of Section 23(2). This approach was disapproved by the B Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singh (supra) on the ground that the terms in which section 30 is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit. The Full Bench decisions of the High Courts of Karnataka, Bombay and Andhra Pradesh were given after Bhag Singh (supra) but before Raghubir Singh (supra) and while construing Section 23(1-A) they adopt the same approach as in Bhag Singh (supra). Keeping in view the decision in C Raghubir Singh (supra) the two-Judge Bench in Filip Tiago (supra) rightly disapproved the view taken in these Full Bench decisions. The learned Judges on the three-Judge Bench in Zora Singh (supra), while reversing the said view in Filip Tiago (supra), have failed to take note of the basic premise underlying the decision in Raghubir Singh (supra). D

A perusal of the various amendments that have been introduced in the principal Act by the amending Act shows that the approach in relation to acquisition proceedings which had commenced prior to the date of commencement of the amending Act is not identical. In relation to some of the amendments provision for their applicability is contained in the amended provision itself (Section 6(1) Proviso (i); Section 11-A Proviso) while in respect of the other amendments separate provision is made in Section 30 of the amending Act. Merely because the provision regarding scope of the retrospectivity in regard to pending matters is contained in a separate provision and is not found in the amended provision would not justify treating the said provisions independent of each other. The provisions contained in Section 30 of the amending Act are to be treated as an integral part of the amended provisions in the principal Act to which they relate. In our opinion, therefore, the observations in Warburton v. Loveland (supra), that no rule of construction can require that when the words of one part of a statute convey a clear meaning, it shall be necessary to introduce another part of a statute for the purpose of controlling or diminishing the efficacy of the first part, which have been approved by this Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 1974, [1975] 1 SCR 504, at p. 519 and on which reliance has been placed by Shri Sorabjee, can have no applica- tion because Section 23(1-A) and Section 30(1) are so inter-connected that H

p. 438 Copy page pinpoint

A for construing sub-section (1-A) of Section 23, it is not possible to ignore the provisions of Section 30(1) of the amending Act.

If sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 is construed in the light of the provisions contained in sub-section(l) of Section 30 of the amending Act B there is no escape from the conclusion that Section 23(1-A), by itself, has no application to proceedings which had commenced prior to the enact- ment of the amending Act and the applicability of the said provision to pending proceedings is governed exclusively by sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. A perusal of sub-section (1) of section 30 of the amending Act shows that it divides the proceedings for acquisition of land which had commenced prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act into two categories, proceedings which had commenced prior to April 30, 1982 and proceedings· which had commenced after 30,

1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with proceedings which had commenced prior to April 30, 1982, clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced after April 30, 1982. By virtue of clause (a) of section 23(1-A) has been made applicable to proceedings which had commenced prior to April 30, 1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those proceedings before April 30, 1982. It covers (a) proceedings which were pending before the Collector on April 30, 1982 where in award was made after April 30, 1982 but before the date of the commencement of the E · amending Act, and (b) such proceedings wherein award was made by the Collector after the date of the commencement of the amending Act. Similarly Section 30(1)(b) covers (a) proceedings which had commenced after April 30, 1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement of the amending Act, and (b) such proceedings wherein award was made F after the commencement of the amending Act. It would thus appear that both the clauses [(a) and (b)] of sub-section (1) of Section 30 cover proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of the com- mencemeI).t of the amending Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1). If Section G 23(1-A), independently of Section 30(1), is applicable to all proceedings which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) would have been confined to proceedings which had commenced prior to the commencement of the amending Act and had concluded before such commencement because by virtue of Section 15 the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been H applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of

p. 439 Copy page pinpoint

commencement of the amending Act. There was no need to so phrase A Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to proceedings which, pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of the amending act. This only indicates that but for the provisions contained in section 30(1). Section 23(1-A) ,would not have been applicable to proceedings pending pefore the Collector on the date of commencement B of the amending Act.

Merely because sub-section (1) of Section 30 only refers to award made by the Collector while sub"section (2) of Section 30 also refers to an award made by the court as well as the order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against such award does not mean that C Section 23(1-A) was intended to have application to all proceedings which were pending before the civil court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. The difference in the phraseology in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 only indicates the limited nature of the retrospectivity that has been given to provisions contained in Section 23(1-A) under D Section 30(1) as compared to that given to the provisions of Sections 23(2) and 28 under Section 30(2). The limited scope of the retrospectivity that has been conferred in respect of Section 23(1-A) under sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not lend support to the contention that the scope of such retrospectivity should be enlarged by reading such further retrospectivity into the provisions of Section 23(1-A). For the reasons aforementioned we are of the view that in relation to proceedings which were initiated prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act Section 23(1-A) would be applicable only to those cases which fall within the ambit of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-s~ction (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. In this context it is also necessary to bear in mind the rule of statutory construction that even where a statute is clearly intended to be to some extent retrospective, it is not to be construed as having a greater retrospec- tive effect than its language renders necessary. [See : Halsbury's Law of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 924). There is, therefore, no scope for extending the ambit of retrospective operation of sub-section (1-A) of G Section 23 beyond the limits specified in Section 30( 1) of the amending Act so as to apply it to all proceedings initiated prior to the date of coming into force of the amending Act which were pending before the civil court on reference under Section 18 of the principal Act irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. For the reasons aforemen- tioned we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in Zora Singh (supra) H

p. 440 Copy page pinpoint

A that sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 would apply to all proceedings pending in the Reference Court on the date of commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date on which award was made by the Collector. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act have been correctly construed in Filip Tiago B (supra)to mean that the obligation to pay additional amount in respect of proceedings initiated before the date of commencement of the amending Act is confined to the matters covered by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act and we endorse the said view.

Reference may be made, at this stage, to the decision of the Judicial C Committee of the Privy Council in Municipal Council of Sydney v. Margaret Alexandra Troy, AIR (1928) P.C. 128, on which reliance was placed by Shri Sorabjee. In that case, a piece of land was acquired by the Municipal Council on June 6, 1924, and on the date of such acquisition interest on compensation was payable at the rate of 4%. After the said acquisition, a D statute was enacted which came into operation on September 17, 1924, whereby the rate of interest was prescribed at 6%. The said statute con- tained a non-obstante clause in Section 17 which gave overriding effect to its provisions. Having regard to the said non-obstante clause the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that prior acquisitions were covered and that for the period upto September 17, 1924, interest on the unpaid amount of compensation was payable at the rate 4% and for the period subsequent thereto, it was payable at 6%. Upholding the said view the Privy Council observed that this conclusion is neither affected by the well-known rule of construction against retrospective interpretation, nor by anything to be imported from the expressions used in the earlier statutes in the series which has to be read in conjunction. The said decision which turns on the non-obstante clause in the subsequent . statute has, in our opinion, no application to the present case in view of the express provisions contained in Section 30(1) of the amending Act which specifically restrict the ap- plicability of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 to proceedings covered by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. G In support of the construction placed on Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act in Zora Singh (supra), the learned counsel for the claimants have referred to the Statement of objects & Reasons appended to the Bill in 1982 as well as the Bill of 1984 H arid have submitted that the said Statements of Objects and Reasons show

p. 441 Copy page pinpoint

that the object underlying the enactment of Section 23(1-A) was to remove the hardship to the affected parties on account of pendency of acquisition proceedings for a long time which renders unrealistic the amounts of compensation offered to them. Our attention has also been invited to the speeches made by members at the time when the Bill was considered and was adopted by Parliament. It has been urged that a construction which advances the said object must be adopted. We are unable to accept this contention. As regards the Statement of Objects and reasons appended to the Bill the law is well settled that the same cannot be used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the state of affairs leading to the legislation but it cannot be used as an aid to the construction of the statute. [See : Asvini Kumar & Anr. v. Arbinda Bose & Anr., [1953] C SCR 1, at p. 28; State of West Bengal v. Subhash Gopal Boshe, 1954 SCR 587, at p. 628, per Das J,; State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] 1 SCR 371 at p. 383]. Similarly, with regard to speeches made by the members in the House at the time of consideration of the Bill it has been held that they are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of D the statutory provisions though the speech of the mover of the Bill may be referred to for the purpose of finding out the object intended to be achieved by the Bill. [See : State of Travancore-Cochin & Anr. v. The Bombay Co. Ltd., [1952] SCR 1112 and Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose, (supra)]. On a perusal of the Bills of 1982 and 1984 we find that they did . not contain the provisions found in Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act E and Section 30(1) of the amending Act. These provisions were inserted when the 1984 Bill was under consideration before Parliament. The State- ment of Objects and Reasons does not, therefore, throw any light on the circumstances in which these provisions were introduced. F Shri V.A. Bobde, appearing for some of the claimants, has contended that a construction whereby Section 23(1-A) is held inapplicable to awards made by Collector prior to April 30, 1982, would render the provisions of Section 30(1) of the amending Act unconstitutional as being violative of the right to equality. To illustrate the discriminatory effect it has been G pointed out that out of two cases arising from same notification one may · be decided by the Collector on April 28, 1982, and the othef on May 1, 1982 and that if the construction placed in Zora Singh is not adopted while the former will not attract the provisions of Section 23(1-A) the latter would. The submission is that a construction which leads to such a result must be avoided. We find no merit in this contention. It was open to H

p. 442 Copy page pinpoint

A Parliament to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) only to awards whether of the Colle~tor or the Court made after the commencement of -the ainending Act. It is not suggested that such a course would ~ave been violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Merely because Parliament has decided to give a limited retrospectivity so as. to cover awards that were made by the Collector during the period from April 30, 1982, when the B original Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha till the date of. the commence- ment of the amending Act would not result in the said provisions being infected with the vice of arbitrariness. The choice of April 30, 1982, the date on which the original Bill was introduced in Parliament, cannot be said to be arbitrary and confining ·the ambit of retrospectivity so as to c exclude awards made by Collector prior to April 30, 1982 would not render the provision of Section 30(1) of the amending Act unconstitutional. The question of expanding the field of retrospectivity so as to cover all the awards made by the Collector prior to the commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date when they were made, therefore, does not arise.

Relying upon the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A of the Constitution which prescribes that "where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful· for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than p the market value thereof' Shri K.C. Jain has submitted that compensation for the land acquired under the Act must be paid on the basis of the market value of the property which should be assessed on the date of acquisition, namely,.the date on which possession is taken. The submission of Shri Jain is that Section 23(1-A) by providing for payment of additional amount at the rate of 12% per annum on the market value for the period commencing G after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) to the date of taking possession seeks to give effect to said requirement of Article 31A of the Constitution and that if it is held that sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 is not applicable to the cases where the award by the Collector.is made prior to April 30, 1982, the result would be that the amount of compensa- H tion would not be equal to the market value on the date of acquisition in

p. 443 Copy page pinpoint

respect of acquisition of lands where the award was made prior to April A . 30, 1982 and the provisions of the Act regarding acquisition would be rendered violative of the provisions of Article 31A. We find no merit in this contention. As pointed in Atma Ram v. State of Punjab&: Ors., [1959) Supp. 1 SCR 887, at p. 904 the object underlying Article 31A is to facilitate agrarian reforms and iJ extends protection to laws bringing about such B reforms. The principal Act is not a law relating to agrarian .reform as contemplated in Article 31A of the Constitution. It is pre-constitutional legislation which was saved by sub-clause (a) of clause (5) of Article 341 from any attack on the ground of violation of the right conf~rred by clause (2) of Ai-tide 31 of the Constitution. The second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A has, therefore, no bearing on the interpretation of sub-section C (1-A) of Section 23 and Section 30(1) of the amending Act.

Conclusion,

For the reasons aforementioned .it must be concluded that in respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to date of commencement of the D Amending Act the payment of the additional amount payable under Sec- tion 23(1-A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act. Zora Singh (supra) insofar as it holds that the said amount is payable in all cases where the reference was pending before the reference court on September E 24, 1984, irrespective of the ~te on which the award was made by the Collector, does not lay down the correct law.

The question referred is answered accordingly. The matters be placed before the appropriate bench for consideration in the light of this order. F SAWANT, J. I have perused the draft of the judgment prepared by my bo$er Justice Agrawal. Since, I respectfully beg to differ with the interpretation on the relevant provisions of the Act and the conclusions drawn therein, I am impelled to deliver this dissenting judgment. G

2Copy pinpoint2. The question of law involved .in these matters though a short one, has been the subject of conflicting decisions of this Court and hence is referred to the Constitution Bench for resolving the conflict. '.I'he question is whether the benefit of sub-section (1-A) of Sectit>n 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the 'principle Act') is to be granted only in the H

p. 444 Copy page pinpoint

A proceedings for the acquisition of land referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of section 30. (1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, (the 'amending Act') or it is to be granted in all proceedings pending before the Courts on the 24th September, 1984.

3Copy pinpoint3. To appreciate the controversy,· it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the principal Act.

·Section 3 (d) defines "Court" to mean a principal Civil Court of original Jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. In the context of the other provisions and the scheme of the Act, it means the Court to which the reference is made by the Collector under Section 18 of the principal Act. .

Section 11 empowers the Collector, among other things, to enquire into the value of the land on the date of the publication of the notification for acquisition of the land under Section 4 (1) and to make an award of the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land.

Section 15 requires the Collector while determining the amount of compensation, to be .guided by the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of Act. E Section 16 empowers the Collector to take possession of the land when he has made the award under Section 11 of the Act. On talcing such possession, the land vests absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. In case of urgency, Section 17 empowers the appropriate Government to direct the Collector to take possession of the land after 15 F days from the publication of the notice under Section 9(1) although no award has been made under Section 11.

Section 18 provides for reference to the Court by an interested person, among other things, on the ground that the amount of compensa- tion awarded by the Collector is inadequate. When a reference is made to G the Court for determining the amount of compensation, Section 23 requires the Court to take into consideration six factors which are mentioned therein for determining the market value of the land. Sub-sections (1-A) and (2) of the said section require the Court to award in every case, amounts referred to therein in addition to the market value of the land. H Sub-section (1-A) provides for an additional amount calculated at the rate

KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA[SAWANT,J.J 445

of 12 per centum per annum on the market value of the land, for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of notice under ' Section 4 (1) to the date of the award of the Co~lector or to the date of ' taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Likewise, sub-section (2) requires the Court to award in every case a sum of 30 per centum on the market value determined under Section 23(1) in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. This amount is commonly known as solatium and is in addition to the additional amount under-section (1-A);

Section 24 enumerates eight matters which are to be ignored while determining the compensation of the land. c Sections 25 lays down that the amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. Section 28 enables the Court to direct the Collector to award interest on the excess amount at the rate of 9 per centum per annum from the date on which the possession of the land is taken to the date of payment D of such excess into Court if, in the opinion of the Court, the sum which the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation,was in excess of the sum which the Collector did award. The proviso to the said section further enables the Court to award interest at the rate of 15 per centum per annum, if the excess amount or any part thereof that is payable is not paid inot the Court within one year from the date on which possession is taken. The E interest is to be paid from the date of expiry of the said period of one year.

Section 28-A enables the persons interested in, all the other lands covered by the same notification under section 4 (1) and aggrieved by the award made by the Collector, to make a written application to the Collec- F tor within three months from the date of the award of the Court requiring that the amount of compensation payable to them be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court to the ap- plicants who had sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act to the Court, if the amount of compensation awarded to such applicants by the G Court is in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector, although the persons concerned may not have similarly applied for a reference under Section 18 to the Court. On such application being made, the Collector is required to hold inquiry to make an award re-determining the award of compensation payable to such applicants. Any person who does not accept the award of the Collector re-determining the amount of Compensation, is H